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Explores the results of Jody Leleck's efforts to turn around underperforming Broad Acres Middle School.

Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) is an innovator of strategic environmental management in the airline industry. Being a first-mover can have both its advantages and disadvantages. This case looks at the airline's decision of whether they should invest in the best available environmental technology for a fleet of new aircraft that would serve them for the next 25 years. While the technology for these low-emission engines had been around since the 1970s, it had never really been commercialized. SAS was feeling pressure from the regulatory authorities with regards to potential new charges and taxes that could affect the future operating costs of the fleet. Despite these anticipated future costs, at the time of the decision, the director of aircraft and engine analysis for SAS could not make an economic case for the more expensive engines. The challenge was for the fleet development team to try to convince the SAS management team to spend the extra kr5 million (Swedish Kronor) per aircraft for the dual combustor engine. Given that corporations are faced with increasing pressure with regards to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, this case study presents an opportunity for discussion and analysis of various environmental concepts including strategic environmental management, adoption of best available environmental technologies, the role of internal environmental leadership in a large corporation and the effect of market-based mechanisms to improve a sector's environmental performance. The case illustrates the complexities of environmental decisions in striking a balance between meeting ambitious commitments and dealing with real capabilities of companies and external pressures.

This case describes the operating model and history of Red Tomato, a non-profit organization dedicated to branding and logistical support for locally grown produce farmers in the northeast U.S. The case highlights the challenges involved in making locally grown produce available to large consumer markets.

The case describes the political, regulatory and stakeholder challenges confronting the founder of Porter Airlines, located in Toronto, Ontario, during the 2002/03 period when he was seeking formal permits to launch the airline from Toronto City Centre airport. The case also includes information on the market opportunity for a new airline, enabling students to assess a) the business case for new entry into a hyper-competitive industry, b) the appropriate competitive strategies for successful performance and c) the political or non market strategies for managing stakeholder and political opposition.

Heeding the wisdom of Peter Drucker might have helped us avoid - and will help us solve - numerous challenges, from restoring trust in business to tackling climate change. He issued early warnings about excessive executive pay, the auto industry's failure to adapt and innovate, competitive threats from emerging markets, and the perils of neglecting nonprofit organizations and other agents of societal reform. If he were still here, a century after his birth, what would he say about the path forward? The essential Drucker can be summarized in three themes: First, management should be a profession, and executives and managers should remember that their primary job is to look out for the long-term health of their organizations. That means taking responsibility for social well-being, not just wealth. Second, knowledge workers cannot be controlled; they must be motivated. Such employees must see a purpose more meaningful than personal profit. And third, nonprofits are necessary ingredients for producing a good society, one in which businesses can thrive. It is critical to invest in them. Drucker was not a revolutionary. He merely asked that we constantly challenge our assumptions. He preached steadiness and vision, recognizing that leading in turbulent times requires foresight about where things are heading as well as judgment about what not to change.

Peter Drucker's extensive writings, including more than 30 HBR essays, are landmarks of the managerial profession. They've influenced the practice and teaching of management for decades and no doubt line thousands of bookshelves. But does anyone read his works? More important, ought they? More important still, what will they gain if they do? In this 1980 article, Kantrow maintains that Drucker's real contribution to the discipline of management lies not so much in the cash value of his ideas but in the rigorous activity of mind by which they are formulated. One can learn far more deeply from watching Drucker think, says Kantrow, than from studying the content of his thought. Using specific passages from many of Drucker's books, the author demonstrates how Drucker's broadly contextual, logical, holistic play of thought enacts a kind of ongoing drama of perspective and how, combined with his fair-minded approach and commonsense flow of reasoning, Drucker so effectively convinces the reader. Kantrow also classifies Drucker's works into four groups - social and political thought, business and management analyses, views of what might logically develop in the future, and how-to primers on business tasks - and offers a guide for how to choose the best book for you. Accompanying Kantrow's article are essays by five leaders who write about Peter Drucker's influence on them: A.G. Lafley, of Procter & Gamble; Frances Hesselbein, of the Leader to Leader Institute; Oscar Motomura, of the Amana-Key Group; Peter Paschek, of Delta Management Consultants; and Zhang Ruimin, of Haier.

Most firms are trying to combine products and services into innovative offerings in an effort to boost revenue and profit streams and balance cash flows. These hybrid solutions can help companies attract new customers and increase demand among existing ones by offering them superior value. Such offerings are commonplace - think Apple (the iPod product combined with the iTunes service). While the promise of combined offerings is great, it's easy to get them wrong. The problem is that too many companies, expecting to catch the brass ring, don't think through exactly how to structure, market, and sell their combined offerings. Over the past three years, the authors have analyzed more than 100 winning hybrid offerings from a variety of B2B and B2C companies. Their research shows that most companies stumble in at least one of four ways: failure to differentiate, failure to scale, failure to assess markets and prices appropriately, and failure to invest in the brand. The authors identify common types of hybrids: A flexible product-and-service combination allows buyers to customize their purchase. A "peace-of-mind" bundle offers the best of breed in both product and service. A multibenefit bundle offers customers an increasing number of add-on features or benefits. A "one-stop" bundle focuses on convenience shopping. The authors also offer a practical set of guidelines for identifying the opportunities to create a successful hybrid offering in your own company.

Philanthropic organizations, exempt from the accountability imposed on business by markets or on government by voters, are free to experiment and take risks. But they have little experience in objectively evaluating their own performance or figuring out how to improve it. Regardless of the economic climate, the authors say, developing a philanthropic strategy is an iterative process - one they've labeled "getting clear, getting real, and getting better." Getting clear means selecting a few strategic anchors - people, problems, or philosophies the institution truly cares about - and using them to guide decisions about programs and grantees. In addition, hard evidence should be examined in light of values and beliefs. Getting real means pragmatically assessing the resources and time required to bring about desired change and soliciting candid feedback from the field. Getting better means regularly reviewing the organization's entire funding strategy in light of both outside perspectives and nonfinancial assets. Ditkoff and Colby outline the traps that funding institutions must avoid if they are to optimize their resources and organizational outcomes, and they offer stories from the James Irvine, Bill & Melinda Gates, Annie E. Casey, David and Lucile Packard, and Edna McConnell Clark foundations as examples of success. The pursuit of excellence, they say, can be imposed only by philanthropic investors themselves.

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The newly appointed chair of the Department of Physiology and Pharmacology (department) at the Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry was thinking about how she would approach the next five years in her new role. The chair thought about two of the important issues she would face: building a cohesive department and nurturing a high performance culture. She became chair at a time when direction was needed. The department had formed in June 2002 as a result of the merger between the Department of Physiology and the small Department of Pharmacology & Toxicology. While the merger had gone well, the chair still sensed that some faculty members in Pharmacology felt as if their department had been taken over by Physiology. At present, it was sometimes difficult to assess performance between faculty members due to differences in workload composition and a lack of documentation. The current thinking was that the department had to move towards adopting best practices in their processes. The chair wanted to look at the issue from a broader perspective. She wondered how the issue could be best framed and what a potential solution might look like.

In the decade that the chairman, president and chief operating officer of Linens 'N Things (LNT) had been leading the firm, there had been significant changes to the industry. Specifically, its main competitor was experiencing higher sales and profits with the result of increased market share. External advice was sought to identify strategies available to LNT to catch up to its competitor and a successful Guest Oriented, Locally-Driven (GOLD) pilot was launched. Due to dwindling interests and internal resistance to the initiative, however, the chairman was left to decide what to do with the roll-out. He had several options to consider: Should he maintain the current pilot, or simply shut it down? Could it be changed or altered to encourage participation? Should it be district-specific? Or perhaps issuing an executive mandate would generate involvement. The chairman knew any decision would have to consider these and other cultural and strategic issues.

A young entrepreneur with a passion for filmmaking moved to Los Angeles and set up his own film production. The film, entitled Movin 'In, had many of the ingredients of a successful motion picture. It had an international cast, talented and well-known stars, top rate production value, and a likeable story. However, he soon learned that these were not the only factors required for a successful movie. After years of hard work and an investment of nearly $1 million, the entrepreneur could not find anyone to distribute his film. At the time of the case, it was difficult to get distribution because there were more films on the market than ever before. Historically, it took more effort to make an independent film, and distribution was easier to secure. When the digital revolution began, the market was flooded with more independent films than distributors could handle. By 2001, independent films were a commodity and DVD distribution deals were plentiful, but theatrical distribution was almost impossible to get because there were more independent films than screens to put them on. The case considers the many challenges faced by all entrepreneurs, such as leadership, management and personality conflicts, as well as those unique to the film industry.

In May 2008, the board of directors of BCE Inc., one of Canada’s leading integrated communications companies, was dealing with the fallout of a Quebec Court of Appeal decision. The court had ruled to disallow a $50 billion privatization deal as, according to the court, the process was flawed and did not consider the debenture (bond) holders of Bell Canada (a wholly owned subsidiary of BCE). The court had ruled that the board had allowed a deal in which benefits accrued only to the shareholders (a 40 per cent increase in value since the firm was in play) at the expense of the bondholders, who were dealt an 18 per cent decrease in value over the same period. In deciding whether or not to launch a last-ditch appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, management and the board needed to determine who were the key stakeholders involved in the decision to take the firm private, what their interests were, and how those interests should guide the board.

The newly appointed chair of the Department of Physiology and Pharmacology (department) at the Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry was thinking about how she would approach the next five year in her new role. The chair thought about two of the important issues she would face: building a cohesive department and nurturing a high performance culture. She became chair at a time when direction was needed. The department had formed in June 2002 as a result of the merger between the Department of Physiology and the small Department of Pharmacology & Toxicology. While the merger had gone well, the chair still sensed that some faculty members in Pharmacology felt as if their department had been taker over by Physiology. At present, it was sometimes difficult to assess performance between faculty members due to differences in workload composition and a lack of documentation. The current thinking was that the department had to move towards adopting best practices in their processes. The chair wanted to look at the issue from a broader perspective. She wondered how the issue could be best framed and what a potential solution might look like.

Less than a month after the close of the merger between The Bank of New York and Mellon Financial, managers at the two firms realized that plans for combining their asset servicing businesses - and realizing the $180 million of annual cost savings that they had promised Wall Street - were fraught with risk. Senior executives must evaluate the seriousness of the risks and identify alternative ways of integrating the two firms, while safeguarding the technologies that process and clear a substantial fraction of the world's financial transactions. [Continues with "B" and "C" cases.]

[Continuation of "A" case.] Less than a month after the close of the merger between The Bank of New York and Mellon Financial, managers at the two firms realized that plans for combining their asset servicing businesses - and realizing the $180 million of annual cost savings that they had promised Wall Street - were fraught with risk. Senior executives must evaluate the seriousness of the risks and identify alternative ways of integrating the two firms, while safeguarding the technologies that process and clear a substantial fraction of the world's financial transactions. [Continues with "C" case.]

[Continuation of "A" and "B" cases.] Less than a month after the close of the merger between The Bank of New York and Mellon Financial, managers at the two firms realized that plans for combining their asset servicing businesses - and realizing the $180 million of annual cost savings that they had promised Wall Street - were fraught with risk. Senior executives must evaluate the seriousness of the risks and identify alternative ways of integrating the two firms, while safeguarding the technologies that process and clear a substantial fraction of the world's financial transactions.

Due to continued budget shortfalls the project manager for the Spinal Cord Rehabilitation Program at the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute needed to provide proposals for immediate cost-saving measures. One of these measures included how to schedule the nursing staff. The problem involved meeting certain occupancy target levels while ensuring a minimum number and correct mix of available nurses.

In May 2008, the board of directors of BCE. Inc. (BCE), one of Canada's leading integrated communications companies, was dealing with the fallout of a previous day's Quebec Court of Appeal decision. The court had ruled to disallow a $50 billion privatization deal as, according to the court, the process was flawed and did not take into consideration the debenture (bond) holders of Bell Canada (a wholly-owned subsidiary of BCE). The court had ruled that the board allowed a deal in which benefits had accrued only to the shareholders (a 40 per cent increase in value since the firm was in play) at the expense of the bondholders, who were dealt an 18 per cent decrease in value over the same time period. In deciding whether or not to launch a last-ditch appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, management and the board needed to determine who were the key stakeholders involved in the decision to take the firm private, what their interests were, and how those interests should guide the board.

The president, chief executive officer (CEO) and co-founder of RepeatSeat wanted his company to be the first to enable mobile ticketing by targeting consumers at movie theatres. But the company's U.K.-based mobile solutions partner had not yet perfected a way to send bar codes wirelessly over the code division multiple access (CDMA) network. The CEO is faced with whether the company should continue to stay the course with its U.K. partner, rely on a local Calgary, Alberta firm's technology or seek to build the solution by itself.