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This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. It's hard to pick up a major management magazine -and we're not excluding this one -and not find several articles outlining in painful detail where a leader went wrong in a particular case. Implicitly or explicitly in these stories, the employees are treated as receptive individuals waiting only for the boss to offer a productive channel to their intrinsic energies. But when a boss stumbles, it may be as a direct result of actions taken by employees who have sabotaged their actions. To keep this from happening, leaders must: 1. Understand the situation they are walking into. Leaders need to know how they are likely to be perceived and what their predecessor was like. 2. Invest early in subordinates. New bosses need to spend significant time one-on-one with employees for three reasons: to understand them; to get to know them; and to establish a rapport. 3. Be mindful of their own behavior. New leaders often overestimate the extent to which their good intentions and good character will shine through. Demonstrating one's "authentic self " does not mean "being natural." Rather, it requires managers to seize everyday opportunities to demonstrate that they are trustworthy, supportive and fair. 4. Intervene early. New bosses need to take action if there is a problem. Letting things fester only postpones the inevitable.

The case describes an organization's use of the science of improvement to transform their process quality from below average to the top 10% in their industry. The case outlines the protagonist's strategy of developing internal experts who are trained in a common methodology for making improvement and spreading these ideas in their work units.

In the year 2000, the Government of the Autonomous Community of Aragón, Spain, made public a project for the development of a large-scale logistics park in the outskirts of the city of Zaragoza. With an area of nearly 13 square kilometers, PLAZA (an acronym for Zaragoza Logistics Platform) would be by far the largest logistics park either built or under development in all of Europe. This case illustrates the motivations behind such an undertaking, the reasoning used in deciding the feasibility of the location of the park, and also the advantages (and disadvantages) related to the project. The case provides sufficient data to prepare an analysis from the point of view of a potential customer, where the cost advantage or disadvantage of locating a facility in Zaragoza (with respect to Rotterdam, a preferred European location) can be quantified, and where the parameters can be changed to determine the main drivers behind such a decision, and how changes in these drivers can affect the customer's analysis. The results are meant to serve as input for PLAZA management to understand which types of customers to target, and how to address the issues that could hinder the park's projected growth.

The case narrates the story of the Rodamas Group, owned by the ethnic Chinese Tan family in Indonesia. The company started as a trading firm in 1951 and, over time, became a joint venture partner in manufacturing businesses with a range of mainly Japanese partners after Indonesia started to embark on an industrialization program in the late 1960s. In the 1980s, the company was slowly transferred to the second generation leader, and continued to grow and prosper until it became part of the top-20 business groups in Indonesia. The businesses included glass manufacturing (with Asahi), personal care products (with Kao), packaging (with Dai Nippon) and MSG production. The role of Rodamas in these partnerships was to deal with local regulations, hire local personnel and distribute the products in Indonesia. When the then President Suharto was toppled in the Asian Crisis in 1998, Indonesia underwent several drastic changes, including the transition to democracy. Its economy became more open, and foreign firms were allowed to operate in the country without having a local partner. In addition, several global business developments, including the tendency of multinationals to rely on lawyers and consultants rather than local equity partners, threatened the Rodamas business model. In view of this, the current leader, Mucki Tan, is reconsidering the future of his company and weighing a few options. The case ends with these strategic options: 1) internationalize with existing partners; 2) develop own businesses that need little technology, such as property; 3) buy existing manufacturing firms; 4) focus on distribution of products for foreign multinationals; 5) focus on a traditional partnership role with a new wave of foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing market multinationals, more specifically, China. Students are asked to analyze the company and its environment, decide on a strategic direction and reflect on the consequences.

This case describes the evolution of a liquid petroleum gas (LPG) distributor start-up, incubated by two not-for-profit NGOs to help improve the vaccine cold chain in Northern Mozambique. These NGOs must face the decision whether and how to sell their participation in the start-up. VillageReach and the Mozambican Foundation for Community Development (FDC), both NGOs, got involved in the national immunization program, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), in northern Mozambique. This program's goal was to ensure prompt and universal access to vaccines and other medical supplies. Early on, VillageReach had realized that the program's goals could not be satisfied unless cold storage (and transportation) of the vaccines was guaranteed. Because electricity was scarce and unreliable in the region, VillageReach searched for alternative solutions for supporting cold storage. VillageReach finally decided to use LPG powered refrigerators, and, due to the lack of reliable sources of LPG in the region, FDC and VillageReach went on to fund VidaGas, an LPG distribution company. It soon became evident that an efficient distribution network of LPG could provide benefits to society above and beyond health: at the time, most businesses and households in the region cooked using biomass fuels. Such fuels are a significant health hazard, and also contribute to deforestation in the region. Although VidaGas could be considered a success, it had yet to reach breakeven in its current operations. In addition, new investments would be required to expand operations to neighboring provinces beyond the province used for the pilot, Cabo Delgado. As the Ministry of Health (MoH), FDC and VillageReach are planning to expand the improvements in the national immunization program to these provinces, the presence of a reliable source of LPG would be essential to their goals. At the same time, VillageReach and FDC's resources for further investment are limited.

In November 2007, a global, cross-functional team at Cisco Systems, Inc. was seeking management approval to start manufacturing a new router, code-named Viking. The team faced a host of challenges in launching the low-cost but powerful router for telecommunications service providers. After overhauling the project to sharply increase the router's planned speed and capacity, the company had just one year to launch the product, an unusually fast schedule. In addition, Cisco wanted to debut China as a low-cost manufacturing base for the high-end product. It planned to use contract manufacturer Foxconn Technology Group to produce the machine, even though Foxconn had never made such a complex product for Cisco. Could Foxconn handle the technical complexity? Could Cisco work closely with Foxconn to mitigate the project risks? Could Cisco's methodology for new product introduction rise to the necessary level of sophistication? The case highlights the challenges and complexities of developing and manufacturing a sophisticated technology product for a worldwide market. Students will consider what it takes to achieve success in new product introduction, or NPI. The case also offers an opportunity to evaluate supply chain issues in a company that outsources manufacturing globally.

A biotech company receives umbilical cells for processing. A number of operational improvements are being considered in order to maintain the company's position and reputation in the market. Information on expected delivery dates is known. However, there is a great uncertainty around these dates. The company needs to take account of this variability when arranging for staffing. A supporting data set is available, product 709E10 for the (A) case, as well as the supplemental B case, product 909E11.

A biotech company receives umbilical cells for processing. A number of operational improvements are being considered in order to maintain the company's position and reputation in the market. Information on expected delivery dates is known. However, there is a great uncertainty around these dates. The company needs to take account of this variability when arranging for staffing. A supporting data set is available, product 7B09E010 for the (A) case, as well as the supplemental B case, product 9B09E011.

A biotech company receives umbilical cells for processing. A number of operational improvements are being considered in order to maintain the company's position and reputation in the market. Information on expected delivery dates is known. However, there is a great uncertainty around these dates. The company needs to take account of this variability when arranging for staffing.

Sales force automation (SFA) is the use of software to automate sales tasks, including sales activities, order processing, customer management, sales forecasting and analysis, sales force management, and information sharing. An SFA system is often part of an enterprise-wide information system that connects and integrates sales activities with the organization's other operations. Therefore, SFA software is not only a tool critical to the success of today's sales force, but is also vital to the entire organization. SFA has the potential to empower companies to more efficiently manage their sales force and sales processes, to automate and standardize sales activities, and to connect the sales force with the rest of the organization. The value of these potential benefits in terms of lower costs or increased revenues has encouraged businesses to adopt SFA. Once adopted, however, SFA systems often fail to deliver anticipated benefits. The leading cause of SFA failures has been revealed as low user acceptance, which can be attributed to such factors as the disruption of established sales routines, sales force perception of the system as a micromanagement tool, differences in sales force and managerial expectations for the system, and lack of managerial support for the system as perceived by the sales force. Given these circumstances, managers who are aware of the major issues surrounding user acceptance of SFA will be more successful in implementing such systems. This article explores the utilization of SFA, the benefits derived from these systems, and user acceptance issues. Herein, we offer suggestions that will help organizations succeed in adopting SFA systems.

This case study teaches students about lean process improvement projects at the Cleveland Clinic, one of the world's leading hospital systems. The majority of the case focuses on one lean improvement project and leads the student step-by-step through the Kaizen events, and the tools, approaches and outcomes of the project. The case study ends with two short mini-cases on additional process improvement projects at the Cleveland Clinic. The detailed and concise case is ideal for a discussion about lean process improvement in the services industry.

Alara Agri, based in Bursa, Turkey, is one of the world's foremost cherry and fig producers. The president and chief executive officer (CEO) was concerned about a recurring capacity problem at the end of the process where cherries were packed. On some of the plant's conveyor belts, piles of cherries of one size waited to be packed while other belts had too few cherries to keep workers busy, and thus delayed order fulfillment. Diverting excess cherries from a busy line to an underutilized line was not an option as cherries were sorted by size. One solution the CEO had considered was to build another processing line at a cost of US$2 million, although he thought a better solution may be achieved by changing the process or reconfiguring the flow of the machine. The CEO wondered how best to improve capacity with the equipment they already had. To aid in his decision, he examined corporate data with regards to revenues and production figures, incoming cherries received in tonnes, expected size distribution of cherries, and the plant layout and packaging options.

How will Newton-Wellesley Hospital (NWH) preserve its private practice tradition while remaining effective and competitive in a healthcare industry demanding increasing integration between physicians and hospitals? This is the decision facing Newton-Wellesley Hospital president Mike Jellinek in 2009, as several trends-higher costs and lower revenues, shifting workforce demographics, and changing reimbursement models-threaten to disrupt NWH's organizational model. Similar to other U.S. community hospitals, NWH has historically been staffed primarily with private practitioners; however, in recent years Jellinek has taken several steps toward further integration, such as hiring primary care physicians and hospitalists, and even proposing formation of a physicians' organization (PO)-a move its veteran private practitioners sharply oppose. In 2009, NWH is renowned for high-quality care and is financially strong; yet, given external pressures, most at the hospital agree that reforms are needed to improve the hospital's and physicians' profitability while maintaining highest-quality patient care. Diverging opinions over how to improve the hospital has exposed differences between some private practice physicians and the administration. The crux of their disagreement centers on one question: how to make the organizational changes required to keep NWH effective and competitive in the face of a diminishing revenue growth rate, while honoring its tradition of physician independence.

The chief operation officer (COO) of Long Wang Sha Tan Ku Company, a boardshorts manufacturer based in Shanghai, China, was expected to present a plan to improve the company's profitability through adjustments to the company's operations. There were at least three possible paths to increase profitability. First, reviewing how production was scheduled between the company's two manufacturing facilities. Second, since the company operated at capacity during busy times, he thought that it might be beneficial for the company to expand capacity in one of its manufacturing facilities. Finally, the COO wondered whether some price adjustments could help out of the company's supply chain and increase contribution.

The president and founder of a Toronto, Ontario transportation company considers his future and that of the family-owned company in the face of major changes in the for-hire trucking industry. After 50 years in the trucking industry, the president considers simplifying operations and expanding the business or, alternatively, stepping down as president and passing control to a successor.

A German expatriate had moved to China in 2005 to take up a merchandizing position at the Wal-Mart China headquarters in Shenzen. By 2008 he had been promoted to the new position of senior director for sustainability for Wal-Mart China (retail) and Global Procurement. His new position required that he lead the rapidly-approaching inaugural Wal-Mart Sustainability Summit. The senior director must ensure that Wal-Mart China's five Strategic Value Networks (SVNs), which were tasked with leading sustainability change within the organization, continued to engage stakeholders by implementing innovative solutions that not only cut costs but also lead to more sustainable operations. The case describes Wal-Mart China's operations (including purchasing, distribution and retail) in the context of the company's desire to improve sustainability in a manner appropriate to China. The immediate issue is to identify opportunities to improve the sustainability of Wal-Mart China's distribution systems and retail operations.

Alara Agri, based in Bursa, Turkey, is one of the world's foremost cherry and fig producers. The president and chief executive officer (CEO) was concerned about a recurring capacity problem at the end of the process where cherries were packed. On some of the plant's conveyor belts, piles of cherries of one size waited to be packed while other belts had too few cherries to keep workers busy, and thus delayed order fulfillment. Diverting excess cherries from a busy line to an underutilized line was not an option as cherries were sorted by size. One solution the CEO had considered was to build another processing line at a cost of US$2 million, although he thought a better solution may be achieved by changing the process or reconfiguring the flow of the machine. The CEO wondered how best to improve capacity with the equipment they already had. To aid in his decision, he examined corporate data with regards to revenues and production figures, incoming cherries received in tonnes, expected size distribution of cherries, and the plant layout and packaging options.

In many industries, disintegration processes have drastically changed the overall industry structure as well as the organization of value creation processes and actors. Highly integrated production and distribution systems have been replaced by devolved organization architectures. This article introduces the concept of value creation architectures, a term that describes the structure and relationships of all the value-adding activities that are carried out by various actors and companies to bring a particular product or service to market. Analyses of business firms tend to overlook the relationship between competitive advantage and the architecture of value creation. This article investigates how different architectures of value creation affect the competitiveness of individual firms. The new concept is illustrated by an in-depth case study of the European automobile industry.

Many managers have never before had to shrink their operations or workforces drastically. Now, as they struggle to weather the storm of recession, they risk making what the author says is a common mistake: assuming that they will have to make the tough initial decision but can leave it to others to carry out. Long experience at Corning, Quest Diagnostics, Masonite International, and Accellent taught Freeman the benefits of what he calls a "soft hands" approach, which involves ensuring that employees, customers, suppliers, and communities are treated with consideration and compassion. Such behavior is simply good business. He offers four commonsensical - but frequently ignored - principles. Treat employees with dignity, fairness, and respect. Tell them why they're losing their jobs, what you will do to help them cope, and what you'll need from them during the transition. Communicate fully and often, be visible and personal, and honor company commitments. Treat your customers and suppliers like valued partners. Keep them informed, consider their needs, maintain your focus on quality, and take pains to transfer the business smoothly. Manage the layoff or closure like a project. Appoint an experienced, full-time project leader and a strong team. Define stages of the process, establish criteria for passing through them, and conduct regular reviews. Use judgment and, if necessary, fight back. Don't be pushed by Wall Street or others to move so quickly that the organization ends up suffering. The shutdown of a Corning plant in Indiana, the merger of Quest with SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs, and the closure of an Accellent factory in Tennessee illustrate successful outcomes of a soft-hands approach.