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Founded in 2016, DeepMap developed high definition (HD) mapping software and localization services for Level 4+ autonomous vehicles. Traditional navigational maps were accurate to a few meters, which was sufficient for drivers, but not for machine-driven vehicles which required centimeter level accuracy. Autonomous vehicles required a new form of map that was highly precise, produced a 3D representation of the surrounding area, enabled vehicles to locate themselves within the map, provided information for how to navigate safely using the correct rules of the road, and was updated continuously as road conditions changed. DeepMap was not selling a static mapping database, but rather licensing its software under a software-as-a-service model. As a startup with limited resources navigating a nascent market, DeepMap faced uncertainty across several dimensions: the timing of overall AV market adoption, which countries would adopt fastest, which AV segments would move most rapidly, which sensor technologies would become standard, and what impact regulation would have. They also faced the challenge of serving customers on a global scale. As DeepMap looked ahead, it had to decide how and where to focus and allocate its funding in order to achieve its short and long-term objectives.

This case follows Lebanese entrepreneur, Hind Hobeika, an engineer and competitive swimmer who spends seven years trying to launch a wearable heartrate monitor and motion sensor to help swimmers track their performance while swimming. While the Beirut-based entrepreneur gained initial traction soon after founding her company Instabeat in September 2011, winning $150,000 in prize money from business plan competitions and raising $100,000 from a local venture capital firm, Hobeika soon faced a series of set-backs in trying to manufacture the product. Given the complexity of the hardware product she was trying to build, Hobeika had invested a significant amount of capital in the manufacturing design and had faced continuous delays. In addition, the product was not proving to be economically viable. By early 2016, Hobeika was out of money and had to let her team go. The business issues had also taken a toll on her personal life. However, Hobeika saw a potential path forward. The VC who had originally backed her was closing a new round of funding and was willing to discuss another potential round. More importantly, while in London, she had recently met Alex Asseily, a prominent Lebanese-British entrepreneur who encouraged her to stay the course. He suggested that she relocate to San Francisco, where he would soon be based, and offered to help her. Would it be worthwhile to leave everything behind, relocate, and rebuild the business? Hobeika had to decide: should she continue or not? If so, under what circumstances? If not, what would she do next?

Wade Watts has won control of the OASIS - a futuristic, immersive virtual reality game world. He must decide on rules, rights, and marketplace design, balancing the founding principles of the OASIS with the platform's potentially negative externalities.

Founded in 2008, Khan Academy was a global educational nonprofit with a mission to provide a free, world-class education for anyone anywhere in the world. By 2018, the organization had expanded into numerous content areas, product areas, and geographic markets. However, a newly minted 3-year strategic plan called for greater focus and prioritization to enable the young organization to maximize its impact. It also called for increased fundraising efforts to ensure long-term sustainability. The case poses several questions: how to balance Khan Academy's far-reaching aspirational vision for transforming education globally with the short term need for greater focus? Would the priorities set in the strategic plan enable Khan Academy to create systemic global change? How should donors evaluate the attractiveness and impact of a potential investment in Khan Academy relative to other organizations in the educational market? Was Khan Academy on the right path to ensuring long-term sustainability?

Founded by a team of hedge fund and NGO alumni, OpenInvest launched its platform in 2015 to enable retail investors to tailor their portfolio to their personal values in an automated way, for instance by screening out weapon manufacturers stocks or overweighting LGBTQ friendly companies, while still closely tracking the overall stock market performance. Bolstered by $3.25M in seed funding from Andreessen Horowitz, in 2017 OpenInvest was also preparing to launch an app targeted at millennials customers that would include a novel proxy voting feature that allowed clients to vote on shareholder resolutions with a simple swipe. With this technological addition OpenInvest was well on its way towards realizing its mission of democratizing SRI investing, bringing transparency to the financial services market, and enabling retail investors to invest their capital in a way that aligned with their values. However, getting to scale and profitability in the crowded robo-advisors space was a critical challenge. The case closes with the founders contemplating expanding or migrating their model from B2C to B2B in order to achieve scale and profitability faster. The case is an opportunity to discuss the theoretical underpinning of creating impact in public markets, to explore how portfolio performance may be affected by Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) screens; and to understand drivers of demand for impacting investing more broadly. The case also explores the challenges the founders face when aiming to design a new product to meet an emerging need, and which distribution channel to choose for doing so.

In 2017, management at Shift, an online marketplace that uses a "high touch," concierge approach to buy and sell used cars, was formulating plans for the San Francisco-based startup's next phase of expansion. One option was to preserve Shift's current business model and grow through geographic expansion. Another option was to decentralize more tasks to sellers and/or buyers, for example, management of inspections and repairs. While decentralizing tasks would reduce Shift's labor per transaction and thereby improve the venture's unit economics and its scalability, Shift might risk undermining users' trust by handing off responsibility for critical tasks.

This short case updates the earlier Intuit case on transitioning from a product company into a platform company. In addition to provided information on the recent successes and challenges of the business, it also explores a new challenge of building a platform with a branded third party solution or a "white label" solution, which would hide the third party brand.

Founded in 2008, Floodgate pioneered the "micro-VC" category, a new type of investment firm that raised smaller funds and made earlier, smaller investments in technology startups than traditional venture-capital firms. By 2015, Floodgate had raised three funds totaling $225 million and achieved outsize success with investments in high profile startups like Twitter, Twitch, Cruise Automation, and Lyft. Floodgate measured success in terms of its coverage of the top 10-15 exits in any given year. These "Thunder Lizards," which had the potential to change the business landscape and grow to Godzilla-like scale, accounted for 97% of returns. With increasing competition from micro-VCs and alternatives like crowdfunding, opportunity funds, and incubators, partners Ann Miura-Ko and Mike Maples wondered how Floodgate could continue to compete successfully in a rapidly changing venture-capital landscape. Should Floodgate stay with the micro-VC model it helped invent, or raise more capital, leveraging its successful track record to make investments at the scale of more traditional VC firms? In selecting a path, they needed to consider Floodgate's dual responsibility to entrepreneurs and LPs.

As a biotech start-up company involved in studying human genomes, Perlegen needed to develop an organization that fostered innovation and teamwork among a group of highly trained professionals from both the science and technology fields. Perlegen's CEO, Brad Margus, had joined Perlegen from the shrimp processing business after learning that two of his three sons had been diagnosed with a rare genetic disease. A Harvard MBA and self-trained geneticist, Margus looked forward to the opportunity to dedicate himself to Perlegen's scientific mission. During his first nine months on the job, Margus had hired a number of junior-level and mid-level employees; now it was time to fill out the senior management team. Margus's first senior management hire was Greg Brandeau, the former vice president of computer operations at Pixar Animation Studios, who signed on to be Perlegen's CEO. Brandeau faced a number of challenges as he integrated into the Perlegen organization, including the fact that he lacked a science background, his two direct reports had already been hired, and he would be the third leg of a tight-knit, two-person senior management team already in place.

Tellme, an early-stage, venture-backed company based in Silicon Valley, leverages speech-recognition technologies to provide: 1) a "voice portal" with news and other information accessible through any telephone, and 2) turnkey application development and hosting services for other companies that wish to voice-enable customer service and marketing applications. These two businesses are interdependent: partners' applications receive greater usage when they are hosted within Tellme's portal, and Tellme's portal receives greater usage by virtue of hosting a richer array of applications. In the fall of 2000, Tellme managers are debating a number of strategic issues, most importantly: 1) should they agree to voice-enable services for mass-market Internet portals like Yahoo!, which would provide significant application development/hosting revenue but accelerate competition to Tellme's own voice portal?; and 2) should they pursue a "Get Big Fast" strategy, investing aggressively in customer acquisition and brand building?

A new approach to philanthropy, led by venture capitalists and the "new wealth." has emerged in the last two years. They are applying the same accountability criteria from results as they would with their investment portfolio.

Details how to design, launch, and scale a rapidly growing Internet venture. Focuses on the challenges and opportunities involved in leveraging a network of partners.

Heidi Roizen, a venture capitalist at SOFTBANK Venture Capital and a former entrepreneur, maintains an extensive personal and professional network. She leverages this network to benefit both herself and others. The case considers the steps she's taken to build and cultivate a network that is both broad and deep.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Catches the situation facing Charles Schwab Corp. in late August 1999 in the dramatically changing brokerage industry. Their bold moves in January 1998 have created a new industry competitive pattern and provoked aggressive response by companies like Merrill Lynch.

A look at the industrial restructuring in the brokerage industry made possible by e-commerce. Focuses the student's attention on the decision alternatives facing Charles Schwab, one of the industry leaders in January 1998. In a word, the challenge is "Do they slash prices to meet competition from companies like E-Trade or do they stand still?"

Describes the procedures and processes used by Cisco Systems in its acquisition of high-technology firms. Its goal is to retain key engineering talent and to leverage existing product development efforts, but to quickly merge acquired companies its own systems and procedures. In addition to describing the general approach used by Cisco, this case describes some of the specifics involving its acquisition of Summa Four, a designer/manufacturer of a related product line, whose major activities are located in New England.

Preview Travel was a leader in the online travel industry, having generated $80 million in bookings in 1997 and growing at a 34% compound annual growth rate per quarter. This case describes the evolution of Preview Travel's business plan and financing strategy and highlights a financial turning point that the company faced in August 1997. In August 1997, the company was in need of an additional cash infusion and had received strong indications of interest from a major U.S. media company. However, Preview Travel was disappointed with the offer the media company eventually made--$4.50 a share--since it was significantly less than the Series E round a year earlier ($9.00 a share). An investment bank advising Preview Travel believed that Preview Travel could garner a higher valuation in the public market and recommended that the company consider an IPO as an alternative means of raising capital. However, there were risks to this strategy. Closes with the question of whether Preview Travel should accept the "sure" but low offer from the media company or pursue an accelerated and potentially risky IPO.

Supplements the (A) case.