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Unigrains is a French agribusiness-focused private equity firm that has provided specialized financing to France's agribusiness sector for decades and, as a result, cultivated a strong reputation and relationships in that space. Now that the broader investment community around the globe has become more interested in agribusiness, Unigrains faces growing competitive pressure. This case describes the general private equity model, provides an overview of agribusiness investing trends, and invites students to weigh the relative merits for Unigrains of expanding its reach globally versus maintaining its specialized position in French agribusiness.

This case, an update on "Henkel: Building a Winning Culture (A)," describes Henkel's strong performance against its tough 2012 objectives, as well as the new objectives CEO Kasper Rorsted set for 2016.

This case focuses on Acıbadem Healthcare Group's, Turkey's only premium nationwide hospital network, potential expansion strategies after it was acquired by International Healthcare Holdings Berhad (IHH) in 2011, the world's second-largest publicly listed health care group and a private hospital leader in Singapore and Malaysia. By providing perspectives on both Acıbadem and IHH-Parkway-Pantai's operational models, growth aspirations, collaboration and synergies, as well as cultural and operational differences, the case allows students to discuss which expansion strategies would be best suited for Acıbadem's operations--which geographic regions should initially be targeted, what business model is best suited for Acıbadem's growth (specialized chain, public-partnership etc.) Also, students are encouraged to discuss how Acıbadem should leverage its relationship with IHH and collaborate with Parkway-Pantai.

In late 2013, telehealth company American Well, which developed a digital platform that allowed patients to conduct online medical consultations with physicians, is considering pursuing a direct-to-consumer (DTC) strategy. Founded in 2006, American Well had, to date, primarily sold its solution to health plans, which then provided online care services to their members using their own brand name. But while American Well attracted some of the largest U.S. health insurers as clients, a surprisingly small number of individual members had actually used the online care service. American Well management believed low consumer awareness-the result of insufficient marketing by health plans, among other factors-was hampering uptake of what should be a highly valuable offering for all stakeholders involved. They wondered if a DTC approach, in which American Well would become a consumer brand and market a telehealth service directly to the public, for example through a mobile app, could drive utilization and catapult the business to the next level. If a DTC offering were given the green light, the company had to come up with a coherent marketing plan to launch it and figure out how to manage potential conflicts with existing clients, who might view the move as competing with their own telehealth efforts. Moreover, the move had to be considered in light of other initiatives the company had recently embarked on, such as marketing its platform to pharmacy chains, targeting large employers, and selling kiosks that provided a physical space to conduct online consultations. The case forces students to grapple with the challenges and barriers involved in disrupting an established industry, examine alternative go-to-market strategies and the timing of implementing them, and consider different business models to manage supply and generate revenues. The case also offers a rich analysis of digital marketing issues.

Bonitas, a South African medical scheme (i.e., health insurer), must navigate highly restrictive regulations that make it difficult for Bonitas to innovate, grow, and compete with market leader Discovery as well as providers of alternative insurance products. Bonitas (HBS No. 315-020) must also plan ahead for the rollout of national health insurance-a deeply politicized issue in a country with great disparities in health care quality and access. How can Bonitas compete today while positioning itself to thrive-and not lose relevance-under a universal public health insurance system?

MasterCard CEO Ajay Banga was investing significant time and attention to increase financial inclusion among individuals with historically no access to banking or financial services in countries around the world with large underserved populations. The effort included partnerships with governments and banks to issue MasterCard branded debit cards to millions of individuals. Financial inclusion could potentially help these individuals by increasing financial literacy, building credit records, improving savings rates, providing access to loans and other financial products, and, in general, by increasing the economic opportunities for these newly banked consumers. And by adding more customers, MasterCard potentially could also grow its bottom line. Financial inclusion raised questions for MasterCard. Was the management time and attention well spent given the low returns expected from adding millions of mostly very poor customers? What risks might MasterCard encounter-particularly in some countries where citizens resented their government partnering with and providing personal data to a large U.S. company.

This two-part case focuses on how to identify and manage strategic uncertainties in an innovative, entrepreneurial start-up company. In the (A) case, students learn about Quiet Logistics, an e-commerce fulfillment company working with high-end apparel retailers such as Bonobos, Gilt Groupe, and Zara. What distinguishes the company from its rivals is its use of Kiva robots which collect customer items within the warehouse and bring them to the appropriate work station for employees to package and prepare for shipment. Processing up to 8,000 orders per day, the robots help make Quiet Logistics a highly-efficient firm and free its workers to complete additional value-added services such as handwritten thank-you notes. The company has also developed proprietary software to collect data on productivity measures, resulting in 99.99% accuracy in its inventory system and completing orders on-time. At the end of the (A) case, students are asked to list the strategic uncertainties that should be keeping the two co-founders awake at night as they consider growth opportunities for their company. The one-page (B) case reveals a surprising strategic twist that throws their plans into disarray. Students are asked to figure out how to respond.

This two-part case focuses on how to identify and manage strategic uncertainties in an innovative, entrepreneurial start-up company. In the (A) case, students learn about Quiet Logistics, an e-commerce fulfillment company working with high-end apparel retailers such as Bonobos, Gilt Groupe, and Zara. What distinguishes the company from its rivals is its use of Kiva robots which collect customer items within the warehouse and bring them to the appropriate work station for employees to package and prepare for shipment. Processing up to 8,000 orders per day, the robots help make Quiet Logistics a highly-efficient firm and free its workers to complete additional value-added services such as handwritten thank-you notes. The company has also developed proprietary software to collect data on productivity measures, resulting in 99.99% accuracy in its inventory system and completing orders on-time. At the end of the (A) case, students are asked to list the strategic uncertainties that should be keeping the two co-founders awake at night as they consider growth opportunities for their company. The one-page (B) case reveals a surprising strategic twist that throws their plans into disarray. Students are asked to figure out how to respond.

This case, a follow-up to Cancer Treatment Centers of America (A), HBS No. 313-012, begins with the debate over New Hampshire's certificate-of-need (CON) law, which restricts hospital expansion. This debate ignited significant public criticism of Cancer Treatment Centers of America (CTCA), a for-profit chain of five cancer-focused hospitals that had previously won a CON exception in Georgia, over its for-profit status and low acceptance of government-insured patients. The case also introduces the controversy over CTCA's cancer treatment outcomes-reporting practices, as well as the disparities in outcomes-reporting practices by cancer treatment providers generally. By providing perspectives on both sides of the issues, the case allows students to debate and draw their own conclusions about whether organizations like CTCA should be granted CON exceptions and whether the criticisms of its patient-acceptance and outcomes-reporting practices are well founded.

In 2013, Kenyan horticulture producer and exporter VP Group is weighing potential expansion opportunities against the growing risks in its production and export markets. With $121 million in 2012 revenues, VP Group has grown rapidly in recent years by expanding its vegetable and flower production beyond Kenya into Ethiopia and Ghana; exploring new products such as sugar; and vertically integrating by bringing marketing and logistics operations in-house. The company's leadership is excited about future growth opportunities but also concerned about the impact of VP Group's growth on its entrepreneurial culture. The company also faces increasing cost pressures due to rising costs in Kenya and flat prices in U.K. supermarkets, its main buyers. VP Group's size, vertical integration, and focus on sustainability leave it well positioned as a long-term partner to U.K. supermarkets, but changes to the overall operating environment might require the company to rethink its strategy.

In November 2013, Dr. Jose Pinto, head of Grupo Beta San Miguel (BSM), Mexico's largest private sugar producer, is weighing the future prospects of the Mexican sugar industry as he considers whether BSM should bid on one of the state-owned sugar mills slated for auction. His decision will be informed by dynamics in the North American sugar market-NAFTA affords Mexico unique duty-free access to the U.S.-as well as the world sugar market and other major sugar-producing countries, especially Brazil.

The widespread cheating scandal that rocked the Atlanta public school system in 2010 and 2011 illustrates how high-stakes performance pressure, without sufficient risk controls, can drive dangerous behavior. After becoming superintendent of the low-income and academically struggling Atlanta, Georgia school system in 1999, Beverly Hall implemented new measurement systems-many of them derived from business best practices-to motivate and evaluate the performance of teachers and principals. Educators whose students performed well on standardized tests received bonuses and public recognition; educators whose students fell short received reprimands, warnings, and eventually termination. With so much riding on "meeting the numbers," teachers and principals began taking drastic steps, including collaborating to change students' test answers while intimidating colleagues who threatened to expose the deception. As Atlanta students' (fabricated) test scores soared, leaders in business and politics praised Beverly Hall's data-driven approach for transforming a lagging school system into a model of success. More than a decade into Hall's tenure, multiple investigations finally exposed the scandal in Atlanta-and its terrible impact on the district's students. (For instructors who want to inject some extra energy, and fun, in the classroom, this case study provides material for students to stage skits in front of the class to illustrate how and why the cheating occurred.)

Ohio-based optical retailer Pearle Vision, part of the vertically integrated Italian eyewear group Luxottica, sold glasses and offered in-store eye exams. Once the largest U.S. optical retailer, Pearle Vision, with 266 corporate stores and 356 franchised stores in 2012, was struggling to compete with and differentiate itself from industry leader LensCrafters, also owned by Luxottica. Increasing competition from low-price competitors, such as Wal-Mart's optical stores, were adding further competitive pressure. The case takes place in early 2013, with Pearle Vision's new CEO announcing his plans for revitalizing the chain. Will his strategy work?

Through the lens of biopharmaceutical contract research organization (CRO) PAREXEL, this case traces the evolution of the firm as it reinvents itself in response to the transformation of the CRO sector from a small, secondary cluster of firms into a major player with essential capabilities for global drug development. The case begins as PAREXEL is pursuing an expensive globalization and IT strategy while many of its competitors focus on cost cutting. Over the prior 20 years, CEO Josef von Rickenbach had grown PAREXEL into a billion-dollar company by taking calculated risks and making bold investments based on anticipated industry trends and client demand. Now, despite slowing demand for CRO services, PAREXEL is betting that a global footprint and technology capabilities will become its key future competitive advantage. Near the end of the case, the timing transitions to a decade after Rickenbach made this strategic decision, describing the development of the industry and PAREXEL's place within it.

This case explores the use of social media to support product design, customer support, marketing and HR activities at National Instruments (NI). Based in Austin, Texas, with over $1 billion in 2011 sales, NI designs, produces, and sells software and hardware platforms that simplify development of its customers measurement and control systems. Its customers, ranging from individuals (professors and their students) to large corporations, consist primarily of scientists and engineers-a pedigree shared by most NI employees. Since dedicating a full-time position to formalizing the use of social media tools in 2006, NI has infused social capabilities into its internal and customer-facing business processes, strengthening relationships and value delivered. NI's story deepens our understanding of how to build a social business strategy, create game changing innovation processes, and measure the value of its social technology investments-a key challenge facing the company. By touching on NI's history and culture, the case also allows students to consider what elements of this company's organization and culture have allowed it to build a robust social business model.

Omar Ishrak, Medtronic's first non-American CEO, aims to reinvigorate the medical device maker's growth by focusing on emerging markets, therapy innovation, and creative business models. In 2012, budget constraints in mature economies, the lack of new medical therapies coming to market, and the decline in growth of Medtronic's core businesses has reduced the company's once dynamic growth close to zero. As the newly appointed CEO, Ishrak faces the formidable challenge of restoring the company's growth. In his first 18 months as CEO, he has laid the groundwork for future growth by ramping up R&D investment in breakthrough therapy innovations. To bolster Medtronic's near-term prospects, he has supported creative product and business model innovations aimed at overcoming adoption barriers in emerging economies. Ishrak restructured his executive team and their responsibilities: the heads of Medtronic's global operating regions and major countries, who previously reported to the head of international, now report directly to the CEO, putting seven non-Americans on the excecutive committee. In another important milestone, Medtronic acquired a Chinese orthopedics company, which became its first fully integrated business unit outside the U.S. Ishrak is trying to decide whether these steps are sufficient to transform Medtronic from a multinational into a truly global company and restore its growth.

Cross Country (renamed Agero in 2011) operated call centers that coordinated with thousands of small, independent towing companies-Cross Country's "service provider network"-to deliver roadside assistance services, such as vehicle towing and tire changes, to motorists covered by automakers' warranties and insurers' policies. The case describes Cross Country's evolution from 1972 to 2012 in three phases. This allows students to, at various stages, grapple with defining Cross Country's business (what business is it, and should it be, in?) and its primary customer (vehicle makers and insurers? motorists? service providers?). The answers to these questions have important implications for organization design. During the first phase, from 1972 to 1998, founder Sidney Wolk built the business through personal relationships with clients. A passionate entrepreneur, his approach to growth-secure customers first, figure out how to make money later-was remarkably successful, if sometimes chaotic. Facing an increasingly commoditized marketplace, in 1998 Wolk hired professional managers who implemented formal performance management systems and invested in sophisticated data analytics. From 1998 to 2007 (phase two), these investments allowed Cross Country to quantify service providers' impact on motorist satisfaction, monitor service providers' performance, and introduce programs to strengthen top-performing service providers' loyalty to Cross Country. Concurrently, the company undertook a two-step organization redesign to focus more resources on service providers (the new primary customer?), improve market-focused innovation and increase client satisfaction. In phase three, from 2008 to 2012, Cross Country entered the high-tech telematics/connected-vehicle business, invested in additional innovations to strengthen its service provider network, and rebranded itself as "Agero." Wolk and his team believed Cross Country had "more driver information than any other company."

Patrick Coveney, CEO of Greencore, one of the top producers of private label prepared foods sold through U.K. grocery retailers, was assessing Greencore's growth options. Growth potential was limited in the U.K., a mature market in which retailers were unlikely to grant much greater market share to Greencore or any of its competitors. In the U.S., where Greencore had struggled to gain traction since its initial entry in 2008, the market for fresh, chilled prepared foods was far less developed. Can Greencore translate its success in the U.K. to the U.S.? Should Coveney focus on developing the U.S. market or on maximizing Greencore's position in the U.K.?

How should Eli Lilly further develop and market a new indication of its highly successful erectile-dysfunction (ED) drug, Cialis, without confusing Cialis's hard-won brand equity with physicians and patients? With the final stages of clinical trials for the new indication, benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), soon to be carried out, the team had to make a decision soon. On its face, the market opportunity for a BPH indication, and its synergies with an ED drug, seemed enormous: both ED and BPH were age-related conditions, and data showed that half of men with ED had BPH symptoms. Moreover, the BPH indication would be taken in the same frequency and dosing as the once-a-day version of Cialis. However, market research had revealed significant challenges in introducing the BPH indication under the Cialis name. For example, although ED and BPH often co-existed, men perceived them quite differently. Some physicians also reacted negatively to the BPH indication. Impending competition from low-price ED generics, given that Viagra would soon be going off patent, underscored the importance of the BPH opportunity.

Would the advent of global payment models and ACOs create sufficient demand for a telemedicine offering covering the care continuum, from hospitals to the home? This was the decision facing Royal Philips Electronics (Philips), the Netherlands-based producer of lighting, consumer electronics, and health care products, in 2012. Philips already offered several remote monitoring systems for hospitals, including the eICU, which it obtained through the 1998 acquisition of Visicu. In the eICU model, patients in hospital ICUs were monitored using bedside devices, which transmitted patient data to a remote station from which clinicians monitored and directed care as needed. The model aimed to improve care quality by enabling early interventions and reducing adverse events, and to cut costs by allowing clinicians to care for a larger number of patients. Building on this and other offerings in its portfolio, including numerous home care devices, Philips could extend this model to create an integrated remote monitoring offering managed through a centralized clinician-staffed station. In doing so, it could gain a deep and early foothold with ACOs and position itself as a leader in telemedicine-enabled care. However, U.S. telemedicine adoption to date was slow, in part due to insufficient cost-effectiveness evidence, and ACOs-the likely target customer-remained underdeveloped. Philips would also contend with a complex selling process and numerous operational challenges. Was it too early to invest? And, if not, who were the ideal ACO beta sites?