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Virginia Mason Medical Center (VM) hired Owens & Minor (O&M) as its alpha vendor for medical/surgical supplies in 2004. By 2005, O&M was performing JIT and LUM services for VM, but they believed the pricing model in the industry was outdated. VM and O&M partnered to create the Total Supply Chain Cost (TSCC) pricing program, an activity-based model that assigned all the cost drivers of distribution and inventory handling to VM, but also assured O&M of a profit. The TSCC incented VM to streamline its distribution activities, since these would directly impact its fee. After beta testing the TSCC for one year, VM's Daniel Borunda and O&M's Michael Stefanic believed that TSCC was a better and more cost-effective pricing model, but could they convince their companies to continue to invest in TSCC?

The epilogue to Supply Chain Partners: Virginia Mason and Owens & Minor (A), the B case details the outcome of the issues discussed in Case A; namely that Virginia Mason and Owens & Minor did implement the TSCC contract. Virginia Mason also kept the suture contract with O&M because the TSCC model was able to prove that O&M was the low-cost provider. Case B also gives results metrics, such as reduction in line items, orders, and days sales outstanding.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 109077

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 109076

The credit crisis of 2008 placed compensation practices at publicly traded firms in the United States under scrutiny. This case examines perceived excessive pay and severance packages at several firms implicated in the credit crisis of 2008, the executive compensation provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, and discusses the implications for compensation committees at public companies.

The A1 and A2 versions of the "Shareholder Activists at Friendly Ice Cream (A)" split the original A case into two parts. The A1 case ends as activists Sardar Biglari and Phil Cooley prepare to meet with CEO Don Smith at Friendly's headquarters in September 2006. The A2 case resumes the story just after the meeting and details Biglari's and Friendly's actions from that point on. The A1 and A2 cases are provided for instructors who wish more flexibility in the teaching plan. These cases do not omit or abridge any information contained in the original A case. Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO and that the directors had conflicts of interest because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

The A1 and A2 versions of the "Shareholder Activists at Friendly Ice Cream (A)" split the original A case into two parts. The A1 case ends as activists Sardar Biglari and Phil Cooley prepare to meet with CEO Don Smith at Friendly's headquarters in September 2006. The A2 case resumes the story just after the meeting and details Biglari's and Friendly's actions from that point on. The A1 and A2 cases are provided for instructors who wish more flexibility in the teaching plan. These cases do not omit or abridge any information contained in the original A case. Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO and that the directors had conflicts of interest because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother, and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO, and that the directors had conflicts of interest, because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

This case study briefly describes the outcome of the Shareholder Activists at Friendly Ice Cream (A) case.

Samit Ghosh, the CEO and founder of Ujjivan, a major microfinance provider in Bangalore, wants to grow his business rapidly and become financially sustainable, but he's struggling with staff fraud, high costs, and how to stay true to Ujjivan's mission of poverty alleviation, while simultaneously reaching out to higher-income customers. The case explores how Ujjivan can grow, looking at such issues as new technology, diversifying product offerings, and how to hire the best staff.

Case B of "Ujjivan: A Microfinance Institution at a Crossroads" addresses some of the actions Ujjivan, a microfinance provider in Bangalore, has taken with regard to issues raised in the A case, particularly regarding fraud and establishing financial sustainability. For example, the CEO of Ujjivan, Samit Ghosh, decides to strengthen the Audit Team and implements new loan products.

Describes a situation in which Sara Campbell, the CEO of a women's apparel company, must decide how to resolve the tense relationship with her Financial Controller and ex-brother-in-law, Stephen Holt. Holt was employed by Campbell for 10 years, took on the majority of financial responsibilities for the firm, and knew the business very well. Although he was bright, Campbell was often disappointed by his poor judgment and disorderly nature. By 1999, two incidents by Holt forced Campbell to question how she should proceed in terms of his employment. Students are given context to debate whether Holt's behavior was detrimental enough to overshadow a successful ten-year working relationship and his monetary obligations to Campbell's immediate family.

Supplements the Sara Campbell Ltd. (A) case by introducing additional concerns with Holt. In January of 1999, Campbell received a certified letter written by Holt. The letter described Holt's own frustration in working for Campbell. Students are given context to discuss how to proceed.

After the merger of two local hospitals, hospital leaders much decide how to reorganize services to take advantage of newly created efficiencies. Focuses on the Orthopedics department at one of the hospitals.

An abstract is not available for this product.

Faced with exponential growth and a competitive telecom environment, Bharti looks for ways to better manage its capital expenditures for telecommunications and information technology. One option is to hand over management of its telecom and IT networks to its vendors. Explores the pros and cons of such an outsourcing arrangement for a company in an industry where technological superiority is considered an essential element in competitive strategy.

Supplements the (A) case.

Faced with falling share prices and the critical eye of the media focused on Jack Welch's retirement plan, newly appointed CEO Jeff Immelt had the challenge of reassessing GE as a leader of corporate integrity and good governance. Presents the changes Immelt initiated in the board of directors, in Immelt's own compensation scheme, and in the compensation scheme for all GE executives, designed to address GE's corporate governance issues. Examines the use of stock options and alternative stock-based incentive schemes, along with the importance of each tool in a total compensation plan. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

In 2002, Esteban Garriga, customer service director at Henkel Iberica, questions whether Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) would help manage retail promotions and limit their impact on the stock-outs and obsolete inventory. Describes the situation facing Henkel Iberica, the Spanish subsidiary of the German consumer products company Henkel KgaA, with respect to the management of retail promotions. The increasing number of promotions and the complexity of the company portfolio seriously taxed Henkel Iberica's sales, production, and distribution systems. Many in the organization believed the company should abandon or cut back promotions and adopt an everyday low pricing strategy. Garriga believes the solution to be in CPFR. Describes Henkel Iberica's operations and provides the necessary background to discuss whether CPFR is the adequate solution for its problems.

Supplements the (A) case.