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This case describes Keroche's growth after entering the beer business in 2008. Although the company was operating at full capacity and not able to fulfill all of its orders, Tabitha Karanja had set a goal of growing Keroche's share of the Kenyan beer market from slightly over 1% to 20%. In 2010, Tabitha Karanja had invested US$2.5 million in a PET bottling line to increase capacity of Keroche's vodka drinks. However, in 2010, the government had passed a law requiring alcoholic drinks to be sold in glass containers, which made the PET investment obsolete. Now, in 2011, Tabitha Karanja sought new funding for a glass bottling line. The case asks whether, in the midst of these new investments, it was also time to expand beer capacity by building a new and larger plant.

This case describes Keroche co-founder Tabitha Karanja's decision to exit the wine business following the Kenyan government's 2007 increase in excise taxes on wine. In August 2007, Keroche introduced the vodka drink Viena Ice as a replacement for its fortified wines, and in August 2008, it entered the beer market with the launch of its Summit Lager premium beer. The case describes the success of Keroche's products in the Kenyan beer market, despite an initial intense advertising campaign by Keroche competitor EABL for its own Tusker beer.

This case discusses the situation of the Kenyan alcoholic drinks producer Keroche in July 2004, when co-founder Tabitha Karanja was debating whether to enter the Kenyan beer market. Doing so would mean direct competition with the multinational EABL in an industry and market where Keroche had no experience. It would also require significant investments in manufacturing capacity, technology, and marketing. The case asks whether Tabitha Karanja should enter the Kenyan beer market, and if so, whether she should continue to target the low- to middle-income consumers with whom she had built the Keroche business, or shift the company's focus toward the upper middle- and high-income consumers who had been customers of EABL. The case also describes how the company successfully rebounded from the plant closures, litigation, and media attacks of the previous year, including through court battles and an extensive public relations campaign.

This case discusses the challenges faced by Kenyan alcoholic drinks producer Keroche Industries Limited in 2003, when the Kenyan government accused the company of manufacturing and selling substandard alcoholic drinks, revoked its liquor licenses, and shut down its manufacturing facility. At the same time, the multinational East Africa Breweries Limited (EABL) was planning to enter the same low-income market as Keroche. The husband and wife duo Tabitha and Joseph Karanja had founded Keroche in 1997 with the aim of providing Kenya's low-income consumers with a cheap and safe alcoholic drink alternative, since these consumers frequently turned to unregulated, informally brewed alcohol that could blind or even kill those who drank it. However, the government was now claiming that Keroche, too, produced substandard drinks. Tabitha Karanja was convinced that EABL was behind these government attacks. The case describes the history of Keroche and EABL, and asks what Tabitha Karanja might do now to combat the allegations of the government and respond to the factory closing.

This case describes Amandla Capital, a fledgling company in Cote d'Ivoire, facing three opportunities in the real estate and hospitality industries in Africa. It introduces students to several concepts: decision making and cost-benefit analysis in real estate, corporate strategy selection, management of stakeholders with varied needs and levels of sophistication, dealing with conflicts of interest, basics of hospitality and hotel management industries.

The so-called "infrastructure finance gap" was a problem in Nigeria as in many parts of the world. Infrastructure projects like power plants and dams were very large capital investments that could generate long term consistent cash flows, but their financing and delivery involved multiple risks and uncertainties. If funds for infrastructure development came from traditional international sources like the World Bank or African Development Bank, those lenders would worry about foreign exchange, interest rates, and political risk and would almost always seek sovereign guarantees (payment guarantees from the federal government). Such assurances and guarantees were hard to come by, difficult to negotiate, and project inception could take decades. In this context could pension funds or private equity-type structures be viable alternative sources of financing for infrastructure? By 2017 Nigeria had reformed its pension administration system so that pension funds could both accept significant amounts of retirement funds from workers and, manage and invest those funds in a transparent and safe structure. One of the asset classes in addition to government bonds, equities, and corporate bonds that was authorized for investment by pension funds was infrastructure debt securities. Until recently, few Nigerian infrastructure securities had strong enough credit ratings to be investable by cautious pension funds. Infrastructure Credit Guarantee Company (InfraCredit) hoped to break that logjam by supporting infrastructure issues denominated in local currency with credit assurances taking the place of sovereign guarantees. Other entities took different approaches to raising capital for infrastructure in this market. Africa Plus Partners (Africa Plus), for example, proposed a fund structure with features of American private equity. It was not yet clear if this type of fund arrangement would be as attractive as debt for pension fund investors.