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A two-party, integrative, negotiation exercise involving several pre-specified issues to be resolved. Each party is given a pre-specified scoring system in monetary units. Side payments, within limits are possible. Face-to-face negotiations take place with no restrictive time limit. The negotiation is between Riverside Lumber Co., who is allegedly polluting the Blue River, and the Department of Environmental Conservation.

A negotiation exercise between Riverside Lumber Co. and the Division of Environmental Conservation about reducing the effects of effluent discharge in a river. Students are assigned to a role and receive confidential information including a scoring system detailing the costs and benefits of various proposals. Though their interests conflict, joint gains beyond simple agreement can be found. Students come to see that joint gains must be created and divided and that the tension between competitive and cooperative urges often lead to inferior agreements. Means for managing this tension can then be discussed. This game can be used as a complex example of bargaining with incomplete information.

Confidential information for students assigned the role of the Division of Environment Conservation. See Riverside and DEC--General Information.

This game is a highly structured exercise in labor-management bargaining. If union and management cannot reach agreement within two days, then the union will strike. The costs of a strike are not the same for the two sides. Similarly, the cost of a settlement to management differs from its benefits to the union. Union and management players frequently feel that they are more powerful, hold out, endure a strike, and do poorly relative to other players.