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One Pot, One Shot (OPOS) was a revolutionary cooking technique developed by B Ramakrishnan, known affectionately as Ramki, in 2015 and subsequently validated by people from various countries. In its initial two years, OPOS had remained confined to a close group of followers on Facebook. Ramki was keen to build up the OPOS business among its followers. Having established a private limited company in July 2019 to meet the legal requirements of doing business in India, Ramki set up a network with multiple revenue streams. His pressing dilemma now was to connect with the wider population and enable OPOS to have a deeper reach. He also wanted to focus on shared value creation for scaling the business and for transforming OPOS into a “for-benefit” enterprise.

It was March 2020 and a newly hired account executive at LinkedIn Corporation (LinkedIn) was keen to close his first major deal. His job was to help marketing teams acquire new customers and grow their businesses by leveraging the LinkedIn Ad network. He had secured a meeting with the vice-president of marketing for the video conferencing company Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom). He had just one hour to prepare for the meeting and determine the best way to position LinkedIn as a solution for Zoom to handle its growth challenges and opportunities.

HKTVmall, owned and operated by Hong Kong Technology Venture Company Limited (HKTV), is the largest online e-commerce platform in Hong Kong. Officially launched in 2015 as an "online supermarket", HKTVmall has morphed into an "online shopping mall" in just five years, serving more than 1 million consumers and almost 4,000 merchants and suppliers. The company recorded its first ever net profit in mid-2020, one year prior to the company's forecast, and became one of the few online shopping operators globally to make a profit in merely five years. Despite this success, Alice Wong, Group Chief Financial Officer and Company Secretary of the company, knew it was far too early to pop the champagne bottles and celebrate - as scores of dotcom businesses in the past had prospered and then subsequently gone bust, including in Hong Kong (e.g. adMart). The challenge now is how to sustain the company's momentum and even expand the business further, especially for the post-COVID 19 era. This case describes the business details of HKTV with a focus on its HKTVmall business. It traces the company's history, retail, and e-commerce environments in Hong Kong as well as the business strategies for HKTVmall. It helps students to understand, analyze, and discuss the company's key success factors, Hong Kong's retail and e-commerce competitive landscape, as well as the post-COVID 19 era for the company's development.

One Pot, One Shot (OPOS) was a revolutionary cooking technique developed by B Ramakrishnan, known affectionately as Ramki, in 2015 and subsequently validated by people from various countries. In its initial two years, OPOS had remained confined to a close group of followers on Facebook. Ramki was keen to build up the OPOS business among its followers. Having established a private limited company in July 2019 to meet the legal requirements of doing business in India, Ramki set up a network with multiple revenue streams. His pressing dilemma now was to connect with the wider population and enable OPOS to have a deeper reach. He also wanted to focus on shared value creation for scaling the business and for transforming OPOS into a "for-benefit" enterprise.

It was March 2020 and a newly hired account executive at LinkedIn Corporation (LinkedIn) was keen to close his first major deal. His job was to help marketing teams acquire new customers and grow their businesses by leveraging the LinkedIn Ad network. He had secured a meeting with the vice-president of marketing for the video conferencing company Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom). He had just one hour to prepare for the meeting and determine the best way to position LinkedIn as a solution for Zoom to handle its growth challenges and opportunities.

This case presents an interesting sequel to a successful product innovation called Carvaan. The product offering could be recognized as reverse positioning. In a market that had a proliferation of sophisticated technological gadgets, the retro-transistor-like device that could shuffle and provide Hindi music of yesteryear was welcomed for its simplicity. Managing Director Saregama India, Vikram Mehra, was confident that the hundred-year-old company could shift from a B2B to a B2C company with Carvaan. As a result, in the next two years, the firm came out with several product variants in quick succession. The latest in the line were CarvaanGo, launched in April 2019 and Carvaan 2.0 in June 2019. While CarvaanGo was a pocket-sized-iPod-like version of the original Carvaan, Carvaan 2.0 was an advanced version, still shaped like a retro transistor but loaded with additional features to enhance the listening experience. Mehra had great hopes that with these brand extensions, the entire music-listening consumer, regardless of age, could be targeted. However, as was evident from the sales figures, these variants had not been able to garner the same success as the original. It was quite clear that Carvaan 2.0 and CarvaanGo both needed promotional backing. The quintessential question was, should the Carvaan product range cover the entire spectrum of music listeners- both old and young- or would it be wiser to stay with the older generation.

Between 2013 and 2019, Natura undertook a set of initiatives to begin its digital transformation and accelerate the global expansion that resulted in it becoming the world's fourth-largest beauty group. Along with its traditional door-to-door operation, Natura opened new channels including e-commerce, mobile apps, and physical stores, while it accelerated its international expansion with the acquisition of the Australian brand Aesop in 2013, followed by The Body Shop from L'Oréal in 2017, and Avon in 2019. In the A case, the challenge for Natura CEO João Paulo Ferreira was to find the right balance between the direct-selling and other channel formats to market Natura, to enable it to thrive in the face of intense competition in the beauty and personal care market in Brazil. In this B case, Natura's business is back on the growth track as the company has successfully aligned the new digital channels with its door-to-door operations, but the details of the omnichannel transformation and digital transformation are still complex. The case set is appropriate for use in an MBA, Executive Education, or undergraduate course on marketing, digital transformation, financial services, distribution channels, brand management, or marketing metrics, and it would work well in any course module focused on sales management.

In 2021, the world's fourth-largest beauty group, Natura &Co, was in the middle of a digital transformation process. Originally a direct-selling company, Natura transitioned to a multichannel business through online and offline channels, while acquiring strong brands such as Aesop, The Body Shop, and Avon. In the A case, the challenge for Natura CEO João Paulo Ferreira's challenge was to find the right balance between the direct-selling and other channel formats to market Natura, thus enabling it to thrive in the face of intense competition in the beauty and personal care market in Brazil. In the B case, Natura's business was back on the growth track as the company successfully aligned the new digital channels with its door-to-door operations, but the details of the omnichannel transformation and digital transformation were still complex. In this C case, Natura's executive team decided to make progress in its digital ecosystem and undertake a digital transformation process by developing a financial-technology (fintech) business. Their choices were mainly between partnering with an existing fintech, buying a solution created by an existing fintech, or creating their own fintech. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic was spreading. The case set is appropriate for use in an MBA, Executive Education, or undergraduate course on marketing, digital transformation, financial services, distribution channels, brand management, or marketing metrics, and it would work well in any course module focused on sales management.

O'Desi Meals was a food and beverage start-up based in Dublin, Ireland that aimed to deliver high-quality, healthy, home-cooked Indian food meals at affordable prices to customers who wanted delivery without compromise on taste or health. A second and more important objective that had driven the founding of the venture was to empower the population of underprivileged homeless individuals in Dublin. In March 2020, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically affected projected estimates for O'Desi Meals operations and revenues. Demand for meals and its subscription-based sales increased exponentially. The substantial increase in orders and popularity strategically challenged the venture's sustainability. To address this challenge, O'Desi Meals adopted two strategies: one short-term, to ensure sustainability (i.e., revenue generation); and one long-term, to ensure growth. Could O'Desi Meals become a successful and socially responsible authentic Indian meals provider by applying these two strategies?

O’Desi Meals was a food and beverage start-up based in Dublin, Ireland that aimed to deliver high-quality, healthy, home-cooked Indian food meals at affordable prices to customers who wanted delivery without compromise on taste or health. A second and more important objective that had driven the founding of the venture was to empower the population of underprivileged homeless individuals in Dublin. In March 2020, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically affected projected estimates for O’Desi Meals operations and revenues. Demand for meals and its subscription-based sales increased exponentially. The substantial increase in orders and popularity strategically challenged the venture’s sustainability. To address this challenge, O’Desi Meals adopted two strategies: one short-term, to ensure sustainability (i.e., revenue generation); and one long-term, to ensure growth. Could O’Desi Meals become a successful and socially responsible authentic Indian meals provider by applying these two strategies?

Maison Singulier was an online vintage furniture and home goods store founded in October 2020 and based in Montreal. Since its inception, Maison Singulier had succeeded in building a loyal customer base across Canada and the United States. Despite the early success of Maison Singulier, the founder realized that she could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the store’s marketing communications if she adopted a more systematic approach to its marketing strategy. Although she had a good understanding of the typical Maison Singulier customer, she wanted to have a more formal definition of her target segment so that she could fine-tune Maison Singulier’s marketing communications. Having enlisted the services of a local market research company, by the end of June 2021, Maison Singulier had the information it needed to redesign its marketing communications strategy to effectively reach out to the selected consumer segments. It was crucial for the future of the company to successfully manage this period.

In this Q&A, Tamara Mendelsohn, chief marketing officer of Eventbrite, discusses how deepening customer connections has reshaped her team's marketing efforts throughout the pandemic, and what opportunities might lie ahead when it comes to changing customer attitudes and behavior.

Maison Singulier was an online vintage furniture and home goods store founded in October 2020 and based in Montreal. Since its inception, Maison Singulier had succeeded in building a loyal customer base across Canada and the United States. Despite the early success of Maison Singulier, the founder realized that she could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the store's marketing communications if she adopted a more systematic approach to its marketing strategy. Although she had a good understanding of the typical Maison Singulier customer, she wanted to have a more formal definition of her target segment so that she could fine-tune Maison Singulier's marketing communications. Having enlisted the services of a local market research company, by the end of June 2021, Maison Singulier had the information it needed to redesign its marketing communications strategy to effectively reach out to the selected consumer segments. It was crucial for the future of the company to successfully manage this period.

Two women entrepreneurs' early-stage company achieved notable success when they introduced an innovative zero-sugar product into the highly competitive beverage market. After navigating a rebrand, the co-founders were poised to scale their company through product line extension, thereby entering the even more competitive ready-to-drink beverage market. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated their direct-to-consumer marketing strategy. The co-owners had to determine both the timing of the new product launch and the marketing strategy.

Two women entrepreneurs' early-stage company achieved notable success when they introduced an innovative zero-sugar product into the highly competitive beverage market. After navigating a rebrand, the co-founders were poised to scale their company through product line extension, thereby entering the even more competitive ready-to-drink beverage market. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated their direct-to-consumer marketing strategy. The co-owners had to determine both the timing of the new product launch and the marketing strategy.

The Alcagüete case is an example of a market-focused social initiative (B Corporation) that encountered serious doubts regarding its mission while it was considering an expansion proposal that would allow it to grow exponentially in record time. Alcagüete produced and sold healthy snacks. A fundamental pillar of the business was its social value proposition of combating childhood malnutrition. This was reflected in the brand and its 1x1 cause-related marketing strategy under which for each product sold, a contribution was made to a social organization addressing childhood malnutrition in Colombia, becoming a mainstay of its positioning and differentiation strategy. A progressive growth strategy had been working, but a more significant scale-up was needed the following year. One of the company's strategic partners had offered to sell products at hard-discount stores, but at what cost? And if they didn't, what other growth options were available?

LenDenClub (LDC) was a primarily online platform operated by Innofin Solutions Pvt. Ltd. in the peer-to-peer lending industry in India. To offer differentiated products in a growing segment, LDC decided to focus on the untapped segment of low-salary earners. However, it was risky to serve this segment; borrowers had little credit history but often required loans immediately for emergency expenditures, and these borrowers had limited repayment capacity, so it was challenging for LDC to remain profitable. LDC responded by developing a new product based specifically on the targeted segment’s needs that allowed LDC to give small loans to more borrowers while achieving the lowest default rates. In June 2020, with preliminary testing done, LDC needed to refine InstaMoney’s features to achieve the best version of the product and obtain the best performance of InstaMoney in terms of conversions and the lowest default rates.

Student spreadsheet to accompany product W25400.

Instructor spreadsheet to accompany product W25401.

CUBO Modular Inc. (CUBO) was a start-up social enterprise in the Philippines that emerged shortly after its chief executive officer, Earl Forlales, received a substantial cash award for besting 1,200 entries in a competition. The concept behind Forlales's competition entry was the use of engineered bamboo to produce modular houses. The materials, design, and fabrication resulted in cheaper houses that could be used for mass housing projects. The public gained awareness of CUBO from the various articles posted online about the competition, which were also posted on CUBO's Facebook page. By 2021, interest in the well-designed CUBO houses had swelled, and the quantity of queries overwhelmed the CUBO team, resulting in its failure to respond to hundreds of queries posed by potential customers. What should Forlales do to keep interest in CUBO products at a high level while managing its production capacity to meet consumer demand?