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This case is about a small American auto parts producer trying to diversify its way out of dependence on the major automakers in 2013. A promising new product is developed and the company gets a chance to license it to a Scottish manufacturer. The issue of whether to license or go it alone in international markets is central to the case. A full class sequel to this case is available, titled Cameron Auto Parts: Joint Ventures, Licensing or Exporting, 9B16M044.

In a 2014 documentary, the multinational technology company Apple Inc. was implicated in alleged human rights violations at Pegatron, a large Chinese supplier that assembled Apple's iPhones. The allegations followed similar, well-publicized violations in 2009 at another China-based Apple supplier. Although Apple had promised to improve its practices, doing so had clearly proven to be a difficult task. How should Apple respond to these new allegations? Should it evade the accusations and instead point to its existing efforts? Could it do more to protect workers? Should it rethink its offshoring and outsourcing strategy? Is it fair to blame Apple for the activities of its suppliers? Where does the blame fall?

In 2014, the vice-president and director of recycling at the Arizona-based First Solar, Inc., the world's leading solar energy company, was considering a business plan to convert its solar panel recycling initiative from a cost centre to a profit-making business. Although the company pre-funded the recycling of photovoltaic solar panels by adding the recycling cost to the end-customers' purchase price, Europe had recently enacted laws requiring that solar modules be recycled after their useful life had ended. First Solar's vice-president and director of recycling recognized a business opportunity in recycling solar panels but wondered about the timing of entry into this area and the profit potential of such a move. How could they best position First Solar's recycling offering to take advantage of the North American recycling regulations that they believed were imminent but that had not yet transpired?

In a 2014 documentary, the multinational technology company Apple Inc. was implicated in alleged human rights violations at Pegatron, a large Chinese supplier that assembled Apple's iPhones. The allegations followed similar, well-publicized violations in 2009 at another China-based Apple supplier. Although Apple had promised to improve its practices, doing so had clearly proven to be a difficult task. How should Apple respond to these new allegations? Should it evade the accusations and instead point to its existing efforts? Could it do more to protect workers? Should it rethink its offshoring and outsourcing strategy? Is it fair to blame Apple for the activities of its suppliers? Where does the blame fall?

Not long ago, it was generally accepted that nice guys and gals finish last in the cutthroat world of big business. Over the past decade, the social enterprise movement has changed the way many people view the end game of capitalism. Nevertheless, the idea that jerks make better CEOs survived the 2008 financial crisis. Since then, Ivey Business School research on leader character has demonstrated that long-term sustainable success is best gained through company executives having a balance of personality traits including compassion, humility, and empathy. In other words, putting a jerk at the helm of a company isn’t advisable even if they have excellent experience, drive, and competencies. <br><br> There is a persistent notion among entrepreneurs that the right “Startup DNA” is comprised of characteristics such as resilience and the ability to accept risk, along with arrogance and the ability to be a huge jerk. But what if billionaire jerks had reined in their inner boor when bringing ideas to market? According to Ivey Professor Ann Frost, many of the world’s successful jerks might be richer if they had played nice, or at least nicer. When venture capitalists invest in start-ups, they spend a lot of time with the management team they’re betting on. VCs also typically add founders of their new portfolio companies to their CEO networks, which tend to function better when members comfortably share ideas instead of aggressively clashing over egos. As such, some VCs have “no A-holes” policies, meaning having a bad reputation can limit one’s ability to strike a favourable deal before negotiations even begin. “The goal [of negotiations] is really finding common ground,” says Professor Frost. “And nobody wants to share ground with a jerk, so they are inclined to make them pay.” While conflict over ideas generally leads to superior outcomes, interpersonal conflict leads to the A-hole tax.

At the Benedictine monastery of Admont in Austria, which had been economically active for over 940 years, the monks tended to think in centuries rather than quarters. However, the monastery’s business director needed to make a decision in a much shorter timeframe. The monastery employed approximately 600 people in its forestry, wine-growing, energy, real estate, services, and industrial businesses. Its largest subsidiary, an industrial manufacturer of wooden floorboards, was faced with severe challenges in 2015, including highly fluctuating demand and a growing pressure on margins due to low-cost competition from Asia. The business director had to decide how to proceed with the loss-making company, bearing in mind his responsibility towards the monastery and its higher purposes (such as providing pastoral care and fostering regional development through the creation of jobs).

Former Trader Joe's President Doug Rauch developed an innovative idea to address the challenge of food insecurity, food waste, and nutrition. His concept was a new retail grocery model, offering nutritious affordable food to a food insecure population in the inner city using excess inventory. His path was not an easy one, but by April 2015, Rauch was celebrating the upcoming launch of his Boston pilot and flagship store, Daily Table. Daily Table would be able to test its operating model and impact, better understand its customer base, and establish community partnerships. After further expansion to other sites in Boston, Daily Table planned to expand nationally. But there were questions about whether acceptance by one community would transfer to others and what could Rauch do to prepare himself and his team.

In November 2014, JCB - the world's leading construction equipment manufacturer, with a presence in 150 countries - decided to add two more facilities to its existing manufacturing strength in India. Based in the United Kingdom, JCB had put US$300 million into building its production and service capabilities since its entry into the Indian construction equipment market in 1979. However, the intricate business environment in India and its difficult terrain, coupled with the recent infrastructure downturn in the country, posed great risks to this large investment. As the management of the privately owned company evaluated the viability of this investment decision, it faced a tough question: How should JCB sustain its market position in such a competitive, demanding, and dynamic Indian construction equipment market, given the tough challenges it faced?

On May 21, 2015, food inspectors in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh tested Maggi instant noodles that had been manufactured by Nestlé India Limited. Their results led them to declare that the samples contained higher-than-permissible levels of monosodium glutamate and lead - substances that could, at those levels, potentially cause harm to consumers. The well-known brand accounted for 26 per cent of Nestlé India Limited's annual revenue, and the subsequent recall was a source of controversy. The recall was one of the biggest business stories of the year in India and was estimated to have cost Nestlé India Limited US$50 million. The company's response to the problem ranged from inaction and denial to attempts at rectification and redemption. The overall actions of the company were characterized by confusion regarding product safety and contradictory statements about the accusations that had been made against it. Given the material losses and the damage to both the Maggi and Nestlé India brands, the company wanted to know how the situation could be corrected - and avoided - in the future. Was the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India correct to recall Maggi noodles? Once the crisis was in motion, how could Nestlé India Limited have handled the situation to appease customers, regulators, and stakeholders?

At the Benedictine monastery of Admont in Austria, which had been economically active for over 940 years, the monks tended to think in centuries rather than quarters. However, the monastery's business director needed to make a decision in a much shorter timeframe. The monastery employed approximately 600 people in its forestry, wine-growing, energy, real estate, services, and industrial businesses. Its largest subsidiary, an industrial manufacturer of wooden floorboards, was faced with severe challenges in 2015, including highly fluctuating demand and a growing pressure on margins due to low-cost competition from Asia. The business director had to decide how to proceed with the loss-making company, bearing in mind his responsibility towards the monastery and its higher purposes (such as providing pastoral care and fostering regional development through the creation of jobs).

On May 21, 2015, food inspectors in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh tested Maggi instant noodles that had been manufactured by Nestlé India Limited. Their results led them to declare that the samples contained higher-than-permissible levels of monosodium glutamate and lead — substances that could, at those levels, potentially cause harm to consumers. The well-known brand accounted for 26 per cent of Nestlé India Limited’s annual revenue, and the subsequent recall was a source of controversy. The recall was one of the biggest business stories of the year in India and was estimated to have cost Nestlé India Limited US$50 million. The company’s response to the problem ranged from inaction and denial to attempts at rectification and redemption. The overall actions of the company were characterized by confusion regarding product safety and contradictory statements about the accusations that had been made against it. Given the material losses and the damage to both the Maggi and Nestlé India brands, the company wanted to know how the situation could be corrected — and avoided — in the future. Was the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India correct to recall Maggi noodles? Once the crisis was in motion, how could Nestlé India Limited have handled the situation to appease customers, regulators, and stakeholders?

In November 2014, JCB — the world’s leading construction equipment manufacturer, with a presence in 150 countries — decided to add two more facilities to its existing manufacturing strength in India. Based in the United Kingdom, JCB had put US$300 million into building its production and service capabilities since its entry into the Indian construction equipment market in 1979. However, the intricate business environment in India and its difficult terrain, coupled with the recent infrastructure downturn in the country, posed great risks to this large investment. As the management of the privately owned company evaluated the viability of this investment decision, it faced a tough question: How should JCB sustain its market position in such a competitive, demanding, and dynamic Indian construction equipment market, given the tough challenges it faced?

Snapdeal.com had launched as a platform for online discount coupons, then revamped its business model in the evolving Indian e-commerce sector to become one of India's largest e-commerce retailers. In India's rapidly growing market, the major players jockeyed for the top position and used various business models and strategic initiatives. Now, the entry of Amazon into the industry challenged the market dynamics and Snapdeal.com faced challenges of funding, positioning, and consumer dissatisfaction. How could it address these challenges to sustain its position as a leading Indian e-retailer? Would it be able to face the growing domestic and global competition? Would it be acquired by a global player, such as eBay, which was already a stakeholder and was perhaps waiting for the right moment to make its strategic move in India? Was coming out with an initial public offering a possible step in the future?

In late 2015, Jeff Seabright, Chief Sustainability Officer at Unilever, had to report to Unilever CEO Paul Polman on the effort to transform the cultivation of oil palm. Historically, palm oil was produced using unsustainable methods that included burning large tracts of forest land which destroyed wildlife habitats, displaced native populations, and emitted greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Global demand for palm oil was increasing which made the situation worse. Unilever was the largest single buyer of palm oil, purchasing about 3% of global production, and had been an active promoter of sustainable palm oil production. In 2015, 60% of globally traded palm oil was covered by sustainability commitments, up from 5% in 2008, but there was more to be done. Palm oil-driven deforestation and different kinds of social issues continued across the world, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, which produced 80% of palm oil. The case discusses the sustainability strategy implemented by Unilever across time with regards to palm oil, together with the efforts implemented by other organizations such as the Consumer Goods Forum, the Roundtable On Sustainable Palm Oil, social and environmental NGOs, Unilever's competitors and the local governments in Southeast Asia. What more could Unilever do to advance the diffusion of sustainable palm oil?

This case describes the teaching and learning processes in Ayurveda, the ancient Indian system of medicine as explained by Vaidya Hardikar. He practised the system of diagnosis through 'Nadi Nidan', pulse reading and treated patients according to the principles of Ayurveda, the ancient Indian system of Medicine. The transfer of knowledge happened through formal and informal processes where he assisted his father and other practitioners in preparing medicines, interrogating the patients and pronouncing diagnosis. The participants can identify and analyze the various processes in the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge.

In June 2014, the co-founder and chief executive officer of the fast-growing, Shanghai-based online food ordering and delivery service ele.me, was wrestling with multiple growth-related questions. He had lofty ambitions for his venture but was facing the first major competitive threat in the form of a diversifying entrant. In the face of this threat, and with his inexperience as a business manager, he was unsure about how quickly to try to scale up the business, and how exactly he should implement his growth plan for ele.me. The company's success had attracted considerable venture capital financing. Should the company seek growth by sending head office managers to new regional offices, by hiring local regional managers and staff, or by franchising the brand in target cities?

In June 2014, the co-founder and chief executive officer of the fast-growing, Shanghai-based online food ordering and delivery service ele.me, was wrestling with multiple growth-related questions. He had lofty ambitions for his venture but was facing the first major competitive threat in the form of a diversifying entrant. In the face of this threat, and with his inexperience as a business manager, he was unsure about how quickly to try to scale up the business, and how exactly he should implement his growth plan for ele.me. The company's success had attracted considerable venture capital financing. Should the company seek growth by sending head office managers to new regional offices, by hiring local regional managers and staff, or by franchising the brand in target cities?

This case explores the transformation of a company, ComplexAminos, from a failing start-up to a successful organization preparing for a liquidity event. After conducting a six-year turnaround strategy, the CEO needed to decide whether the company should go public or be sold. During the turnaround, the company adopted a roll-up strategy to grow quickly. This case explores such issues as when roll-ups are appropriate and how the CEO gained the funding and board support to successfully implement the strategy.

Professional service firms are facing new competitive challenges in a global market with more value-focused clients, service commoditization, regulatory changes, and new Internet-enabled business models. They increasingly need to improve competitiveness through sustained innovation of the value they provide and the efficiency with which they provide it. But how can firms establish an effective and sustainable innovation system? This Executive Digest shares a best practice model for innovation based on academic research and honed by a decade of practical experience in application across professional service firms in consulting projects. This work covers how to develop innovation strategies by establishing processes and organization to support innovation, providing innovation training, developing new services, and re-engineering existing services. The author, Alastair Ross, details the practices required and shares some of the challenges encountered in realizing them. This article draws heavily on his latest book, Innovating professional services: Transforming value and efficiency.

From 1980 to 2010, frequent flyer programs (FFPs) had evolved from simple customer reward programs to independent profit-generation business models. The airline industry had seen enormous success with FFPs, which had become businesses of their own. In June 2014, however, United Airlines announced that as of March 1, 2015, it would move from awarding miles based on distance flown to awarding miles for dollars spent per ticket, following in the footsteps of Delta Air Lines. According to the new mileage accrual plan, most United Airlines passengers would earn fewer reward miles. Many customers saw this change as a significant devaluation of award miles and complained about United Airlines' new policy. Who benefited from the revenue-based FFPs and how would the new program affect the behaviour of United Airlines' customers? Should American Airlines also adopt the revenue-based FFP?