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Maximizing the wealth of organizations involves "creative destruction," when scientific or technological breakthroughs lead to the launch of a radically new product or service despite little evidence that a market opportunity exists. The management of technology-driven entrepreneurship is different from market-driven entrepreneurship. It is thus necessary to identify guidelines that can help ensure the success of technological entrepreneurship projects in start-ups and existing businesses. This text draws upon academic theory and case materials to define ways to optimize the outcomes of technological entrepreneurship. Chapter 12 discusses how recent advances in science and technology offer new opportunities for technological entrepreneurship in diverse industries such as global warming, agriculture, health care, the internet of things, artificial intelligence, and wearable technology.

In 2016, a recently retired artilleryman from the Canadian Armed Forces was planning his next steps as a civilian. He had always been passionate about healthy lifestyles, and his sense of entrepreneurship led him to consider the viability of launching a series of fitness boot camps, based on different skill levels and age groups. He saw this boot camp idea as a way of providing health services to a group of clients who were already interested in exercise but who might become more involved if their fitness activities were held outdoors. He could either launch the boot camps on his own or partner with a small local gym. He needed to earn $2,000 after all expenses per month from May to August each year for the business to be feasible. The gym offered him cost-saving options, but was he ready to share his revenue with a partner?

Josie Sung and Greg McNamara founded Denver-based Lighthouse Systems in 2006 shortly after graduating from the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2005. After exploring several ideas, they landed on a technology solution for helping large corporations better communicate with their customers. However, after running into a few roadblocks in the early days, the company pivoted as it learned more about its customers' needs. Now, almost seven years after its founding, Lighthouse had finally found its sweet spot with the launch of a mobile-based app that would allow companies to deliver valuable content to their employees (similar to a company intranet) via any electronic device. By the spring of 2013, Lighthouse had gained steady momentum, with 30 percent quarter-over-quarter sales growth, and it was on track to reach $150 million in revenue by year end. With the potential to really take off, Josie and Greg decided it was time to bring on a senior sales executive to drive revenue growth to the next level. In November 2013, Tristan Jones joined Lighthouse as the company's vice president of sales and quickly made a significant impact on the organization. After closing one of the company's largest deals in 2014, Tristan delivered outstanding results throughout the first half of 2015, and served as a valued member of Josie's eight-person management team. However, Josie is faced with a challenging situation when Tristan violates the company's gifting policy on more than one occasion. Should she find a way to accommodate her best salesperson so as to not sacrifice company performance, or terminate her top performer and deal with the fallout that will inevitably follow?

This is a B case written as a follow-up to the original case, Uber: Changing the Way the World Moves (316101). It describes a slew of controversial incidents besetting the company in early 2017.

Gerald Chertavian, an HBS graduate and successful tech entrepreneur, founded Year Up in 2000. He sought to provide opportunity via education and job training to disaffected American youth, focusing on young people in urban areas. In 10 years, he built the company from one site with 22 students to 10 sites, successfully training 1,300 students a year. However, after three years of high unemployment in the United States, Chertavian became concerned about the growing opportunity gap and wondered whether Year Up would ever make enough of an impact. In 2011, he and his board wrestled with the question of how to address this issue, and they weighed the fate of the small but highly successful Year Up program. Chertavian and his team were considering options for scale and how to maintain the organization's model.

The case discusses a non-governmental organization, Udayan Care, founded in 1994 by Dr. Kiran Modi to raise orphans in a family environment and re-integrate them into society through its Udayan Ghar program. Udayan Care diversified into providing a variety of other services over time, including education to underprivileged girls through the Udayan Shalini Fellowship (USF) program, which began in 2002, and vocational skills to disadvantaged youth through its Udayan Care IT and SD (Information Technology and Skill Development) centers in 2003. By 2015, the organization had grown to include 13 Udayan Ghars and seven IT and SD centers in and around New Delhi in North India, while the USF program had spread to 10 cities throughout India including Kolkata, West Bengal, in East India, Jaipur, Rajasthan, adjoining New Delhi and Hyderabad, Telengana, in South India. Since 2008, Udayan Care had also established affiliates in Australia, the United States and Germany. While the founder was charismatic, enthusiastic and untiring in her efforts to build resources, generate commitment from the mentor parents who provided support to the children in the orphanages, and forge relationships with the community as well as with multinational organizations, scaling up was a challenge. Key issues involved hiring and retaining top level staff and paying more attention to fund-raising to administer a larger organization and enable continued growth.

Having worked for two VC firms before entering academia, Lakshmi Balachandra was mystified: Why did a proposal that looked so promising on paper become a nonstarter when it was actually pitched? She spent almost 10 years capturing what happens in pitch meetings and quantifying the results, and drew four broad conclusions: (1) Passion is overrated--VCs prefer a calm demeanor, which they equate with leadership strength. (2) Trust beats competence. (3) Coachability matters--most angel investors want to be hands-on mentors. (4) Gender stereotypes play a role--VCs respond poorly to high levels of stereotypically feminine behavior. Entrepreneurs should approach the pitching process less as a formal presentation and more as a give-and-take conversation in which attitude and mindset matter more than business fundamentals, she says.

If your industry is in turmoil, your instinct might be to double down on innovation so that your firm can get ahead of all the change. But new research from a team led by a professor from City University of London suggests you might want to hold off. Its study of innovation in Formula 1 racing showed that when car technologies were undergoing rapid shifts, the teams that produced very basic vehicles outperformed the rest.

DJI, founded by 24-year old Frank Wang Tao in 2006, grew rapidly from an unknown startup in China to a leading global player in the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) market for hobbyists within seven years. DJI saw its revenue soar 79 times in three years (2010-2013) and its staff grow 50 to 1,500 across Asia, Europe and the USA. The case describes how a tech entrepreneur started serving a niche segment moved towards a broader consumer market, by opening up new horizons for aerial photography and videos enabled by its innovative products. The case outlines DJI's product development strategy to establish its competitive advantage and the entrepreneurial process for taking a technology concept from initial idea to developing the prototype, and subsequently launching the new product in the market. The post-startup issues encountered by a growing technology venture and the challenges faced in an evolving marketplace.

In 2014, a Hong Kong-based chartered accountant inadvertently started a social enterprise called Ana by Karma. The initial intent of helping an illiterate Bhutanese woman soon evolved into a journey to empower women in Bhutan to use their creative talents to become financially independent. As a result of her own charming personality and communication skills, the chartered accountant mobilized a team of volunteers to promote scarves that were handwoven by Bhutanese women and thereby bring hope to an increasing number of Bhutanese families who were living in poverty. In early 2016, while relishing her experiences over the previous 18 months, the chartered accountant mulled over the future development of Ana by Karma. How could the venture evolve sustainably? Was it realistic for her to operate Ana by Karma on a full-time basis?

My Kind of Cakes (MKOC), a cake boutique in Ghaziabad, India, had carved a niche for itself with its unique bakery products, quality food, and excellent service, all offered at a reasonable price. Within five years of opening, the business had flourished, growing in worth from ?7.2 million in 2012 to ?19.5 million in 2016. In January 2017, the owner of the cake shop pondered his strategies for achieving his target revenue of ?50 million by 2020. He wondered if he should expand geographically and open franchises in nearby towns or if he should increase his product range. Should he build a digital platform to increase awareness of his brand or launch a loyalty program to strengthen MKOC’s customer relationships? If so, how should he build such a program? Since he had also been asked to photograph special occasions such as baby showers, he wondered whether he should add theme photography to MKOC's offerings.

In February 2013, the vice-president of human resources at PowerTech India Private Limited (PowerTech India), was in his office at the company’s Gurgaon headquarters studying the organizational chart of his firm with interest. In his seven-year tenure with the company, he had watched the organization grow considerably. What he loved most about his job was the company’s commitment to follow best practices in human resources management and the people-oriented approach that made the work a creative, feel-good, and dynamic process. In this highly competitive power sector, expansion had been the catchphrase of the organization as it strove to carve a niche for itself; now retention of talent was more crucial than ever. But after meeting with PowerTech India’s managing director, the vice-president wondered if the expected turbulent times required a reconsideration of the company’s key human resource policies, which had become a hallmark of the organization. Redesigning the workforce at PowerTech India would be a delicate balancing act.

The Awethu Project (Awethu) was a South African-based social enterprise that operated as a venture capital and investment firm for small, medium, and micro-sized enterprises. The company was widely acknowledged for its social mission of creating jobs and benefiting society while maximizing profit. In March 2016, Awethu’s leaders signed an agreement with a prominent South African corporation, which could allow Awethu to operate within a higher segment, bringing the company closer to fulfilling its strategy. But Awethu continued to wrestle with a number of challenges, such as its socioeconomic environment and strategic focus decisions, and the question of how to continually attract capital and deliver on the company’s vision. Finding themselves at an important moment in their company’s history, Awethu’s leaders considered how the new partnership could help Awethu address these looming challenges, while creating sustainable profit and value.

In 2014, the general manager and a director of an Australian building company were seeking an outside investor to provide the company with the needed resources to recover from a disastrous takeover. The two found such an investor in a Chinese entrepreneur and Sun Tzu master based in Hong Kong. To the shock of those involved with the Australian company, the Chinese investor used Sun Tzu war strategies to take over and destroy the smaller Australian company, while flouting ethical business practices and Australia's standards of corporate governance.<br><br>The Australians' naïveté and their desperate need for capital made the investor's tactics possible. With the benefit of hindsight and omniscient narration revealing the thoughts and actions of both parties, students can evaluate how the events in the case led to the shocking conclusion in 2015, leaving a shell of a company worth penny stock.

In 2014, a Hong Kong-based chartered accountant inadvertently started a social enterprise called Ana by Karma. The initial intent of helping an illiterate Bhutanese woman soon evolved into a journey to empower women in Bhutan to use their creative talents to become financially independent. As a result of her own charming personality and communication skills, the chartered accountant mobilized a team of volunteers to promote scarves that were handwoven by Bhutanese women and thereby bring hope to an increasing number of Bhutanese families who were living in poverty. In early 2016, while relishing her experiences over the previous 18 months, the chartered accountant mulled over the future development of Ana by Karma. How could the venture evolve sustainably? Was it realistic for her to operate Ana by Karma on a full-time basis?

In June 2016, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the United Kingdom-based Time Out Group PLC (Time Out), had just taken the company through an initial public offering, raising much-needed capital for investment and growth. Time Out, which provided consumers with information, tickets, and access to theatre, concerts, and events, as well as food, drink, and cultural experiences in its Time Out Market, had reported significant losses in 2014 and 2015. However, there was momentum in new market areas, and the recently launched Time Out Market in Lisbon, Portugal, had seen revenue growth of 67 per cent between 2014 and 2015. Now, with £59 million to invest, the CEO had to lead the company back to profitability. He needed to balance foreign direct investment in physical Time Out Markets with digital transformation of the company’s offerings. At the same time, he had to find ways to reinforce the new organizational culture he was building at Time Out as a way to help fulfil his corporate vision of Time Out as a disruptive force.

After recognizing numerous opportunities in the global market, Xiaomi Technology Corporation Ltd. (Xiaomi), based in Beijing, charted its overseas market strategy in 2013. However, opportunities came with challenges, and during the internationalization process, Xiaomi encountered many problems. By 2016, after three years of hard work, Xiaomi had gained more experience than profits. Compared with Xiaomi's domestic success, Xiaomi's internationalization strategy was unsatisfactory. How could Xiaomi meet its international goals? Should it establish international strategic alliances, develop its firmware operating system, or consider other options?

In September 2013, Tokyo Electron Limited announced a merger with Applied Materials Inc. The deal would place the new entity in the leader position in the highly consolidated global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry, which counted Intel Corporation and Samsung Group as major customers. Due to antitrust issues, the deal was eventually cancelled. Shortly after, in October 2015, Lam Research Corporation announced a merger with KLA-Tencor Corporation. If this deal was accepted, the market would be led by three companies—Applied Materials Inc., ASML Holding, and Lam/KLA-Tencor—while Tokyo Electron would be marginalized. Given the tremendous cost pressures from the consolidated competitors and powerful customers, should Tokyo Electron initiate another merger to consolidate its position? Were there other effective competitive options? What could it learn from its failed merger with Applied Materials Inc.?

The Poultry Research Centre at the University of Alberta farm was an internationally recognized research, development, and learning hub. It began the Rare Poultry Conservancy Program in 1986 as a way to maintain heritage chicken breeds. In 2009/10, as a result of the global financial crisis, university funding was reduced, and every campus department needed to cut programs or find creative ways to finance them outside of the traditional methods. By 2014, the funding cuts posed a grave concern for the continuation of the heritage chicken program. Annual costs of CA$75,000 were required to maintain the flocks with very limited financial return. However, a leader at the Poultry Research Centre felt that the birds were important enough to develop a model where they could pay for themselves.