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Prabjot Nanua was proud of the growing capabilities of the General Motors Technical Center India Powertrain Engineering group that he oversaw. Since 2003 engineers there had expanded the center's capabilities, developing a reputation within GM for completing high-quality design and analysis projects for other Technical Centers at a substantially lower cost. In areas such as tolerance stacking analysis, GMTCI-Powertrain was now the only location in GM worldwide that performed this type of work. Nanua thought about the next stage of development for the center. Should they "go deep" and focus on more areas of technical competency where the center had developed a competitive advantage? GMTCI could become the center of expertise for a narrower set of methods and capabilities like they had done in tolerance stacking. Or should they "go broad" and continue to lobby headquarters for more complex assignments that might ultimately lead to program ownership for an entire vehicle? Each scenario had different implications for how GMTCI fit within the network of Technical Centers and corporate GM. If they did the former, they might be faced with the perception that GMTCI was limited to back-office analysis for GM's products. But when Nanua put on his headquarters "hat," he wondered if that shouldn't also be the corporation's priority for them.

Too many U.S. companies base decisions about where to locate production largely on narrow financial criteria. They don't consider whether keeping manufacturing at home makes more sense strategically or take into account the impact it might have on their ability to innovate. The result has been an exodus of manufacturing from America, which has weakened the capabilities that domestic firms need to keep inventing high-quality, cost-competitive products. One problem is that it's hard to tell when moving production far from R&D will do damage. To make that determination, say Harvard Business School's Pisano and Shih, executives need to examine two things. The first is modularity, or the degree to which product design can be separated from manufacturing. When modularity is low, product designs can't be clearly specified and design choices affect manufacturing processes in subtle, difficult-to-predict ways (and vice versa). The second is the maturity of the manufacturing process. Immature processes are ripe for innovation, but over time opportunities for improvement become incremental. Viewed through the modularity-maturity lens, relationships between manufacturing and innovation fall into four quadrants: pure product innovation, pure process innovation, process-embedded innovation, and process-driven innovation. In the first two quadrants, locating design near production isn't critical, but separating the two functions is risky in the third and fourth quadrants. This framework will help business leaders make better sourcing decisions and reinvigorate America's innovation-driven economy.

This note describes capital efficiency metrics including RONA, ROIC, and EVA. This note is intended to be used with the case "Boeing 737 Industrial Footprint: The Wichita Decision," HBS No. 612-036.

The note discusses the modularization of design, and the modularization of manufacturing in the commercial aerospace industry. It is intended to be taught with the case, "Boeing 737 Industrial Footprint: The Wichita Decision," HBS No. 612-036.

The case examines the circumstances leading up to the Boeing Company's decision to spin-off its Wichita Division. This case is intended to be taught with two other notes: "On the Use of Capital Efficiency Metrics," HBS No. 612-034, "Modularity in Design and Manufacturing: Application to Commercial Aircraft," HBS No. 612-035.

As Mr. Li Chunrong visited the new assembly line for the Dongfeng Passenger Vehicle Company in Wuhan, China, he contemplated the position his business unit found itself in: a latecomer. As a state-owned enterprise Dongfeng had entered into numerous joint ventures to produce automobiles under foreign brands, but its foray into selling vehicles under its own brand had only started recently, and now the unit faced a crowded market filled with fierce competition. As he walked back to the office, he reflected on the time it was taking to establish the Dongfeng brand. Would his business unit grow strong enough in their five province geographic focus before other hungry competitors looking for growth piled into these market areas? Or should they go more aggressively to attack the coastal areas with its new 2000 cc model to be launched in late 2011?

This case is set inside IBM Research's efforts to build a computer that can successfully take on human challengers playing the game show Jeopardy! It opens with the machine named Watson offering the incorrect answer "Toronto" to a seemingly simple question during the championship match. Was the answer a reflection of a strategic weakness, or was it actually consistent with design principles established by the development team? The case seeks to expand students' view of the product development process. Traditional software development projects begin with the gathering of requirements and analysis of the problem, and the writing of a detailed specification. The Jeopardy! problem is different - it requires a probabilistic approach where there is no closed form solution. Instead statistical patterns in the data are important and there is no obvious mapping to the way queries are expressed. Such problems are increasingly common in data mining, optimization problems, or Internet applications where the goal is to find an acceptably good solution in a short amount of time, when a deterministic approach might be less fruitful or impractical. We aspire for students to recognize that product development can take many forms, and that these are enabled by creativity and the right organizational flexibility and mindset. The case highlights the key role of performance metrics in building a flexible system that could be refined through experimentation and testing, steadily improving performance with the incorporation of new algorithmic ideas and new data sources. The case then delves extensively into the analysis of the "Toronto" failure and why the answer that Watson produced was a rational product of a sound strategy. This leaves students to judge the generality of the strategy and its applicability to important business problems.

"This trial is going to take longer." Those were words that Michael Kaschke, CEO of Carl Zeiss AG, was not surprised to hear as he nurtured the intraoperative radiotherapy business inside his company's microsurgery unit. But he also didn't expect it to take 13 years to get to the end of an all-important clinical trial that was a critical enabler to the granting of reimbursement codes. The technology was clearly disruptive to him, but as the business confronted the challenges of improving the standard of care for women with breast cancer, he couldn't help but wonder if the greater opportunity was in vastly underserved emerging markets. But for 13 years he had been telling the team the importance of focus, and as the advanced markets of Germany, the UK, and the US started to hit high growth rates, was he now telling them something different? Was this a focus question or a strategic sequencing question?

For Carl Zeiss Microimaging, modular hardware and software enabled customers to tailor Zeiss's broad range of microscopy systems hardware and software to meet a wide range of needs from basic scientific research in the biological and medical sciences to clinical applications, materials science, and industrial sectors. Modularity also provided Carl Zeiss' engineers the benefit of decoupling the development schedules of individual components and subsystems. Yet the well codified interfaces at many module boundaries also opened the system up to outside providers of components, mainly software. This served research scientists who were doing cutting edge research extremely well, as they wanted to be able to apply the latest techniques and analysis tools. At the other extreme, clinical and QA/QC applications by their nature had a much higher need for automation, because of the repetitive nature of tasks. Simple, integrated solutions seemed to make more sense in these circumstances, and many applications did not demand the ultraprecision of Carl Zeiss's hardware platforms. Rather there was a call for simplicity and robustness, especially in production environments. The case exposes some of the strategic issues and opportunities facing the microscopy business.

Metrology plays a key role in the manufacture of mechanical components. Traditionally it is used extensively in a pre-process stage where a manufacturer does process planning, design, and ramp-up, and in post-process off-line inspection to establish proof of quality. The area that is seeing a lot of growth is the in-process stage of volume manufacturing, where feedback control can help ensure that parts are made to specification. The Industrial Metrology Group at Carl Zeiss AG had its traditional strength in high precision coordinate measuring machines, a universal measuring tool that had been widely used since its introduction in the mid-1970s. The market faced a complex diversification of competition as metrology manufacturers introduced new sensor and measurement technologies, and as some of their customers moved towards a different style of measurement mandating speed and integration with production systems. The case discusses the threat of new in-line metrology systems to the core business as well as the arising new opportunities.

When IBM shifted from a traditional territory-based multinational organization to what it called a globally integrated enterprise, it established its headquarters for "Growth Markets" in Shanghai and "Established Markets" in New York. This positioned its China Development Labs (CDL) in Shanghai as a key platform for serving growth markets including the BRIC countries and other rapidly developing regions. Though quite young, CDL Shanghai had grown to become one of IBM's largest labs. The case examines IBM's early-mover establishment of its corporate research lab and CDL, and through the examination of three product development vignettes looks at the systematic approach taken to the development of lab personnel and capabilities.

This technical note discusses scale economies, and direct and indirect network effects in the context of building better business models. Some of the great business disasters of the dot.com bubble were companies that scaled their infrastructure without working through the scaling effects. This note also discusses multi-sided platforms, the skewing of business models reflecting a mispricing to get one side on board, and suggests the importance of testing in establishing viable business models.

When David Wang took over as the CEO of SMIC, he knew that if he was to capitalize on the company's strategic location in the China market, he would have to transform the company mindset and its operating structure from its roots in the manufacturing of DRAMs to the service orientation that was necessary to support the customer promise of being a foundry. This meant transforming from a high volume continuous flow manufacturer of commodities chips to a job shop structure that focused on custom manufacturing services. This entailed more than rearranging the manufacturing lines, it meant a dramatic shift in the company culture. Wang also had to ensure the firm's ability to offer the most advanced process technologies. Having fallen behind in previous generations, his predecessor had chosen to license process technology from IBM. Now he faced the question of whether his rapidly changing and maturing organization had the ability to go it alone on future process technology development, or whether it still had to depend on IBM, at least for the time being.

Gordon Zong is trying to teach Chinese universities and research institutes how to do effective technology transfer and IP licensing, but he is trying to do it in an environment with weak property rights and an underdeveloped support infrastructure. As the managing director of the Office of Technology Transfer at the Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences, he works with researchers at the forefront of biology and biotech, yet he faces seemingly insurmountable obstacles to getting the technology commercialized within domestic Chinese companies, so he has turned to global multinational pharma companies, for now. The purpose of the case is to help present and future managers at global multinationals who have responsibility for R&D strategy to understand some of the complexities of the Chinese intellectual property environment so that they can build effective participation strategies for their organizations. Understanding the misaligned incentives that result in the production of junk patents and the challenges of patent enforcement, as well as the direction of change are vital, because as the Chinese system evolves quickly, the implications of those changes will have important commercial consequences.

This background reading looks at reverse engineering in the context of piracy and knock-offs in emerging markets like China. It first considers legal aspects of reverse engineering in strong property rights regimes like the United States as a way of unpacking the legal issues. It considers the importance of tacit or unexposed knowledge, and whether modularizing a system facilitates the recovery of design intent. Finally we look at the role of reverse engineering in the development of capabilities and how it enhances a firm's absorptive capabilities. It is intended to be used as a background reading for the case "From Imitation to Innovation: Zongshen Industrial Group," HBS No. 610-057.

The case was prepared to be used as part of a process review in the first year Technology and Operations Management course at HBS. It offers students an opportunity to discuss the context of a manufacturing process choice, and then examine actual production numbers that resulted from a series of choices. While there isn't a traditional case issue, the discussion should focus on the gap between theoretical process designs and the reality of practical implementations, with the impact of operator variability in pace and the complex intertwining with work scope. The case only meant for one discussion pasture to review the Hayes-Wheelwright product-process matrix, and the impact of variability on line performance. While comparative numbers for the process choices are provided, the hope would be to develop students' intuition around why the numbers change so much.

Barry Lam, the CEO and Founder of Quanta Computer (the largest notebook computer manufacturer worldwide), has recognized for many years, that he had to transform the company to decrease its dependence on producing commodity hardware for other global brands and move the firm into areas of higher value-added products and services. But how could he transform an organization that was rooted in low cost manufacturing and supply chain management into one that creates innovative new products and commands premium prices? The existing organization was built to operate in a highly constrained innovation space, and the internal resistance to change often seemed insurmountable. Meanwhile, the firm had to continue delivering predictable revenues. Lam launched the Quanta Research Institute (QRI), a targeted effort to foster industrial research as a vehicle for organizational transformation and to build differentiation in a commodity world. The case examines how QRI sources ideas, and discusses how Quanta will use China as a test market for new products and services.

The learning objective of this case is to help students to recognize the interplay between intellectual property (IP) rights and corporate strategy. We do this by examining what is a fairly atypical circumstance today in which a single firm is able to secure what it perceives to be a frontier IP "estate" that blocks competitors from "practicing" in a significant part of the field. Those who elect to sign a license agreement must pay a high license fee and therefore help to fund the company's R&D. The company, meanwhile, must balance the immediate benefit of non-dilutive financing obtainable from the license fees vs. enabling a potential future competitor. The case setting is a lawsuit over a seemingly arcane issue: whether one of the co-owners of a key patent application is properly prosecuting the application. Understanding the issue requires students to progressively build up an understanding of some key aspects of U.S. patent law. Then by piecing together the strategy of the company and how it is driven by its IP position, students can understand why the litigation represents such a high stakes gamble.

Delta Electronics, the world's largest manufacturer of switching power supplies, hoped to enter the market for gasoline-electric hybrid power trains for automobiles by being a major component and subsystem supplier. While most public awareness of hybrid vehicles fell to the tier one integrated vehicle manufacturers, Delta felt it had an opportunity to enter the market via new automotive market entrants in China who had comparatively fewer capabilities and were willing to purchase major subsystems. Yet the company faced a dilemma -- a major customer wanted Delta to transfer ownership of key intellectual property as a condition of doing business. The case affords students an opportunity to consider whether a technological shift will enable what seems traditionally to be a highly integrated product designs to shift to a modular architecture, and consider the implications for appropriability of returns.

As Zuo Zongshen drove the transformation of the Zongshen Industrial Group from an early imitator in the motorcycle business to a company that increasingly focused on innovation as a way to get out of the hyper-competitive commodity business, he continually faced new challenges. The company had become a leader in gasoline powered motorcycles and small gas engines, but increasing taxes and restrictions on the use of motorcycles in congested urban areas had spawned a new industry, electric motorbikes, which posed a threat to the company's core business. Sourcing the technology for these e-bikes, and hiring and retaining the management and creative talent the company needed, were continuing challenges. The case traces the development of capabilities in the Zongshen Industrial Group, how it used the early imitation phase to foster rapid technological learning and upgrading, and how it used a unique corporate structure and listing strategy to finance the acquisition of important technologies.