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The elections for India's 294-seat West Bengal (Bengal) Legislative Assembly were due to be held sometime in April-May 2021. The All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), which had been in power in the state since 2011, faced a tough challenge from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had been in power in the Central Government of India since 2014. The TMC and its political rivals in Bengal faced unprecedented social and political divisions among voters in 2021. To add to the TMC's problems, at least half a dozen TMC stalwarts and many more local leaders had shifted to the BJP in the previous three months. In the run-up to the election, politicians across party lines used emotive issues such as religion, gender, and language to woo undecided voters. The TMC needed to devise a marketing strategy to gain a sustainable competitive advantage. Winning the maximum possible number of votes was the only item on the agenda.

The chief executive officer of the jewellery division at Titan Company Ltd. withdrew two successive advertising campaigns for jewellery brand Tanishq during its high selling festive season in 2020 due to intense social media trolling. These adverse social media reactions, shaped by religious beliefs and ideology, challenged the well-entrenched "progressive and bold" positioning of the brand. With multiple stakeholders and shifting societal ideologies, should the company continue promoting its progressive image and bold creative executions irrespective of the recent setbacks, continue with the current positioning with significantly toned-down executions, or reposition the brand and its creative execution completely?

The chief executive officer of the jewellery division at Titan Company Ltd. withdrew two successive advertising campaigns for jewellery brand Tanishq during its high selling festive season in 2020 due to intense social media trolling. These adverse social media reactions, shaped by religious beliefs and ideology, challenged the well-entrenched “progressive and bold” positioning of the brand. With multiple stakeholders and shifting societal ideologies, should the company continue promoting its progressive image and bold creative executions irrespective of the recent setbacks, continue with the current positioning with significantly toned-down executions, or reposition the brand and its creative execution completely?

The elections for India’s 294-seat West Bengal (Bengal) Legislative Assembly were due to be held sometime in April–May 2021. The All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), which had been in power in the state since 2011, faced a tough challenge from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had been in power in the Central Government of India since 2014. The TMC and its political rivals in Bengal faced unprecedented social and political divisions among voters in 2021. To add to the TMC’s problems, at least half a dozen TMC stalwarts and many more local leaders had shifted to the BJP in the previous three months. In the run-up to the election, politicians across party lines used emotive issues such as religion, gender, and language to woo undecided voters. The TMC needed to devise a marketing strategy to gain a sustainable competitive advantage. Winning the maximum possible number of votes was the only item on the agenda.

In early December 2020, the sales controller for Star Medical Equipment, Brazil, was working on the sales forecast for 2021. Sales in 2020 had been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, but ultimately recovered, and the company had ended the year with about 7 per cent growth over 2019. Predicting the market demand for 2021 was uncertain, as the pandemic was not over and newer strains of the virus were afflicting different parts of the world, again and again. What was certain was that freight costs and transfer prices would increase significantly in 2021. If the sales controller attempted significant sales growth, the organization's gains could be high; its success was uncertain, while a reduction in profitability was certain. He had to decide whether he should play it safe and follow global business guidelines to increase profitability or gamble with ambitious sales and market share growth plans for 2021.

In December 2020, White House Industries (White House), a manufacturer of aerosol aluminum cans for deodorants and other consumer products, including sanitizers and pain relief sprays, received customer order forecasts of 30 per cent more than its maximum production capacity. Unless White House invested in a third production line, which represented a significant capital investment and required almost a year’s lead time, it would be unable to fulfil several customer orders with its existing manufacturing lines. Some customers had long-term relationships with White House, some were newly acquired, and some had a global-level tie-up with White House’s parent company. In addition, the demand from some customers was already large, while others had immense future potential. White House’s board and management team had different views regarding which customers the company should retain and which it should decline. This customer selection issue was a pressing and challenging problem that needed to be solved immediately. How should White House resolve its customer selection conundrum?

In early December 2020, the sales controller for Star Medical Equipment, Brazil, was working on the sales forecast for 2021. Sales in 2020 had been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, but ultimately recovered, and the company had ended the year with about 7 per cent growth over 2019. Predicting the market demand for 2021 was uncertain, as the pandemic was not over and newer strains of the virus were afflicting different parts of the world, again and again. What was certain was that freight costs and transfer prices would increase significantly in 2021. If the sales controller attempted significant sales growth, the organization’s gains could be high; its success was uncertain, while a reduction in profitability was certain. He had to decide whether he should play it safe and follow global business guidelines to increase profitability or gamble with ambitious sales and market share growth plans for 2021.

Fitzie, a sports and fitness brand that manufactured, marketed, and sold sports and lifestyle footwear and apparel, had been doing relatively well in its Eastern Europe, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa (EMESAA) region, with double-digit growth for the past two years. However, the business had been affected by the global COVID-19 pandemic, with the business forecast for 2020 reduced by 39 per cent. As a result, Fitzie’s global team had reduced the EMESAA region’s marketing allocation for 2020 by the same ratio. Archana Roy, the marketing head of Fitzie’s EMESAA region, had to present her marketing plan for 2021 to Fitzie’s global team at the end of September 2020. What had worked in the past might not yield results for 2021, as significant shifts in consumer behaviour had occurred and different markets moved asymmetrically. It was important to prioritize and align all local stakeholders for strong execution and to ensure that the global team allocated the required marketing budget. Was there a need to reconsider the well-established marketing budget allocation process and, if there was, what should the criteria be for reallocation?

Fitzie, a sports and fitness brand that manufactured, marketed, and sold sports and lifestyle footwear and apparel, had been doing relatively well in its Eastern Europe, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa (EMESAA) region, with double-digit growth for the past two years. However, the business had been affected by the global COVID-19 pandemic, with the business forecast for 2020 reduced by 39 per cent. As a result, Fitzie's global team had reduced the EMESAA region's marketing allocation for 2020 by the same ratio. Archana Roy, the marketing head of Fitzie's EMESAA region, had to present her marketing plan for 2021 to Fitzie's global team at the end of September 2020. What had worked in the past might not yield results for 2021, as significant shifts in consumer behaviour had occurred and different markets moved asymmetrically. It was important to prioritize and align all local stakeholders for strong execution and to ensure that the global team allocated the required marketing budget. Was there a need to reconsider the well-established marketing budget allocation process and, if there was, what should the criteria be for reallocation?

In January 2020, the proprietor of Basmati House Supermart (BHS), a large grocery retail outlet in India, terminated a partner retailer contract with Springers, an online retail platform. The proprietor had an ancestral property, located in a high-footfall area of the wholesale market, that could be developed into a retail outlet. In the new outlet, the broad options were to replicate the current retail business, focus selectively on staples and do more wholesale, or only focus on rice and develop it as a brand for larger distribution. Alternatively, the proprietor could rent the new property, wind down the grocery business, and invest the money in a fitness centre. Each option required its own particular investments, competence, and marketing strategy, and all options entailed considerable uncertainty and risk. BHS was steadily losing money; therefore, the decision had to be made quickly.

In January 2020, the proprietor of Basmati House Supermart (BHS), a large grocery retail outlet in India, terminated a partner retailer contract with Springers, an online retail platform. The proprietor had an ancestral property, located in a high-footfall area of the wholesale market, that could be developed into a retail outlet. In the new outlet, the broad options were to replicate the current retail business, focus selectively on staples and do more wholesale, or only focus on rice and develop it as a brand for larger distribution. Alternatively, the proprietor could rent the new property, wind down the grocery business, and invest the money in a fitness centre. Each option required its own particular investments, competence, and marketing strategy, and all options entailed considerable uncertainty and risk. BHS was steadily losing money; therefore, the decision had to be made quickly.

In July 2019, the owner of Basmati House Supermart (BHS), a grocery store, entered into a six-month agreement to become a partner outlet of a large online grocery retailer in India. During the first two months, BHS acquired many new customers and also increased its customers' monthly purchase. However, the steep discounts and promotions used to attract customers to the business drove down the margins, while the customer churn rate increased. The store owner was particularly concerned about the continued use of discounts to attract new consumers, which could potentially transform his own loyal customer base into deal-seeking, less loyal, and online-promotion-driven buyers, thereby leaving BHS terminally dependent on the large online retailer to maintain its sales. The owner wondered whether he should renew his contract with the online retailer in January 2020, and if he did not, what his best course of action would be.

In July 2019, the owner of Basmati House Supermart (BHS), a grocery store, entered into a six-month agreement to become a partner outlet of a large online grocery retailer in India. During the first two months, BHS acquired many new customers and also increased its customers’ monthly purchase. However, the steep discounts and promotions used to attract customers to the business drove down the margins, while the customer churn rate increased. The store owner was particularly concerned about the continued use of discounts to attract new consumers, which could potentially transform his own loyal customer base into deal-seeking, less loyal, and online-promotion-driven buyers, thereby leaving BHS terminally dependent on the large online retailer to maintain its sales. The owner wondered whether he should renew his contract with the online retailer in January 2020, and if he did not, what his best course of action would be.

The director of sales for the detergents arm of LDFL India Limited (LDFL) had to develop a 2019 sales strategy with the objective of reducing the inter-channel conflict that had resulted in the general trade (GT) channel's destocking of LDFL products and a loss of market share in 2018. The cash and carry format was the biggest challenge for the GT business, as it provided a cheaper, on-demand supply source alternative to the GT retailers that dominated the total detergent sales in the industry. The sales strategy options were to demarcate specific channels for sales of specific stock-keeping units; focus on stricter price control across channels, which could ensure a level playing field for GT; customize market offerings for targeted customer segments; or make changes pertaining to organizational structure and performance metrics. Every option had benefits, pitfalls, and implementation challenges.

The director of sales for the detergents arm of LDFL India Limited (LDFL) had to develop a 2019 sales strategy with the objective of reducing the inter-channel conflict that had resulted in the general trade (GT) channel’s destocking of LDFL products and a loss of market share in 2018. The cash and carry format was the biggest challenge for the GT business, as it provided a cheaper, on-demand supply source alternative to the GT retailers that dominated the total detergent sales in the industry. The sales strategy options were to demarcate specific channels for sales of specific stock-keeping units; focus on stricter price control across channels, which could ensure a level playing field for GT; customize market offerings for targeted customer segments; or make changes pertaining to organizational structure and performance metrics. Every option had benefits, pitfalls, and implementation challenges.

The chief executive officer of Ridlr, a mobile application (app), faced a new challenge in 2019. Ridlr was a subsidiary of ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd., which was a major player in India's transportation-as-a-service sector and also owned Ola, a ride-hailing app. The chief executive officer envisioned Ridlr becoming the preferred information and mobile ticketing option for India's public transportation modes. He wanted to successfully position the firm to grow from 600 million annual transactions in 2019 to 6 billion in 2022. He was confident in the firm's value proposition to serve the large consumer base, but he wasn't convinced that direct monetization through consumers was the best option. Although the business-to-business channels of transporters and technology service providers offered some opportunities at monetization, how could Ridlr gain access to that value? The chief executive officer needed to prepare a product and marketing strategy that would ensure both growth and monetization. Where should he begin?

The chief executive officer of Ridlr, a mobile application (app), faced a new challenge in 2019. Ridlr was a subsidiary of ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd., which was a major player in India's transportation-as-a-service sector and also owned Ola, a ride-hailing app. The chief executive officer envisioned Ridlr becoming the preferred information and mobile ticketing option for India’s public transportation modes. He wanted to successfully position the firm to grow from 600 million annual transactions in 2019 to 6 billion in 2022. He was confident in the firm's value proposition to serve the large consumer base, but he wasn't convinced that direct monetization through consumers was the best option. Although the business-to-business channels of transporters and technology service providers offered some opportunities at monetization, how could Ridlr gain access to that value? The chief executive officer needed to prepare a product and marketing strategy that would ensure both growth and monetization. Where should he begin?

On March 25, 2019, the head of business growth for SmartMoney, owned by the Indian conglomerate Smart Industries Limited, was expected by his company’s management team to propose a strategy for capturing 10 per cent of India’s digital payments market in financial year 2019–20. He knew that the market was vast and fragmented and that he was working with a platform business, where fast mobilization was a key factor. SmartMoney already had market presence, resources, and the required expertise to be competitive on the merchant side of the industry over the long term. Therefore, the immediate and considerable challenge was how to mobilize the consumer side, where the company faced various well-established and aggressive incumbents. To thoroughly asses the market, the head of business growth had to integrate a great deal of available information. He would need to select the right entry strategy and target a consumer segment, offering appropriate incentive schemes to attract business. His challenge was to devise a strategy and build a stable, substantial customer base that would deliver the desired results to sustain long-term growth for both SmartMoney and its parent company.

On March 25, 2019, the head of business growth for SmartMoney, owned by the Indian conglomerate Smart Industries Limited, was expected by his company's management team to propose a strategy for capturing 10 per cent of India's digital payments market in financial year 2019-20. He knew that the market was vast and fragmented and that he was working with a platform business, where fast mobilization was a key factor. SmartMoney already had market presence, resources, and the required expertise to be competitive on the merchant side of the industry over the long term. Therefore, the immediate and considerable challenge was how to mobilize the consumer side, where the company faced various well-established and aggressive incumbents. To thoroughly asses the market, the head of business growth had to integrate a great deal of available information. He would need to select the right entry strategy and target a consumer segment, offering appropriate incentive schemes to attract business. His challenge was to devise a strategy and build a stable, substantial customer base that would deliver the desired results to sustain long-term growth for both SmartMoney and its parent company.

In January 2018, the regional manager of Fairdeal Appliances (Fairdeal) was deliberating the merits of continuing with a selective distribution strategy in Denpasar, Bali. Abdul Electronics, Denpasar’s biggest retail outlet for Fairdeal appliances, had just taken on a dealership for Technica, which was a strong competitor to Fairdeal. However, if Fairdeal responded by approaching additional retail outlets to carry its appliances, it risked an increase in intra-channel competition, which could result in less dealer motivation to sell Fairdeal appliances and an overall reduction in Fairdeal sales in Denpasar. The regional manager also knew that if Fairdeal did not increase its presence through additional retail outlets, it would likely continue to lose sales from Abdul Electronics, but would have no possibility of making up the shortfall. In future, other retailers who sold Fairdeal appliances might also become Technica dealers. Had Fairdeal’s selective distribution strategy run its course? Should Fairdeal open up the market and pursue an intensive distribution strategy? The entire market was waiting for a response from Fairdeal.