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In the Republic of Georgia, legend had it their land was a precious gift from God he had intended to keep for his mother. But over time, the land had been under intermittent threat from without and within. In 2017, the Bitfury Group, which Valery Vavilov had co-founded, had helped publish 300,000 Georgian land titles onto the blockchain, making them immutable and, many believed, unhackable. What came next, Vavilov's team envisioned, were smart purchase and sale contracts via the blockchain; and from there, a full suite of property-related services and, eventually, blockchain as the foundation for a transformation in government services. Vavilov, who had co-founded Bitfury and expanded it substantially from its bitcoin mining roots, felt a blockchain-driven makeover of this sort would take place not just in Georgia's government, but around the world. It was not a matter of "if?" anymore; although that still left the question of "when?"

In 2014, mobile payment company Square, Inc., based in San Francisco, California, was one of an increasing number of venture capital financed firms with valuations above US$1 billion, which had become known as unicorns. By September 2014, the company had raised $371 million over five rounds of venture capital financing. Since the first funding round had been almost five years previous, it was possible that venture funding investors would be pushing for an exit. The firm considered an acquisition offer and an initial public offering, but it was apparent that neither option would yield its desired $6 billion exit value. With $139 million in cash on hand, Square, Inc., was on track to use $138 million of cash in 2014. It approached venture capital investors for a sixth round of financing. It was then up to the investors to determine if they could agree to suitable terms.

To identify design ideas for their own startup, two MBAs compare the different profiling, matching, and monetization approaches employed by five incumbent dating services: Coffee Meets Bagel, OKCupid, Jiayuan, Dating Ring, and HurryDate.

In June 2012, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) sought to further financial inclusion in India by permitting non-bank corporate bodies to roll out “white-label” automated teller machine (WLA) networks. Unfortunately, most licensed operators soon found that the number of customers using the white-label machines was lower than anticipated, while the costs of installation, operation, and maintenance were higher than projected, and the revenues received from card-issuing agencies (i.e., banks) were inadequate to ensure viability of the business proposition. However, one operator, Tata Communications Payment Solutions Limited (TCPSL), rolled out its “Indicash” network very quickly, installing over 7,000 units in about 33 months, accounting for close to 60 per cent of all WLA installations by March 2016. Yet by June 2016, in what seemed like a reversal, TCPSL was put up for sale at an estimated valuation of between INR10–13.5 billion. In attracting potential buyers of the Indicash network, how could TCPSL leverage its accomplishments with the WLAs to make a sale? What would attract a strategic buyer to the WLAs?

In 2015, the Copenhagen School of Entrepreneurship (CSE), the largest business incubator in Denmark, was admitting 100–125 new start-ups each year and attracting external funding of US$33 million from both public and private sources—all with an annual budget of US$435,000, funded exclusively by the Copenhagen Business School. Like most business incubators, CSE worked to provide entrepreneurs with training, mentorship, and investors, and to enhance their visibility in the market. It required all admitted start-ups to participate in a screening/selection tool and a set of incubation activities over three specific stages. The school measured success in terms of the number of incubator participants who had both a business customer and a sustainable business model at the end of a nine-month incubation period. In 2015, CSE's success rate was 53 per cent. At this point, CSE's leaders recognized a need to question how they measured the benefits of the program. How should the 53 per cent success rate be compared to the Copenhagen Business School's investment? What changes could the CSE leadership make to create more value for Danish society?

For 30 years, Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda) partnered with Ford Motor Company (Ford), helping Ford in small-car engineering and lean manufacturing in exchange for finance and marketing know-how; however, this alliance was terminated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2015, Mazda entered into another long-term partnership to share technologies and cope with cost pressures—this time with Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota). According to its 2016 Structural Reform Plan, Mazda aimed to achieve a global sales volume of 1.65 million units, an operating income ratio of at least 7 per cent, an equity ratio of at least 45 per cent, and a dividend payout ratio of at least 20 per cent by 2019. Given the highly competitive domestic and global automotive markets, to what extent could the partnership with Toyota and the Structural Reform Plan allow Mazda to achieve these goals? Would Mazda need to make any changes to its competitive strategies to keep the company driving forward?

In September 2016, the leadership team at KritiKal Solutions Private Limited, a software product research and development company in Noida, India, was facing several challenges. The company provided product design and development services in computer vision and image processing, embedded systems, and the Internet of things, as well as web, software, and mobile applications. It was highly regarded by its clients and employees for its research orientation and technical competence. However, the leadership team was struggling with options for strategic growth and product mix. How much time and effort should go into services and how much into new product development? What kind of structure and funding would work for the company as it expanded? The chief executive officer needed answers to these questions in order to make the leap to high growth.

In late 2016, the entrepreneurial founder of Mental and Natural Company, a digital multimedia company in China, wanted to have ready access to China’s best multimedia talent and expertise, but without burdening the company with an excessive number of employees. The entrepreneur and his team were developing a cloud-based multimedia crowdsourcing and collaboration platform, which would allow the company to quickly and easily crowdsource the needed freelance talent from around China. Yet, even before the platform was fully up and running, a new growth opportunity presented three possible options for the company to pursue. The entrepreneur and his team had just three weeks to decide on which option best fit the company’s existing business model, made best use of its resources, and was the best choice to secure the company’s future.

As they prepare to graduate from Harvard Business School, the co-founders of greeting card company startup Lovepop need capital to cover the company's operating costs and must choose between two seed financing offers. One offer is from an angel group and the other from a startup accelerator. Having bootstrapped the company's operations since its founding a year and a half earlier, the founders must weigh the differences in valuation and pros and cons of the accelerator program to determine which option is appropriate for Lovepop at this stage. In addition to addressing the challenges of early-stage fundraising, the case details the terms, offerings, and operations of startup accelerators.

Valued at $70 billion in 2017, Uber is globally the most valuable private start-up. Uber had a tumultuous year, culminating in the forced resignation of Travis Kalanick, Uber's co-founder and long-time CEO, in the wake of several ethical and leadership shortcomings. The case protagonist is Arianna Huffington, an Uber board member, who has been tasked to guide the new CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi, as he addresses some of Uber's ethical shortcomings and prepares the ride-hailing company for an eventual initial public offering (IPO) within a timeframe of 18-36 months. Arianna Huffington and Dara Khosrowshahi have to address a number of critical issues, but not limited to: corporate culture; employee morale; alleged gender discrimination; non-stop negative coverage in the media; customers defecting to Lyft; driver dissatisfaction; continued and more draconian regulations by cities, counties, states, and even countries; defendant in lawsuit filed by Waymo alleging Uber stole proprietary self-driving car technology when acquiring Otto, a self-driving start-up created by a then-Waymo employee; among many other issues.

Innovation is a perennial management challenge. That's why, for decades, MIT Sloan Management Review has been publishing new research and insights about innovation, from business school researchers as well as from leading business executives and consultants. For this article, the authors tapped into that knowledge base. They combed through the MIT SMR archives, looking for older articles with innovation insights that today's MIT SMR readers might have missed but that still remain timely and have wide relevance. The authors winnowed their list to 12 essential innovation articles from the MIT SMR archives. They distilled key concepts from those archival articles into 12 brief innovation insights contained in this article. The insights cover a range of innovation-related topics -from managing innovative employees to innovating in different ways -and draw on work by researchers from a number of universities, including Cambridge Judge Business School, Harvard Business School, London Business School, and the MIT Sloan School of Management.

Plummeting data acquisition costs have been a big part of the surge in business analytics. We have much richer samples of data to use for insight. But more data doesn't inherently remove sampling bias; in fact, it may make it worse.

At most companies, innovation is a top managerial priority. Many managers look at successful innovators such as Apple Inc. and Google Inc. with envy, wishing that their companies could be half as innovative. To boost and benchmark innovation, managers often use quantitative performance indicators. Some measure innovation as results or outcomes, such as sales from new products; others measure innovation as a process, using metrics such as the number of innovation projects; some rely on input metrics; and still others focus on the innovation portfolio by looking at factors such as the percentage of investments in breakthrough projects versus line extensions. The key managerial challenge, the authors argue, does not lie in identifying metrics; there is no shortage to choose from. Rather, they say, it is understanding the problem that measurement should solve for the company and, based on that insight, designing and implementing a useful innovation measurement framework that is appropriate to the organization's needs. To do this, managers need to understand the innovation challenges the company faces, how innovation is currently measured, and the extent to which current measurement practices help or hinder efforts to achieve innovation goals. Only then will they be able to steer clear of common innovation measurement mistakes, such as placing too much value on data at the expense of meaning, or getting bogged down with too many measures that provide contradictory advice and incentivize employees to do the wrong things. The article contains a step-by-step framework that allows managers to identify whether their current innovation measurement practices need to change and, if so, how to go about measuring innovation more effectively. The framework is also aimed at companies that do not currently measure innovation but would like to start.

The authors analyzed the mathematics of innovation as a search process for viable product designs across a universe of components. They then tested their insights using historical data from four real environments and concluded that companies can have an advantaged innovation strategy by using information about the unfolding process of innovation. But there isn't one superior strategy. The optimal strategy, they found, is both time-dependent and space-dependent. Based on their findings, the authors developed a five-step process for constructing an information-advantaged innovation strategy. Step 1. Choose your space: Where to play? It's not enough to analyze markets or anticipate customers'needs, the authors say. To innovate successfully, you also need to understand the structure of your innovation space. Step 2. Select your strategy: How to play? Measure the evolution of complexity in the space by analyzing the distribution of product sizes in terms of the number of unique components in products. If complexity is low and stable, the authors say, it's an indication that the space is still in its infancy, which argues for an impatient strategy. If complexity is high, then the space is maturing and a patient strategy will be the best approach. Step 3. Apply your strategy: How to execute? If you follow an impatient innovation strategy, the objective is to adopt or develop components that enable the company to bring relatively simple products to market quickly. Managers should ask themselves how they can be first. However, if the characteristics of your chosen innovation space imply that a patient strategy is more appropriate, your objective should instead be to maximize future innovation options. Step 4. Sense shifts and adapt: How to extract a switch signal? You need to monitor the complexity of your innovation space and compete on access to information in order to detect valuable strategy-switching signals before competitors.

In October 2016, the founder of Summer Swim Academy-a provider of swimming lessons and lifeguarding services to families in Burlington, Ontario-was reflecting on the organization's second full season of operations. The founder had been providing services in Burlington for the past six years and had been operating the business formally under the Summer Swim Academy brand for the past two years. She wanted to evaluate the possibility of expanding her business, either geographically or to a year-round operation, in order to achieve a profit goal of $50,000. To determine whether this goal was attainable, she needed to assess geographic and service-delivery expansion options for Summer Swim Academy.

In February 2016, the owner of a wool and yarn products retail business in the Enterprise Arcade, a not-for-profit retail business incubator in Stockton-on-Tees, United Kingdom, needed to meet with the manager of the arcade. Based in a central and prominent position in a struggling Northeast England town, the Enterprise Arcade was opened by the local council as a part of a large renovation project. It was intended to regenerate the area and support enterprise and employment by providing small, indoor, market-sized retail spaces for self-employed retail start-ups to test their markets. After 14 months with the incubator, the owner of the wool and yarn business was expected to be ready to move out, but her business models were still unproven, and she wanted to stay longer. The manager had to balance the overall success of the Enterprise Arcade with the turnover and successful graduations of the businesses therein. How should the business owner organize her priorities and prepare to negotiate with the manager? What should the manager advise her to do?