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On February 1, 2003, the world watched in horror as the Columbia space shuttle broke apart while reentering the earth's atmosphere, killing all seven astronauts. Some have argued that NASA's failure to respond with appropriate intensity to the so-called foam strike that led to the accident was evidence of irresponsible or incompetent management. The authors' research, however, suggests that NASA was exhibiting a natural, albeit unfortunate, pattern of behavior common in many organizations. The foam strike is a prime example of what the authors call an ambiguous threat--a signal that may or may not portend future harm. Ambiguous threats differ from threats with obvious causes--say, a fire in the building--for which the response is clear. They also differ from unmistakable threats that may lack straightforward response paths (such as the frightening oxygen-tank explosion aboard Apollo 13). However, when the warning sign is ambiguous and the threat's potential effect is unclear, managers may choose to ignore or discount the risk. Such an approach can be catastrophic. Firms that do a good job of dealing with ambiguous threats do not improvise during a crisis; rather, they apply a rigorous set of detection and response capabilities that they have developed and practiced beforehand. In this article, the authors outline how to put such capabilities in place long before a crisis strikes. First, companies need to hone their teamwork and rapid problem-solving skills through practice. Second, they must learn to recognize weak signals, amplify the threat, and encourage employees to ask disconcerting "what if" questions in a safe environment. Finally, they should explore possible responses to threats through quick, low-cost experimentation.

Describes the way in which General Dwight D. Eisenhower worked with his commanders, as well as political leaders, to plan the June 1944 D-Day invasion.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Too many managers are burned out on strategic change. They have lived through the scenario in which the CEO announces a bold initiative designed to lift performance dramatically. The initiative calls for sweeping changes in the company's processes, systems, and culture--and large resource investments. Despite some short-term gains, it's common for the organization to slip back into old ways of doing things. Argues for a system that enables change initiatives to stick. Uses a detailed case study (a disguised large clothing retailer) to demonstrate what it takes to produce sustainable changes in processes, behavior, or performance. Uncovers four critical processes--chartering, learning, mobilizing, and realigning--that pave the way for successful institutionalization of a strategic change initiative. The elements rely much more on an understanding of the mix of task-related, emotional, and behavioral factors than is fashionable in today's metrics-driven environment. Also highlights the study's divergence from conventional wisdom about programmatic change, arguing that managers need to set in motion a series of processes right at the start if widespread changes are to stick.

Describes how Billy Beane, general manager of the Oakland A's baseball team, employs statistical methodologies to select who is undervalued in the marketplace. Examines why few teams have imitated his organization's successful strategy. Explores threats to Oakland's competitive advantage.

Faced with the need for a massive change, most managers respond predictably. They revamp the organization's strategy, shift around staff, and root out inefficiencies. They then wait patiently for performance to improve--only to be bitterly disappointed because they've failed to prepare employees adequately for the change. In this article, the authors contend that to make change stick, leaders must conduct an effective persuasion campaign--one that begins weeks or months before the turnaround plan is set in concrete. Like a political campaign, a persuasion campaign is largely one of differentiation from the past. Turnaround leaders must convince people that the organization is truly on its deathbed--or, at the very least, that radical changes are required if the organization is to survive and thrive. (This is a particularly difficult challenge when years of persistent problems have been accompanied by few changes in the status quo.) And they must demonstrate through word and deed that they are the right leaders with the right plan. Accomplishing all this calls for a four-part communications strategy. Prior to announcing a turnaround plan, leaders need to set the stage for employees' acceptance of it. At the time of delivery, they must present a framework through which employees can interpret information and messages about the plan. As time passes, they must manage the mood so that employees' emotional states support implementation and follow-through. And at critical intervals, they must provide reinforcement to ensure that the desired changes take hold and that there's no backsliding. Using the example of the dramatic turnaround at Boston's Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, the authors elucidate the inner workings of a successful change effort.

Describes the 16-day final mission of the space shuttle Columbia in January 2003 in which seven astronauts died. Includes background on NASA and the creation of the human space flight program, including the 1970 Apollo 13 crisis and 1986 Challenger disaster. Examines NASA's organizational culture, leadership, and the influences on the investigation of and response to foam shedding from the external fuel tank during shuttle launch.

This case looks at the turnaround at the Massachusetts Port Authority after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It begins with the situation during the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and then describes how the new CEO restructures the public agency to operate much more like a business organization.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Prepares students to view "Path to War"--a movie that depicts the decision-making processes employed by President Lyndon Johnson and his advisers during the Vietnam War. Provides a brief history of the conflict in Vietnam prior to Johnson's decision to commit American combat troops and biographical information about Johnson and the other key participants in the decision-making process.

Describes the Colorado fire tragedy that resulted in 12 deaths. Examines leadership, decision making, and team dynamics in a high-stress, crisis situation.

Describes the 1949 firefighting tragedy in Montana that led to the deaths of 12 smoke jumpers. Explores the myriad of poor decisions by the firefighting crew and their foreman.

Describes the process that the firm employs to allocate resources to new product development projects. Examines whether the firm can sustain its competitive advantage given its existing game design process.

Describes the acquisition decision-making process employed at Polycom. Focuses on the potential acquisition of the firm's archrival, Picturetel, in mid-2001.

This case is one of two cases that describe the situation and poor performance at McDonald's Corp. in early 2003. This exercise instructs students to employ an unstructured brainstorming process to develop strategic options for McDonald's.

Describes the events that transpired during the May 1996, Mount Everest tragedy. Examines the flawed decisions that climbing teams made before and during the ascent.

On January 7, 2002, Paul Levy became CEO of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, a troubled organization, in serious financial difficulty. This case describes the situation Levy inherited, his negotiations prior to taking the job, and his first six months as CEO.

Many participants and observers have analyzed the 1996 Mount Everest tragedy and blamed a host of factors, including the weather, equipment failures, and human error. This article examines the people and events through three theoretical lenses: behavioral decision theory, group dynamics, and complex systems. Factors at each level--individual, group, and organizational system--interacted with one another to cause the tragedy. This analysis provides a framework for understanding and diagnosing large-scale organizational failures, and it provides several important lessons for managers making and implementing high-stakes decisions within organizations.

Describes the decision-making process employed by President George W. Bush's War Cabinet in the days following the September 11th terrorist attacks. Examines how the president and his advisers framed the problem, exchanged ideas, generated alternatives, and developed a plan of action.