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When a company brings out a new product, it often raises the prices of its existing products--which means that you can follow suit without risking customer defections over price. Companies that understand this can avoid reflexive, and expensive, defensive measures.

New research finds five strategies that can help produce a highly successful merger.

This case explores the use of social media to support product design, customer support, marketing and HR activities at National Instruments (NI). Based in Austin, Texas, with over $1 billion in 2011 sales, NI designs, produces, and sells software and hardware platforms that simplify development of its customers measurement and control systems. Its customers, ranging from individuals (professors and their students) to large corporations, consist primarily of scientists and engineers-a pedigree shared by most NI employees. Since dedicating a full-time position to formalizing the use of social media tools in 2006, NI has infused social capabilities into its internal and customer-facing business processes, strengthening relationships and value delivered. NI's story deepens our understanding of how to build a social business strategy, create game changing innovation processes, and measure the value of its social technology investments-a key challenge facing the company. By touching on NI's history and culture, the case also allows students to consider what elements of this company's organization and culture have allowed it to build a robust social business model.

New products and services are created to enable people to do tasks better than they previously could or do things they couldn't before. But innovations also carry risks. Just how risky an innovation turns out to be depends in great measure on the choices people make in using it. Attempts to gauge the riskiness of an innovation must take into account the limitations of the models--formal and informal--on which people base their decisions about how to use the innovation, warns Robert C. Merton, MIT professor and Nobel laureate in economics. Some models turn out to be fundamentally flawed and should be jettisoned, he argues, while others are merely incomplete and can be improved upon. Some models require sophisticated users to produce good results; others are suitable only to certain applications. And even when people employ appropriate models to make choices about how to use an innovation--striking the right balance between risk and performance--experience shows that it is almost impossible to predict how their changed behavior will influence the riskiness of other choices and behaviors they make, often in apparently unrelated domains. It's the old story of unintended consequences. The more complex the system an innovation enters, the more likely and severe its unintended consequences will be. Indeed, many of the risks associated with an innovation stem not from the innovation itself but from the infrastructure into which it is introduced. In the end, any innovation involves a leap into the unknowable. If we are to make progress, however, that's a fact we need to accept and to manage.

In 2009, TED, an organizer of highly respected conferences on "ideas worth spreading," threw its doors open, allowing anyone, anywhere, to manage and stage local, independent events under its banner. In the next few years, an army of volunteers produced some 5,000 such TEDx events in more than 130 countries. The brand extension and new content TED gained through these gatherings would have cost millions to produce by traditional means. But they came with a risk: TED no longer completely controlled its brand, and an extended community of people who didn't work for TED were now capable of damaging it. And when TEDx licensees began putting dubious pseudoscientific presentations on their programs, that risk became a real threat. The blogosphere trashed TED for producing dumb content and questioned its overall credibility. In this article, Nilofer Merchant describes the uproar and the lessons it offers: (1) that "open" does not mean "easy" or "free" and (2) that you need to get the crowd working with you, not against you. TED did that, turning things around by adopting three practices: "listening loudly," realigning the community through shared purpose, and being strategic about the parts of the business it opened to the crowd and the parts it kept under tight control.

Much of the strategy and management advice that business leaders turn to is unreliable or impractical, say the authors, because those who would guide us underestimate the power of chance. Raynor and Ahmed undertook a statistical study of 25,000 companies--those that had traded on U.S. stock exchanges at any time from 1966 to 2010. They measured performance according to return on assets--a metric, they reasoned, that reliably reflects managerial efforts rather than simply changes in expectations, which are the primary driver of shareholder returns. Out of that 25,000 they identified 344 companies they deem exceptional: 174 Miracle Workers, whose ROA fell in the top 10% of all companies studied, and 170 Long Runners, whose ROA fell in the top 20% to 40%. For purposes of comparison, they also identified companies that were Average Joes. After repeatedly trying and failing to isolate measurable behaviors that were consistently relevant to success, the authors shifted their emphasis away from what these companies did to hypotheses about how they thought. They realized that the choices these companies had made were consistent with three seemingly elementary rules: (1) Better before cheaper--in other words, compete on differentiators other than price. (2) Revenue before cost--that is, prioritize increasing revenue over reducing costs. (3) There are no other rules--so change anything you must to follow Rules 1 and 2.

Course overview note for students.

The fast rise of Lenovo among its competitors in the computer industry raised a series of questions regarding the sustainability of its competitive position, as well as the choices it had made in its efforts toward globalization. First, how could Lenovo establish and sustain a leadership role in an industry where competitive positions were increasingly unstable? Next, how could the Chinese firm build a solid competitive position in an industry characterized by smaller and smaller margins? Finally, after the acquisition of IBM's PC business and the subsequent accelerated international expansion, could Lenovo still be considered an entirely Chinese entity or was it a truly global enterprise of Chinese origin?A video interview with Lenovo's strategy and corporate development vice-president, Lenovo: A Chinese Dragon in the Global Village - DVD, is also available.

The co-founder and president of an environmentally friendly moving supply company faces the challenge of expanding his company's brand. The company, which provides plastic, reusable moving bins and other moving supplies, has branded itself as providing a convenient, affordable and eco-friendly alternative to cardboard moving boxes. The company can expand by setting up additional corporate stores or by selling individual franchises. The co-founder and president also contemplates focusing his efforts on dominating and revolutionizing the Canadian moving industry. He also remains open to the possibility of eventually selling the company to a larger organization. In considering all options, he wants to sustain the integrity and success of the brand he has built and to ensure that any future expansion maintains his commitment to providing consumers with value, high quality and superior customer service.

This disguised case describes a Midwestern institution that had had remarkable successes in preparing to operate in a managed care environment. The case can be taught as part of a sequence on managing change and works well with the McKinsey 7S model.

The CEO of Newmont Mining Corporation (Newmont) had learned that a subcontractor's truck en route to Lima from Yanacocha, a gold mine operated by Newmont, spilled mercury along the highway and in small villages. Local residents had picked up some mercury with their bare hands and taken it to their homes. The CEO was trying to determine the best way to handle the situation. This A case describes the mine developer's history, the operations at Newmont's most profitable gold mine, the significance of foreign investment to Peru's economy, the environmental impact of gold mining and the local and anti-mining movements' responses to mine operations. In the B case, Newmont Mining Corp. and a Mercury Spill in Peru (B) 9B13M003, the new CEO is trying to decide what else Newmont is morally required to implement before continuing to operate Yanacocha, and Newmont's other mines, successfully.

This B case is a supplement to Newmont Mining Corp. and a Mercury Spill in Peru (A) 9B13M002. Since the spill, Newmont spent more than US$100 million on compensation and improvements to the mine to reduce its environmental impact and prevent further spills. An internal audit concluded environmental standards at the mine were seriously lacking. In-house counsel warned other executives about the possibility of criminal liability. Despite improvements at the mine, a large local protest prevented Newmont from expanding its operations in the area. Lack of trust by the locals contributed to the protest. The new CEO is trying to decide what else Newmont is morally required to implement before continuing to operate Yanacocha, and Newmont's other mines, successfully.

An Indian company was planning to set up a Global Design Competence Centre (GDCC) in India. The company offered scented candles and holiday and gift products primarily for the U.S. market. Through its two American subsidiaries, it made and sold its products to large American mass-merchandisers and independent retailers. In-house design capabilities also existed in the form of six teams across India and the United States. Through the GDCC, the company intended to use Indian designers in collaboration with U.S. designers to create products for the U.S. market. The case draws students into exploring possible strategies to set up the GDCC.

Supplement for case 710464