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From humble beginnings in Kerala, India, Mr. PNC Menon built a reputation for quality, detail, and trustworthiness, earning him major construction commissions in the Gulf region. This paved the way for venturing into real estate development in Dubai, UAE. Striving to control quality and schedule, his firm, Sobha Middle East, self-performs a wide range of tasks - an unusual set of choices in the global real estate and construction industry. In mid-2018, the 70 year old entrepreneur and his team are contemplating their longer term strategy, particularly regarding land acquisition, construction strategy, and financing. Is the backward integration model replicable and sustainable? Meanwhile, sitting in Bangalore, PNC Menon's son Ravi Menon, Chairman of publicly listed Sobha India, is facing a typical in-house versus outsource decision. Sobha India had pioneered the backward integration strategy prior to Dubai. Ravi Menon and his team are deciding on the structural system for Sobha Bellahalli complex of 5,000 apartments in Bangalore. Should they deploy a cast in place structural frame or invest in a precast concrete manufacturing plant on site? Additionally, should they purchase local ready-mix concrete or invest in their own mixing and batching plant? The cost and schedule implications will influence bidding strategy in an upcoming land joint venture. Father and son, on both sides of the continent, have a lot to think about.

Supplement to case 217054.

The so-called "infrastructure finance gap" was a problem in Nigeria as in many parts of the world. Infrastructure projects like power plants and dams were very large capital investments that could generate long term consistent cash flows, but their financing and delivery involved multiple risks and uncertainties. If funds for infrastructure development came from traditional international sources like the World Bank or African Development Bank, those lenders would worry about foreign exchange, interest rates, and political risk and would almost always seek sovereign guarantees (payment guarantees from the federal government). Such assurances and guarantees were hard to come by, difficult to negotiate, and project inception could take decades. In this context could pension funds or private equity-type structures be viable alternative sources of financing for infrastructure? By 2017 Nigeria had reformed its pension administration system so that pension funds could both accept significant amounts of retirement funds from workers and, manage and invest those funds in a transparent and safe structure. One of the asset classes in addition to government bonds, equities, and corporate bonds that was authorized for investment by pension funds was infrastructure debt securities. Until recently, few Nigerian infrastructure securities had strong enough credit ratings to be investable by cautious pension funds. Infrastructure Credit Guarantee Company (InfraCredit) hoped to break that logjam by supporting infrastructure issues denominated in local currency with credit assurances taking the place of sovereign guarantees. Other entities took different approaches to raising capital for infrastructure in this market. Africa Plus Partners (Africa Plus), for example, proposed a fund structure with features of American private equity. It was not yet clear if this type of fund arrangement would be as attractive as debt for pension fund investors.

Colombia conceived its 4G (Fourth Generation) Road Program to try to attract $17 billion from the private sector for investment in toll roads. The nation had also created the National Infrastructure Agency of Colombia (ANI) to oversee multiple investments, and the National Development Fund (FDN) as a credit enhancement vehicle. By 2017, Colombia had largely recovered from the "bad times" and was viewed as one of Andean Nations' success stories. Colombia was rapidly expanding its seaports, airports, power grid, and, particularly, its road network to link multiple metropolitan and rural areas across its mountain-riddled territory. Private-public partnerships were used since the federal budget did not have enough cash flow or credit to fund a vast road building program. The 4G Program featured improvements as compared to earlier-generation programs, making it more attractive to private investors. These included newly crafted contracts, shared risks between private and public parties, and liquidity lines of credit provided by FDN.

Private investment in public infrastructure can be encouraged when there are multiple avenues to capture and to share the value created by such a project. Gains in the market value of land adjacent to projects are not customarily channeled back into defraying the original capital cost of the project-but they can be. This case uses irrigation, agriculture, land values, and an arrangement between the local government in northern Peru and the privatizer firm to accomplish the irrigation of vast areas of land, leading to jobs and GDP growth in the state, based on a combination of fees for water, auction price for raw land, investment in enabling infrastructure, and market value increases for irrigated land. The mechanics of this three-component deal (land company, water distribution company, construction company) are tracked on a pro forma multi-year cash flow basis with the ability to make and test a variety of different assumptions. The choice of an agricultural setting with one possible use case (farming at ground level) leads in to more complex value capture analyses. Real estate, for example, can have more dimensions (more floors allowed) and more use cases (retail, housing, office) than does agriculture. The local government can accomplish hundreds of millions of dollars of construction without advancing any funds to do so.

Extreme drought conditions in California have significant impacts on the ability of the San Diego County Water Authority to provide adequate water for current users. Water shortfalls also could curtail the economic development of one of the fastest growing regions in America. Seawater desalination is expensive and energy intensive, but it could be a partial solution. Brian Brady and other members of the Authority need to vote for or against a financing and construction plan that includes a 30-year water purchase agreement with Poseidon Resources (Channelside) LP, a private company. In the early years the cost of water would be almost double the average unit cost the Authority pays at the time of the decision. Is this proposal good policy in the long run to lock in supply and price for 7% of the region's water needs? Is the private finance and provision of public infrastructure appropriate for a basic good like water? The case also investigates the allocation of water supply and usage in California and the environmental impacts of running this plant on electricity drawn from the local utility, which in San Diego County is about 65% from fossil sources. The case is intended to be used as an introduction to water policy, seawater desalination, bond finance and cash flow waterfalls, infrastructure as a foundation for economic development, and risk allocation in public-private partnerships.

The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is an ambitious economic development project linking six of the most competitive states in India with the sea. The corridor is modeled on the Jiangsu Corridor in China (Nanjing to Shanghai) and the Tokyo-Hokkaido Corridor in Japan. The Government of Japan is a major investor. Several of India's proposed Smart Cities are located on the Corridor. Eventual success of the corridor depends on attracting jobs in very large numbers. Infinite Technology is a big IT and BPO firm in Bangalore. The case looks at the economics and soft issues as Anjali Varma of Infinite decides whether to depart Bangalore for Dholera on the DMIC. This case is intended to be used with HBS Case 214-077, "Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor: India's Road to Prosperity?"

Eco-Motors, funded in part by Khosla Ventures, has to decide how to go to market with a new technology for internal combustion engines for automotive and industrial use. The OPOC engine has opposed pistons and is a two-stroke engine, as compared to a more traditional in-line or V-oriented 6, 8, or 12 cylinder gas or diesel engine. A two-stroke engine is cheaper to build and has higher power output than a four-stroke engine but historically has been more polluting. At present in the U.S., two-stroke engines are mostly deployed in lawnmowers and chainsaws with four-stroke engines the leaders in cars, boats, and generators. Should the company be an invention company licensing its technology; an engine designer and manufacturer selling to auto, marine, and fixed OEM companies; or a fully integrated power and transport solution? How is the value chain currently organized, what obstacles are there in going to market, and how can this company thrive with this innovation that is cleaner and cheaper than the incumbent but hard to explain and to deploy?

As China's largest homebuilder, China Vanke Co. Ltd. (Vanke) was facing an industry downturn sparked by strong government intervention. Faced with falling prices, Vanke's president must decide whether to keep the company's pricing and product positioning intact, and how aggressively to pursue its greener building strategy. Follow-up cases present additional decisions, including how, and how aggressively, to improve safety and quality (A-2), and whether to expand into other asset classes, such as commercial real estate.

China Vanke's president and his team must decide on a plan of action after reviewing the quality issues the company faced in early 2012 after a series of highly publicized incidents concerning the quality of the homes they built.

China Vanke's president is considering whether and how the company might make further inroads into the commercial real estate sector, while continuing to lead in the residential sector. He is also considering whether to branch into overseas residential markets such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States.

The case describes Vanke's response to the decisions posed in the A1, A2, and A3 cases and asks whether Vanke should expand its strategic scope by defining itself as an "urban facilities provider" rather than a "residential housing developer." The management team is also reviewing the company's forays in places such as Hong Kong, Singapore, the U.S., and Europe.

The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) was an ambitious $90 billion infrastructure project covering the 1483-km distance between Delhi and Mumbai. The project would create new industrial townships, high speed freight lines, six-lane expressways, airports, ports and power plants. It would also give the country a unique opportunity to plan, develop and build new cities that were economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. The DMIC could boost India's flailing manufacturing sector, increase foreign investments, augment exports, generate jobs and situate the country on a higher growth trajectory. While the project held many promises for India, there were many risks involved. Its success would depend on land acquisition and unprecedented levels of coordination across various government agencies. This case examines whether Amitabh Kant, CEO, Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (DMICDC), the nodal agency for planning and implementing the project, would be able to deliver on the project's promises.