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The family-run Balaji Wafers Pvt. Ltd. (Balaji Wafers), a savoury snack manufacturer, had adopted a phased strategy in taking on the likes of global multinational corporation PepsiCo in India, an emerging economy. After operating successfully for more than three decades in western India, Balaji Wafers was planning to grow and to go national with forays into north and south India. Balaji Wafers had a strong foothold in western India, where in Gujarat and Maharashtra it had left PepsiCo's brand Lay's far behind; however, growing nationally would require more investments, robust business strategy, and marketing acumen. In pursuing growth, should Balaji Wafers expand nationally, or should it strengthen its leadership position in its home territory?

In August 2016, China's home-grown ride-hailing company Didi Chuxing Technology Co., Ltd. (Didi) acquired the Chinese assets of Uber Technologies Inc. (Uber), including Uber China's brand, business, and data. Didi had previously ventured into Uber's territory by investing and collaborating with Lyft Inc., Uber's main competitor in the United States. Didi's transformation from its beginning as a humble mobile application into a technology giant that was re-shaping transportation both within and beyond China was related to significant transformations in its social and business context. These transformations included the rapid growth of China's cities and China's status as one of the first countries to formally recognize the legality of Internet-based private car services. Looking to the future, Didi faced questions about its development in a rapidly changing global digital economy: How could it expand its products and services to the international market? Could Didi achieve the same impressive market record abroad? How could Didi continue to innovate? What was a truly sustainable business model for an online ride-hailing firm? How could it maintain its current leading position in the market?

In early 2017, the chief executive officer of Empowerment through Integration, a not-for-profit organization based in the United States and also operating in Lebanon, wanted to scale up the organization's social impacts and improve its financial sustainability. Empowerment through Integration was committed to breaking social stigmas against people with visual impairments and empowering them to reach their full potential; however, it faced financial, legal, and social struggles in Lebanon, which limited its abilities to reach its goals. What tactics should the chief executive officer pursue to achieve the dual goals of scaling up the organization's social impacts and enhancing its financial sustainability?

This case describes the organisational developmental journey of ZTE from a labour-intensive manufacturing company to a high-tech intensive telecommunication giant. ZTE was regarded as one of the innovative state-owned companies. Over the years, it had developed capabilities across carrier network, enterprise, and consumer fields. This Case provides an understanding of what type of external environment would provide a window of opportunity for a company to catch up fast. It also provides the internal factors of how ZTE handled the challenge of innovation and deployment of technology capabilities. Though the Company was recognised for its innovation, a breaking crisis was facing ZTE due to its "short cut" innovation approach in core technologies. The current development was paralysed because of the denial of access to US technology, which is a symptom of how dependent they are on external sources of technology.

As the market leader in fastening technology Bossard maintained a global network of more than 1,800 employees in 50 countries from its headquarters in Zug, Switzerland. The company focused on the supply of fasteners, a process that included sales, technical and engineering support and inventory management. Its business model also spanned three strategic areas: product solutions, application engineering and logistics. Bossard enjoyed a very strong value proposition if its account managers could only access engineers, quality managers, heads of operations, research and development (R&D) departments and business owners who understood the total cost of ownership (TCO) concept. If it had to submit a quote in response to an RFP (request for proposal) and bid for a given list of parts, the customer's procurement department might simply compare prices, and Bossard typically was not the cheapest provider. Competitors also had copied Bossard's logistic system and claimed that they could offer similar solutions for lower prices. Anecdotal evidence suggested that most competitors' solutions were less reliable and accurate than SmartBins and that their data integration workflows did not work as well. In a manufacturing world where global competition, commoditization and strategic procurement puts suppliers under constant margin pressure, how was it possible that a Swiss-based fastening supplier could grow profitably with an EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) margin of 12.3%, significantly above industry benchmarks?

Back in 2014, Bossard's growth had been driven largely by an excellent executive management board, led by CEO David Dean, a long-time Bossard leader, who focused on three strategic pillars: product solutions, engineering and logistics. While enjoying the success of the company, the CEO and the Chairman started a process to focus on new technologies that will impact the industrial fastener market and the production of their main customers, i.e. OEM manufacturers. 3D-Printing, for example, will not replace the manufacturing of industrial fasteners in the near future. However, if more industrial parts are 3-printed and not assembled, there is no need for fasteners. On the logistics and production front, the Internet-of-Things (IoT), Industry 4.0, and Robotics will change the factory of the future. Big Data, Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence will also open new frontiers in manufacturing, and finally, "smart screws" have the potential to serve as sensors for collecting relevant data. Despite all these new technology, Bossard decided that it does not need a "Digital Transformation", but realized that it had no shared vision for the company's digital future.

In January 2017, Ontario, Canada launched its cap-and-trade program in an effort to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Ontario took a progressive position on combatting climate change that included shutting down coal-burning power plants, investing heavily in renewable power, and setting aggressive emissions-reduction targets across all sectors. Its targets included reducing emissions levels of 1990 by 15 per cent in 2020, 37 per cent in 2030, and 80 per cent in 2050. Its efforts allowed the province to meet its 2014 target of 6 per cent below 1990 levels. These targets complemented Ontario's commitment to the United Nation's 2015 Paris Agreement. Firms that annually emitted more than 10,000 tonnes but fewer than 25,000 had the option of entering the market on a voluntary basis. The expected downstream impact to the average Ontario household would be an increase of about CA$150 per year in home-heating and car-fuel costs. However, cost increases would be felt less directly through the rest of the economy. Four particular companies in Ontario had some decisions to make regarding how the province's cap-and-trade program would affect their operations.

Supplement for product W18559.

Supplement for product W18559.

Supplement for product W18559.

Supplement for product W18559.

In 2014, Andreas Karaiskos took over as CEO for a classic classroom based financial services training organisation, Fitch Learning, and started implementing a global expansion strategy via enhanced eLearning capabilities, partnerships with global financial institutions, co-location with other Fitch group companies while also evaluating target markets' sustainable financial indicators and their supportive customer demographics. With its main focus on certificate and basic skills training, its global presence and knowledge, and Fitch Group quality stamp, Fitch Learning is well positioned to capitalise on the large global financial institutions' desire to outsource basic training needs. In addition, with Fitch Group's global footprint, Fitch Learning is well positioned for the developing world's increasing need of financially skilled and certified individuals. Fitch Learning, created by merging Fitch's in-house old styled training department with the acquisition of the eLearning company '7cities' and its advanced eLearning platform and online technology. Andreas Karaiskos, who came from the acquired company's "built for sale" culture, had to merge these two very disparate organisations into a modern, flexible, tech savvy 21st century eLearning company "built for growth" and he needed a new strategy! He had to identify and acquire new resources & capabilities, implement a new organisational culture, keeping an eye on the industry trends while also ensuring the company's profitability. The strategy required a deep understanding of the industry and the forces affecting it, as well as a need for great leadership to keep key staff motivated. In an era where the use of Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, automation, ever increasing government regulations (fuelled by the growing numbers of high tech start-ups in the FinTech, EduTech and RegTech areas) does Fitch Learning have the right strategy to remain relevant as a financial services learning provider?

One of directors' key fiduciary duties is to set the firm's direction and then vet the strategy proposed by the CEO. Despite this, McKinsey reports that the majority of directors feel they do not understand their firm's strategy, and even if they do understand it, they do not feel they have the desired impact on their firm's strategy. This article argues that this shortfall stems from a failure to cross the chasm between CEOs and directors. We propose a framework to bridge this gap and assist board members to better understand and vet their firm's strategy.

Advances in information technology (IT) have prompted tremendous growth in security issues for companies. Increasingly, cyberattacks represent a threat to companies and national security; to prevent them, firms should routinely perform risk assessments of their IT infrastructure and employees. This article highlights the importance of open-source intelligence (OSINT) tools in conducting risk assessments to prevent cyberattacks. More specifically, we performed a vulnerability assessment on the critical infrastructure of a company operating on the U.S. electrical grid. We successfully profile the company's network software, hardware, and key IT personnel-using OSINT-and detailed potential vulnerabilities associated with these findings. The results of our study provide empirical evidence for the efficacy of OSINT in improving the security posture of organizations. Our research findings were subsequently used to produce tactical and strategic recommendations for organizations based on the use of OSINT to identify vulnerabilities, mitigate risks, and formulate more robust security policies to prevent cyberattacks.

Companies increasingly face the need for transformation in today's rapidly changing business environment, characterized by major shifts in technology, regulation, and customer behavior. A lack of strategic risk insight and foresight leaves many incumbents insufficiently prepared in the face of such deep uncertainty. We argue that traditional risk management falls short because it predominantly focuses on strategy execution while leaving strategy formulation largely untouched. Moreover, an administrative-heavy risk management process can create strategic inertia and a misleading sense of control. In today's dynamic business context, companies must not only increase the speed and impact of their strategy execution but also continuously explore the development of new strategies in response to disruptive events or emerging opportunities. Our research shows how leading companies develop a strategic risk management (SRM) capability to increase their resilience and agility in response to deep uncertainty. SRM takes a strategic, forward-looking perspective and focuses on strengthening processes, people, and practices for purposefully integrating risk into the strategy formulation process. This article offers a framework with three proven configurations of content and timing integration, risk management roles, and leading practices that enable effective SRM.

The MSK Group Oy was a third-generation family-owned business located in Ylihärmä, Finland. One of its subsidiaries, Junkkari Oy (Junkkari), manufactured agricultural and forestry equipment, including a range of mid-sized disk wood chippers used in small-scale farming and forestry applications; most of these were exported to markets in Europe and South Africa. Junkkari was not the only Finnish firm manufacturing wood chippers, and there was little to differentiate Junkkari's machines from those of its competitors. Like many small firms that exported to foreign markets, Junkkari used partner distributors to sell its equipment internationally. In early 2017, Junkkari's export manager was reviewing the wood-chipper orders. He knew the firm could double its annual production, but without firm orders, growth was stalled. He wondered how to grow the company's business with a very limited budget.

In 2017, the president of Fujitsu Asia Pte. Ltd. in Singapore, a subsidiary of Japanese conglomerate Fujitsu Limited (Fujitsu) needed to decide between two project options that represented growth in different industries in Asia. Both projects represented Fujitsu's vision of connected services and could potentially be much-needed engines of new growth for Fujitsu Singapore over the next 5 to 10 years. The first option was to offer its Japanese-engineered cloud-computing platform to engage small and medium enterprises in the manufacturing industry. Given the high costs of customizing the existing platform for local use, the president wondered whether small and medium manufacturers would generate sufficient demand to justify such a costly investment. The second option was to leverage the success of Fujitsu's intelligent agricultural cloud-computing project with the Japanese government to offer vertical farming to Singapore and other Asian cities that faced similar space constraints but valued food resilience. But was it the right time to enter the agricultural industry? The president had limited time and resources, and needed to make a decision very soon.

This case examines the development of Shenzhen through three key phases of its economic journey that span almost 40 years, starting with its humble beginnings as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). We analyse the city's evolution and push towards innovation via Porter's Diamond Theory and its four interrelated factors of national comparative economic advantage: firm strategy, structure and rivalry; related supporting industries; demand conditions; and factor conditions. In understanding Shenzhen's economic transformation, we should, in particular, appreciate the important role and commitment of the Chinese government in driving economic development and innovation through setting and articulating economic direction; attracting talent; providing physical infrastructure; making policy adjustments; and building a presence on the global platform. We end by projecting the threats that Shenzhen may face in sustaining its future growth.

Samsung is a Korean conglomerate (or chaebol) founded in 1938. Once a sole trading company, it has grown into a myriad of companies generating over $380 billion globally in industries as varied as construction, semiconductors, shipbuilding, banking and entertainment. Like most Korean conglomerates, an unusual feature of Samsung is that it has no overarching holding company; it is a constellation of companies sharing a common name and tightly interwoven cross-ownership ties. This ownership structure allows the third-generation descendant of the family business, Jae-Yong Lee, to control the conglomerate with shares in only a few affiliates. The case focuses on three pivotal moments of the Lee family's leadership of the Samsung Group: the leadership transmission from the founder Byung-Chul to the second generation; the hospitalization of the visionary leader Kun-Hee and the succession to the third generation; and Jae-Yong's arrest and later conviction, causing a leadership vacuum within the group.