個案總覽

Cypress Sharpridge, a REIT investing in agency securities, launched its IPO just before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. The IPO failed. In June 2009, an IPO window seemed to be opening. Should the company try again? CEO Kevin Grant knew that his company's survival depended on differentiating itself from discredited real estate investment strategies and raising permanent capital. But if its IPO failed again, the company might lose any remaining credibility and be forced to fold.

This note provides students with an explanation of the regulatory and tax framework for hedge funds vs. mutual funds in the U.S.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 210022

This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze the restructuring of Chrysler in the midst of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. It describes how debtors can use section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to sell assets quickly. It allows for discussion of who benefits and who loses in such restructurings, and it also raises a variety of policy issues concerning 363 sales and the appropriate role of government entities in restructurings.

In late January 2009, Thomas Fekete, Managing Director at Barclays Wealth in London, redeemed the most illiquid positions in the so-called Wealth Absolute Return Fund (WAR), one of Barclays Wealth's most promising offshore funds of hedge funds, and halted the Fund's investment activities. For Fekete, the decision to declare the WAR funds a ''failed experiment" marked a turning-point. In May 2009, money from the redeemed underlying funds would become available, and by that date, he had to develop a new investment strategy. Fekete faced two options. Option one was to revive the WAR Fund. Option two was to shelve the WAR Fund and launch a new fund of UCITS regulated funds domiciled in Europe with UCITS qualification. Which strategy would be the best way to invest during this period of crisis, to the benefit of both Barclays Wealth and its clients?

After posting its first-ever quarterly loss in 2008, Goldman Sachs surpassed market expectations for Q1 of 2009 but came under intensive fire for, among other things, announcing its intention to repay TARP thereby avoiding its compensation limitations.

Having taken steps to shore up investor confidence, during the turbulent fourth quarter of 2008, Goldman Sachs confronts the challenge of whether its business model will continue to be viable under radically altered market conditions and a new regulatory regime.

Facing the worldwide financial crisis, Goldman Sachs' CEO Lloyd Blankfein considered his options including whether his company could avoid a forced marriage and what steps Goldman Sachs should take to try to restore confidence in financial services companies.

Factors affecting decision-making about appropriate types of business entities are explored in the context of advising a prospective investor with particular emphasis on why LLCs are increasingly "go-to" entities. The potential effect of choice of organization on litigation outcomes is illustrated using the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, 2008 WL 1961156 (May 7, 2008) and the practical implications of the differences between unincorporated and corporate entities are highlighted.

When do discussions of a great business idea have real consequences and how can an entrepreneur plan for and manage them? Using facts from a litigated case, the concept of inadvertent formation of an entity is explored, the duties of partners to one another are introduced and the legal consequences of breach of those duties are discussed.

On October 18, 2007, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa announced his intention to migrate Petrobras' existing participation contracts to exploit oil reserves in Ecuador's Blocks 18 and 31 to servicing agreements under which Petrobras would be paid a production fee and reimbursed for investment costs but all recovered oil would belong to the government. Correa also announced a dramatic increase in corporate taxes and changes to other contracts to which Petrobras was a party. All foreign oil companies operating In Ecuador would be similarly affected and any company refusing to "renegotiate" its contracts would face a 100% tax on profits. How should Petrobras respond to Ecuador's riding roughshod over its contracts? Should Petrobras take the Ecuadorian government to arbitration? Or would it be better to pursue a negotiated solution similar to that reached in Bolivia a year earlier? How should Petrobras balance its fiduciary duties to and the best Interests of its shareholders with the interests of the Brazilian government? How should it communicate with its various constituencies?