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Describes the retailer-supplier negotiations of Frey Farms Produce in its growth from a small local produce supplier to becoming a supplier for Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer. The (A) case sets up three negotiations led by Sarah Talley of Frey Farms Produce in order to sell produce to Wal-Mart, manage price expectations during a difficult growing season, and deal with issues of co-management. The (B) case describes strategies, tactics, and the results of these negotiations, along with broader insights from the protagonist into a general approach to retailer-supplier negotiations.

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Describes the negotiations by Howard and Marilyn Bollinger over supplying a new product line to Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer. The (A) case outlines the Bollingers' development of their product, the Wallpockett, documents their negotiation preparation for dealing with Wal-Mart, and describes their negotiation challenges. The (B) case describes strategies, tactics, and the results of their negotiations with Wal-Mart and draws on their experience to provide a set of recommended approaches to retail-supplier negotiations.

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Summarizes the background and career highlights of Jack Valenti, longtime head of the Motion Picture Association of America and the Motion Picture Association. Sets up three difficult negotiation challenges facing Valenti over a rating system for movies, the financial syndication rules for television networks, and a French-backed "culture exemption" for movies in world trade talks.

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In this three-party negotiation exercise, Jesse J, star center in the U.S.A. Women's Basketball League, with her agent, is negotiating a possible compensation package with the Boston Sharks involving a base salary, a possible share of team merchandising profits, and a performance incentive. Each player (Jesse J, her agent, the Sharks general manager) has a confidential brief as the basis for the negotiation.

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Sets the stage for analyzing the strategy of labor organizer Ray Rogers in bringing J.P. Stevens to the bargaining table when conventional union tactics failed. Though set in the specific context of labor-management relations, it illustrates much more fundamental aspects of negotiation analysis, strategy, and tactics. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Supplements the (A) case. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

What stands between you and the yes you want? According to negotiation experts David Lax and James Sebenius, executives face obstacles in three common and complementary dimensions: tactics, or interactions at the bargaining table; deal design, or the ability to draw up a deal at the table that creates lasting value; and setup, which includes the structure of the negotiation itself. Each dimension is crucial in the bargaining process, but most executives fixate on only the first two: 1-D negotiators focus on improving their interpersonal skills at the negotiating table, and 2-D negotiators focus on diagnosing underlying sources of value in a deal and then recrafting the terms to satisfy all parties. In this article, the authors explore the often-neglected third dimension. Instead of just playing the game at the bargaining table, 3-D negotiators reshape the scope and sequence of the game itself to achieve the desired outcome. They scan widely to identify elements outside the deal on the table that might create a more favorable structure for it. They map backward from their ideal resolution to the current setup of the deal and carefully choose which players to approach and when. And they manage and frame the flow of information among the parties involved to improve their odds of getting to yes. Lax and Sebenius describe the tactics 3-D negotiators use and cite examples from business and foreign affairs.

Most experienced negotiators are comfortable working out the terms of an economic contract--they bargain for the best price, haggle over equity splits, and finesse detailed exit clauses. Yet these same seasoned professionals spend so much time ironing out the letter of the deal that they often pay little attention to the spirit of the deal--the social contract. And that can lead to major problems, say the authors, because even though the parties agree to the same terms on paper, they may have very different expectations about how to meet them. Because the parties have failed to have a true meeting of the minds, they sign a deal that is likely to fall apart. To avoid such a disastrous outcome, negotiators should explicitly discuss the details of their social contract before inking the deal. For instance, what is the real nature, extent, and duration of the agreement? And in practice, how will we make decisions, handle unforeseen events, communicate with one another, and resolve disputes? The authors also highlight risk factors that can lead to misunderstandings and expose common misperceptions about the social contract.

Cultural differences can influence business negotiations in unexpected ways, as many a hapless deal maker has learned. But the differences extend well beyond surface behaviors, such as proper table manners and the exchange of business cards--and even beyond deeper cultural characteristics, such as attitudes about relationships and deadlines. Indeed, there's another, equally treacherous aspect to cross-border negotiation: the ways that people from different regions come to agreement or the processes involved in negotiations. Decision-making and governance processes can vary widely from culture to culture, not only in terms of legal technicalities but also in terms of the behaviors and core beliefs that drive them. Numerous promising deals have failed because people ignored or underestimated the powerful differences in process across cultures. In this article, James Sebenius offers ways in which negotiators can prepare for such cultural differences. A useful approach, he says, is to map out the decision-making process--including who's involved, what formal and informal roles people play, and how a resolution is actually reached. With that knowledge, you can design a strategy that anticipates obstacles before they arise. Those negotiations that might otherwise have failed because people ignored or underestimated powerful disparities in process will, in the end, yield a meaningful "yes."

This case describes issues facing the founder-CEO of a high-tech start-up in Boston, as he negotiates with multiple large potential partners and investors. The negotiations include a potential business partnership with FleetCenter and Madison Square Garden, and a potential investment from two large venture capital firms. The case focuses on the sequencing among the parties, how to resolve conflicting interests among the parties, and the issues facing small entrepreneurial firms trying to negotiate with very large and powerful investors and business partners.

Examines the strategies and tactics used by U.S. negotiator George Mitchell during his two-year tenure as chairman of the all-party talks in Northern Ireland. His efforts culminated in the signing of the historic Good Friday Accords.

A two-party, multiple-issue dollar-scoring negotiation exercise dealing with the formation and terms of an IT-industry joint venture. Subordinates have made some progress on several issues but have reached an impasse. Division heads will now attempt to reach a resolution.