個案總覽

Supplements the (A) case.

An abstract is not available for this product.

Organizations that fear sharing their data with aggregators might be surprised to learn they can benefit from letting other firms disseminate their information online.

CEOs looking for ways to improve ROI should examine the practices of similar companies in other industries.

Despite Africa's regional poverty, the continent's gross national income per capita is greater than India's. That represents a huge potential market for enterprises worldwide.

Most organizations bend over backward to avoid failure. They shouldn't, says economist Paul Ormerod. History shows that failure and success are inherently random, so firms should innovate and adapt.

On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing inadequate levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be widely seen as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or destroyed. It was the worst urban disaster in national memory. However, city leaders were not prepared to accept New Orleans' demise. On September 29, 2005, Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a blue-ribbon panel known as the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission to produce a reconstruction plan by the end of the year. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and nonprofit worlds. BNOB turned for advice to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a Washington, DC-based research and educational organization that sought to promote responsible development. ULI's panel of experts urged what it saw as a pragmatic approach. The city lacked the resources to restore services quickly to all of New Orleans. It would have to pick and choose the most promising areas to rebuild first. The hope was that vibrant rebirth in the center would catalyze growth elsewhere. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the lower-lying, poorer sections of town hardest hit by Katrina would have to wait. In fact, it might not make sense to rebuild neighborhoods likely to experience serious flooding in a future hurricane. Two-thirds of the city's pre-Katrina residents were African Americans, disproportionately residents of the poorer, lower-lying, worst damaged areas. Some saw the ULI plan as a conspiracy to get rid of them and make New Orleans whiter. Even many middle-class whites and blacks who did not share the conspiracy theory vehemently opposed the ULI proposal because it seemed to relegate their homes and neighborhoods to oblivion. Meanwhile, city councilors representing lower-lying districts feared that ULI would plan their political base out of existence. HKS Case Number 1862.0

This sequel accompanies the main case (1862.0). On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing inadequate levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be widely seen as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or destroyed. It was the worst urban disaster in national memory. However, city leaders were not prepared to accept New Orleans' demise. On September 29, 2005, Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a blue-ribbon panel known as the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission to produce a reconstruction plan by the end of the year. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and nonprofit worlds. BNOB turned for advice to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a Washington, DC-based research and educational organization that sought to promote responsible development. HKS Case Number 1862.1

Reed Hastings founded Netflix with a vision to provide a home movie service that would do a better job satisfying customers than the traditional retail rental model. But as it encouraged challenges it underwent several major strategy shifts, ultimately developing a business model and an operational strategy that were highly disruptive to retail video rental chains. The combination of a large national inventory, a recommendation system that drove viewership across the broad catalog, and a large customer base made Netflix a force to be reckoned with, especially as a distribution channel for lower-profile and independent films. Blockbuster, the nation's largest retail video rental firm, was initially slow to respond, but ultimately rolled out a hybrid retail/online response in the form of Blockbuster Online. Aggressive pricing pulled in subscribers, but at a price to both it and Netflix. But a new challenge was on the horizon: video-on-demand. How should Netflix respond?

Dollar General Corporation (DG) operates one of the leading chains of extreme value retailers in the United States. 2006 revenues reached $9.2 billion, making DG the 6th largest mass retailer in the country. With revenues growing at 9% annually over the five-year period up to 2005, DG had the distinction of being only one of three retailers to outperform Wal-Mart in both revenue and profit growth in that time. Life in a Dollar General store paints a vivid picture of the roots and historical focus of the company. Opportunistic buying has given the stores an eclectic merchandise mix. Analysts often referred to this category as "treasure hunt" SKUs. Offers an opportunity to examine a company's business model, particularly since DG has been so successful competing with Wal-Mart where so many other retailers have not. While it started out as a family business in the five-and-dime tradition, it evolved to a close-out retail model where its unique low-overhead operations were advantageous. As it added highly consumable categories its mix shifted, but it managed to retain its low-overhead model. Interestingly, the mix shift was likely more an emergency strategy driven by store level operations than by top-down driven strategy. Frames the growth options available to DG's CEO as he grapples with how to maintain growth.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 607140.

When John Seybold and his partners founded Guidewire (originally Centrica Software) in 2001, he knew little more about the insurance industry than an informed consumer. But as chief architect of the startup company, he also knew he and the team had to learn quickly if they were going to convince mainstream insurers to scrap their expensive aging mainframes and adopt Java-based solutions from an unknown and unproven provider. Seybold felt the flexibility and speed they needed might be realized through current thinking on agile project management and a process called "Scrum." An outcome of the Agile Manifesto, Scrum defined a new way of organization: One that focused on creating products with the customer; that cut out middle management; where projects ran on a monthly cycle; and that enabled the team to rethink priorities and processes at the conclusion of each monthly cycle. Seybold and his partners imagined that this process would help them quickly create an opportunity in insurance software. However, the direction brought risk. Scrum had been used on a project basis, but as far as Seybold and his partners knew, never before to organize a whole company. Would it scale as the organization grew? Might clients reject a startup company with both radical new products and a radical new organization? And would building a new company, a new product and a new organizational form be more than Seybold and his partners could manage? In the hostile post-internet bubble environment where funding was limited and interest in new software from startup companies was even more limited - they would have to be right fast.

Supplement for IMD453 In addition to using Scrum and Sprint Teams internally, Guidewire has been successful at teaching their clients how to use the process as well. In these larger organization, the process has enabled: a) rapid customer feedback; b) flexible product implementations; c) fast development. If a large mainstream insurance company can derive these benefits from the process, where else might it apply?

Provides an overview of the retail sector within the United States as online shopping captures an increased percentage of consumer spending. The role of enabling technologies and applications, including comparison shopping sites and recommendation systems, are covered. Additionally, the strategies, specifically the evolution of multi-channeling retail, are discussed.

Based on a combination of exploratory field research and executive experience, proposes that defining the "Minimum Winning Game" (MWG) is a difficult yet critical responsibility of top management. It is essential to keep a high-technology venture focused and to enable managers to learn from their ongoing efforts in the face of rapidly evolving technological and market uncertainties. Achieving the MWG requires the intelligent balancing of three "key drivers of strategic action": technology, product, and strategy development. Finally, instilling the discipline necessary to define the MWG and balance the drivers of strategic action is facilitated by the use of a strategy-making process informed by key data gathering and analysis tools such as the Market Requirement Document and the Product Requirement Document.

Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.

How can companies break into attractive markets, where incumbents erect many barriers to entry? To answer this question, the authors studied organizations that successfully entered the most profitable industries in the United States between 1990 and 2000. When they dissected the strategies that worked best, one common theme stood out: indirect assault. Smart newcomers don't duplicate existing business models, compete for crowded distribution channels, or go after mainstream customers right away. Instead, they attack the enemy at its weakest points; then gain competitive advantage; and later, if doing so meets their objectives, go after its strongholds. Recent battles in the soft drink industry--where brands, bottling and distribution capabilities, and shelf space are incumbents' main advantages--are a case in point. When Virgin Drinks entered the U.S. cola market in 1998, it advertised heavily and immediately tried to get into the retail outlets that stock the leading brands. Virgin has never garnered more than a 1% share of the market. Red Bull, by contrast, came on the scene in 1997 with a niche product: a carbonated energy drink. The company started by selling the drink at bars and nightclubs. After gaining a loyal following through these outlets, Red Bull elbowed its way into the corner store. In 2005 it enjoyed a 65% share of the $650 million energy drink market. Successful entrants use three basic approaches in their indirect attacks. They leverage their existing assets and resources, reconfigure their value chains, and create niches. These approaches may appear to be simple, but their magic lies in their combination. By mixing and matching them, Bryce and Dyer say, enterprises can defy half a century of economic logic and make money entering highly profitable industries. The authors use Skype, Costco, Skechers, and many other companies to illustrate their argument.

Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.

In this interview, the director of Wharton's Center for Risk and Decision Sciences explains why the private sector must take a leadership role in assuring a safer environment, and how our increasing interconnectedness breeds risk. The interview touches on 'extreme-event preparedness' and how security will soon become a marketing argument. The time has come to get creative, says Kerjan, and a first step is to acknowledge that the challenges of large-scale risks have become vital strategy and policy issues for major stakeholders - firms, governments, non-governmental organizations and the media. The key, he says, might lie in the ability to imagine and act more collaboratively, as the 9/11 Commission report made very clear.

When it comes time to generating business growth by bringing new products and services into the world, the stakes are high, and risk is everywhere. Risk, in the traditional business sense, is an assessment of the downside that might result from taking a particular action. If the perceived level of risk is too high, people working within a business-as-usual paradigm look for a less-risky alternative, or even forego action altogether. This negative definition of risk simply doesn't exist in the lexicon of most designers. The authors, from leading design firm IDEO, show that for designers, risk isn't a measure of 'the downside', but instead, it is a measure of upside and opportunity. If the risk isn't great enough, they might well ask themselves, "why bother?" The authors provide seven initial steps that managers can take to embrace the designer's approach to risk.