個案總覽

This case deals with the means by which a company's board assess its strengths and weaknesses, identifies the skills and experience it needs, derives a list of suitable candidates, conducts "due diligence" in the process of narrowing in the list, and invites desirable candidates to join the board.

Case #5 in the Jack Wright series provides for the discussion of issues relating to succession planning for the CEO, their selection and appointment, and the subsequent appraisal of their performance. These activities are among the most crucial that boards have to face, and directly impact the long-term performance of the company.

The process by which the board determines the mix of vehicles for compensation of the CEO and the level of compensation is among the most important aspects of board responsibility. Additionally, the board must appraise the performance of the CEO, many aspects of which necessarily relate to the various methods of compensation. This case provides a vehicle for the discussion of many aspects of these topics.

There are many aspects of relationships between the board and management that are determined on a best effort basis. That is, the rules and by-laws of the company cannot pre-specify the detailed workings of the intersecting interests. Our system of capitalism depends on the good faith efforts of all concerned to derive effective working relationships. This case provides for a discussion of these issues in the context of Jack Wright and Mega Corporation.

This case deals with the issues of the corporation's organizational structure and capital structure. Jack Wright and the Mega Corporation board must consider a proposal to eliminate a large number of subsidiary companies to simplify the organization and another proposal to issue corporate bonds, the proceeds of which would be used to repurchase a large block of the company's outstanding shares.

This case finds Jack Wright, now Chairman of the Mega Corporation board, having to deal with an offer from a director to buy the company, in either a friendly or unfriendly fashion.

This case finds Jack Wright and the Mega Corporation board having to deal with a conflict situation involving a director and a "sticky situation" that has emerged from another board on which the director sits. The discussion must deal with both the director's dilemma on the other board and Jack's responsibilities as Chair of the Mega board.

Supplements the (A) case, UV4277.

Increasingly, companies are measuring customer loyalty, employee satisfaction, and other nonfinancial areas of performance that they believe affect profitability. But they've failed to relate these measures to their strategic goals or establish a connection between activities undertaken and financial outcomes achieved. Failure to make such connections has led many companies to misdirect their investments and reward ineffective managers. Extensive field research now shows that businesses make some common mistakes when choosing, analyzing, and acting on their nonfinancial measures. Among these mistakes: They set the wrong performance targets because they focus too much on short-term financial results, and they use metrics that lack strong statistical validity and reliability. As a result, the companies can't demonstrate that improvements in nonfinancial measures actually affect their financial results. The authors lay out a series of steps that allow companies to realize the genuine promise of nonfinancial performance measures. First, develop a model that proposes a causal relationship between the chosen nonfinancial drivers of strategic success and specific outcomes. Next, take careful inventory of all the data within your company. Then use established statistical methods for validating the assumed relationships and continue to test the model as market conditions evolve. Finally, base action plans on analysis of your findings, and determine whether those plans and their investments actually produce the desired results.

The (A) case describes the situation of Cadbury Schweppes (CS) and its sugar confectionery business, in a state of 'satisfactory underperformance' in which past strategies and practices make it hard for new management to initiate change in this widely respected company. The (B) case shows how from 1997 to 1999 John Sunderland, the new CEO and a new divisional manager used value based management (VBM) as a vehicle for transforming respectively the company and the sugar confectionery division with strong emphasis on people and leadership practices. The (C) case describes how CS' performance management system was redesigned in line with the Managing for Value (MfV) philosophy. It illustrates the new management performance process in action in the beverages business in Spain, where the country manager is faced with major competitive challenges.

GE believes its ability to develop management talent is a core competency that represents a source of sustainable competitive advantage. This case traces the development of GE's rich system of human resource policies and practices under five CEOs in the post-war era, showing how the development of talent is embedded into the company's ongoing management responsibilities. It describes the development of a 25-year-old MBA named Jeff Immelt, who 18 years later is named as CEO of GE, arguably the biggest and most complex corporate leadership job in the world and how he frames his priorities for GE and implements them, pulling hard on the sophisticated human resource levers his predecessors left him. Immelt questions whether he should adjust or even overhaul three elements of GE's finely tuned talent machine.

Spreadsheet supplement to case 304049.

The case offers an overview of a startup that has chosen to sell its solutions entirely through indirect channels-currently through value-added resellers (VARs) and, in the future, through both VARs and systems integrators (SIs). In the case, we discuss why the company chose a channel strategy, how management devised its marketing, product development, and pricing scheme for channel selling, the steps the company undertook to build its VAR network, and the costs of building such a channel. We also touch on how the company motivates, supports, and evaluates this network. We discuss issues such as pricing and bundling, dealing with under-performing VARs, and fundraising from a venture community that traditionally shuns companies that sell indirectly.

This appendix supports student preparation of the associated multimedia case study of the same name. See the abstract and teaching note for that case to obtain a summary of the teaching purpose, subject, issues, and classroom applications. Information contained in this appendix would be useful in executive education settings and wherever the student needs hard-copy reference to the material in the case. Generally, students who are adept at use of the computer will find this appendix to be redundant. Thus, the instructor's use of this appendix is entirely optional and should be linked to the needs of the student.

Rogers Communications Inc.'s interest in acquiring Videotron caused the chief executive officer at Quebecor Inc. to consider purchasing the company as well. Quebecor was a large international printing, publishing and media company and this acquisition would make the company the third largest cable TV company in Canada. The acquisition had a number of considerations: it would require CRTC approval, Videotron did not earn the same level of return on assets and sales as Quebecor's other lines of business, there were questions about the quality of Videotron's management, the purchase would limit cash flow affecting the growth and development of new products and services and countering Rogers offer could led to a bidding war. Did the company want to go down this road?

A seasoned health services entrepreneur develops a business plan for a cardiovascular-focused factory. Will it work?

This note provides an introduction to process analysis, covering key concepts such as bottlenecks, capacity, capacity utilization and throughput time. Concepts are illustrated in a context that is simple and familiar to most students: neighborhood drycleaner. The note is suitable as a technical reading on process analysis in a required MBA or undergraduate course in operations management.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Over the past decade, companies have become increasingly aware of the social and environmental pressures facing business. Many management scholars and consultants have argued that these new demands offer terrific opportunities for progressive organizations, and innovation is one of the primary means by which companies can achieve sustainable growth. But, say the authors, the reality is that managers have had considerable difficulty dealing with sustainable-development pressures. Specifically, their innovation strategies are often inadequate to accommodate the highly complex and uncertain nature of these new demands. In response, the authors propose the concept of sustainable-development innovation, or SDI. In contrast to conventional, market-driven innovation, SDI considers the added constraints of social and environmental pressures. SDI is, therefore, usually more complex, because there is typically a wider range of stakeholders, and more ambiguous, as many of the parties have contradictory demands. Furthermore, sustainable-development pressures can be driven by science that has yet to be accepted fully by the scientific, political, and managerial communities. Organizations that fail to understand such issues could well find themselves making costly mistakes in bringing new technologies to market.