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In 2014, U-Haul International Ltd. (U-Haul) was the biggest North American company in do-it-yourself moving and storage. A publicly-traded but family-controlled firm, U-Haul's corporate performance was very strong. However, the company continued to be plagued by reputation-related challenges stemming from long-ago family feuds that had been made public. Just when the feuds were settling, the company’s executive vice-president learned that a television series planned to air an episode profiling the murder of a member of the family. The murder took place in 1990, and the killer was arrested, but the case was controversial. Such a program detailing the murder might create new challenges for U-Haul's reputation. How should the company respond to this planned television episode? How much of the past still affected U-Haul’s reputation, and how much of the reputation still affected U-Haul's relationships with employees, customers, suppliers, and investors? Should the company hope the renewed attention would blow over or should it set out to influence its public relationships?

In August 2016, it had been almost two years since American fashion retailer Nordstrom opened its first Canadian store in Calgary. Nordstrom believed Canada to be an ideal location for its global expansion. Executives identified the country as a potential US$1 billion opportunity with no language barrier and a population with a higher average income than in the United States. Despite this enticing potential market, Nordstrom executives entered Canada with a slow, conservative approach. Nordstrom faced slow economic growth in Canada and fierce competition from other luxury retailers. Although Canada was an attractive potential market, increased competition and a changing economic environment presented new challenges to the retailer’s international expansion plan. How could Nordstrom find success in Canada?

Amarnath Gupta and Sons was a distributor of lubricants and owner of a petrol pump based in Alwar, Rajasthan, India. The business was originally set up as a family-owned single petrol pump in 1953. The family member currently in charge of daily operations had expanded the business significantly, especially since the entry of new multinational players in the Indian lubricant market. In 2013, this owner-partner was looking at ways to involve his children-one of whom had finished college (a son), one of whom was in college (a daughter), and one of whom was about to start college (a son)-in the family business. Should three businesses be established for each of the three children, or should they all be part of the same business? How could the next generation enter the business successfully?

In June 2015, two entrepreneurs launched HeyTaxi!, a start-up venture that used bicycle taxis in Mumbai. The goal was to reduce the time, effort, and money spent by citizens on commuting. But the entrepreneurs faced a problem of survival and sustainability: the government authorities refused to issue a licence for the bike-taxi service. The venture was favoured by citizens who used its services, but HeyTaxi! was limited to marketing its service not as a legitimate taxi service but as a ride-sharing service. HeyTaxi! was fulfilling a social need, and customer loyalty was fuelling the venture's journey, but the absence of regulatory permits put the longevity of HeyTaxi! at risk. Concerns about HeyTaxi!'s future needed to be addressed to ensure the venture's survival, scalability, and sustainability.

In August 2011, the newly hired chief executive officer of the Indian firm Headstart Industries Ltd. (HIL) faced a dilemma over whether or not to allot funds for a new project of a business unit that had poor performance over several years and had affected the company's overall profitability. The chief executive officer was faced with a tough choice between acting against the dominant culture of HIL by refusing to fund the new project or displeasing the board members who had hired him to bring about organizational change. He was well aware of the board members' belief that the division in question was a burden on HIL's resources and should be closed down. Should he appease the culture, or should he accept the risks and approve the funding?

In August 2016, it had been almost two years since American fashion retailer Nordstrom opened its first Canadian store in Calgary. Nordstrom believed Canada to be an ideal location for its global expansion. Executives identified the country as a potential US$1 billion opportunity with no language barrier and a population with a higher average income than in the United States. Despite this enticing potential market, Nordstrom executives entered Canada with a slow, conservative approach. Nordstrom faced slow economic growth in Canada and fierce competition from other luxury retailers. Although Canada was an attractive potential market, increased competition and a changing economic environment presented new challenges to the retailer's international expansion plan. How could Nordstrom find success in Canada?

In 2003, the All India Artisans and Craftworkers Welfare Association (AIACA) was launched to explore new and commercially sustainable models of livelihood promotion for India's vulnerable communities of craftworkers. The Indian handlooms and handicrafts, collectively referred to as the craft sector, symbolized the rich historical and cultural diversity that distinguished India from the rest of the world. The sector provided low-cost, "green" livelihood opportunities to millions of Indian families, supplementing their incomes in seasons of agrarian distress, checking migration, and preserving traditional economic relationships. The sector represented the economic lifeline of the most vulnerable sections of Indian society. AIACA took a unique approach towards stakeholder engagement by establishing partnerships with local non-governmental organizations, business enterprises, individual craftworkers, self-help groups, and government agencies. This level of co-operation produced effective advocacy and high-impact developmental work through multiplicative strategies, and the results were scalable and replicable in the context of informal sectors in transitioning economies. AIACA had spent a decade successfully designing and implementing livelihood interventions to help small-scale, family-managed businesses evolve into sustainable enterprises and innovative networks. The organization now needed to re-examine its approach and look for ways to deliver a deeper developmental impact.

In 2014, U-Haul International Ltd. (U-Haul) was the biggest North American company in do-it-yourself moving and storage. A publicly-traded but family-controlled firm, U-Haul's corporate performance was very strong. However, the company continued to be plagued by reputation-related challenges stemming from long-ago family feuds that had been made public. Just when the feuds were settling, the company's executive vice-president learned that a television series planned to air an episode profiling the murder of a member of the family. The murder took place in 1990, and the killer was arrested, but the case was controversial. Such a program detailing the murder might create new challenges for U-Haul's reputation. How should the company respond to this planned television episode? How much of the past still affected U-Haul's reputation, and how much of the reputation still affected U-Haul's relationships with employees, customers, suppliers, and investors? Should the company hope the renewed attention would blow over or should it set out to influence its public relationships?

In a world awash in digital connectivity, disruptive innovations, political instability, cultural fragility, and continuous interactive feedback loops, linear thinking isn’t effective for building even moderately effective mid-range strategies. This article explains why linear logic has never been more dangerous in terms of related opportunity costs, and then offers tips on how to break the habit. Based on linear projection, we tend to conflate the immediate, inferable extensions of current conditions with the future. This is dangerous due to five fatal flaws in the linear model that can negatively impact the way most businesses think about their past, present, and — most importantly — their future: 1) Linear thinking leads to wrong assumptions. 2) Linear thinking assumes past is prologue. 3) Linear thinking marginalizes the concept of discontinuities. 4) Linear thinking imposes old patterns rather than discovering new ones. 5) Linear thinking minimizes the role of feedback in an increasingly interconnected world.

Founded in 2005, Greek yogourt maker Chobani used value innovation to become the number one yogourt brand in the United States by 2011. However, due to some internal problems such as a lack of seasoned professionals and financial resources, and external factors such as competition and decline in demand, Chobani lost its market share to competitors starting in early 2013. With help from a private venture firm, Chobani took several steps to turn things around by 2016. Will Chobani be able to regain its leadership position going forward? If so, how will it fuel its growth?

Founded in 2005, Greek yogourt maker Chobani used value innovation to become the number one yogourt brand in the United States by 2011. However, due to some internal problems such as a lack of seasoned professionals and financial resources, and external factors such as competition and decline in demand, Chobani lost its market share to competitors starting in early 2013. With help from a private venture firm, Chobani took several steps to turn things around by 2016. Will Chobani be able to regain its leadership position going forward? If so, how will it fuel its growth?

In March 2013, the chief executive development officer of the Heiltsuk Economic Development Corporation (HEDC) was preparing a report on the findings and recommendations of the organization’s seven-year history. The HEDC, the economic development arm of the Heiltsuk Nation, was not meeting its goals. The HEDC structure was based on the theory that economic development success in Aboriginal communities required a separation of business from political influence. Unfortunately, the HEDC had yielded little economic success to date. Further, it was not clear whether it had effectively brought about the desired separation of economics from politics. Similar concerns were expressed by the chief councilor of the Heiltsuk Tribal Council, the political governance structure responsible for administering, governing, and setting policy for the Heiltsuk Nation. There was hope that the report would bring clarity to what had gone wrong in the development process under the HEDC. Was the governance structure appropriate for the task the HEDC was supposed to fulfill, or were the roles and responsibilities not clearly defined? What was causing the myriad of communication issues? What should be done?

In the fall of 2010, the founders of Campus FundSource, an organization developed to help campus groups raise money for their respective causes, were asked to present to a potential investor. The three founders were struggling with how to scale their start-up that connected campus groups that needed funding (such as language groups, intramural sports teams, and singing groups) with major brands that were trying to reach a younger demographic with their marketing messages. The company was still at the start-up stage, and the founders had just graduated from a business accelerator program, where they finished developing their website and tested both the site and the business concept--connecting brands with students. In order to show potential investors that they were readily scalable, they needed to show that they could quickly attain a critical mass of both student groups and national brands. This presented a chicken-and-egg dilemma, as it was proving difficult to penetrate two markets at once. How could Campus FundSource attract both the student groups who needed funding and the national brands that wanted to attract and keep post-secondary students as their customers?

In March 2013, the chief executive development officer of the Heiltsuk Economic Development Corporation (HEDC) was preparing a report on the findings and recommendations of the organization's seven-year history. The HEDC, the economic development arm of the Heiltsuk Nation, was not meeting its goals. The HEDC structure was based on the theory that economic development success in Aboriginal communities required a separation of business from political influence. Unfortunately, the HEDC had yielded little economic success to date. Further, it was not clear whether it had effectively brought about the desired separation of economics from politics. Similar concerns were expressed by the chief councilor of the Heiltsuk Tribal Council, the political governance structure responsible for administering, governing, and setting policy for the Heiltsuk Nation. There was hope that the report would bring clarity to what had gone wrong in the development process under the HEDC. Was the governance structure appropriate for the task the HEDC was supposed to fulfill, or were the roles and responsibilities not clearly defined? What was causing the myriad of communication issues? What should be done?

De Beers, a sophisticated, international mining company, operated the Victor Mine, an open pit diamond mine in Canada, located within traditional territory claimed by the Attawapiskat First Nation. To develop the mine, De Beers had to follow provincial and federal legislation, meet environmental standards, and most importantly, negotiate use of the land with the First Nation. Although the mine was successful, the First Nation community was suffering with health, education, and housing issues; rampant unemployment; and a remarkably high rate of suicide among its youth. Benefits negotiated in the mining agreement were not resolving the problems, despite the provision of employment opportunities and payment of millions of dollars to the First Nation. In frustration, the First Nation set up road blockades to stop work at the mine. De Beers now wanted to extend their mining operation by using a mine extension, but to do that, they had to seek further agreement from the Attawapiskat. Did the history of First Nations in Canada affect their relationship with De Beers? Were the stakeholders meeting their responsibilities? What lessons could be applied to negotiations for future developments?

In the fall of 2010, the founders of Campus FundSource, an organization developed to help campus groups raise money for their respective causes, were asked to present to a potential investor. The three founders were struggling with how to scale their start-up that connected campus groups that needed funding (such as language groups, intramural sports teams, and singing groups) with major brands that were trying to reach a younger demographic with their marketing messages. The company was still at the start-up stage, and the founders had just graduated from a business accelerator program, where they finished developing their website and tested both the site and the business concept--connecting brands with students. In order to show potential investors that they were readily scalable, they needed to show that they could quickly attain a critical mass of both student groups and national brands. This presented a "chicken-and-egg" dilemma, as it was proving difficult to penetrate two markets at once. How could Campus FundSource attract both the student groups who needed funding and the national brands that wanted to attract and keep post-secondary students as their customers?

In 2005, three international information technology professionals formed an international joint venture to design and construct information technology systems for shopping centres and office buildings. Despite being relative newcomers to working in the Chinese marketplace, in 2012, the company won a contract for a large job in China. However, when the company’s three directors travelled to China to meet with their Chinese business partners, they encountered several unexpected, questionable situations. Their Chinese business partners were not there to meet them; rather, they had travelled to another country. The three directors met instead with representatives from the Chinese government consortium overseeing the construction project, and these officials pressed the three company directors regarding what they had brought for them. Their limited preparation and lack of contingency plans challenged their ability to maintain respect and move forward. How could they recover the situation and still achieve their goals of a signed contract?

De Beers, a sophisticated, international mining company, operated the Victor Mine, an open pit diamond mine in Canada, located within traditional territory claimed by the Attawapiskat First Nation. To develop the mine, De Beers had to follow provincial and federal legislation, meet environmental standards, and most importantly, negotiate use of the land with the First Nation. Although the mine was successful, the First Nation community was suffering with health, education, and housing issues; rampant unemployment; and a remarkably high rate of suicide among its youth. Benefits negotiated in the mining agreement were not resolving the problems, despite the provision of employment opportunities and payment of millions of dollars to the First Nation. In frustration, the First Nation set up road blockades to stop work at the mine. De Beers now wanted to extend their mining operation by using a mine extension, but to do that, they had to seek further agreement from the Attawapiskat. Did the history of First Nations in Canada affect their relationship with De Beers? Were the stakeholders meeting their responsibilities? What lessons could be applied to negotiations for future developments?

In January 2015, the chief executive officer and managing director of Tata Consultancy Services, India’s largest information technology company, expected to face questions from the media related to recent rumours of his company’s plans to lay off nearly 30,000 employees. Over the previous four weeks the reports had spread on both social media and conventional media platforms, leading to widespread protests against the company and attempts to unionize information technology employees (a first in India). The company’s carefully constructed corporate reputation of being employee friendly was threatened. The chief executive officer needed to design and execute a communication strategy that addressed the concerns of the various stakeholders involved.

<p style="color: rgb(197, 183, 131);"><strong> AWARD WINNER - Corporate Social Responsibility Award, European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD) Case Writing Competition</strong></p><br>Bank Audi, a leading financial institution, was founded in Lebanon in 1830 and, over the years, had been engaged in various forms of philanthropic, charitable giving embodying its responsibility towards its various stakeholders. The head of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) unit faced a prominent decision. How could the bank consolidate its CSR efforts—which had taken a largely philanthropic approach, especially between 2010 and 2012—in the context of a coherent strategy that built on the assessment of aspects that were material and critical to both the bank and its key stakeholders? Setting the bank’s CSR priorities would serve as the basis of a coherent CSR strategy for Bank Audi.