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For two years since 2014 Uber had fought an intense, costly battle for China's ridesharing market with well-financed and well-connected domestic Chinese competitors. During this time, Uber also had to respond to an ever-shifting regulatory landscape that looked increasingly bleak in 2016. Then on August 1, 2016 Uber CEO Travis Kalanick shocked the global ridesharing industry by selling the company's China operations to arch rival Didi Chuxing. Given the competition from domestic rivals and the uncertainties of government regulation, was the decision to exit China the right one for Uber? What does this latest reconfiguration of the market mean for China's burgeoning ridesharing industry? What lessons could other tech companies learn from Uber's experiences in China?

In March 2016, Eveready Industries India Limited (Eveready) announced its intention to venture into the consumer-appliance segment. Eveready was the market leader in the batteries segment in India, with a market share of more than 50 per cent. The company’s portfolio comprised dry-cell batteries, flashlights, packet tea, compact fluorescent lamps, and LEDs. Eveready was readying itself to take on the giants of home appliances in India. With India’s home-appliances industry still underpenetrated, was Eveready’s entry into this segment timely? If yes, what strategic capabilities could it leverage? How should it then differentiate itself at a time when the market was saturated with multilevel segmentation? What could be the possible obstacles to Eveready’s success in the consumer-appliance industry?

In 2008, the chairman of the Zuellig Family Foundation and former Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Philippines, asked the foundation's president to take up the challenge of providing health care for the poor of the Philippines. The foundation's president was particularly struck by the health inequities between the urban rich and the rural poor. The rich had a life expectancy above 80 and the poor below 60; the maternal mortality ratio was 15 among the rich but over 150 among the poor. The foundation's president had spent much of his career working to bridge fundamental divides within Philippine society. Within four years, he led the foundation to complete a health care program with remarkable success in selected areas of the country, which transformed the inert and broken health care system into a living, thinking, intelligent network of stakeholders. A dignitary praised the program and asked the foundation's president to roll out the program country-wide. Could the foundation succeed with such a broad undertaking while preserving the efficacy, soul, and sustainability of the program?

In March 2016, Eveready Industries India Limited (Eveready) announced its intention to venture into the consumer-appliance segment. Eveready was the market leader in the batteries segment in India, with a market share of more than 50 per cent. The company's portfolio comprised dry-cell batteries, flashlights, packet tea, compact fluorescent lamps, and LEDs. Eveready was readying itself to take on the giants of home appliances in India. With India's home-appliances industry still underpenetrated, was Eveready's entry into this segment timely? If yes, what strategic capabilities could it leverage? How should it then differentiate itself at a time when the market was saturated with multilevel segmentation? What could be the possible obstacles to Eveready's success in the consumer-appliance industry?

In 2007, the founders of Airbnb were looking to solve a problem and ended up transforming their idea into a $10 billion company. What started as a quick website to advertise an overnight stay on their apartment airbeds along with breakfast in the morning eventually grew into an online accommodation booking business that spanned the world. Airbnb used its business model to carve out an extremely important space in an already crowded industry. However, along with success came challenges in terms of the scalability of its business model. In 2014, Airbnb was also facing legal challenges by state attorneys general that could make its business model suspect. The founders had to decide whether to defend their business model in a court of law and in the court of public opinion, or change it.

In 2007, the founders of Airbnb were looking to solve a problem and ended up transforming their idea into a $10 billion company. What started as a quick website to advertise an overnight stay on their apartment airbeds along with breakfast in the morning eventually grew into an online accommodation booking business that spanned the world. Airbnb used its business model to carve out an extremely important space in an already crowded industry. However, along with success came challenges in terms of the scalability of its business model. In 2014, Airbnb was also facing legal challenges by state attorneys general that could make its business model suspect. The founders had to decide whether to defend their business model in a court of law and in the court of public opinion, or change it.

In September 2013, Sanjit “Bunker” Roy was honoured with an award for his vision and leadership in addressing global problems through his novel organization, Barefoot College (Barefoot). Barefoot’s mission was to improve the lives of impoverished rural residents by upgrading their existing skills with training so the villages and their residents were self-sufficient. When he started the college in the state of Rajasthan, India, in 1972, Roy never dreamed that Barefoot would be able to affect the lives of millions of people in 24 countries. Barefoot’s global footprint was spreading at a rapid pace with requests for even more locations. Roy wondered whether he should freeze the organization in its present state or continue to increase its presence with a centralized headquarters. Alternatively, he could replicate the autonomous model on a smaller scale, still adherent to the beliefs, values, and assumptions that were the foundation of Barefoot College. This case won second prize at the ISB-Ivey Global Case Competition 2016 in the overall category.

In 2012, Germany-based Putzmeister was acquired by China-based SANY, the largest concrete machinery manufacturer in the world. By early 2015, the degree and extent of integration was still incomplete, which put pressure on SANY’s management. SANY focused mainly on the Chinese domestic market, whereas Putzmeister had an established brand and good experience in international markets. Should the acquisition integration focus only on Putzmeister, or should it be tied more closely to SANY’s strategic renewal? SANY and Putzmeister had launched a “double-brand strategy” in specific markets, but was it the appropriate strategy?

In 2014, the Patient Room of the Future (PRoF) was the largest European open innovation consortium in the healthcare sector. Established in 2009 by a group of manufacturers who were suppliers to the health care sector, PRoF brought more than 300 professionals from multiple disciplines and industries together to think about and contribute to the future of the health care industry. The consortium derived its power from a novel interdisciplinary approach, resulting in the successful completion of four projects. Yet its future presented many unanswered questions: How would PRoF continue to provide an innovative and dynamic environment for its members and stakeholders in the healthcare sector? How would PRoF’s projects achieve large-scale adoption, and what resources were needed to do that? What was the next step in the consortium’s development?

In January 2016, the chief executive officer of Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals (AGH) was reflecting on the 12-year journey that had led to the establishment of AGH as the strongest pillar of holistic healthcare in Eastern India. AGH brought together the best infrastructure, equipment, people, and systems to serve the people of Eastern India with end-to-end tertiary healthcare. The institution grew with a continuous drive for expanding knowledge, introducing the latest technologies, and building a culture of compassion and care. However, AGH’s success had led to a shift in focus, drawing the attention of several leading tertiary care hospitals to the untapped healthcare delivery potential in Eastern India. This shift meant increased competition for AGH and higher expectations from its customers. AGH wanted to maintain its leadership position and better understand the organization’s future challenges and focus areas. Which business model would best serve the people of India: expanding the current location or launching a multi-location facility? How could AGH maintain its current high level of recognition, expertise, and availability?

In 2016, a recent business graduate entered the workforce as the manager of a radio station in a small town. His new employer, RSM Broadcasting, led the way in serving small Canadian communities and took steps to provide radio content in the most relevant way possible, but it might be time to quicken the pace. He faced a number of obstacles because the industry had been changing and internal politics made it challenging to enact any of his own ideas for strategic renewal. He had three options: support a current initiative, bolster his own idea for change, or focus on his own development. His newness to the organization, his youth, and his position as a middle manager could get in the way of promoting change in the short-term.

In 2014, the Patient Room of the Future (PRoF) was the largest European open innovation consortium in the healthcare sector. Established in 2009 by a group of manufacturers who were suppliers to the health care sector, PRoF brought more than 300 professionals from multiple disciplines and industries together to think about and contribute to the future of the health care industry. The consortium derived its power from a novel interdisciplinary approach, resulting in the successful completion of four projects. Yet its future presented many unanswered questions: How would PRoF continue to provide an innovative and dynamic environment for its members and stakeholders in the healthcare sector? How would PRoF's projects achieve large-scale adoption, and what resources were needed to do that? What was the next step in the consortium's development?

In 2012, Germany-based Putzmeister was acquired by China-based SANY, the largest concrete machinery manufacturer in the world. By early 2015, the degree and extent of integration was still incomplete, which put pressure on SANY's management. SANY focused mainly on the Chinese domestic market, whereas Putzmeister had an established brand and good experience in international markets. Should the acquisition integration focus only on Putzmeister, or should it be tied more closely to SANY's strategic renewal? SANY and Putzmeister had launched a "double-brand strategy" in specific markets, but was it the appropriate strategy?

In 2012, the founder of Patanjali Ayurved Limited (PAL) and his associate were leveraging a unique business model by venturing into the fast-moving consumer goods sector in India. By March 2016, PAL had become the fourth-largest company in this highly competitive industry and was planning to become the market leader by 2020. Through its low-priced herbal and Ayurvedic products, PAL occupied a unique white space in the already existing strategic groups of domestic and multinational competitors. Industry experts were undecided about whether PAL posed a serious threat to multinational and domestic firms or if PAL should be praised for creating a new market for its products in India. If PAL was posing a real threat, then other fast-moving consumer goods firms had to develop strategies to maintain their own position, and PAL needed a plan to face the challenges involved in its future growth.

In 2012, the founder of Patanjali Ayurved Limited (PAL) and his associate were leveraging a unique business model by venturing into the fast-moving consumer goods sector in India. By March 2016, PAL had become the fourth-largest company in this highly competitive industry and was planning to become the market leader by 2020. Through its low-priced herbal and Ayurvedic products, PAL occupied a unique white space in the already existing strategic groups of domestic and multinational competitors. Industry experts were undecided about whether PAL posed a serious threat to multinational and domestic firms or if PAL should be praised for creating a new market for its products in India. If PAL was posing a real threat, then other fast-moving consumer goods firms had to develop strategies to maintain their own position, and PAL needed a plan to face the challenges involved in its future growth.

Doing business in China requires a preemptive intellectual property (IP) strategy because local firms built IP arsenals after learning from past patent battles. As foreign companies flocked to China over the past three decades, they faced significant IP risks such as counterfeiting and the difficulty of enforcing IP rights. Now they have a new problem—an escalating risk of committing an infringement of Chinese intellectual property rights. While China remains a major factory of the world, Chinese government officials have been pushing to transform the country into an innovation powerhouse. Several recent moves have been made to transform the economy, including policies to support the development of IP. Consequently, there has been an influx of Chinese patents filed in the manufacturing and technology sectors, and the impact of these patents is being felt domestically and internationally. <br><br>To gain long-term IP rights in China requires a local patent in one of three categories: a) regular invention patent, b) utility model (UM) patent, or c) design patent. Besides driving a dramatic increase in patent filing, Chinese public policy has had a disturbing side effect—an explosion of domestic UM filings. This paper recommends that foreign companies file UM patents on their OEM and ODM products in China as soon as possible—even before sourcing Chinese manufacturers. Foreign companies, especially SMEs in the manufacturing and technology sectors, must implement a Chinese market IP strategy that includes filing UM patents and/or design patents before entering. They should see this as a necessity, even if they don’t plan to enter the Chinese market anytime soon. If they don’t, foreign companies should heed the advice given to Chinese firms by American lawyers in 2003: expect to be sued.

In 2016, the founder and chief executive officer of West Paw Design (WPD) was faced with a growth dilemma: how could he align WPD's socially responsible ethos with his desire to expand business activities in the growing pet products market? Based in Bozeman, Montana, WPD developed, manufactured, and distributed pet products. The company was a certified "B Corporation," meaning its social and environmental credentials had been verified by an external organization, B Lab. The founder had to consider his options very carefully, because some of them could undermine or negate WPD's growth objectives, as well as its cherished B Corporation principles.

Hillary Clinton was expected to succeed U.S. President Barack Obama, but not because of her character. Americans were expected to elect her as the candidate often seen as the “lesser of two evils,” but U.S. voters shocked the world by handing the Oval Office to Donald Trump. Being a good head of state requires being a good leader who goes about nation-building in a sustainable and socially responsible way, and this requires more than competencies and commitment. Good leadership requires having what Ivey calls “leader character” in order to ensure that competencies are deployed in ethical and effective ways for all stakeholders. Character in the White House matters more than ever before. After all, what mainly set America apart in the past was its ability to create wealth while maintaining a perceived commitment to religious tolerance, equality, and freedom. The pivotal role that character plays in good leadership has been articulated by Ivey research on the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. But as Ivey research notes, the expensive lessons learned in the aftermath of that crisis already appear forgotten as high-profile cases of appalling corporate behaviour continue to undermine capitalism. While Trump could prove to be a strong president who creates American jobs in the medium term, the example he has set as a leader is far from presidential and his election does not bode well for those who care about social responsibility and economic sustainability.

In late 2011, Netflix was migrating from its highly successful business model of delivering DVDs by mail to streaming movies and other media content directly to subscribers' televisions. To be profitable, Netflix decided to charge more for receiving DVDs by mail—a service that its existing customers had come to expect as a minor add-on to their original subscription arrangement. This charge led to a huge backlash: subscribers defected and Netflix's stock price dropped. Netflix faced the dilemma of remaining profitable in the video streaming business while paying much more for content and dealing with competition that had been absent in its DVD-by-mail business model. The company was at a crossroads; the path it chose would affect its future. Should it return to combining the two services or continue with two separate services and live with the consequences?<br><br>This case is a follow-up to Netflix, 9B09M093, and precedes Netflix: Proving the Skeptics Wrong, 9B16M081.

Netflix, a subscription-based movie and television show rental service, offered content to subscribers either via DVDs delivered by mail, or through Internet-based streaming. After splitting the two services, the company lost subscribers, and its stock price plummeted. Most observers were skeptical that Netflix could maintain its profit margins, given the increased cost of acquiring streamable content. However, Netflix not only reduced its cost per user but also increased its subscriber growth both in the United States and internationally. Were these moves sufficient to deliver the growth needed to support its rising stock price? Netflix also faced increased streaming costs because it used disproportionately more bandwidth than other streaming companies. Would these costs mean that the Netflix business model was no longer viable?<br><br>This is a follow-up case to Netflix, 9B09M093, which describes the company’s innovative business model of delivering DVDs by mail, and Netflix Inc.: The Second Act—Moving into Streaming, 9B16M080, which describes the after-effects of the dual-subscription model.