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This case is set in December 2014, and discusses the business model and challenges facing BPI Globe BanKO ("BanKO"). Established in 2009, BanKO is the Philippine's first mobile phone-based, microfinance-focused savings bank. At that time, statistics showed that eight out of ten Filipinos did not have access to a bank. A few informal moneylenders provided some 40% of small-scale business lending in the market, at interest rates that could touch around 240% per annum. The population living in 40% of the Philippines' municipalities did not have easy access to a physical bank branch. BanKO intends to address these issues by leveraging its combined assets in banking and telecommunications through a partnership between the Bank of the Philippines Island (BPI), the oldest operating bank in Southeast Asia; Globe Telecom, a leading telecommunications company; and the Ayala Corporation, one of the largest conglomerates in the Philippines. BanKO aims to provide the delivery of a range of banking services through mobile solutions supported by a network of partner outlets. These outlets are existing establishments in the community, such as pawnshops and grocery retailers, which have been selected, trained and accredited to conduct customer identification for new account applications, and perform cash-in and cash-out transactions. They are the critical link to bringing financial services to communities located even in remote locations. BanKO also offers loans to microfinance institutions, including rural banks and cooperatives. As it expanded its product range and customer base, BanKO began to extend its ecosystem to involve a range of other partners including fast moving consumer group (FMCG) companies such as Nestle, Proctor & Gamble and Unilever, "sari-sari" stores, social media providers such as Facebook, local governments, cooperatives and aid agencies.

In Part C, Matthew identifies a plot of land to develop the hotel and raises a significant part of the capital required from his friends and acquaintances. He and his wife also start a side business to bring in some financial respite, while Matthew continues to raise capital for his dream project - building a hotel in Vietnam.

In Part B, Matthew quits E&Y and to gain experience first works at a Vietnamese hotel as a bell boy for three months and then at a hotel in Singapore as a management trainee for another three months. This gives him confidence about the hotel business but the financial pressure of not having a stable job is getting tougher by the day. He faces the dilemma of whether or not to return to the corporate world.

This case study set in 2013 discusses the critical career decisions that Matthew Tan, a young university graduate from National University of Singapore, has to make. The case is in three parts. In Part A, Matthew inspired by his childhood experiences is toying with the idea of leaving his job at Ernst & Young (E &Y) and opening a hotel that would help under-privileged youths. It is a risky decision as he has no experience in the hotel business and no capital to start it with.

This relatively short case describes the development of Rolls-Royce's (RR) Seletar plant in Singapore, and in particular how the plant moved very quickly from a factory receiving information and innovation from its sister facility in the United Kingdom to a node in RR's manufacturing network. The Seletar plant in Singapore is RR's first overseas plant to assemble aircraft engines, as well as to produce some high tech components. The case is divided into three main parts, each discussing a key question: Why did RR decide to set up a plant in Singapore? How did RR develop in the early days of the plant (e.g. talent development, transfer of knowledge, etc.)? How did the RR Seletar plant evolve from a receiver of knowledge to a partner in the network? The case ends by asking the question how to maintain the good network interactions after the plant has matured, and the initial attention paid to the new plant by the UK management has subsided. The case pays particular attention to the transfer of knowledge from the UK to Singapore and the development of a capable local workforce and management.

Konecranes is a leading manufacturer of lifting equipment and a market leader in industrial cranes and components. Headquartered in Finland, the group has the world's most extensive crane service network. North Americas is the group's best performing territory, accounting for a third of global sales. However, it is increasingly clear that future growth will primarily come from emerging markets elsewhere. In mid-2012, Pekka Lundmark, president and chief executive officer of Konecranes, makes the radical decision to relocate his office from Finland to Singapore since he believes this will help bring the necessary balance between markets, move the company closer to new opportunities and achieve success. He is determined to continue Konecranes on its journey of pivoting this product- oriented company to one of high-end services. But is this the right approach? What are the implications of such a change in the business model?

The case is set in May 11, 2013, when the Shangri-La Bosphorus Hotel in Istanbul is inaugurated. The Hong Kong-based Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts is Asia Pacific's leading luxury hotel group and globally regarded as one of the finest hotel ownership and management companies in the world. The group has grown to over 80 hotels and resorts in its 40-year history, though this will be the group's first venture into in Turkey. There have been many challenges in launching the hotel. This has included delays in completing the project and hiring high caliber customer service-oriented staff, of which Shangri-La is known for. On-going retention and development of the employees is also a key challenge. Moreover, the Shangri-La brand is not very well known in the highly competitive Turkish and regional markets, and so brand awareness must be enhanced. How should Shangri-La Bosphorus position itself against competitors? In the long-term, what will drive the hotel's growth? Over and above, the financial viability of the Bosphorus project is of key importance to the group.

After studying medicine and specialising in paediatrics in India, Dr Vibha Krishnamurthy, the founder and Medical Director of Ummeed, underwent further training in children's developmental disabilities in the US. The resources available at the centres there highlighted the lack of similar facilities in India. After relocating to India in 1998, she decided to set out on her own. In November 2001, supported by her husband, Vibha founded Ummeed - a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that provides an integrated medical and therapeutic support system for children with developmental disabilities. Founded with an initial staff of only three, Ummeed has grown to include about 50 professionals, ranging from paediatricians to therapists and social workers. It has also moved into areas of training, research and advocacy, and is increasingly well regarded as one of India's leading NGOs, respected for its work with children with disabilities. But with this growth, the constant challenge to procure adequate funding has been exacerbated. Ummeed's strategic plan and business model is built around the theory that if it were able to access children with disabilities early through their families, it could maximise their outcomes for educational, financial and social achievement. Hence, its business model involves creating ways to access families by building awareness and demand in communities, with subsequent capacity building and training. But is this the most effective way to create a change for children with disabilities? Vibha also recognises that Ummeed's evolution has brought her to a crossroads where a decision will soon have to be made: while on the one hand, she would like to keep Ummeed 'small', retaining the personalised organisation culture that she has embedded at all levels - on the other hand, she would like to scale-up Ummeed, so that it could extend its reach. How should Ummeed position itself? What would be the best way to create an impact in this field?

Over the past decade or so, Karnataka Soaps and Detergents Ltd (KS&DL) - an Indian public sector enterprise - has observed a significant fall in its signature product's brand image, Mysore Sandalwood. The company now aims to rebuild its overall image by launching their new, Mysore Sandals Millennium, soap in January 2012. Millennium is a super-premium luxury soap offering that has taken three years of research and development and is targeted at the top-end consumer segment. It is priced at US$12.60 for a bar - making it the most expensive Indian soap on the market - where the premium range is available for as low as US$0.35 a bar. Will KS&DL succeed in marketing a product priced at a level that makes it unaffordable to most Indians? How can the company best go about executing and communicating its strategy to make this launch a success?

City Developments Limited (CDL) has been publishing an annual dedicated sustainability report, in line with the Global Reporting Initiative's reporting guidelines, since 2008. In January 2016, Esther An, chief sustainability officer at CDL, produced the 2015 sustainability report using an integrated reporting approach. She saw the fundamental challenge of integrated reporting as communicating to stakeholders the business and financial impact of the firm's efforts in Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) integration. The business environment was also changing as consumers demanded more transparency and regulators required more non-financial disclosure from companies. Leaving external pressures aside, CDL had always taken pride in being a socially responsible company. For over two decades, CDL had embraced sustainability in its corporate philosophy and business strategy. This focus is evident in the management of its operations both as a developer and landlord, and also through its building designs and construction methods. Adhering to the integrated reporting approach will allow a more holistic form of reporting that linked the impact of the firm's social and environmental performance to its financial bottom line.

In January 2012, Starbucks enters into a 50:50 joint venture with Tata Global Beverages Limited (TGBL), under which Starbucks will own and operate outlet stores in Mumbai. TGBL has a strong reputation and presence throughout the entire coffee production chain - growing, roasting and trading - that has helped Starbucks navigate its entry into the Indian market. But will this alliance be enough for Starbucks to overcome the political, economic, social and cultural challenges unique to the Indian market and establish its stamp? Would it even be possible to do so without a local partner?

This case is set in August 2012 about ten months after the 'Ready for the Future' (RTF) Transformation Programme was implemented at Singapore Post Limited (SingPost). The programme came in response to new challenges and opportunities that had arisen in the postal industry. The results have so far been encouraging. However, will the roadmap laid out by the RTF programme empower SingPost to become a leader in delivery solutions? Is the programme comprehensive and effective enough to grow the company? And has the organisation picked the right sectors for expansion?

This case describes the strategy adopted by Cisco India to develop the Advanced Services Router 901 ('ASR 901'). It is part of a larger strategy by Cisco headquarters to understand what could be built in the developing markets for the developing markets, as opposed to products conceived with only developed markets as the focus. Within a time frame of a few months, a team forms to develop the ASR 901 completely from scratch - from conception to launch - in Bangalore, India. It then goes on to win several awards, and interestingly, orders begin streaming in from not just the developing economies, as had been expected, but also from top tier customers in the developed markets. ASR 901 is undoubtedly a milestone in Cisco India's indigenous innovation initiatives. Can the lessons learnt while progressing through the several stages of product development be applied to similar new initiatives?

This case is set in April 2013, and discusses the key elements that have contributed to the successful operations of the Rolls-Royce Singapore Seletar Campus. In 2006, Rolls-Royce had decided to expand its production capacity and set up operations outside the UK to meet growing customer demands and future growth. Asia was the Group's largest and fastest growing market, with almost half of their new aircraft-engine orders coming from customers in this region. In order to meet this increased demand, Rolls-Royce helped strategise and facilitate the company's largest investment to date: the US$565 million (SG$700 million) Seletar Campus - a 154,000 square metre site housing cutting-edge manufacturing, training and research capabilities. However, while building the facility was relatively straightforward; sourcing the right talent was more challenging. The issue of technology and knowledge transfer essentially came down to developing the high-value skills necessary to assemble and test Trent aero engines and manufacture wide chord fan blades to Rolls-Royce standards. Rolls-Royce was committed to growing its own highly-skilled workforce, and invested heavily in training staff with the intention of developing high-value skills through internationally recognised qualification programmes. Rolls-Royce knew that the local labour market lacked enough seasoned aerospace technicians with the desired manufacturing experience to meet their requirements. To overcome this challenge, the Group developed several collaborations with existing and new partners to develop training and qualifications programmes. This case discusses the challenges encountered, and the way they were overcome, by this public-private partnership that successfully created an ecosystem, which could provide a steady stream of new recruits with the high-value prerequisite skills mandatory for developing quality aerospace technicians.

This case is set in April 2013, and discusses the key elements that have contributed to the success of Infosys Ltd's Campus Connect Programme (CC) in developing India's Information Technology talent over the past eight years. The CC programme is an industry-academia initiative that re-constructs the education experience of engineering students. The programme was launched in May 2004 with 70 colleges. By December 2012, the model had been successfully scaled up to cover 400 colleges, and more than 180,000 readers and 8,300 faculty members across India had benefited from the programme's technical and soft skills training, and exposure to industry practices. Since CC's launch, Infosys has experienced a measurable improvement in the quantity and quality of their new recruits. Infosys understands the value of creating a talent ecosystem, and this case explains just how, and why, Campus Connect has worked as a successful example of industry-academia partnership in the talent management space.

This case study discusses the causes, consequences and implications of the nuclear disaster at Tokyo Electric Power Company's (TEPCO's) Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant that was triggered by a massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami waves on March 11, 2011. There are two essential questions: First, "How could it have come so far?" Japan is rightfully considered a technologically advanced nation and is known for its diligence and high-quality products. While the combined earthquake/tsunami triggered the catastrophe, there are a number of deeper underlying causes that are described in the first section of the case. Second, "What next?" While the plant technically achieved cold shutdown with all damaged reactors reaching temperatures below 100°C, this did not mean that the Fukushima disaster was over. Instead, numerous consequences and implications extend into the future.

This case is set in September 2007, and revolves around the Head of Sales & Marketing at Tata Chemicals Limited wondering how he could boost the market share of Tata Salt, one of the flagship products of the company. The dilemma is particularly interesting as Tata Salt had been ranked as the 'Most Trusted Food Brand in India' for the fourth year in a row and had very high brand equity - and yet its market share of 46% in the national branded segment and 18% in the total packaged iodised salt market, did not appear to grow in reflection of that high brand equity. Some of the key factors that the protagonist had to consider while devising a strategy was the complexity of the different markets within India across geographical areas, as well as the intensifying competition from other brands and types of salt.

This case study discusses the initiatives taken by Unilever, one of the world's leading fast moving consumer goods companies, to promote sustainability, by using the example of Lipton Tea in Turkey. In November 2010, Unilever launches the ambitious "Unilever Sustainable Living Plan", committing to a ten-year sustainable growth plan. Lipton defies the traditional approach of introducing sustainable products as a niche brand in the market. Instead the company adopts a large-scale mainstream approach, planning that by 2015, all the tea in Lipton teabags will be sourced from Rainforest AllianceTM Certified farms, and by 2020, every kilogram of tea will be sourced sustainably.

This case is a two-part case series. Part A of the case study is set in early 2011, and begins with Parag Gadre, the assistant vice president of marketing and strategy at Tata Chemical Limited (TCL), contemplating what to do with Tata Salt's flanker brand. It has been five years since I-Shakti was launched in 2006, and has since become the second biggest salt brand in India. I-Shakti was originally conceived as a flanker brand to satisfy demand that TCL's original flagship product, Tata Salt, could not satisfy. The target markets, pricing and other attributes of the two brands were originally envisaged to be very distinct. However, I-Shakti has far outperformed expectations, and is now at a stage where it could potentially cannibalise Tata Salt's market share. This case will stimulate a discussion on the concepts and rationale of a flanker brand. In addition to the overarching question of whether it is a good idea to introduce a flanker brand, it will also create a forum for discussing strategies that are available to a company when the flanker outperforms expectations and becomes a potential threat to the original premium brand that it was set up to protect. Finally, it also enables students to discuss whether market share is an appropriate concern for an organisation. Part B of the case is set at the start of 2012, about one year after the conclusion of Part A. Readers are given an update of the strategy that TCL adopted - a strategy that not only continues with I-Shakti Salt, but also ventures into the production and distribution of an I-Shakti brand of pulses. The reason for doing so is given in the case, and students are left to analyse whether they agree with the company's decision. This section also links back to the earlier Part A of the case study, as it gives the readers an example of a viable alternative that is available to the company in the event that it decides to play down or altogether phase out the flanker brand.

This case is a two-part case series. Part A of the case study is set in early 2011, and begins with Parag Gadre, the assistant vice president of marketing and strategy at Tata Chemical Limited (TCL), contemplating what to do with Tata Salt's flanker brand. It has been five years since I-Shakti was launched in 2006, and has since become the second biggest salt brand in India. I-Shakti was originally conceived as a flanker brand to satisfy demand that TCL's original flagship product, Tata Salt, could not satisfy. The target markets, pricing and other attributes of the two brands were originally envisaged to be very distinct. However, I-Shakti has far outperformed expectations, and is now at a stage where it could potentially cannibalise Tata Salt's market share. This case will stimulate a discussion on the concepts and rationale of a flanker brand. In addition to the overarching question of whether it is a good idea to introduce a flanker brand, it will also create a forum for discussing strategies that are available to a company when the flanker outperforms expectations and becomes a potential threat to the original premium brand that it was set up to protect. Finally, it also enables students to discuss whether market share is an appropriate concern for an organisation. Part B of the case is set at the start of 2012, about one year after the conclusion of Part A. Readers are given an update of the strategy that TCL adopted - a strategy that not only continues with I-Shakti Salt, but also ventures into the production and distribution of an I-Shakti brand of pulses. The reason for doing so is given in the case, and students are left to analyse whether they agree with the company's decision. This section also links back to the earlier Part A of the case study, as it gives the readers an example of a viable alternative that is available to the company in the event that it decides to play down or altogether phase out the flanker brand.