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A firm that simultaneously engages in a high degree of both innovation and efficiency follows an approach that is often referred to as an ambidextrous strategy. Surprisingly, relatively few firms are able to balance these two emphases. Internal battles for resources often tip the scales in favor of efficiency over innovation, or vice versa. Management gurus frequently warn that simultaneously pursuing both can set the firm up for mediocre performance, yet the turbulent nature of today's markets and cut-throat competition create a renewed need for firms to reconsider this dual approach for longer-term success. Unfortunately, practical insights from empirical studies regarding performance benefits and implementation issues are still scant. Perhaps this is one reason why few firms are successful in both efficiency and innovation. In this article, we provide evidence-using a cross-industry survey of senior marketing managers in publicly-traded U.S. firms-that firms which successfully employ an ambidextrous strategy outperform those which overemphasize either efficiency or innovation. Furthermore, we highlight marketing's role as an example of the often overlooked need for successful functional implementation. Finally, we provide useful methods for managers to answer three key questions: (1) Is my firm ambidextrous?; (2) Should my firm be ambidextrous?; and, if so (3) How can my firm become ambidextrous?

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection reports that counterfeit goods seizures were up 83% in 2006. While a plethora of anti-counterfeiting strategies target distribution channels, international organizations, pirates, and company-based initiatives, few reports debate the effectiveness of these distinct anti-counterfeiting tactics to curb the problem. For this study we conducted in-depth interviews with United States managers to gauge the efficacy of various anti-counterfeiting tactics to preserve intellectual property rights. The results indicate that corporate managers find the practice of encouraging distributors to notify the manufacturer about counterfeits, as well as educating both employees and channel members about the counterfeit problem, to be some of the most effective ways to fight pirates. However, the managers report many other tactics are futile, including providing financial incentives for distributors to reject counterfeits and stressing the harmful effects of fake goods in advertising. We recommend a specific program that firms can employ to deter counterfeiting, including managing the registration of all trademarks and patents in key markets, establishing a company-based enforcement team, monitoring the growth of fakes through a central information repository, developing a multi-pronged action plan, and preparing to fight pirates through investigative work in conjunction with local law enforcement.

It's not easy being lean. And for many companies, getting lean right the first time does not always happen. Lean is a management philosophy focused on identifying and eliminating waste throughout a product's entire value stream, extending not only within the organization but also along the company's supply chain network. Lean promises significant benefits in terms of waste reduction, and increased organizational and supply chain communication and integration. Implementing lean, however, and achieving the levels of organizational commitment, employee autonomy, and information transparency needed to ensure its success is a daunting task. This article describes in detail two lean implementation projects within the same company: a global manufacturer of food processing machines and equipment. The first project was a failure, while the second is viewed as a success. Examining these projects in detail, the major criteria and conditions that led to either lean failure or lean success are identified. Based on these conditions, we highlight a number of lessons learned, all of which may help other organizations ensure the success of their own lean implementation and improvement efforts.

This case has been developed to facilitate a negotiation exercise related to the formation of partnership deals in the healthcare industry. It is based on actual information, but reflects a hypothetical situation involving two companies and a product that have all been disguised. The scenario described within the case involves Pharmac, a large pharmaceutical company, and Respire, a small medical start-up. Pharmac and Respire began negotiating a partnership to develop and eventually market an inhaled form of parathyroid hormone (PTH) to treat osteoporosis. If successful, this product would improve the available options for the treatment of osteoporosis. It was also expected to produce "blockbuster" sales since it would make PTH, an already extremely effective treatment option, more convenient and appealing to a large segment of untreated patients who were injection-averse (injection was the standard delivery mechanism for this drug). Development of the product was highly speculative and was expected to take six to seven years due to early stage development of the inhalable delivery system and the multi-year Phase III fracture trials required for approval. Pharmac had released the first man-made, injectable form of parathyroid hormone, called Strocal, in 2002. However, no one had yet developed a non-injectable version of PTH, despite efforts by Pharmac and other companies that spanned more than a decade. Respire's goal was to be the first company to solve this problem by developing an inhaled formulation and a device to deliver Strocal through the lungs in a safe, effective, and reproducible manner. Enough information is provided within the case to enable students to negotiate terms for royalties, milestones, exclusivity provisions, and an equity investment. At the end of OIT-81A, information known to Pharmac (but not to Respire) is provided. In OIT-81B, information known to Respire (but not to Pharmac) is given.

This case has been developed to facilitate a negotiation exercise related to the formation of partnership deals in the healthcare industry. It is based on actual information, but reflects a hypothetical situation involving two companies and a product that have all been disguised. The scenario described within the case involves Pharmac, a large pharmaceutical company, and Respire, a small medical start-up. Pharmac and Respire began negotiating a partnership to develop and eventually market an inhaled form of parathyroid hormone (PTH) to treat osteoporosis. If successful, this product would improve the available options for the treatment of osteoporosis. It was also expected to produce "blockbuster" sales since it would make PTH, an already extremely effective treatment option, more convenient and appealing to a large segment of untreated patients who were injection-averse (injection was the standard delivery mechanism for this drug). Development of the product was highly speculative and was expected to take six to seven years due to early stage development of the inhalable delivery system and the multi-year Phase III fracture trials required for approval. Pharmac had released the first man-made, injectable form of parathyroid hormone, called Strocal, in 2002. However, no one had yet developed a non-injectable version of PTH, despite efforts by Pharmac and other companies that spanned more than a decade. Respire's goal was to be the first company to solve this problem by developing an inhaled formulation and a device to deliver Strocal through the lungs in a safe, effective, and reproducible manner. Enough information is provided within the case to enable students to negotiate terms for royalties, milestones, exclusivity provisions, and an equity investment. At the end of OIT-81A, information known to Pharmac (but not to Respire) is provided. In OIT-81B, information known to Respire (but not to Pharmac) is given.

Cape Wind is an extreme example of NIMBY--not in my backyard syndrome. This is the first offshore wind project planned for the United States, in Nantucket Sound, just south of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Initially proposed six years ago, in 2001, the wind farm would be visible from Hyannis port and Osterville, two affluent communities. The coastal residents of those towns have led a campaign in Massachusetts and in Congress to thwart the efforts of Cape Wind. This case introduces the global wind industry, the rationale for wind, and then carefully reviews the various issues associated with the project.

Uria Menendez, the pre-eminent law firm in Iberia, is at a critical point in its long and distinguished history. Its newly appointed second generation co-managing Partners are facing some critical strategic decisions concerning how the firm should position itself in Iberia, geographical expansion to serve the needs of its clients, and its "Best Friends Network" with leading law firms in other countries. The firm must also address critical issues regarding the hiring, development per in work/life balance, and compensation of the top law school graduates the firm needs to maintain its position and reputation.

This one-page case, to be handed out in class, briefly lists the three major strategic options facing Uria Menendez.

The Uria Menendez C case describes the passing of the firm's founder, Rodrigo Uria, its continued success (including being one of the Top 10 MNA law firms in the world) and its decision to open an office in Warsaw.

The Uria Menendez (B) Cas describes the three major strategic options facing the firm. It can be used when the instructor wants to teach the case over two classes. The first class, based on the A case, explores the reason for the the firm's success. The B case describes the three main strategic options and the issues regarding each option. In the second class, students can debate each option.

This case examines a hard fought litigation over a patent that originated at Bell Labs. It illustrates the challenges that technology companies face today innovating in a complex intellectual property environment in fields where there is a high amount of cumulativeness. The case highlights the leverage that good strategic thinking can bring to influencing the outcome.

It may not be negotiator’s remorse but at certain times you may feel sorry that – or at least wonder why – you ever closed a deal. In such a case, you’ll probably discover that you did the deal for the sake of doing a deal – not to build a sustainable, positive and productive relationship. These authors describe how to make sure that every deal delivers value.

It's a competitor's notion of the perfect storm - low-cost and value-added provider. These authors have valuable advice to help managers weather the storm.

Robert's Center of Performing Arts (RCPA), founded and owned by Robert Gernburd, was a music school. In addition to individual instrument lessons and group lessons in music theory and music history, the RCPA sold second-hand pianos. It was difficult to find a supplier of used pianos but after a great deal of research, Gernburd found a supplier in Japan. Recently, an invoice containing supplier information had been temporarily misplaced. Since then, Gernburd had learned that his in-house piano tuner had been selling pianos without his knowledge. Gernburd was unsure how to proceed.

Wall Street's darling, Google Inc., offered more than a pretty financial picture. Poverty, communicable diseases and climate change - some of the world's largest problems - were also key interests of Google's cofounders. By applying innovation and significant resources, Google's cofounders hoped that their efforts in these areas would one day eclipse Google itself in worldwide impact. On February 22, 2006, Google Inc. announced the appointment of an executive director of the newly created Google.org. With one per cent of Google Inc.'s equity and profit as seed money, Google.org's mandate was to address climate change, global public health, economic development and poverty. Although charity by successful entrepreneurs was not unusual, this press release signaled a new organizational form, a for-profit philanthropic company. The new executive director's task ahead was unprecedented. How could he leverage the company's for-profit status to make the biggest impact possible with the resources trusted to Google.org? What decision-making criteria should be used for strategic investments? How would he measure Google.org's success?

As it entered its seventh academic year, Codman Academy, an expeditionary learning charter school located in Dorchester, Massachusetts, was reflecting on its successes and challenges. The school had succeeded in placing every member of its most recent graduating class in college. However, recent changes to the state's accountability system necessitated greater focus on helping Codman Academy students meet this graduation requirement. Codman Academy's founding, academic model, leadership, and partnerships (including its unique relationship and location within a community-based health center) are also discussed.

Many managers indicate that their organizations are very good at starting projects, but not so good at finishing them. According to this author, the reason most often cited is that marching orders change when other priorities are recognized. Employees find this extremely frustrating and wasteful, as it is difficult to make positive gains when managing on a sea of shifting priorities. The author suggests that there is a better way.

From the ephemeral to the measurable describes one way Corporate Social Responsibility has evolved. This article describes metrics and criteria that can help companies adopt best practices.

Most managers consider global expansion to be an imperative, and cross-border expansion commands wider support than cross-business expansion. This article not only counteracts such a bias, but provides a framework for valuing cross-border moves, called the ADDING Value Scorecard. There are two broad approaches to evaluating strategies: in terms of principles and in terms of analyzing their implications for value. While principles may help guide routine decisions, they should be seen in the context of important decisions as ways of complementing analysis of value rather than substituting for it. The ADDING Value Scorecard’s first component is Adding volume, and is followed by three levers for improving margins: Decreasing costs, Differentiating, and Improving industry attractiveness. The last two components, Normalizing risks and Generating knowledge (and other resources), are add-ons that reflect large discontinuities that can arise at national borders. As an example, the scorecard is applied to a cross-border move that clearly failed the ADDING Value test — the merger, recently dissolved, of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler.

Can we change our brains to sharpen perception and memory, increase speed of thought, and heal learning problems? According to the author, we can, and he describes how in this excerpt from his book The Brain That Changes Itself: Stories of Personal Triumph from the Frontiers of Brain Science (Viking Penguin, 2007). The author shows how leading-edge scientists are challenging the view that we are stuck with the brain we have at birth. For instance, the 'Merzenich brain', featured in the article, is structured by its constant collaboration with the world. The evidence Doidge assembles provides hope for life-long learning that defies aging: "Everything that you can see happen in a young brain can happen in an older brain."