個案總覽

By the time Merck withdrew its pain relief drug Vioxx from the market in 2004, more than 100 million prescriptions had been filled in the United States alone. Yet researchers now estimate that Vioxx may have been associated with as many as 25,000 heart attacks and strokes. Evidence of the drug's risks was available as early as 2000, so why did so many doctors keep prescribing it? The answer, say the authors, involves the phenomenon of bounded awareness--when cognitive blinders prevent a person from seeing, seeking, using, or sharing highly relevant, easily accessible, and readily perceivable information during the decision-making process. Doctors prescribing Vioxx, for instance, more often than not received positive feedback from patients. So, despite having access to information about the risks, physicians may have been blinded to the actual extent of the risks. Bounded awareness can occur at three points in the decision-making process. First, executives may fail to see or seek out the important information needed to make a sound decision. Second, they may fail to use the information that they do see because they aren't aware of its relevance. Third, executives may fail to share information with others, thereby bounding the organization's awareness. Drawing on examples such as the Challenger disaster and Citibank's failures in Japan, this article examines what prevents executives from seeing what's right in front of them and offers advice on how to increase awareness. Of course, not every decision requires executives to consciously broaden their focus. Collecting too much information for every decision would waste time and other valuable resources. The key is being mindful. If executives think an error could generate almost irrecoverable damage, then they should insist on getting all the information they need to make a wise decision.

Answer true or false: "I am an ethical manager." If you answered "true," here's an uncomfortable fact: You're probably wrong. Most of us believe we can objectively size up a job candidate or a venture deal and reach a fair and rational conclusion that's in our, and our organization's, best interests. But more than two decades of psychological research indicates that most of us harbor unconscious biases that are often at odds with our consciously held beliefs. The flawed judgments arising from these biases are ethically problematic and undermine managers' fundamental work--to recruit and retain superior talent, boost individual and team performance, and collaborate effectively with partners. This article explores four related sources of unintentional unethical decision making: implicit bias--judging according to unconscious stereotypes rather than merit; in-group bias--favoring people in their own circles; a tendency to overclaim credit; and conflicts of interest. To counter these unconscious biases, traditional ethics training is not enough. You should gather better data, rid the work environment of stereotypical cues, and broaden your mind-set when making decisions.

Think hard about the problems in your organization or about potential upheavals in the markets in which you operate. Could some of those problems--ones no one is attending to--turn into disasters? As Harvard Business School professors Michael Watkins and Max Bazerman illustrate in this timely article, most of the "unexpected" events that buffet companies should have been anticipated--they're "predictable surprises." Such disasters take many forms, from financial scandals to disruptions in operations, from organizational upheavals to product failures. The bad news is that all companies, including your own, are vulnerable to predictable surprises. The good news is that recent research helps explain why that's so and what companies can do to minimize their risk. The authors contend that organizations' inability to prepare for predictable surprises can be traced to three sets of vulnerabilities: psychological, organizational, and political. To address these vulnerabilities, the authors recommend the RPM approach. More than just the usual environmental scanning and contingency planning, RPM requires a chain of actions--recognizing, prioritizing, and mobilizing--that companies must meticulously adhere to. Failure to apply any one of these steps, the authors say, can leave an organization vulnerable.

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. The corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.

Plum Creek Timber Co. decides to go ahead with negotiations for a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) on its Pacific Northwest properties. HCP represents a new form of public-private-sector collaboration and innovation to improve upon command-and-control environmental policy solution. Throughout the negotiation process, the company must manage several factors: identifying which native fish species to include beyond the bull trout, matching "best science" standards with cost-efficient conservation commitments, minimizing the regulatory burden while enhancing species protection, and fostering support and avoiding conflict with a range of interested stakeholders, from environmental activists to forest products executives.

Proposed changes by the SEC will reduce the accounting profession's conflicts of interest arising from consulting. But auditors can never be truly independent when they are hired and fired by the companies they audit.

It happens all the time. Two parties with common interests fail to reach an agreement--about a sale, a merger, a technology transfer--because they have different expectations about the future. They are both so confident in their prediction, or so suspicious of the other side's motives, that they refuse to compromise. Such impasses are hard to break through. Fortunately, they can often be avoided altogether by using a straightforward but frequently overlooked type of agreement called a contingent contract. The terms of a contingent contract are not finalized until the uncertain event in question--the contingency--takes place. In some areas of business, such as compensation, contingent contracts are common: a CEO's pay is tied to the company's stock price, for instance. But in many business negotiations, contingent contracts are either ignored or rejected out of hand. That's a mistake, according to the authors. In an increasingly uncertain world, flexible contingent contracts can actually be more rational and less risky than rigid, traditional ones. In particular, contingent contracts offer six benefits: they enable a difference of opinion to become the basis of an agreement, not an obstacle to it; they cancel out the biases of negotiators; they level the playing field by reducing the impact of asymmetric information; they provide a means of uncovering deceitful dealings; they reduce risk by sharing it among parties; and they motivate parties to fulfill their promises. While contingent contracts are not appropriate in all instances, they are much more broadly applicable than managers may think.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Executives today face many difficult, potentially explosive situations in which they must make decisions that can help or harm their firms, themselves, and others. How can they improve the ethical quality of their decisions? How can they ensure that their decisions will not backfire? The authors discuss three types of theories--theories about the world, theories about other people, and theories about ourselves--that help executives understand how they make the judgments on which they base their decisions. By understanding those theories, they can learn how to make better, more ethical decisions.