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Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Maestro pizza opened its first store in 2013 after its founder, Khalid Al Omran, recognized an opportunity in Saudi Arabia to offer high quality pizza at affordable prices. The business grew rapidly and under the radar at first, but soon enough caught the attention of international pizza giants who had been operating in the country for nearly two decades. That was when Maestro found itself locked into a costly, seemingly relentless, multi-year marketing and pricing war with the market leader at the time; Domino's pizza. This series of cases (from A to H) chronicles Maestro's journey from inception up to 2020 and the various challenges it faced. This multi-part case study provides students with the opportunity to reflect at key inflection points for Al Omran and his team as a result of the competition with Domino's and changing market conditions.

Many innovative business models don't see a profit until they scale up but if the business model itself is fundamentally flawed, that profit won't materialize. Entrepreneurs can determine if their startup is built to last by looking at the profitability at the unit level so they can be sure they're capturing the full value and don't scale too soon.

Over its 17 years in existence, Tesla had redefined people's view of electric cars, and in 2020, the company saw its stock rise by more than 700% to became the most valuable carmaker in the world. In December 2020, Tesla celebrated its fifth consecutive quarter of profit and joined the S&P 500. However, in 2021 competition in the electric vehicle space was rapidly heating up. In January, General Motors announced that it would phase out gas-powered vehicles to sell only vehicles with zero emissions by 2035. A week later, Ford announced that it would invest $22 billion on electric vehicles (including hybrids) and $7 billion on autonomous vehicles by 2025. Meanwhile, BMW was developing electrified versions of all its models, and the Volkswagen Group had announced a new strategic plan with the specific aim of catching up with Tesla. Tesla's run had defied the skeptics, but with competition revving up, would Tesla be able to dominate the market in the years to come?

The case opens in September 2019 as Sacha Poignonnec and Jeremy Hodara, co-founders and co-CEOs of Jumia, the leading Pan-African e-commerce platform, are contemplating the company's path to profitability in the aftermath of a fragile investor sentiment, as the company announced two internal issues in August 2019. The case chronicles the founding and expansion of Jumia and the iterations of its business model and describes its competitive outlook. The case then provides a detailed overview of how Jumia built its three pillars-its marketplace, logistics, and payments arms-and how the co-founders decided on the company's strategic, customer, and product scopes over the seven years in which Jumia spread across 14 countries in Africa since its founding in 2012. The case also provides an overview of Jumia's vertical scope, its technology, marketing, and payments systems, and how the company's localization strategy brings complexities to its business model, as Jumia tries to adopt its approach, website, products, and services to each country to increase profitability. While there is for the most part no single competitor that serves the same geography as Jumia does, Jumia strives to educate the African market about shopping online and overcome various infrastructure problems in the continent to improve its margins and become profitable. While its second quarter 2019 financials show continued GMV and customer growth, the co-founders need to convince investors of the company's path to profitability and answer questions such as: Is Jumia's existing product-service mix and geographical coverage the best use of the company's financial and managerial resources, or does the company need to make some eliminations? Can Jumia's expansive approach be sustainable as the geography becomes more developed and the inevitable specialized players come in?

This case describes the history of Uber, its business model-including the ways it differed from that of the traditional taxi industry-and its competition with Lyft. The case is set in 2017, a year in which Uber was plagued by even more scandals than usual, though its behavior had frequently sparked controversy ever since its launch in 2010. By June 2017, Uber had a valuation of $70 billion, making it the most valuable venture-funded tech startup in the world, but a shadow hung over its reputation, due in part to recent revelations about its toxic and sexist corporate culture, and to its tendency to ignore local regulations when expanding into new markets. In June 2017, Uber's co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick resigned, and in August 2017, Dara Khosrowshahi, formerly the CEO of Expedia, was hired in his place. Meanwhile, Lyft, which presented itself as the "nice guy" alternative to Uber's bad-boy image, seemed to be gaining ground. The case asks what Khosrowshahi might do to fix Uber's broken culture and improve its public image, and how he could best ensure Uber's dominance in the years to come.

This case describes the founding of Chinese coffee chain Luckin Coffee in 2017 and its path to surpassing Starbucks as the largest coffee chain in China (by number of stores) in 2019. Unlike Starbucks stores, which were designed to be welcoming "third places" for customers to gather away from their homes or offices, most of Luckin's stores were small and bare, reflecting its mission to provide convenient takeout or delivery coffee to busy customers. With its app-based ordering, cashierless stores, and "smart," cloud-connected kitchen equipment, Luckin positioned itself as a technology company, rather than just a coffee shop, and attracted a number of big-name investors.<br/> However, Luckin used deep discounts on its products to attract new customers, and as of 2019, it had yet to be profitable on a company level. The case asks whether Luckin's business model could be sustainable, even in the absence of these promotional prices, and whether Luckin's focus on takeout and delivery (soon to be expanded through a network of vending machines and express coffee machines) was enough to differentiate it from competitors.

This case describes revelations of fraud at Luckin Coffee, beginning with an anonymous report in January 2020 and continuing with the company's admission in April 2020 that it had inflated its revenues by 2.2 billion RMB ($310 million), almost half its reported revenue, in the last three quarters of 2019. It was later found that Luckin had arranged false transactions at many of its stores, and that it had sold tens of millions of cups of coffee (through coffee vouchers) to corporate customers with ties to Luckin chairman Charles Lu. It had also falsified supplier payments, creating a loop of fraudulent transactions that inflated both its sales and expenses.