個案總覽

Hitachi must decide whether to make a British executive, who has successfully built its European rail business from scratch, head of its global rail division even though the bulk of revenues for the unit still come from Japan. The case describes the history of Hitachi Rail as the provider of trains for the Japanese Shinkansen and its struggles to build a European business with expatriates before the success of an outside hire, Alistair Dormer, in winning major contracts in the UK. By 2014, Hitachi is wondering whether to make Dormer CEO of the global rail business in order to further globalise the unit. Will an outsider and a foreigner be the correct choice for a Japanese company? How can the values of the Japanese company be preserved as it globalises? What changes are necessary to further globalise the business?

Two esports entrepreneurs must choose on which business model to focus their time and money. After successfully launching an online esports coaching platform, a number of new opportunities emerge in the rapidly growing esports space which now has close to 1 billion gamers and an online audience that is greater than the Superbowl. Should they focus on a B2C business, a B2B business? Develop an analytics capability to support "sabremetrics" for esports or a content creation capability? How can they best exploit ownership of the world's top team in the "Hearthstone" league. The choice will depend on the future industry structure and how the two can most effectively "follow the money".

In 2017 Edward Jones, the largest brokerage firm in the U.S., is deciding whether and how to implement a new "solutions" business model to replace its traditional "product" or "transactional" approach. Many of the required changes appeared to violate some of the tradeoffs that had made the previous approach successful. Was this the right way forward for Edward Jones? Where did this leave the classic strategy with its reliance on the one financial advisor office as the sole channel of distribution?

This case explores how Walmart should compete with Amazon.

The case focuses on Irene Rosenfeld's tenure as CEO of the global snack food company Mondelēz International. Beginning in 2006, she had led the company through many acquisitions, including France's LU Biscuit and British confectionery company Cadbury, before, in 2012, boldly splitting the company into two: Kraft, a North American grocery business, and Mondelēz International, a global snack food company.

Mickey Mouse, Snow White, and Buzz Lightyear strolled down Main Street at the grand opening of Hong Kong Disney in the Fall of 2005, pausing to snap selfies with enthusiastic children in their Mickey Mouse ears. Bob Iger, newly appointed CEO of The Walt Disney Company proudly watched the parade go by, but concerned for the future of the global corporation, he turned to colleagues and asked, "How many characters in this parade were created by Disney in the last ten years?" There was one. But the languishing Disney animation department was not the company's only problem. Disney was under pressure: the company had recently delivered poor financial results; ratings at the ABC network had fallen below competitors; Walt's nephew, Roy E. Disney, had stepped down from the Board after expressing his displeasure with the direction of the company under Iger's predecessor, Michael Eisner; and Comcast had made a $54 billion hostile bid to take over Disney only one year before. The situation for Disney looked bleak. Yet by December 2015 the tide had turned (Exhibit 1). The much-anticipated Star Wars: The Force Awakens was set to become the highest grossing film ever in the U.S. and earn over $2 billion worldwide. Frozen had just surpassed $1 billion in box office to become Disney animation's biggest success ever. In live action movies, Disney franchises, like Pirates of the Caribbean and Marvel's Iron Man, had produced multiple blockbuster hits. ESPN, ABC and other cable and broadcast properties were producing record profits. Attendance was up at Disney parks and cruise ships, while the Shanghai Disney Resort, the company's third and largest theme park in Asia, was scheduled to open in June 2016. Iger thought back to the Hong Kong Disney parade, reflecting on how far the company had come and the lessons he had learned about reawakening the Disney magic.

The case discusses the digitalization strategy of Siemens AG, a German-based company operating in manufacturing and electronics. The increasing impact of digital technologies on all of its business units had prompted the CEO Joe Kaeser and his team to put digitalization at the core of the new corporate strategy, alongside electrification and automation. The challenge was to balance this corporate initiative with the many business units within Siemens, which were used to being independent and had very specific offerings for their clients. For its new analytics platform, Siemens had opted for a push and pull approach to involve business units in its creation, rather than conceptualizing the platform centrally and imposing it on the business units afterwards. The jury was still out whether this approach would drive digitalization within Siemens fast enough, given the exponential developments in data generation and analytics.

Co-founders Julie Rice and Elizabeth Cutler have grown SoulCycle from a business idea in 2006 to a major presence among urban boutique fitness studios in 2015. In March 2015, fitness company Equinox approaches them with an offer to buy them out. Evaluating the offer requires an assessment of market or industry attractiveness and of SoulCycle's (potential) competitive advantage.

When Joe Jimenez became CEO of Swiss-based Novartis in 2010 replacing longtime CEO Dan Vasella, he assumed control of one of the top pharmaceutical companies in the world. Vasella, an avowed advocate of diversification, had expanded the scope of the company and structured it into sixteen distinct business units ranging from animal health to oncology while "actively fostering competition between those divisions for resources." Shortly after assuming his position, Jimenez initiated a strategic review that sought to concentrate the portfolio on businesses where Novartis could be at global scale in attractive markets. Rather than following competitors, like Pfizer, in a single mega-acquisition, Jimenez and his M&A team decided to achieve this goal through targeted transactions, or "precision M&A". By 2014 after examining twenty or so possible deals, the company was in the process of negotiating a multi-billion dollar asset swap with Glaxo-Smith Kline (GSK) that was unprecedented in the pharma industry. Although Novartis would improve its position in oncology by acquiring GSK's promising drug portfolio, it had to sell its vaccines and animal health businesses, while giving up control of the over-the-counter (OTC) business. Jimenez and his team knew the offer was "all-or-nothing" and struggled over whether to accept it, or reject it and move in another direction.

When Jamie Dimon took over as CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Chase) in 2005 he reaffirmed the commitment to pursue a "Universal Bank" strategy - providing a full range of products and services to both retail and wholesale clients. Yet the merits of the universal bank had long been disputed. After 2008, the Financial Crisis and subsequent Great Recession damaged many global and domestic financial services firms. While the Government bailed out universal banks and monoline financial institutions alike, both governments and public clamored for action against banks they deemed "too big to fail." Regulators around the world stepped in to increase capital requirements while the U.S. government passed the Dodd-Frank bill, which improved transparency and accountability, and, with the Volcker Rule, limited banks' ability to pursue proprietary trading. In response, many financial institutions reduced their scope and reshaped their portfolios. In this context, JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the U.S. by assets since 2011, which had successfully weathered the financial crisis in part due to the benefits of diversification, emerged with a ""fortress balance sheet" and an improved position in the banking league tables. Nevertheless, the bank faced pressure from many directions, including large civil fines to settle, analysts' arguments about its "conglomerate discount," and regulation that penalized size, interconnectedness and complexity. Despite the pressure, Jamie Dimon remained vocal in advocating for the value of a broad scope, large scale financial services firm. However, questions remained about the optimal scope of the bank, and how JPMorgan Chase could best allocate resources across its diverse lines of business in the face of new regulations designed to limit size and complexity.

Strategy and entrepreneurship are often seen as polar opposites. Strategy means rigorously defining and pursuing one clear path, while entrepreneurship involves continually changing direction to take advantage of new opportunities. Yet the two desperately need each other: Strategy without entrepreneurship is central planning; entrepreneurship without strategy leads to chaos. There is a way to reconcile the two, through the "lean strategy process." It ensures that start-ups innovate in a disciplined fashion so that they make the most of their limited resources. Lean strategy helps company builders choose viable opportunities, stay focused, and align the entire organization. The process begins with setting the venture's vision, or ultimate purpose--perhaps the only aspect of strategy that should be permanent. To deliver on it, senior executives agree on a deliberate strategy, defining the firm's objective (the near-term goal that describes success), scope (what the firm will and will not do), and competitive advantage (how it will win). The deliberate strategy sets the bounds within which experiments will take place and guides daily decisions. But the results of those experiments and decisions lead to learning that reshapes the strategy. Though priorities evolve, at each point in time it's clear to everyone in the firm which ones take precedence.

By 2015, there had been an upsurge in activist shareholders arguing for radical changes in companies' corporate strategies. Personalities like Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman, and Daniel Loeb were feared and loathed in some quarters, celebrated in others. With nearly $120 billion in assets under management in 2014, and big players like Icahn Enterprises managing $22.3 billion, Pershing Square managing $13.4 billion, and Third Point managing $8.3 billion, activist hedge funds had become a prominent feature of the corporate landscape, escaping some of their earlier approbation as corporate raiders or, even worse, "greenmailers." Activism covered a range of approaches-from proxy votes and demands for Board seats, to full blown takeover attempts-and sought to pressure changes on a wide range of issues-from corporate governance and executive pay, to strategic direction and excessive corporate overhead. Yet one of the most common concerned the scope of the corporation. In many cases, activists demanded the splitting up of the corporate entity, or the spinning off or sale of part of the company to another owner.

During his tenure as CEO since 2005, Bill Nuti had moved NCR Corporation (originally National Cash Register) from its historical competence in hardware to become a provider of hardware and software for managing transactions across a range of industries and payments methods. Nuti envisioned a world in which consumers would use NCR hardware or applications whether transacting at a bank or ATM, purchasing clothes at a retailer, or checking into a flight at an airport-and in which NCR software would register the transactions, securely store and process the data, and use the transaction information to help NCR customers efficiently manage their operations. In 2011 and early 2013, NCR had made two major acquisitions of companies that were important providers of transaction software in the retail and hospitality industries. Now, in late November 2013, Nuti and his team were considering a third potential major acquisition: Digital Insight, a market leader in online and mobile banking solutions. Nuti saw Digital Insight as key to complementing NCR's offerings in the financial services industry, transforming it from a maker of standalone, electromechanical cash registers and ATMs into an "omni-channel, omni-commerce, software-driven company." Would this acquisition be the next right strategic move for NCR's transformation?

Beth Wozniak, President of Honeywell Environmental and Combustion Controls (ECC) at Honeywell International Inc., spun around in her office chair, reflecting about how the classic, mature thermostat industry was rapidly evolving. In February 2014, Google paid $3.2 billion to acquire Nest Labs, a new startup whose goal was to reinvent unloved home devices, such as thermostats and smoke alarms. Their smart thermostats posed a threat to the traditional thermostat business, and it was essential that Honeywell determine the best way to respond. In addition to selling thermostats, Nest had ambitious plans to facilitate connections between Nest and other companies, making it easier for consumers to save money and energy. Many companies were developing smart, connected products that could be controlled remotely. But who really wanted to check ten different apps to make sure the heat was down, the doors were locked, and the lights were turned off? The Internet of Things (IoT) redefined the potential of industries, allowing a company that created a smart, connected product to develop an entire system of products that worked together. How would Honeywell, the mature, industrial company in a basic, mechanical business, compete with the new startup bought by Google and developing its own ecosystem - notably giving away thermostats to AirBnB in return for selling data to utilities?

DaVita had launched Paladina in early 2011 and the startup was struggling to gain traction: Paladina had already used a significant amount of the $40 million in funding committed by DaVita; the company's primary care clinics had not yet reached the number of patients necessary to sustain a profitable business; and it was in the midst of trying to integrate with another primary care clinic operator that it had acquired years earlier, but was just now merging into Paladina. Although the startup was young and still finding its way in an emerging industry, Thiry believed that Paladina would benefit from Golomb's experiences at Rx, which had also struggled in its early years. The situation at Rx became so precarious at one point that many of DaVita's senior leaders wanted to shut it down entirely. Rx made it through those challenging early years though, and was expected to exceed $600 million in revenues for 2013. However, Golomb wondered how relevant his Rx experience was to Paladina. Rx was closely tied to its parent company-DaVita provided dialysis services to patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) and Rx supplied medications to ESRD patients-while Paladina's connection to DaVita was less obvious. If Golomb took the job, what could he do to make Paladina's clinics as efficient as possible in terms of service and its economics, without compromising on its value proposition? Was Paladina just too different of a business to be part of the DaVita family? This case offers an example of "intrapreneurship"-i.e. entrepreneurial ventures launched within large companies-at a Fortune 500 company. DaVita has already had a successful experience launching Rx (after some difficult early years), and the company is now even serving patients from some of DaVita's leading competitors. However, Paladina is the company's first intrapreneurial venture outside of its core focus of serving end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients-DaVita's main function is to provide dialysis se

In February 2014, Facebook announced the acquisition of WhatsApp for $19 billion. WhatsApp, founded in 2009, was a relatively young company that employed only 50 people and earned merely $10 million in revenue in 2013. It was one of many mobile messaging services that allowed users to contact each other without paying costly text message fees. However, its popularity and growth potential enticed Facebook, a company facing many challenges and looking for opportunities to expand its user base. Facebook, the social networking website that allowed users to share information with friends, believed WhatsApp was a logical next step that would help it achieve its mission of "making the world more open and connected." When Facebook announced the acquisition, it vowed to keep WhatsApp operating independently, letting the founders control the direction of the company and allowing WhatsApp to stay true to its mission. Yet, many debated the logic behind paying so much for such a small company with limited revenue streams. Was Facebook correct to purchase WhatsApp? Even at $22 billion? How could it create value if it did not integrate WhatsApp with Facebook?

In 2006, Sophia Amoruso started Nasty Gal, an eBay boutique selling vintage clothes. With a strong sense of style and personality, Amoruso poured herself into building the brand and developing relationships with her customers - typically the slightly edgy 18-24 year old. The company had grown since that time into a multi-category retailer, expanding into third party clothing, accessories and its own private label. Its explosive growth was one of the biggest stories in e-commerce, especially when the retailer attracted $50m in investment from Index Ventures, a top VC firm that funded other successful retailers such as Net-a-Porter and Etsy, in 2013. Yet, with a cash infusion, plans for a brick and mortar store, an ever-growing e-commerce site, and fierce competition, Amoruso wondered what opportunity to tackle next. Should she concentrate on product line expansion into lingerie, swimwear, cosmetics and fragrances? How would a brick and mortar store impact the focus of the company or its ability to develop customized web sites for overseas markets? How would she maintain the detail and attention she had put into so many aspects of the company as Nasty Gal grew? As Sophia's time was limited and management resources were already spread thin to sustain the existing site's growth, what was the best way forward?

In 2014, seven years after he was appointed CEO of the Danish shipping and oil conglomerate A.P. Møller Maersk (the Maersk Group), Nils Andersen was reexamining the size and role of corporate headquarters in the company he had reshaped as a "premium conglomerate." During his tenure, Andersen had divided what had previously been operated as almost a single entity into separate lines of business, each accountable for its own performance and expected to deal at arms-length with its "sister" businesses, while substantially reducing the size and functions of the corporate headquarters. But as the business units (BUs) and corporate headquarters adjusted to their new roles, new issues surfaced.

In May 2012, Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) founded edX, a new non-profit joint venture that would provide a platform for massive open online courses (MOOCs). edX did not produce original courses or instructional content-it made a web platform through which Harvard and MIT, and subsequently dozens more "partner" universities, could offer their lecture courses as MOOCs. While the future role of MOOCs in higher education remained a topic of public debate, edX needed to answer concrete managerial and strategic questions. For example, what should edX's scope be? Should edX try to develop a consumer brand of its own, or rely on the brands of its partners? And how could edX monetize its services to recoup Harvard and MIT's investments and reward participating universities? This case presented the history of edX and the online education market as background for a discussion about edX's strategic choices.

In July 2012, Michael Dell, CEO and founder of Dell, Inc., met with a representative of Silver Lake Partners to explore taking his company private. The company, which he had founded in his dorm room as a college freshman and which had made him the youngest Fortune 500 CEO in history, had been the market leader in PC sales in the early 2000s. In recent years, however, the company had been surpassed by competitors and, worse, the PC market was becoming less lucrative, due to overseas competition, longer turnover rates on PCs, and the rise of tablets and smartphones. Michael Dell hoped to respond to by changing shifting the company form its core to a "new Dell" based around "Enterprise Solutions and Software" (such as servers, consulting, and software-as-a-service) and now claimed he needed to take the company private to do so. By the summer of 2013, the Dell board and its shareholders would have to decide whether to accept his offer to take the company private for $13.65 a share. Meanwhile, Carl Icahn bought a large stake in Dell Inc., accused Dell of trying to steal the company, and urged shareholders to rebel and demand a "leveraged recapitalization" instead. This case presents the information the Dell board worked with as it debated its decision.