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The case opens in 2016 as Amine Benkirane, CEO of the furniture retailer KITEA, observes KITEA's dormant sales on the day IKEA opens its first store in Morocco. It then provides information on IKEA's Morocco store, as well as a detailed pricing comparison between IKEA products in Morocco and elsewhere and similar products sold by KITEA. The case then asks whether KITEA had any chance to compete with IKEA under the current circumstances, taking into account its extensive preparation for the competition.

The case opens in 2018 after KITEA has recorded two years of double-digit sales growth following IKEA's entry into the Moroccan market. It then traces the factors that contributed to KITEA' success and that led Tana Africa Capital Limited to acquire a minority stake in the company. In February 2018, following the acquisition, the partners announced plans to create a presence in North and West African countries through KITEA's stores. The case asks whether, after a number of frightening years, KITEA was ready to expand internationally to Sub-Saharan Africa, and if so, what the optimal structure and pace for this expansion should be.

This case describes the delay of IKEA's store opening in Morocco in 2015. After Sweden ordered an internal review of its position on the independence of Western Sahara, a territory Morocco regarded as part of its own, the Moroccan government declared that IKEA did not have proper licensing to open its store in Morocco. The opening of its Zenata store was delayed by at least several months. What additional changes should Amine and Othman Benkirane implement at KITEA in the extra time?

The case opens in February 2016, when the official date of IKEA's store opening (March 16, 2016) is announced after a five month delay. It reviews the changes that Amine and Othman Benkirane had made to KITEA's workforce in the extra five months afforded by the delay, and asks if KITEA is now ready to compete successfully against IKEA.

The case opens in 2013 as Amine Benkirane, founder and CEO of the leading Moroccan furniture company KITEA, contemplates the loss his company has incurred for the first time in its 20-year history. The case then describes KITEA's origins and provides a detailed overview of the business plan that enabled Benkirane to bring affordable modern furniture in flatpacks to the Moroccan market, which had previously been dominated by unorganized artisans. At the beginning of 2010, KITEA was a market leader with a robust market share of 24%. However, Benkirane read about rumors that IKEA was planning to enter the Moroccan market. The case explores in detail KITEA's efforts to prepare for the increased competition. In 2013, KITEA found itself in a difficult situation, facing a downturn in the economy, a slowdown in sales, a delayed store opening, and souring creditor sentiment following the news about IKEA's entry. Would KITEA be able to bounce back and remain competitive when IKEA entered the market?

At the end of 2016, the leadership team of Commonwealth Joe Coffee Roasters-Robert Peck, Chase Damiano, and Jeremy Martin-had begun an ambitious retail expansion strategy in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area for their specialty coffee business. That October, they had opened their first custom-designed store in a brand-new luxury apartment building. The new store was an immediate success, even though a Starbucks had recently opened across the street. At the same time, a separate business line-selling cold brew coffee in kegs to office customers-had grown unexpectedly. Many new office accounts were added, even as the team promoted the new retail store. Now, as Peck, Damiano, and Martin prepared for the next capital raise, targeted for February 2017, they evaluated their strategy going forward. Should Commonwealth Joe stay with retail, or should they shift their strategy to focus on the office business?

In 2013, the Swiss sports data company Sportradar debated whether to expand from its core business of data provision to bookmakers into sports media products. Sports data was becoming a commodity, and in the future, sports leagues might reduce their dependence on third-party data feeds such as Sportradar's, prefering to develop data services in-house. Thus, CEO Carsten Koerl believed the company needed to branch into sports media, not just supplying data to companies, but finding ways to tell stories about that data. However, Sportradar's core business was thriving, whereas a recent attempt to branch out into video player tracking systems had proved a costly failure. The team weighed the pros and cons of various media ventures, including online sports betting minigames, a social media site, and streaming of sports content.

This case follows up on the competition between Kmart and Walmart as discussed in the A case. It summarizes the companies' positions in the early 2000s, and discusses events between 1990 and Kmart's declaration of bankruptcy in 2002. Walmart grew significantly, expanded internationally, and became a leading player in groceries. However, it also faced criticism regarding its wage and labor practices. Meanwhile, Kmart faced an identity crisis, falling between the cracks while customers sought lower prices at Walmart and higher-end goods at Target. In the 1990s, its growth stemmed mainly from acquisitions, not all of which proved beneficial in the long term.

This case, set in 1990, describes the history of Walmart and asks what competitive strategies Kmart might adopt in response to Walmart's success. It discusses the strategy and organization of both companies in terms of HR practices, store location, distribution, information technology, procurement, pricing, and company culture. This (A) case is the first in a multi-part series that goes on to describe the results of Kmart's competition with Walmart, as well as Walmart's later grappling with ecommerce and Amazon.

Founded in 2012, Jumia Nigeria, a startup effort by Germany-based Rocket Internet, aimed to become an African Amazon. The company entered the nascent market and immediately enjoyed an uptick in consumer spending fueled by the strength of Nigeria's oil-based economy. By 2016, however, Jumia's growth had begun to taper, hindered by plummeting oil prices, the subsequent economic downturn, and the pressure of Nigeria's limited retail ecosystem. In addition, Jumia's inventory-intensive retail model required significant infusions of capital that, in the face of a deteriorating economy and the company's inability to show a profit, was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Considering all this and looking to the success of the Amazon and Alibaba marketplace models where third-party sellers largely carried inventory costs, the Board had made a drastic decision: Jumia would shift from an online retail model to a marketplace model. They also made it very clear that a failure to properly implement this transition could mean the end of investor support for Jumia. Senior management wondered how they would meet the challenges ahead. While Amazon in the US and Alibaba in China had found success with the marketplace model, they wondered if Jumia would be able to do the same. Was this the right model for the very different Nigerian environment? Would vendors, many of whom already had retail operations in the country, choose to sell through Jumia? How could Jumia continue to provide the same high quality customer service on which the company's success had been built while switching to a marketplace model in which parts of this critical aspect would now be in the hands of third parties?

This follow up case study explores the ramifications of Jumia's decision to move from a retail led to a markplace business model for its e-commerce platform. The case visits the company's successes as well as its many failures when adopting this vendor-led strategy. It also considers Jumia's options going forward- should it return to the retail-led model or develop a hybrid alternative?

This case explores the strategic decision-making process of premium power tools manufacturer Hilti in 1999, when the company was considering implementing a fleet management system in the construction industry. Fleet management would involve a shift from selling power tools to leasing them as a service. For Hilti, it represented an entirely new business model, which would substantially differentiate the company from its competitors. While fleet management had the potential to significantly improve the customer experience, Hilti was already a successful firm under its extant model, and had to decide whether the restructuring of its business model was worth the risk.

Buoyed by success in the market for gambling contracts, Betfair attempts to enter the market for financial products using its exchange model.

Prompted by a takeover bid from CVC, Betfair reassesses the strengths and weaknesses of the exchange model.

Betfair reconsiders its approach to international gambling markets amid regulatory uncertainty.

This case explores the introduction of fleet management in the construction industry by the premium power tools manufacturer Hilti in 2000. Following its customers' needs, Hilti moved from selling power tools to leasing them as a service. The introduction of the new business model contributed significantly to the success of Hilti, since it sustainably differentiated the company from its competitors. For instance, the adoption of fleet management resulted in customer loyalty levels five times higher than under the dominant business model Hilti had formerly employed, and over-proportioned profit contribution at Hilti. Hilti's Chief Technology Officer described the importance of the innovation as follows: "Hilti developed many very innovative and successful products over the years, but they paled in comparison with the fleet management business model, which was the most important innovation in Hilti's history." All told, Hilti, which had about 22,000 employees and made about 4.5 billion Swiss Francs (or $4.589 billion USD) in sales in 2015, managed 1.5 million tools under fleet management contracts in 40 countries, resulting in a contract value of more than 1.2 billion Swiss Francs (approximately $1.4 billion USD). Case A describes the strategic decision-making process regarding the introduction of fleet management in its early planning stages. Case B (separate) tackles the implementation and scaling process of fleet management over the years and explores current challenges facing the BMI.

The (B) case tackles the implementation and scaling process of fleet management over the years. Finally, the case explores current challenges facing the BMI.

The Corporate Strategy Reading uses the lens of value creation and value capture in order to examine corporate strategy. It highlights why firms, especially those competing in multiple businesses, need a corporate strategy in order to guide their decisions about the scope of businesses they should operate in, as well as whether and how to structure the relationships between these businesses. In doing so, the Reading emphasizes how different modes of coordinating economic transactions affect the likelihood of positive and negative synergies. The Reading also considers how a firm should organize in order to implement its corporate strategy successfully. It concludes with two short supplemental readings that consider the interaction between corporate strategy and organizational scope.

This case examines the strategic choices and evolving business model of Imprimis Pharmaceuticals from the perspective of CEO Mark Baum. The A case provides a brief history of the company and of the compounding business, outlining the challenges faced by Imprimis in 2013. At the time, Imprimis was in the process of seeking FDA approval for a branded drug called Impracor. This process, already difficult, was further complicated by recent manufacturing issues. Meanwhile, the opportunity arose for Imprimis to purchase a technology related to compounded ocular injections. Because of the different competencies and business models required for the traditional pharmaceutical business vs. pharmaceutical compounding, Imprimis did not have the resources to pursue both of these options at once. Instead, Baum had to decide whether or not to abandon the company's previous focus on Impracor and to delve headlong into the compounding business. The two paths would require vastly different approaches to marketing, R&D, and manufacturing, so that either decision would shape the future of the company for years to come.

This case is a supplement to Imprimis (Case A). It describes the company's decision to enter into the pharmaceutical compounding business in 2013-14. Imprimis purchased a compounded ophthalmological medication called Dropless Therapy, which was injected into patients' eyes post-cataract surgery, with the aim of replacing a complex regimen of prescription eye drops. After a successful launch of the compounded medication, Imprimis ran into complications when Medicare changed its policy regarding payment for the drug. Under the new policy, not only would Medicare not cover the medication, but patients could no longer pay for it out of pocket. Instead, the cost had to be absorbed by the physician or surgery center. Imprimis now had to figure out a way to deal with the effects of this policy, whether that be by lobbying for a policy change, creating a compounded eye drop treatment of their own, or moving out of the cataract treatment business entirely.