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This case is a supplement to Imprimis (Case A), Imprimis (Case B), and Imprimis (Case C). It describes Imprimis's 2015 decision to develop a $1 per pill compounded alternative to Daraprim, the branded drug that had recently undergone an extreme price hike, raising its price to $750/pill. Imprimis also created compounded alternatives to several other branded drugs, and made investments to increase its manufacturing capabilities. The company now had to decide where to focus its efforts in the future. In developing innovative compounded formulations, should it base its decisions on market size, either by population or dollar size? Should it concentrate instead on the level of exploitation by the branded drug manufacturers--how much they had raised prices by, in what amount of time? Or should it decide instead based on the life-threatening nature of the disease, regardless of how many people were afflicted? The company had to balance these choices with the expansion of its core ophthalmology business while continuing to raise funds from investors.

Paillasse International SA was a Swiss-based bread company operating in 15 European markets as of 2016. The company had invented a proprietary, patented process for producing bread concentrate that was used to make high quality, healthy breads. The company was successfully using licensing agreements for the bread concentrate with bakeries throughout the European markets; the latest agreement was with a retailer in Spain. The chief executive officer had just shared the good news with the company owner. The conversation then turned to questions concerning the future growth of the company. Where should it expand next? What impact would the maturing industry have on the company’s growth plans? How could the company maintain its competitive position in the market?

SAPMER SA was a Southern Ocean fishing company started by three Réunion Island entrepreneurs with one ship in 1947. The company grew from an entrepreneurial venture to a corporate acquisition, then back to a beloved family business not expected to make much money. But in 2006, SAPMER SA tested the waters with a new tuna venture. The venture was successful, but the company saw a better long-term opportunity in occupying a niche position. SAPMER SA launched a strategic rebirth with a five-year plan to develop a new segment: super-frozen tuna fishing and processing in the Indian Ocean, addressing premium Asian markets in sashimi, tataki, and tuna loins and steak. SAPMER SA’s strategy resulted in strong performance, but in early 2013, when examining the financial records and the terms for purchasing newly acquired ships, the owner could see challenges ahead. To manage the challenges, the owner needs to know the reason for the improvement in return on equity, what potential problems could be identified from a DuPont analysis of the financials, and what bottlenecks to anticipate in the coming years.

SAPMER SA was a Southern Ocean fishing company started by three Réunion Island entrepreneurs with one ship in 1947. The company grew from an entrepreneurial venture to a corporate acquisition, then back to a beloved family business not expected to make much money. But in 2006, SAPMER SA tested the waters with a new tuna venture. The venture was successful, but the company saw a better long-term opportunity in occupying a niche position. SAPMER SA launched a strategic rebirth with a five-year plan to develop a new segment: super-frozen tuna fishing and processing in the Indian Ocean, addressing premium Asian markets in sashimi, tataki, and tuna loins and steak. SAPMER SA's strategy resulted in strong performance, but in early 2013, when examining the financial records and the terms for purchasing newly acquired ships, the owner could see challenges ahead. To manage the challenges, the owner needs to know the reason for the improvement in return on equity, what potential problems could be identified from a DuPont analysis of the financials, and what bottlenecks to anticipate in the coming years.

Catalant, founded in 2013 as an online marketplace where MBAs could bid on consulting projects posted by small- to medium-sized businesses, had expanded by 2016 to provide Fortune 1000 companies with access to over 35,000 independent experts. The founders envisioned extending their matching solutions to help enterprises staff projects with a mix of current employees and external experts, hypothesizing that the "future of work" would involve more flexible employment arrangements. They debated how much to invest in new functionality versus improving their existing marketplace, and how to pitch their evolving strategic vision to investors.

In 2015, a nutritionist and dog lover developed a new canine energy bar called K9FuelBar. This product was made of all-natural, non-genetically modified, organic ingredients. In doing some investigation, the product's developer realized there could be a small, but sufficient, market to make her product commercially viable. At this point, she needed to evaluate and decide on the best method of distribution for her product. She identified multiple distinct options, each with different qualitative and quantitative issues to consider. The owner of K9FuelBar needed to decide which option to pursue and to develop an overall market communication program to support her product.

The minister of Haiti’s Department of Energy Security needed to prepare a presentation for the country’s prime minister that proposed a solution for transforming Haiti’s energy infrastructure. Haiti wanted to attract foreign direct investment that would spur socio-economic reform; however, the opportunities depended on a solid energy infrastructure providing reliable electricity to businesses, which Haiti did not have. Also, the residents of Haiti were in dire need of a low-cost, reliable energy solution that would allow them to move away from biomass and petroleum products, which were expensive and bad for the environment. How should the minister structure his proposal? What criteria would be required to support a strategy that considered the energy value chain, types of public-private partnerships, and need for socio-economic reform?

CIC creates "entrepreneurial ecosystems," renting out office and co-working space to start-ups and related companies and providing basic business needs like wi-fi and legal advice. Founder Tim Rowe refers to the CIC as "innovation infrastructure," bringing together money, talent and ideas in one place. Founded in Cambridge in 1999, CIC has since grown to become one of the largest concentrations of entrepreneurial activity in the world and has expanded to multiple locations across the Boston area. Rowe envisions taking this model to cities across the world, and CIC is in fact about to open a new branch in St. Louis, their first location outside greater Boston. He is concerned, though, because one month from opening day, CIC still has a lot of empty space and few clients signed up. Rowe and his team have to consider how to quickly bring in more clients before opening day, and, more broadly, whether the CIC idea will work outside the Boston/Cambridge area.

In early 2016, Chuck Davis, chairman and CEO of Prodege LLC, parent company of the brand promotion business Swagbucks, and Josef Gorowitz, Prodege's founder and president, must decide whether to acquire MyPoints, a competitor to Swagbucks, after a significant cultural transformation that the company has just gone through. Over the preceding two years, Davis and Gorowitz had grown Swagbucks from a relatively small venture staffed by people from Gorowitz's personal and professional networks into a professionally managed and rapidly scaling business. This had been no easy task, because Davis had to be careful not to destabilize Prodege's strong culture, which was built around the deeply held religious beliefs of the company's founding employees, many of whom were devout ultra-Orthodox Hasidic Jews, as he introduced change. The culture had resulted in some unique challenges for a growing technology company, such as a requirement that the company shutter its office on Jewish holidays and every week for observance of Shabbat. By 2016, the company was thriving both financially and operationally. Considering the opportunity to acquire MyPoints, which was an established competitor with millions of members, Davis and Gorowitz must determine whether the company's culture is sufficiently robust to integrate another business and its employees.

In 2003, Mawlyngot Tea Growers’ Cooperative Society (MTG), a village cooperative in Meghalaya, India, was spearheaded by a local teacher who wished to lift the village’s people up from poverty, transform their lives, and improve their economic condition. The cooperative started with just a few farmers from the village, but by the end of 2013, the village was growing tea on nearly 90 hectares of land, involving almost all 45 households of the village. <br><br>Although MTG was a successful model of cooperation for income and social well-being, competition was increasing in the tea market as local players and big multinationals expanded their offerings in the region. In competing for market share, MTG did not want to compromise on its farming practices, which were 100 per cent sustainable and organic. MTG also wanted to build its brand. The cooperative needed to reposition and grow to expand its capacity, sales, and market presence, but the founder was uncertain how to proceed.

Since its inception in 2011, The Vanca, an Indian e-commerce brand selling women’s Western apparel, had come a long way. After overcoming initial problems typical of many entrepreneurial start-ups, The Vanca made significant progress in terms of sales. However, its brand-building activities had not been very successful. Having concentrated entirely on online digital marketing, the company did not see the expected results. The digital space offered many opportunities, but it was replete with cases of promising companies facing failure. In addition to the dynamic nature of the online retail space, there were new government regulations in India as of March 2016, which restricted online retailers in many ways, in an attempt to bring order to the previously unregulated industry. Accordingly, in May 2016, The Vanca hired a specific digital marketing manager with the goal of reworking the brand’s digital strategy. The company's management knew that multiple marketing issues needed to be addressed in order for The Vanca to achieve success.

In 2016, Detroit Bikes was a relatively new company seeking to become the largest bicycle manufacturer in North America. The U.S. bicycle market was dominated by imports from China and Taiwan, and Detroit Bikes saw an opportunity to compete by producing bicycles in the United States. The numerous business opportunities arising from Detroit’s economic downfall and recent resurgence provided an ideal location for the new bicycle company. The founder was growing Detroit Bikes aggressively, taking advantage of the company’s marketable “Made in USA” branding. His ambition was to build on this success, eventually producing 50,000 bicycles per year.

As a Lebanese non-governmental organization, Arcenciel (AeC) had successfully created several sustainable development programs and projects that addressed the needs of marginalized populations in Lebanon’s society. At the same time, AeC based its activities on an economic strategy that guaranteed financial independence from donations and public funding. This social entrepreneur had been able to develop and adjust its strategy in a very challenging environment over the course of several decades, successfully bridging the gap between non-profit objectives and the necessity to be financially profitable. In December 2015, the organization was about to win a prestigious national peace award in recognition of its research and activities. Government institutions, municipalities, and individuals alike had recently sought AeC’s assistance in dealing with a waste-management crisis. Although this project represented a useful opportunity for AeC to communicate its vision, the co-founder wondered whether the organization was prepared to assume a larger role in Lebanon or, even further, to introduce its concept abroad. He needed to think carefully about AeC’s evolution as well as its past success factors and the possibilities for expansion.

In the summer of 2016, the general manager of IXSIR Winery of Lebanon (IXSIR)—a young winery in Lebanon that offered customers a new level of quality by producing wine from a mixture of grapes harvested from different terroirs—received news of a bomb striking Beirut. IXSIR had been facing challenges competing in the unstable and risky local market, and the general manager realized that the bombing signalled rougher economic times ahead and likely a decrease in wine consumption. He was concerned about how the political unrest in the country could negatively impact wine sales and started thinking about different ways to tackle the threat of an ongoing economic downturn. He also wondered how to mitigate a potential decrease in revenue. Should IXSIR pursue revenue-generating activities such as oenotourism or diversify into different products?

As a Lebanese non-governmental organization, Arcenciel (AeC) had successfully created several sustainable development programs and projects that addressed the needs of marginalized populations in Lebanon's society. At the same time, AeC based its activities on an economic strategy that guaranteed financial independence from donations and public funding. This social entrepreneur had been able to develop and adjust its strategy in a very challenging environment over the course of several decades, successfully bridging the gap between non-profit objectives and the necessity to be financially profitable. In December 2015, the organization was about to win a prestigious national peace award in recognition of its research and activities. Government institutions, municipalities, and individuals alike had recently sought AeC's assistance in dealing with a waste-management crisis. Although this project represented a useful opportunity for AeC to communicate its vision, the co-founder wondered whether the organization was prepared to assume a larger role in Lebanon or, even further, to introduce its concept abroad. He needed to think carefully about AeC's evolution as well as its past success factors and the possibilities for expansion.

Founded in 2008, Floodgate pioneered the "micro-VC" category, a new type of investment firm that raised smaller funds and made earlier, smaller investments in technology startups than traditional venture-capital firms. By 2015, Floodgate had raised three funds totaling $225 million and achieved outsize success with investments in high profile startups like Twitter, Twitch, Cruise Automation, and Lyft. Floodgate measured success in terms of its coverage of the top 10-15 exits in any given year. These "Thunder Lizards," which had the potential to change the business landscape and grow to Godzilla-like scale, accounted for 97% of returns. With increasing competition from micro-VCs and alternatives like crowdfunding, opportunity funds, and incubators, partners Ann Miura-Ko and Mike Maples wondered how Floodgate could continue to compete successfully in a rapidly changing venture-capital landscape. Should Floodgate stay with the micro-VC model it helped invent, or raise more capital, leveraging its successful track record to make investments at the scale of more traditional VC firms? In selecting a path, they needed to consider Floodgate's dual responsibility to entrepreneurs and LPs.

In 2012, after the U.S. government passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, the founder of Hudson Integrated, a website development company, decided to launch StartupValley, an equity crowdfunding company focused on the Title III provisions of the JOBS Act. These provisions allowed companies to solicit equity investments directly from small investors by using an intermediary registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, consisting of either a broker-dealer or an approved funding portal. However, three years passed before all Title III regulations were finalized, and more than six months later, they came into effect. During that time, the market became crowded with both start-ups and established companies. In 2016, when the Title III provisions finally went into effect, the entrepreneur faced two key challenges. How should he position StartupValley for success in this new industry? And how should he balance his own time and resources between his existing web development business and the new venture?

Nest Wealth Asset Management Inc. (Nest) was a new Canadian robo-adviser based in Toronto. The company competed not only against large incumbents such as Canadian banks but also against other financial technology start-ups. In April 2015, Nest's main competitor had just aligned with a significant partner that had abundant financial resources and broad market access. Nest's chief executive officer needed to consider the best option for the company's future: Should he maintain the current business-to-consumer model by maintaining a focus on scaling and expanding Nest's consumer base, or should he explore a business-to-business model by leveraging Nest's technological capability and offering technology to human advisers?

In early 2013, three young Nepalese entrepreneurs were deciding whether to launch Kaffeine, the first of a large chain of coffee shops, in Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal. As experienced entrepreneurs, the partners were interested in a recently vacated location near Durbar Marg, a major street and shopping destination in Kathmandu that represented a unique opportunity to build a highly successful coffee chain. Coupled with the increasing trend in Nepal toward coffee drinking rather than tea, this was an opportunity the trio felt they could not pass up. The entrepreneurs had many things to consider, such as location, competition, target market, and how to measure the feasibility of this new venture.

PharmAccess is an Amsterdam based NGO working to support the development of the private health care market in Africa. This work is critical as over 50% of care is delivered through the private sector, but well-intentioned efforts to address global health through the public sector have the unintended consequence of crowding-out capital formation in the private sector. PharmaAccess is working to crowd-in funding instead through the development of a three-pronged effort in Kenya. They are working to address supply through efforts to improve the quality of health care facilities through education and through a micro-lending program. At the same time, they are working to address demand through the development of the M-TIBA mobile health wallet. The critical question for this case is whether these efforts, in essence the development of a novel platform simultaneously addressing supply and demand, will be enough to change the dynamics of the private health care market. The case provides a background on private health care in Africa and in Kenya.