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The Tiny Prints case describes the founding of the online stationery company in 2004, through its growth and evolution to 2007. The three cofounders bootstrapped the company from the beginning, primarily so that they could retain control over the decision-making and strategic direction of the company. While that decision allowed the cofounders flexibility and independence, it also led to capital constraints and a "good enough" culture that had a variety of positive and negative implications for the company. Ultimately, Tiny Prints was able to grow because of its very specific focus on the birth announcement, and later holiday, market, an emphasis on customer service and innovations in design and distribution. As of 2007, the founders faced questions regarding their future growth strategy, particularly given increasing competition in the market, and were at an inflection point where they needed to consider the important decision of bringing in outside capital. Part B of the case explores the management team's decision to move forward with a purchase offer from Shutterfly or to maintain control of the company and continue to grow organically.

Michiel Leijnse, global brand development director of Lipton Tea, faces a very important meeting with Unilever CEO Patrick Cescau in a few short hours, during which he will recommend strategies on how Lipton can become credible with consumers, obtain sustainable certification, integrate sustainable practices into its entire supply chain, and tell customers about it. He has to consider the financial implications of the decision and demonstrate a reasonable return on investment. Would there be a first-mover advantage for Unilever or would the company be paving the way for its competitors to sustainably source tea without the investment? He would also have to recommend a certification agency and craft a plan for implementation of the change.

With increasing attention from consumers surrounding food safety and public health, it comes at no surprise that Perdue Farms is considering eliminating antibiotic use in its poultry operations. Perdue is positioned to receive positive responses from reducing antibiotic usage, but the question of feasibility in implementation remains as the producer had previously failed to phase-out antibiotics. From this case, students will structure argumentative thought around causes of CSR strategies and how CSR impacts business operations

Unilever has successfully rolled out an initiative to sustainably source Lipton tea, and Unilever CEO Paul Polman is wondering if the company could apply the same concepts to its wider portfolio of products. The move has triggered change throughout the industry, but questions remain as to whether sustainable sourcing would be as successful with other products. Lipton's strategy of maintaining price point (shrinking margins) while increasing sales may not be a viable option for Unilever's other brands. There may be pieces of the supply chain where a sustainability program would lead to higher costs. If Unilever scaled the initiative to the rest of the organization, it had to find a way to integrate sustainability into its corporate strategy, reduce environmental impact, and boost social good, all while increasing profits.

The case looks at how The Abraaj Group has emerged as a global private equity firm and came to define its focus and strategy in this process. While the local knowledge and relationships is considered to be critical for value creation in the private equity industry, firms often seek to expand geographically as their funds and resources increase. The case explores how a global firm like Abraaj can balance the need to focus on local networks and knowledge with a global stretch. It tries to answer this question by focusing on how Abraaj creates value, how the firm differentiates itself from local and global competitors, and how local-global dynamics manifests itself through the different phases of the firm's business.

Most business activities can be understood as progressions from insight to outcome - getting from the original spark of an idea to the actual realization of financial and strategic results. And yet, leaders and companies fail to master this progression all the time, in the headline-grabbing, large scale transformative initiatives we read about, as well in the rest of iceberg - the core business processes and the non-routine initiatives and projects that collectively can have a defining impact on a company's performance. In this teaching note, we argue that senior executives can, in fact, systematically ensure their organizations' ability to progress effectively from insight to outcome, and we discuss three critical behaviors that they need to embrace to make this happen: managing the insight to outcome sequence as an integrated, end-to-end process; recognizing and overcoming the challenges of the degree of difficulty curve; and mastering the complex calculus of strategic inflection points.

This technical note provides a history and context for corporate venture capital (CVC) investment, or the practice of corporations making equity investments in startup companies outside their core business. The note outlines the growth of CVC, from its inception in the 1960s through its maturation today, and explores companies' motivations for making these types of investments, which typically involve a combination of both financial and strategic goals. In addition, the note explores how CVC units within companies are structured, how they evaluate and finance investment opportunities, and how they generate business value for the parent company.

In January 2013, Mike Johnson, CEO of Headwaters Software, was weighing the opportunity to diversify into a new but related market. Despite being a small company, Fisdap, as everyone called it, was the leading provider of software solutions and content to students and educators in the field of emergency medical services (EMS). Since its inception, Fisdap had played a key role in facilitating new ways to track and manage clinical internships of EMS students. Now, it appeared that educational programs for other healthcare occupations were likely to adopt methods similar to those now used in EMS. Johnson had recently returned from a visit to a community college using Fisdap's EMS software, which had requested Fisdap to consider developing solutions for their nursing program as well. Nursing education was a large market, offering substantial growth potential for Fisdap. However, entering the market involved a number of risks, and meant that the company would move away from its existing strategy and direction. Johnson was concerned about whether the company could manage growth while maintaining its company culture and conservative approach to financing. Furthermore, the size of the nursing education market might entice larger competitors than Fisdap had encountered to date. Johnson felt that the nursing education software tools market might develop rapidly, so if he was going to enter, he had better do it now.

India had long suffered floods during the monsoons, droughts during the dry seasons, and periodic death causing famines during multi-year droughts. The old canal-based irrigation system developed by the British had crumbled from neglect and wealthier famers had turned to wells. Water shortages were compounded by the rapid population growth in India and water pollution. Dinesh Shindey had been asked by the prime minister to chair a task force to study the social, environmental, technical, and economic aspects of the proposed River Linking Project. It was a massive federal government project that required the construction of 34 new dams, 94 tunnels, and 12,500 kilometers of new canals. Proponents believed it would greatly increase the supply of water, but opponents believed it would never work as designed. Many simply believed that it was impossible to complete such a massive project in corruption plagued India. A former Secretary of the Ministry of Water Resources of India named S. Kannan believed that the solution to the water crisis in India lay instead in a decentralized approach based on conservation, the completion of numerous small, decentralized regional and local projects, and in managing the demand for water. After meeting with S. Kannan, Shindey's task force would write their recommendations in a report that would become a basis for how India would respond. This case presents a complex multicriteria decision problem that requires students to examine the relevant political, economic, cultural, environmental, and legal aspects as related to a wide-ranging mix of stakeholders. Students can assign probabilities and do a decision tree analysis before looking at the situation through the rational, incremental, and garbage can models of decision making. The case illustrates both how carefully humans need to manage natural resources in the face of rapidly growing demand and also how incredibly complex it is to manage such resources in a democratic system.

This case tells a series of schedule delay issues that CBMI Construction Co., Ltd., encountered during the implementation of the NOC project of transnational cooperation. Under triple pressures including industry winter, group merger and industry chain continuation, CBMI signed the cement plant construction project in the Republic of Benin with demanding schedule through active exploration of overseas markets and EPC project management model. As the first cement plant construction project carried out in the Republic of Benin and the first project signed after a year of zero project signing, CBMI has attached great importance and coordinated all departments' resources to be fully engaged in the operation of the project. However, the factors including harsh natural environment, complexity of project management organization, resource conflicts and differences between Chinese and Western cultures have seriously affected the smooth progress of the project, making the NOC project schedule fall into the dilemma. This case demonstrates the methods and measures to crack the NOC project progress puzzle with the use of critical chain technique through in-depth analysis of influencing factors on project progress.

When Dalian Wanda Group of China announced its plan to acquire the AMC Entertainment theatrical exhibition chain in the United States, many people in the U.S were mystified. Unlike China where theatrical exhibition was experiencing rapid growth, the U.S. market was viewed as mature, and rapidly changing technology was giving consumers a widening range of choices for movie viewing. AMC was owned by a group of private equity firms, and their pessimistic view of the industry influenced their strategies and investment decisions. AMC's management team had yet a different view on the prospects of the industry. Thus three present or potential stakeholders, all looking at the same data, had distinctly different views of future prospects. How could this be? The (B) case looks at AMC's performance in the year after the acquisition.

This is part of a case series. As the Alps disappeared into the darkness through NayaMed's window, the General Manager Aarnav Sendutta considered how to grow his fledgling unit. It was February 2014, and NayaMed, a unit of medical device giant, Medtronic, was just over two years old. It was formed to distribute Medtronic's economy range of heart pacemakers and defibrillators, with regional sales and online technical support. Aarnav was facing two key issues. The first was the perception from Medtronic sales reps that NayaMed would cannibalise their offering. The second issue was how to grow the unit, which currently operated from its Lausanne base in Switzerland, targeting only Italy, Germany and Sweden. The business had grown but was still very small, generating US $4 million in its second year of existence. Aarnav's passion for the NayaMed business was clear, the justification for NayaMed made good business sense, but attempts to grow it were being constrained by organisational issues within the parent company, Medtronic. What could they do?

Supplement to case LBS168

A Swedish light bulb manufacturer reviews its strategy to better compete against large global multinationals.

Set in 2013, the case documents the challenges encountered by an emerging economy multinational enterprise (EMNE) when accessing R&D knowledge from its technologically superior subsidiary. Further, it shows the strategies that Suzlon, an Indian wind turbine manufacturer, adopted to catch up with global industry leaders. It tracks how Suzlon's astute and aggressive chairman, Tulsi Tanti, led the company to develop the capabilities to perform higher value added activities despite being a late industry entrant and one, moreover, from an emerging economy. The setting for the case is the global wind power industry, an emerging high-tech industry. The case thus shows that EMNEs are entering and succeeding not only in mature industries but also in newly emerging industries. By acquiring technologically superior firms, Suzlon made a mark in the global wind power industry dominated by European and American companies. While most of its acquisitions successfully served their purpose, Suzlon's 2007 acquisition of the German wind turbine manufacturer REpower did not go as planned. REpower was a technology-focused firm with expertise in large offshore turbines. Suzlon's goal was to access REpower's technology and combine it with Suzlon's low manufacturing cost and operational efficiency to gain competitive advantage over rivals. However, the expected knowledge transfer from this acquisition did not materialize as quickly as planned due to REpower's refusal to share its technology with its parent, Suzlon. The case primarily describes the challenges involved in this acquisition, amplified by the economic recession of 2008. It shows Tanti's attempts to make the acquisition work by balancing the "power" struggle between the Indian parent and the German subsidiary. Further, by tracking Suzlon right from its inception, it also describes Suzlon's catch-up strategies to emerge as a market leader in India and the fifth largest wind turbine manufacturer in the world.

This short case is a companion to the classic "Crown Cork & Seal in 1989" case, documenting the evolution of the metal can and container industry in the quarter-century following the rise of William J. Avery to the CEO position at Crown in 1989.

The case illustrates how Mad Head Limited ("Mad Head"), the developer of a smash hit mobile game, Tower of Saviors ("TOS"), became financially successful by imitating another well-known product on the market. The story presents background on the founders and the company from its inception as an e-cards business to the release of TOS. The case is intended to stimulate debates on topics such as imitation vs. innovation, viable business models for start-ups and the ethical concerns associated with an imitative approach. If time permits, the instructor can also guide discussion to more in-depth topics such as the distinction between Schumpeter's and Kirzner's views on entrepreneurship and their economic implications.

How should organizations balance pressures to decrease short-term costs at the expense of long-term profitability? How "long" is the long-term? What is the cost of innovation? These are the questions that CEO Mary Barra must face when leading General Motors (GM) into the 21st century. GM became the world's first mass-produced electric vehicle retailer when it released the "EV1" in 1996. However, GM canceled the program in 2002, citing high costs, a limited market for electric vehicles, and the lack of technology available to make high-performance vehicles. The emergence of Tesla Motors in 2006 and its exponential growth in the electric vehicle market has proven otherwise. Ironically, Tesla Motors began with the same technology that GM already had access to with only a fraction of GM's resources. The rapid rise of Tesla Motors in the electric vehicle market and the subsequent bankruptcy of GM suggest that GM made the wrong decision to abort its electric vehicle program in 2002. However, it is unclear how GM should proceed. In 2015, the company will launch its first all electric vehicle since the EV1, the Chevrolet Spark. To what extent should GM enter the electric vehicle sector? Tesla Motors is already scheduled to release a more affordable car in the next two years and has been proving its autonomous driving technology. Other automobile manufacturers have also released all-electric vehicles, including BMW, Nissan, Ford and Toyota. Hydrogen fuel cell technology is also on the rise and may be a promising alternative to electric vehicles. Lastly, the Asian markets are leading the demand for automobiles. Place yourself in the shoes of Mary Barra. What should GM's strategy be in order to regain its stature as the world's leading automobile manufacturer? Learning objectives: When organizations are first established, their success largely depends on their value proposition and unique offering to the market as they achieve their vision. But then what? Often times, large or

In 1998, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and US manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines signed a consent decree which included among other things, pulling forward ("pull ahead") by 15 months a new nitrogen oxide (NOx) emission standard. By early 2002, Caterpillar and Detroit Diesel were requesting EPA to delay the "pull ahead". Cummins was being pressured by its competitors to join in this request. On the other side, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and several environmental organizations wanted Cummins to adhere to the requirements of the consent decree. Cummins was navigating through a very difficult economic time and could not afford to make a mistake. Joe Loughrey, Cummins Engine Business President and his team needed to make a strategic decision. Would they a) agree with the competitors' position asking EPA to delay the consent decree which required the company to pull ahead an expensive environment requirement, thus allowing manufacturers to continue using the established engine technology that had customer support, or b) accept the terms of the consent decree and continue to develop a new engine technology against the wishes of many in the industry and thus face possible market retraction. Both strategic decision options had substantial consequences and needed to be carefully evaluated. Not only was the future of Cummins Engine Business in jeopardy, but as we learn later, this decision impacted the future of the whole industry.

Politics in organizations are a fact of life, and have been regarded as such for decades by organizational scientists and practitioners alike. Unfortunately, far less is known about the skills or competencies needed in order to be successful--and even survive--in such political environments. Although many believe performance, effectiveness, and career success are determined mostly by intelligence and hard work, political perspectives on organizations contend that other factors such as positioning, social astuteness, and interpersonal savvy also play important roles; that is, individuals need to possess political skill. In this article, we describe the underlying features and operation of political skill in organizations, and argue that it allows people to be effective at work by giving them the capacity to more accurately recognize opportunities in the work environment and effectively capitalize on those opportunities. Using the game of chess as a metaphor, we describe how politically skilled individuals strategically employ their competencies in ways that ensure goal attainment. Further, we provide some practical guidance for employees about how to play the organizational politics 'game' to facilitate success.