個案總覽

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)’s executive VP was faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed as executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW’s on-screen performance was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro television program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience, and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already low morale among WCW’s on-screen talent and support staff.

This case is a supplement to World Championship Wrestling — A Crisis of Leadership (A).

This case is a supplement to World Championship Wrestling — A Crisis of Leadership (A).

This case is a supplement to World Championship Wrestling — A Crisis of Leadership (A).

Bihar State Milk Cooperative Federation (COMPFED) had been marketing its milk and milk-related products under the Sudha brand name in the Bihar and Jharkhand regions of India for three decades. It operated through six unions and two dairies to process the milk collected from nearly 4,000 village-level cooperatives. COMPFED appeared to have a competitive advantage for its supply of milk, since it maintained the largest network for milk procurement, which spanned a large area and was unmatched by its competitors. However, due to various environmental forces, the ability to procure an adequate supply had declined in the last two years, which negatively affected the profitability of the organization.<br><br><br><br>The marketing manager of COMPFED had been facing difficulty in serving the growing demand and maintaining profitability. Since he operated in an industry with high fixed costs, the declining supply of milk procurement meant lower sales. As a result, there was no opportunity to significantly lower operating costs to match the limited supply.<br><br><br><br>The marketing manager thought of two reasons in the external environment that contributed to this situation. First, a series of floods had caused damage to grazing land and livestock operations. Additionally, private players were disrupting the supply chain by offering short-term higher payments to some suppliers/farmers. These players did not face the same regulatory and hygiene guidelines that COMPFED did. The marketing manager’s options included two very different alternatives: trying to work with these agents or securing a process to minimize or eradicate their activities.

Looking back on the disastrous vacation of an American couple in Indonesia, this case shows how a globally branded North American hotel chain disregarded the basic tenets of maintaining their global brand promise, ignored generally accepted customer service standards, failed to instigate delivery failure recovery, and leveraged firm-specific capabilities to maximize shareholder wealth. The reaction of the local manager at the Indonesian hotel and adaptation of the value proposition are told from the perspective of the vacationing couple that experienced the diluted brand firsthand.

Trust is at the heart of a collaborative innovation capability. Without a foundation of trust, collaborative alliances can neither be built nor sustained. Using a two-stage qualitative research method, we discovered that managers understand neither the nature of trust nor the dynamics of trust building. To help alleviate these knowledge gaps, we herein develop a definition of collaborative trust, describe a trust maturity framework, and discuss the competitive power of trust. We conclude by presenting a dynamic systems model that elaborates on the process of building trust to improve collaboration, innovation, and competitive performance.

The chief executive officer of Mission Hills, a Chinese golf course operator, is reviewing a handful of expansion options. In August 2011, Mission Hills has three large land holdings in Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Haikou, 12,000 employees, and 22 golf courses. In addition to golf courses, it owns two luxury hotels and sells houses built within its properties. Mission Hills occupies an average of 60 per cent of the land it currently owns, and Chu is trying to decide if growth should come by expanding to a third Chinese province or if it should continue building in its current land holdings. He wants to identify and mitigate some of the risks that come with running a high-growth business.

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)'s executive VP is faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed the executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW's onscreen product was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro (Nitro) program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already-low morale among WCW's on-screen talent and support staff.

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)'s executive VP is faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed the executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW's onscreen product was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro (Nitro) program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already-low morale among WCW's on-screen talent and support staff.

In January 2000, World Championship Wrestling (WCW)'s executive VP is faced with a challenging decision. He had been appointed the executive VP just three months ago, and was tasked with restoring the company to a profitable position. However, WCW's onscreen product was suffering; ratings for the flagship WCW Monday Nitro (Nitro) program had fallen to their lowest levels in nearly three-and-a-half years. WCW was losing its market leadership position, its viewing audience and even some of its on-screen talent to its major competitor, the World Wrestling Federation (WWF). The executive VP faced problems on a number of fronts: a talent roster low on motivation and morale, turnover among both the writing staff and company leadership, and a rapidly shrinking audience. Furthermore, the current instability in leadership meant that another major change would seriously impact the already-low morale among WCW's on-screen talent and support staff.

North American and European branded hotel chains in their quest to maximize shareholder wealth have recently shed ownership of assets and freed up capital to focus on their core businesses with the help of strenuous contracts. The ensuing pursuit of further business development has expedited the internationalization process and a new business model of franchising the brand/value proposition in international locations has evolved. Globally accepted brands hold the promise of global quality. It is widely believed that Western brands deliver more value than brands from emerging nations, such that they can charge global prices to global customers. Service delivery failure is encountered frequently in the accommodation and food services industry. Such failures can act as an important performance measurement criteria. Managers are taught how to recover from service delivery failure and address loyalty issues of existing customers. They fear losing them as the cost of acquiring new customers may exceed the cost of keeping existing customers. The case illustrates how a globally branded North American hotel chain disregarded the basic tenets of maintaining the global brand promise, ignored generally accepted North American customer service standards, failed to instigate delivery failure recovery and leveraged firm specific capabilities to maximize shareholder wealth. The reaction of the local counterpart, the reaction to countermand the imbalance in the ensuing business relationship and adaptation of the value proposition are told from the perspective of a vacationing couple that experienced the diluted brand firsthand.

The head of the branded private investment company owner of the Virgin brand reflected on the group's new pillars of growth. Since the 1970s when Richard Branson created the Virgin record retailing company, Virgin had developed from scratch six companies worth more than $1 billion each and changed their focus from record retailing and music production to a broader one based on airlines, health, financial services, mobile and media businesses. In addition, Virgin had been able to apply the Virgin brand to several different products without harming the brand. Their challenge had been finding the capital to finance the new ventures rather than the brand. Since 2005, Branson was dedicating more and more time to a charitable organization, Virgin Unite, and had appointed Stephen Murphy the new CEO of the Group. As Murphy contemplated their growth strategy for the next decade he faced a number of difficult decisions. First, how should he fund new ventures? While growing, the Group had sold stakes in its companies and had signed with them licensing agreements for the use of the Virgin brand name. The Virgin Group was today a loose group of companies some linked to Virgin only by brand licensing agreements. Should they expand by signing new licensing agreements? Second, what kind of opportunities should he seek? Should they keep acting as a venture capital firm, nurturing new ventures as in the past or should they invest in larger and more established companies? What would be the consequences of their choices on the brand and on the Group? Would they always be able to inject the Virgin culture and turn around companies?

This case focuses on organizational transformation in an accounting firm in South Africa. It describes how the impact of both globalization and the transformation that the country had undergone since the advent of democracy in 1994 steered StratAFin Inc. towards a process of building a new identity. The firm’s senior management realized the need for transformation based on the many new challenges in the changing environment. Change was experienced at many levels within the organization: from the construction of a new building as a symbol of change, to corporatizing and growing the firm, changing the management structure, investing heavily in technology and human capital development, focusing on continuous improvement, and driving major diversity transformation. The case offers insights into the many drivers that had to be considered in the process, how the organization had to manage resistance to change and the need for flexibility during the process, and the importance of measurement of the many dimensions of the transformation process. The case concludes with the challenge of how the firm’s leadership could ensure that the continuing transformation maintained its momentum.

The case is about a software development company, Telerik, which was based in Sofia, Bulgaria, with offices in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and Germany. The company was founded in 2002 and had become a world-leader in user interface (UI) components for Microsoft's .NET framework. The company was still managed by its original four founders and had grown to 400 employees. In response to rapid growth and to retain its rapid development product process, Telerik adopted agile development in 2006. Agile development is a values-driven process that includes the elements of decentralization, rapid development cycles, intense customer service, teamwork and face-to-face communication. Telerik has fully implemented this process, including the software development components, communication, coordination and management tools that are collaborative and rely heavily upon communication and widespread team interaction and responsibility. Telerik had moved into a new and modern building that included game and quiet rooms, and its physical environment was designed specifically to facilitate agile development. The company's management style was informal, hands-on, consultative and development-driven, and their culture was youth-focused. Telerik's human resource ("human capital") practices were innovative and flexible and its benefits and compensation package had allowed Telerik to attract a high quality workforce. Its recent innovations in benefits, including concierge services and stock options, had given Telerik an edge in human capital with an employee turnover rate of under five per cent. The founders had worked diligently to create a high performing, cohesive organization that was an exciting place to work. They had built a company with an excellent reputation, both in technical achievements and product development, and as an employer. Their success was based upon the rapid deployment of committed human capital in a culture of teamwork and custom.

The president of Infusion Development Corporation was reviewing the progress of the new subsidiary the company had set up 15 months earlier in Krakow, Poland. The purpose of the subsidiary was to work with other Infusion offices around the world to provide innovative software development services to global clients. The investment, a big success, had grown in size from eight to forty staff in one year, and there were plans to double that by the end of the following year. The issues facing the president were threefold. Firstly, how could he work with the country manager to continue to grow the subsidiary? Attracting the right talent was vital to Infusion’s culture and business model. Initial growth in Poland was based partly on local referrals in the community of .NET professionals in Krakow. It was also based on being a new start-up with an entrepreneurial culture. The president and country manager were concerned that there were limits to these factors. Secondly, what role should Infusion Poland have in the wider company in the future? Should it become a global centre of excellence and a pivotal hub for the company’s innovative capability? If so, how? Thirdly, what kind of succession planning should be put in place for the country manager in Poland? If he moved to another post at Infusion, as expected, should the company seek a local country manager instead of transferring one from headquarters?

<p style="color: rgb(197, 183, 131);"><strong> AWARD WINNER - Oikos Sustainability Case Writing Competition</strong></p><br>Cargill, Inc., the privately owned, U.S.-based agribusiness company, was one of the largest sellers of palm oil in the world. Starting in 2007, the company was targeted by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), a non-governmental organization (NGO) that advocated environmentalism. RAN targeted Cargill because the production of palm oil in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia destroyed rainforests. Pressure was put on Cargill’s customers, including Nestle, to demand palm oil produced by sustainable farming. Palm oil producers formed an industry-monitoring body called the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). A September 2011 announcement of Indonesia’s withdrawal from the RSPO warranted a response from Cargill to combat the strident protest of RAN. Cargill’s CEO had to come up with a plan of action to respond to RAN’s demands.

In 1998, Boots PLC was in the midst of planning to enter the Japanese retail drugstore market. Boots, a household name in the United Kingdom and a fixture in traditional English shopping areas known as High Street, had an impressive lineup of Boots-branded health and beauty products. Boots developed, manufactured, marketed, and sold these products through its chain of Boots The Chemists stores. Management was convinced that the markets for health and beauty products were becoming increasingly global. Although Boots made few international sales at this time, it was in the midst of expanding overseas and had identified Japan as a particularly attractive market to enter.<br><br><br><br>International retailing efforts can prove difficult, as many failed international ventures show. Japan presented a number of unique challenges and required careful planning and attention. Boots had dispatched a manager to Japan to work on market entry and had been discussing a joint venture to develop several pilot stores together with Mitsubishi Corporation, one of Japan’s large trading companies. Mitsubishi had a great deal of clout in Japan, something Boots lacked, and was interested in the retailing venture. The case centres around the question of whether Boots should go ahead with the joint venture with Mitsubishi, and also facilitates a broader consideration of the market attractiveness and market entry in general.

The Apple A and B cases provide two perspectives on the evolution of Apple and are designed to evoke debate about models of strategy, organization and leadership.

The Apple A and B cases provide two perspectives on the evolution of Apple and are designed to evoke debate about models of strategy, organization and leadership.