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Muhammad Alagil was a second-generation leader in the well-known Alagil Family Group of businesses in Saudi Arabia and co-founder and chairman of its family office, Jarir Company for Commercial Investments (Jarir Investments). The case opens in 2021 with Alagil pondering whether or not to allow family members of the next generations aged 35 and over to spin off their pieces of the trust and set out on their own. This change would have been a massive departure from the state of mind he and his four brothers shared for the past decades: Why would anyone leave and shrink the pie? He was confident that none of the third generation (G3) would leave but he knew there was no guarantee they would stay either. He also knew that, when their time came, a portion of G4 members (the eldest of whom was 12 years old) would likely exercise that right and leave. With the sustainability of the family office in mind, would it be disastrous if some members left? The case discusses whether it was the G2 members' responsibility to entice future generations to stay and, if so, how? If not, should they at least come up with a mechanism to ensure that future generations would survive on their own?

Muhammad Alagil was a second-generation leader in the well-known Alagil Family Group of businesses in Saudi Arabia and co-founder and chairman of its family office, Jarir Company for Commercial Investments (Jarir Investments). The case opens in 2021 with Alagil pondering whether or not to allow family members of the next generations aged 35 and over to spin off their pieces of the trust and set out on their own. This change would have been a massive departure from the state of mind he and his four brothers shared for the past decades: Why would anyone leave and shrink the pie? He was confident that none of the third generation (G3) would leave but he knew there was no guarantee they would stay either. He also knew that, when their time came, a portion of G4 members (the eldest of whom was 12 years old) would likely exercise that right and leave. With the sustainability of the family office in mind, would it be disastrous if some members left? The case discusses whether it was the G2 members' responsibility to entice future generations to stay and, if so, how? If not, should they at least come up with a mechanism to ensure that future generations would survive on their own?

The case provides a background on the Saudi financial sector, as well as NCBC, and continues to chronicle Al Suhaimi's journey in NCBC and the transformation process she and her team put in action. When she joined NCBC as the first female CEO of a Saudi investment bank at the young age of 31, Al Suhaimi inherited an underperforming business with broken relations with all key stakeholders including the parent bank, customers, and the regulator. The case follows the turnaround process Al Suhaimi executed. After putting together a senior management team both from inside the business and external hires, Al Suhaimi worked with her team to diagnose and address pain points. Most notably, they drastically shifted NCBC's strategy from a brokerage driven, transactional revenue model to a recurring revenue, full-fledged investment banking and asset management model. They also made cultural and operational changes across NCBC, and mended fractured relations with their parent bank and the regulator. By 2019, NCBC became the market leader in revenues and profit securing landmark advisory mandates and creating innovative, successful products. At the fifth year mark of her appointment, in 2019, Al Suhaimi was now looking at a much different picture: NCBC was the market leader and internally, members of Al Suhaimi's senior management team were being poached by the competition, with no immediate candidates to replace them. Meanwhile, Al Suhaimi knew that she needed to make adjustments to the strategy to get the company on its next wave of growth. Externally, the Saudi stock exchange was opening up to foreign investors and had just joined three of the top emerging markets indices and competition in investment banking had heated up. With her trusted team at risk of departure, she needed to decide on her focus for the next five years: succession planning, setting the strategy for the next growth phase, and inspiring and motivating the team were top of her list.

This case explores how a family business builds a board that includes independent directors that helps to professionalize and strengthen governance in the company. The case relates to One Family Textiles, an Abu Dhabi-headquartered manufacturer of garments. The company was founded in 1975 by Adnan Kalam and his elder brother Ali Kalam; two Kenyan nationals with Indian roots. The company enjoyed impressive growth, and by the early 1980s had several factories in the South-Asian sub-continent and sold to businesses in Asia, the Middle East, North America, and Europe. By the mid-1990s, members of the second generation joined the family business and pushed Adnan to further professionalize the company and strengthen its governance practices. Accordingly, the family sought the help of consultants and hired experienced senior executives, two of whom (first in 2014, and then in 2018) were appointed as the first independent directors of the advisory board. Over the next two years, the board focused on helping revamp operations and instilling sound governance measures. By January 2020, Adnan had stepped back from day-to-day operations and bought out his brother's stake in the company, making him the sole owner of the business. His eldest son was the group CEO and felt it was time for an IPO. The board was divided on this decision; significant improvements in professionalization and governance had been made, but the independent directors foresaw more work to be done. What should Adnan do?

Arcelik Turkey, the country's market leader in household appliances, was at an omnichannel crossroads in January 2020. Arcelik was a B2B player utilizing a dealership network with an umbrella of brands and had one of the largest brick-and-mortar store networks in Turkey. In 2015, Arcelik, which was focused on offline sales, realized that online demand was growing and they were behind the competition, which was intensified due to the entry of global household appliances brands and online marketplaces to Turkey. So, they decided on a company-wide omnichannel transformation scheduled to go-live by 2020. They faced resistance from both dealers and employees. While Arcelik tried to gain the dealers' trust and buy-in, they experimented with one of their smaller brands on online marketplaces to learn more about e-commerce. In early 2020, Arcelik felt the squeeze as pressure mounted from the growing presence of marketplaces and online demand. They needed to find a way to cater to the online demand quickly while keeping their established partners happy.

The case opens in 2020 as Michael Lahyani, founder and CEO of Property Finder, Dubai's leading online real estate classifieds portal, contemplates the company's five-year growth strategy. Since its founding in 2005 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Property Finder had secured multiple rounds of investments and expanded into countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The business grew following a proven business model revolving around monthly flat subscription fees paid by real estate brokers for packages of listings, while remaining free for end-customers to browse. By 2020, Property Finder had reached profitability in the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, which it considered its core markets, and had done significant brand building in newer markets of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and Turkey. In 2020, Lahyani needed to decide on the company's growth strategy to increase profitability. Property Finder could focus on its core markets and switch to segmented pricing, lure in more developers to post first hand property directly, and create new revenue channels. Alternatively or in parallel, the company could tailor its business model to suit the dynamics of each of its newer markets. All the while, Lahyani had just onboarded a new executive team that was busy adjusting the organizational structure and institutionalizing procedures and processes. As a result, company resources were spread thin and Lahyani found himself at a crossroads; should the company focus its efforts on bolstering its position in incumbent markets and thus forego growth abroad, or should it pursue new markets and risk tarnishing its reputation in its core markets in case of a failure?