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After several years of effort, Dalian Zhongding Information Co. (DZI) had become the leading prepaid card distributor in Liaoning Province. When government regulations and the rise of online third-party payment options sent the prepaid card business into decline, DZI transformed itself into an online intermediary by building a regional e-commerce platform offering fast home delivery, mainly of supermarket products. Despite its marketing efforts, the company faced fierce competition, difficulty attracting users, and a low secondary purchase rate. In 2015, the company needed to adjust its development strategy. What practices should this regional e-commerce platform adopt to obtain traffic, increase purchasing conversion rate, and increase visitor retention?

After several years of effort, Dalian Zhongding Information Co. (DZI) had become the leading prepaid card distributor in Liaoning Province. When government regulations and the rise of online third-party payment options sent the prepaid card business into decline, DZI transformed itself into an online intermediary by building a regional e-commerce platform offering fast home delivery, mainly of supermarket products. Despite its marketing efforts, the company faced fierce competition, difficulty attracting users, and a low secondary purchase rate. In 2015, the company needed to adjust its development strategy. What practices should this regional e-commerce platform adopt to obtain traffic, increase purchasing conversion rate, and increase visitor retention?

Jiemo.net (Jiemo), an Internet-based study-abroad consultant agency headquartered in Dalian, China, began in 2010 by providing application support to customers who wished to apply to study abroad. In 2014, the company discovered that profit existed in providing services to students once they had been accepted to study abroad. Jiemo changed its traditional pricing model, used social media marketing, and collaborated with other agencies to establish an ecosystem for these students. The result was that Jiemo acquired customers by providing free Internet-based application support (“front end” services), and reaped profits by providing services that those customers needed once they were studying abroad (“back end” services). However, as Jiemo grew, the designed profit model was not supporting growth. Jiemo had to modify the model. Should it improve the back end services to reduce costs and gain more profit from existing customers, or explore the needs of potential customers and add new services?

Jiemo.net (Jiemo), an Internet-based study-abroad consultant agency headquartered in Dalian, China, began in 2010 by providing application support to customers who wished to apply to study abroad. In 2014, the company discovered that profit existed in providing services to students once they had been accepted to study abroad. Jiemo changed its traditional pricing model, used social media marketing, and collaborated with other agencies to establish an ecosystem for these students. The result was that Jiemo acquired customers by providing free Internet-based application support ("front end" services), and reaped profits by providing services that those customers needed once they were studying abroad ("back end" services). However, as Jiemo grew, the designed profit model was not supporting growth. Jiemo had to modify the model. Should it improve the back end services to reduce costs and gain more profit from existing customers, or explore the needs of potential customers and add new services?

The number and value of Chinese enterprises' cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are increasing, but their success rate remains very low. The failure of cultural integration is one of the most important reasons. In 2005, Lenovo Group Ltd., acquired IBM's PC division in what was called a "snake swallows elephant" acquisition that caused a sensation worldwide. During the ten years after the M&A, Lenovo integrated IBM's PC division's culture through several stages of acculturation, which ended with great success. In 2014, Lenovo acquired IBM's x86 Server. Lenovo faced a challenge: Should the first acquisition's cultural integration be replayed and copied for the x86 Server acquisition? Or should Lenovo look for a new approach?

In 2007, the chairman of Supor Group led the company in a new venture in the sanitary ware industry. Supor Group was the first listed company in the Chinese cookware market, and Supor Sanitary Ware Co., Ltd. (Supor) was Supor Group’s most important industry. Supor established three production bases in Zhejiang and Shenyang, China. Its marketing channels included brand agents and direct-sale stores. The company also opened an online flagship store on Tmall, a Chinese-language website for business-to-consumer online retail. Since its performance on Tmall was poor, the company outsourced this channel to Company X. However, this led to channel conflict between online and offline channels. How could Supor Group resolve the conflict, improve channel performance, and achieve channel synergy?

In 2007, the chairman of Supor Group led the company in a new venture in the sanitary ware industry. Supor Group was the first listed company in the Chinese cookware market, and Supor Sanitary Ware Co., Ltd. (Supor) was Supor Group's most important industry. Supor established three production bases in Zhejiang and Shenyang, China. Its marketing channels included brand agents and direct-sale stores. The company also opened an online flagship store on Tmall, a Chinese-language website for business-to-consumer online retail. Since its performance on Tmall was poor, the company outsourced this channel to Company X. However, this led to channel conflict between online and offline channels. How could Supor Group resolve the conflict, improve channel performance, and achieve channel synergy?

The number and value of Chinese enterprises’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are increasing, but their success rate remains very low. The failure of cultural integration is one of the most important reasons. In 2005, Lenovo Group Ltd., acquired IBM’s PC division in what was called a “snake swallows elephant” acquisition that caused a sensation worldwide. During the ten years after the M&A, Lenovo integrated IBM’s PC division’s culture through several stages of acculturation, which ended with great success. In 2014, Lenovo acquired IBM’s x86 Server. Lenovo faced a challenge: Should the first acquisition’s cultural integration be replayed and copied for the x86 Server acquisition? Or should Lenovo look for a new approach?

BIG PASTURE Animal Husbandry Company (Group) Co., Ltd. (BIG PASTURE) had achieved great success after nearly 10 years of development. It had started as a ready-to-eat food processing factory that supplied individually owned stores and franchises with self-produced food. Since then, its product line was extended to include fresh and processed beef and mutton. At the same time, BIG PASTURE undertook a major shift from company-operated stores to community convenience stores, further fostering its community economy. However, since the rapid development of e-commerce had contributed toward the success of many local sellers in China, BIG PASTURE saw the possibility of a breakthrough. Thus, the major challenges facing the company included creating a national market through e-commerce and developing community economies.

BIG PASTURE Animal Husbandry Company (Group) Co., Ltd. (BIG PASTURE) had achieved great success after nearly 10 years of development. It had started as a ready-to-eat food processing factory that supplied individually owned stores and franchises with self-produced food. Since then, its product line was extended to include fresh and processed beef and mutton. At the same time, BIG PASTURE undertook a major shift from company-operated stores to community convenience stores, further fostering its community economy. However, since the rapid development of e-commerce had contributed toward the success of many local sellers in China, BIG PASTURE saw the possibility of a breakthrough. Thus, the major challenges facing the company included creating a national market through e-commerce and developing community economies.

Beijing Xiaomi Technology Co. Ltd. (Xiaomi) had grown into the third-largest cell phone brand in China and the sixth-largest in the world. The company solely deployed online channels, which contributed to its success. In the initial stage, Xiaomi depended on its own online channel to interact with consumers to develop user-friendly products and sell products. Three years after its inception, the company successfully established its flagship store on the largest business-to-consumer e-commerce platform in China. However, Xiaomi was facing a series of challenges, such as competitors’ imitation and consumer complaints regarding services. Xiaomi was at a crossroads: should it stick to its online channels or develop online-to-offline channels?

Beijing Xiaomi Technology Co. Ltd. (Xiaomi) had grown into the third-largest cell phone brand in China and the sixth-largest in the world. The company solely deployed online channels, which contributed to its success. In the initial stage, Xiaomi depended on its own online channel to interact with consumers to develop user-friendly products and sell products. Three years after its inception, the company successfully established its flagship store on the largest business-to-consumer e-commerce platform in China. However, Xiaomi was facing a series of challenges, such as competitors' imitation and consumer complaints regarding services. Xiaomi was at a crossroads: should it stick to its online channels or develop online-to-offline channels?

Shanghai NSE Electric Co. Ltd. (NSE), a medium-sized manufacturer of marine switch panels, had entered into a joint venture with Schneider Electric under which NSE was Schneider's sole technology licensee in China. NSE felt fortunate because the world shipbuilding market was strong and orders were often full. With comprehensive and close cooperation, NSE was confident in Schneider. Nevertheless, Schneider announced that it would issue a second license to NSE's outsourcing manufacturer, SaierNico Electric & Automation. This meant that a competitor that produced and sold products of the same brand would emerge in the Chinese market. What was worse, this competitor had been cultivated by NSE. The CEO of NSE believed that NSE had three options: (1) continue to cooperate with Schneider; (2) broaden its business and cooperate with other powerful companies; or (3) invest more in local innovation to develop its own brand.

Shanghai NSE Electric Co. Ltd. (NSE), a medium-sized manufacturer of marine switch panels, had entered into a joint venture with Schneider Electric under which NSE was Schneider’s sole technology licensee in China. NSE felt fortunate because the world shipbuilding market was strong and orders were often full. With comprehensive and close cooperation, NSE was confident in Schneider. Nevertheless, Schneider announced that it would issue a second license to NSE’s outsourcing manufacturer, SaierNico Electric & Automation. This meant that a competitor that produced and sold products of the same brand would emerge in the Chinese market. What was worse, this competitor had been cultivated by NSE. The CEO of NSE believed that NSE had three options: (1) continue to cooperate with Schneider; (2) broaden its business and cooperate with other powerful companies; or (3) invest more in local innovation to develop its own brand.

The general manager of market development for the Dalian International Airport in China was worried. Two years after he had successfully launched the Northeastern Hinterland and Bohai Rim Region Airport Aviation Market Strategic Alliance in 2009, it was facing serious external and internal challenges. Competitors had begun to impact on the alliance by intensively adding flights to regional airports with the support of subsidies from provincial and local governments. And as alliance members gained more air traffic, they began to compete for transport resources, which challenged the organization’s sustainable development. From the beginning, Dalian International Airport, as the core of the organization, had shared its routes and ticket fares with other alliance member airports, had removed landing fees for stopover flights and had organized a trade fair to encourage interactions between small regional airports and the airlines that had ignored them in the past, not recognizing how China’s booming economy was making even remote routes potentially profitable. The general manager had three possible options: utilizing outside help, increasing his airport’s market position and strengthening internal ties to resist external forces. All three options had their pros and cons. What should he do?

Krohne Inc. of Germany separately established a joint venture, a wholly owned sales company and a manufacturer in China. Unfortunately, although the sales channels were different, the product lines of the joint venture and the wholly owned manufacturer overlapped. The two companies were therefore competing and unsure about which company rightfully represented the parent enterprise. In addition, the two investment parties were battling for control of the joint venture.

Krohne Inc. separately established a joint venture, a wholly owned sales company and a manufacturer in China. Unfortunately, although the sales channels were different, the product lines of the joint venture and the wholly owned manufacturer overlapped. The two companies were therefore competing and unsure about which company rightfully represented the parent enterprise. In addition, the two investment parties were battling for control of the joint venture.