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The case describes the history and transformation of DKSH, a privately-held global trading company headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, that has been doing business in the Far East for some 150 years. The case focuses on the efforts of CEO Joerg Wolle since 1999 to bring together several independent family-owned Swiss-based trading houses under one corporate roof and to transform successful but steady old-fashioned trading houses into a new type of company specializing in "Market Expansion Services." This novel Market Expansion Services company works with global "clients" (e.g. major pharmaceutical companies) to help them get access to and accelerate growth in different Asian markets and with "customers" (e.g., Asian distributors and retailers) to provide them with access to the goods and services from the global clients. To effectively achieve this corporate transformation, Wolle worked with several other senior executives to create integrated IT, logistics, and market intelligence capabilities. The case focuses on the growth strategy and associated challenges, mostly people-and leadership related-to bring DKSH to the next level of profitable growth.

This case covers the electric vehicle industry, starting with the history of the electric car and then moving on to the forces driving the twenty-first century automotive industry toward electrification. These include: Government incentives for buying electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles, the economic and political problems related to oil dependency, the effect of oil prices on consumers' car buying habits, carbon dioxide emission and pollution awareness, and the effect of current and upcoming worldwide emissions regulations. The case then discusses the challenges to mass electric vehicle adoption including: the relatively higher price of certain electric vehicles; consumers' fear of "range anxiety" - the term for batteries running out of power in the middle of the road; and the narrow demographics of traditional hybrid buyers - which could be mirrored in the demographics of electric car buyers. Other challenges include: competition with internal combustion engines that were becoming more fuel efficient, time limits for government incentive programs, the new competitive market of small, more fuel efficient cars being produced and sold in China and India for less than $3,000, and the question of carbon footprint - the concept that coal is the major source of electricity production in the United States and China, and therefore electric vehicles may simply create a shift in carbon footprint from oil to coal. The case provides specific data about electric car and plug-hybrid brands, price, all-electric driving range and release dates. It also details government programs to promote electric vehicles, as well as current and future mandated miles per gallon for various countries. In addition, it provides data about worldwide and U.S. car sales, how far Americans drive and for what purpose, and psychographics of hybrid vehicle owners.

This case is set five years after the Stanford Graduate School of Business case "Infosys Consulting in 2006: Leading the Next Generation of Business and Information Technology Consulting." Since then Infosys Consulting (IC) had become quite successful in the IT consulting world through its model of offsite technology development and its new Value Realization Method, which had driven IC's profits and reputation while becoming the company's key differentiator. The method involved quantitatively linking IC programs back to the creation of shareholder value on one side and to customer value on the other. While IC brought in zero dollars of revenue in 2004, in fiscal year 2011 direct revenue hit $200 million. In addition, IC drove another $600 million in revenue for its India-based parent company, Infosys Technology Limited (ITL). IC also had an operating margin of 25 percent. The company had grown very rapidly - by 2011 it counted 700 consultants worldwide and 42 partners. This quick growth provided both opportunities and challenges for the new company. IC's parent company ITL was also growing extremely rapidly, and the case discusses IC relationship with its parent company, which was across the world and had a much more formalized method of operation. By contrast, IC described itself as a maverick culture, which it saw as a great asset and helped the company attract and retain top-notch consultants.

In 2010, First Solar was the global leader in photovoltaic (PV) modules and looked to dominate the market going forward. The company's strong market position was largely predicated on its proprietary Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) cell technology, which had allowed First Solar to achieve the lowest cost in the industry. Despite its success to date, the company faced significant challenges in 2010. Declining subsidies in major markets in the EU, increased competition from well-heeled Chinese manufacturers, and the risk of disruption from higher efficiency technologies all threatened to undermine the progress that First Solar had made. The case provides a backdrop for analysis of how significant changes in the external market environment alter the relative importance of a company's distinctive competencies and require the development of new competencies. Specifically, the declining growth in subsidy markets requires First Solar to seek new sustainable markets in which PV solar is viable in the absence of subsidies. Success in these markets requires development of new skills not necessary for pure-play module manufacturing. In addition, the case explores key elements of technology leadership and mitigation of disruptive forces as the industry leader. Furthermore, the case examines the rationale for vertical integration within the solar industry and confronts the question of business definition. Management at First Solar must consider whether the company is simply in the module business in 2010 or whether its development and EPC capabilities have made it a more general energy company. The case also details the company's financial strategy, highlighting the intimate linkages with the overall corporate strategy. Finally, the company's corporate culture and management control systems are examined for their effectiveness at aligning the organization amidst significant external change.

In the spring of 2010, Intel was regarded as an important champion for a new broadband technology called WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access). WiMAX transmitted large amounts of data over radio signals, and offered much greater range than Wi-Fi. It also offered much faster connection speeds than 3G networks run by AT&T, Verizon and Sprint. WiMAX was a new space for Intel, and the company hoped it would yield the same type of profitability and success for Intel that Wi-Fi had. Between October 2008 and May 2010, Intel had joined forces with Clearwire, Sprint, Motorola and other partners to launch WiMAX in about 30 U.S. cities. Intel's vision for the deployment of WiMAX evolved from fixed wireless (for broadband connectivity to homes and businesses) to portable wireless (laptops) to mobile wireless (handheld devices and high-end smart phones), as the company spent billions of dollars on acquisitions and investments in the WiMAX arena. But Intel faced many challenges with WiMAX. A large infrastructure would have to be built from the ground up in the U.S. and around the world, and WiMAX needed a least a few major cellular operators to choose it as their next-generation (4G) technology. Intel would have to create a new 4G ecosystem to convince equipment manufactures to embed WiMAX technology in its devices. In addition, WiMAX faced stiff competition from other new wireless technologies, including LTE (Long Term Evolution), which AT&T and Verizon planned to use when they upgraded from 3G to 4G technology. Although WiMAX had a two- to three-year lead over LTE, the size of the mobile operators already committed to LTE threatened to make WiMAX a niche technology.

This case covers the coal industry and clean coal initiatives in the Unites States and China. Coal is a crucial source of global energy, but coal-fired plants are environmentally unfriendly and are a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. One way to reduce emission is through clean coal technologies, a term which usually refers to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), also referred to as Carbon Capture and Sequestration. CCS projects around the world are in the pilot and planning stage. The U.S. government has become involved in promoting clean coal technology by setting aside $3.4 billion for CCS projects through the Department of Energy. One billion of that will go toward a troubled CCS project called "FutureGen" in Illinois, and the government is trying to put together a group of 20 private companies to invest in the project in order for it to move forward. Private Companies, such as American Electric Power Company and Duke Energy are also working on their own individual CCS pilot projects. The Chinese government has also gotten involved in promoting clean coal technologies by dedicating billions of dollars to technology development and joining with private companies on CCS projects, the most notable of which is GreenGen. Seventy percent of China's energy comes from coal, as well as eighty percent of its electricity. The case also looks at the arguments and impact of environmentalists on the adoption of clean coal technologies. Environmentalists, most notably former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, believe that clean coal is a myth and have been lobbying against clean coal and coal in general.

By 2009, just 30 years after they had been commercially introduced cellular phones were used by billions of people worldwide. This note reviews the development of the cellular telecommunications industry, with particular emphasis on the role of intellectual property and technical standards. Throughout the industry's history, companies owning intellectual property (IP) actively advocated for standards to be adopted that incorporated their IP. Once standards were adopted, companies with strong IP positions were positioned to reap substantial financial rewards. This has led to intense competition over the standards process. This note covers developments to 2009, including work on standards for fourth generation (4G) cellular systems. However, its primary focus is on the earlier struggles between TDMA and CDMA technologies, and the role of Qualcomm in influencing the standards-setting process.

In September 2008, Google and its Open Handset Alliance (OHA) partner, T-Mobile, launched the first Android-enabled smartphone in the U.S. market. Android was a new, open source, operating system for the wireless industry, developed by the OHA, a group which Google brought together in November of the previous year. The introduction of an open source operating system specifically designed for mobile telecommunications had the potential to make a substantial impact on the marketplace. The case describes the mobile telecommunications industry landscape Google faced, and the incentives that the dominant search engine provider would have for initiating the Android project. The case also describes the challenges facing Google, and the Android operating system. By studying the dynamics of the wireless industry available in the case, one may consider whether Google had the potential to become a Cross Boundary Disruptor (XBD) in the wireless industry.

The case covers and analyzes the major players in the Electric Car Industry, with a focus on the United States and China. The case looks at start-ups and incumbent automakers, battery makers, retrofitters, utility companies and the government. In 2009, the electric car industry was poised to take a giant leap forward, with start-up companies a step ahead of large automakers. Venture capital firms were pouring hundreds of millions of dollars in promising electric car and Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) start-ups, while existing companies were pouring billions of dollars into electric car and PHEV research. There were also companies that retrofitted existing cars, turning them into Plug-in Hybrids. The case also examines the role of the U.S. and China's government in promoting the electric car industry by providing grants and loans to electric car and battery makers, as well as giving subsidies for consumers to buy electric cars. At the same time, battery makers were racing to build enough lithium-ion batteries for automobiles to meet the expected demand. Most batteries were developed and manufactured in Asia. The electric car industry also required a vast infrastructure of charging stations in each country to enable electric car and PHEV owners to charge their cars outside their homes. Electricity companies were taking an interest in the industry, and began partnering with automakers to test how extensively electric cars used the grid. The case also explores how internal combustion engine makers were striking back with new engines that were smaller, more fuel efficient and more environmentally friendly.

This case describes the work of the Innovation Program Office (IPO) within the Personal Systems Group (PSG) at technology company Hewlett-Packard (HP). It shows how this group solicits, qualifies and develops ideas for new products and services.

In November 2005, members of Corning Incorporated's early-stage opportunity identification and development team were preparing to make a recommendation regarding whether or not the company should move forward with a project to develop mercury abatement technology to help power plants meet impending U.S. legislation for the cleaner use of coal. This opportunity, which had been surfaced through Corning's relatively new process for early-stage opportunity identification, was believed by some to have the potential to become a sizable new business. As the company evaluated whether or not to invest in the development of this new venture, it was equally important for Corning to consider the effectiveness of its early-stage opportunity identification process. With limited resources and a pressing need to increase the company's rate of innovation, this process was designed to take as much guesswork as possible out of the ambiguous "art" of identifying new business prospects. This case describes the Corning process for identifying and evaluating early-stage opportunities and allows readers to construct a recommendation as to what Corning should do regarding its mercury abatement project.

Throughout its history, Corning Incorporated had maintained a strong dedication to technology and innovation, committing approximately four to six percent of its annual sales to research, development, and engineering (RD&E) until the late 1990s when this figure climbed to 10 percent. Even when the company was faced with severe financial challenges in the early 2000s by a crash in the telecommunications industry, its largest business segment, Corning saw investment in innovationand particularly in new business developmentas its road to recovery. While other companies might have slashed their RD&E budgets in a desperate effort to regain profitability, Corning increased and formalized the amount of time, money, and resources it dedicated to the identification of potentially large new businesses. As the company emerged from its financial crisis, management set a goal to double Corning's rate of innovation with the objective of launching two to four significant new businesses each decade. To accomplish its ambitious goals, Corning created an organization called Strategic Growth. The purpose of this new team was to collaborate with corporate research to identify and develop new, large (approximately $0.5 billion), and profitable business opportunities. Under the leadership of Dr. Mark Newhouse, a Corning senior vice president, Strategic Growth was more than three years into its charter by late 2007. Although the group had realized many accomplishments since its inception, the question facing Newhouse, his team, and Corning's executives was how well the company's innovative approach to organic growth was working. This case describes the Strategic Growth organization, its process, and its challenges.

In December 2007, more than 75 percent of all U.S. Internet users streamed some form of video online, consuming over 10 billion videos in total. While devices such as AppleTV and TiVo allowed users to watch Internet video on their televisions, Internet-delivered video was largely a web-based phenomenon. Despite this, the industry was preparing for the inexorable collision of Internet video and the television. While a video signal could be fed over coaxial cable, through copper wires or over fiber optic connections, the majority of U.S. consumers would continue to receive their television signal and Internet service through a wired connection for the foreseeable future. This case examines the transition to IP video delivery in 2008 from the perspective of those companies that own the "pipe," notably telecommunications companies, descendants of the 1982 AT&T divestiture, and cable companies, otherwise known as Multiple System Operators (MSOs).

The case describes the strategic situation facing Carlos Ghosn and the Renault-Nissan Alliance in 2008 and beyond. One set of strategic issues concerns how to exploit to a greater extent the potential of the novel organization form - a sort of supra-corporate ecological system - that the Alliance represents. A second set of strategic issues concerns the further evolution of the Alliance - what Ghosn calls the "fourth stage" - in light of the dynamic forces that are reshaping the global automotive industry, and especially the issue of how to further scale-up the Alliance. A third set of strategic issues concerns developing further the strategic leadership capability of the Alliance and the evolving role of Carlos Ghosn as CEO of both Renault and Nissan.

This article presents the "strategy diamond," which extends received strategic management theory by integrating the positional view and the resource-based view, the formulation and implementation of strategy, and the firm's internal selection environment into one relatively simple conceptual framework of dynamic forces driving firm evolution. The article suggests that this framework can be helpful in stimulating further research to drive towards a dynamic theory of strategy. The strategy diamond facilitates understanding the dynamic interplays between strategy logic and strategy execution, and its jargon-free "natural language form" may facilitate strategic conversations and help inculcate a strategic mentality into organizations. This framework has been useful for senior executives in two major corporations. Four case studies highlight how the framework may help instill strategic discipline in high-technology ventures operating in extremely dynamic environments.

This case describes the difficult times Charles Schwab the company faced after the dot-com bust of the early 2000s. It also describes how Charles Schwab the man returned in July 2004 to take on the CEO position, and the strategic actions he took to fix the problems and refocus the company he founded over 30 years ago. The case shows how he was able to draw on the considerable remaining strengths of the company, not in the least its long-established culture that emphasized doing the right thing for customers. Two years following Schwab's return to the CEO job, the company turned in strong results. With the crisis of the past few years weathered, the case focuses on the challenges the company faces going forward as it pursues its strategy of offering good, consistent, un-conflicted investment advice to increasing numbers of smaller investors.

Examines the plans for a new knowledge management system at Katzenbach Partners LLC, a 150-employee management consultancy, from the perspective of the firm's managing partner. Covers both system functionality and plans for driving user adoption of the system.

Based on a combination of exploratory field research and executive experience, proposes that defining the "Minimum Winning Game" (MWG) is a difficult yet critical responsibility of top management. It is essential to keep a high-technology venture focused and to enable managers to learn from their ongoing efforts in the face of rapidly evolving technological and market uncertainties. Achieving the MWG requires the intelligent balancing of three "key drivers of strategic action": technology, product, and strategy development. Finally, instilling the discipline necessary to define the MWG and balance the drivers of strategic action is facilitated by the use of a strategy-making process informed by key data gathering and analysis tools such as the Market Requirement Document and the Product Requirement Document.

In the summer of 2006, Nike announced a major corporate reorganization that would shift the company's focus to a category-driven approach. The six major business categories were running, men's training, basketball, soccer, women's fitness, and sportswear. For years, Nike had organized its business around footwear, apparel, and equipment. Integration between these three business units was inconsistent at best. The goal of the reorganization was to take a more consumer-oriented approach to the market to give customers holistic collections of everything they want and need in a particular sports category. This would require the organization to break down its product-oriented silos and collaborate on a more formal, ongoing basis. The reorganization also reflected a change in Nike's corporate strategy. The elevation of women's fitness to a major focus for the company was a substantial victory for the team that had been fighting for the increased prominence of this market segment for years. Darcy Winslow, general manager of Nike's global women's fitness business, and a team of individuals across the company working across traditional boundaries within Nike's complex, matrixed organization to achieve the required level of cross-business integration to deliver cohesive collections of footwear, apparel, and equipment to the women's market. Focuses on Winslow and her team as they tackled challenges related to product development, operations management, organization structure, reporting relationships, change management, and stakeholder buy-in.

Describes the actions taken by HP's CEO Mark Hurd in his first two years leading the company.