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In 2007 Grupo Bimbo, a leading global player in the baking industry, expands into China, while at the same time undertaking initiatives to make its U.S. and South American operations more profitable. Allows students to analyze the company's entire global strategy. Places particular attention on how a multinational firm should best adapt to differences in the basic institutions of capitalism and consumer preferences across countries as well as within them.

When Jim Weddle took over as Managing Partner of Edward Jones in January 2006, the brokerage firm was at a critical juncture. The firm's distinctive strategy had enabled it to grow from its roots in small-town America to become the 4th largest broker in the U.S. Weddle was concerned, however, that the firm's success, and the changing landscape of the financial services industry, were challenging the core aspects of the strategy that had brought the firm so far. He knew that the impending strategic decisions would determine whether Edward Jones could sustain its extraordinary performance and achieve its goal of growing to 20,000 financial advisors by 2017.

In 2007, Wal-Mart faced challenges to its historically high growth rate. Lagging same-store sales and setbacks overseas led the company to consider strategic shifts. Wal-Mart was the world's largest retailer, but competition had become particularly acute as the company expanded from rural markets, which it had long dominated, into urban and suburban areas. Covers developments in Wal-Mart's merchandising strategy and its approach to store formats; its sometimes controversial human resources practices; its efforts to improve its image through a public relations campaign; its aggressive, though occasionally problematic, move into international markets; and its leading competitors, especially Target. Exhibits provide data (current as of February 2007) on Wal-Mart's financial performance, its stock-price performance, its international operations, and its store formats, as well as on Target's financial performance.

Aurolab is the in-house producer of IOLs (required in cataract surgery) for the Aravind Eye Care System, a group of charity hospitals with the largest volume of eye surgery in the world. Aurolab's manufacturing capability and capacity had long exceeded the requirements of Aravind. With its impending move to a new, world-class facility, fundamental questions of strategic direction and mission fulfillment gained renewed attention among the organization's senior leaders.

Through the co-evolutionary war game, strategists can better understand the forces that influence complex competitions.

The main goal of any international strategy should be to manage the large differences that arise at the borders of markets. Yet executives often fail to exploit market and production discrepancies, focusing instead on the tensions between standardization and localization. In this article, Pankaj Ghemawat presents a new framework that encompasses all three effective responses to the challenges of globalization. He calls it the AAA Triangle. The As stand for the three distinct types of international strategy. Through Adaptation, companies seek to boost revenues and market share by maximizing their local relevance. Through Aggregation, they attempt to deliver economies of scale by creating regional, or sometimes global, operations. And through Arbitrage, they exploit disparities between national or regional markets, often by locating different parts of the supply chain in different places--for instance, call centers in India, factories in China, and retail shops in Western Europe. Ghemawat draws on several examples that illustrate how organizations use and balance these strategies and describes the trade-offs they make as they do so. Because most enterprises should draw from all three As to some extent, the framework can be used to develop a summary scorecard indicating how well the company is globalizing. However, given the tensions among the strategies, it's not enough simply to tick off the corresponding boxes. Strategic choice requires some degree of prioritization--and the framework can help with that as well. While it is possible to make progress on all three strategies, companies usually must focus on one or two when trying to build competitive advantage.

Whether you're in a traditional smokestack industry or a "clean" business like investment banking, your company will increasingly feel the effects of climate change. Even people skeptical about global warming's dangers are recognizing that, simply because so many others are concerned, the phenomenon has wide-ranging implications. Investors already are discounting share prices of companies poorly positioned to compete in a warming world. Many businesses face higher raw material and energy costs as more and more governments enact policies placing a cost on emissions. Consumers are taking into account a company's environmental record when making purchasing decisions. There's also a burgeoning market in greenhouse gas emission allowances (the carbon market), with annual trading in these assets valued at tens of billions of dollars. Companies that manage and mitigate their exposure to the risks associated with climate change while seeking new opportunities for profit will generate a competitive advantage over rivals in a carbon-constrained future. This article offers a systematic approach to mapping and responding to climate change risks. According to Jonathan Lash and Fred Wellington of the World Resources Institute, an environmental think tank, the risks can be divided into six categories: regulatory (policies such as new emissions standards), products and technology (the development and marketing of climate-friendly products and services), litigation (lawsuits alleging environmental harm), reputational (how a company's environmental policies affect its brand), supply chain (potentially higher raw material and energy costs), and physical (such as an increase in the incidence of hurricanes). The authors propose a four-step process for responding to climate change risk: Quantify your company's carbon footprint; identify the risks and opportunities you face; adapt your business in response; and do it better than your competitors.

The global recorded music industry was undergoing a major transition in 2006. Sales had been declining for a decade, and consumers were buying music in new formats and through different distribution channels. CD sales still accounted for the majority of revenues, but sales of music in digital formats (downloads, videos, ringtones) were growing significantly and accounting for approximately 10% of the industry's revenues in 2006. Many considered digital the future of the music business but the format posed both opportunities and challenges. While it had revitalized the singles market, for instance, digital had also facilitated rampant piracy. The music industry was retaliating, launching lawsuits against illegitimate peer-to-peer operators such as groups caught downloading illegally. Whether this would be enough to stop the trend was a matter of much debate. Meanwhile, the industry continued to consolidate. In 2004, Sony Music and BMG, the third- and fifth-largest record firms at the time, merged to form Sony BMG. Surprisingly, in 2006 the European Union's Court of First Instance annulled the merger--which the European Commission had approved two years earlier--after a group of independent music labels complained about the merger's effect on competition. While Sony and BMG were defending the merger in court, EMI Group plc wondered if its desired takeover of Warner Music Group--which it had been pursuing since 2000--would ever happen. If it did, how much business would the new entity have in the rapidly changing environment? All wondered how the industry would evolve.

This case details cement, ready-mix, and concrete giant CEMEX's consideration of a set of strategies designed to grow the Mexican market from the bottom of the economic pyramid: the low-income do-it-yourself homebuilders that characterized an untapped market there. Alfredo de Armas, VP of business development at CEMEX, must consider the needs and limitations of customers with no access to credit and a budget that might allow a purchase of just one bag of cement per week. What would it take to reach that market? Would doing so be profitable?

Fernando del Sol, president of F. S. Inversiones in Chile, had just bought himself a headache as a New Year's present. On December 31, 2001, he purchased a Chilean electricity generation and transmission company called Edelnor that was in danger of becoming insolvent within months. del Sol had six months to restructure the company before it would become completely insolvent, and his headache was compounded by the fact that the process for company reorganization in Chile typically dragged on in the courts, often for two or more years. Any debtor, no matter how small, could hold up the process at any point by issuing written complaints to the court. del Sol needed to figure out whether the company was worth saving, whether it had a business strategy that could succeed if the company's debt was restructured, and whether he could find some means of saving the company in time.

In April 2006, Ocean Park, Hong Kong's only home-grown theme park, launched a syndicated loan to raise HK$4.1 billion for a master plan to revamp the park. The master plan represented the park's strategic responses to the arrival of Hong Kong Disneyland, which had opened the previous year. Faced with a formidable competitor, Ocean Park repositioned itself as a world-class marine theme park. Looks at how Ocean Park positioned itself against an international competitor and how Disneyland's failure to accommodate local culture consolidated Ocean Park's position

Senior executives have long been frustrated by the disconnection between the plans and strategies they devise and the actual behavior of the managers throughout the company. This article approaches the problem from the ground up, recognizing that every time a manager allocates resources, that decision moves the company either into or out of alignment with its announced strategy. A well-known story--Intel's exit from the memory business--illustrates this point. When discussing what businesses Intel should be in, Andy Grove asked Gordon Moore what they would do if Intel were a company that they had just acquired. When Moore answered, "Get out of memory," they decided to do just that. It turned out, though, that Intel's revenues from memory were by this time only 4% of total sales. Intel's lower-level managers had already exited the business. What Intel hadn't done was to shut down the flow of research funding into memory (which was still eating up one-third of all research expenditures); nor had the company announced its exit to the outside world. Because divisional and operating managers--as well as customers and capital markets--have such a powerful impact on the realized strategy of the firm, senior management might consider focusing less on the company's formal strategy and more on the processes by which the company allocates resources. Top managers must know the track record of the people who are making resource allocation proposals; recognize the strategic issues at stake; reach down to operational managers to work across division lines; frame resource questions to reflect the corporate perspective, especially when large sums of money are involved and conditions are highly uncertain; and create a new context that allows top executives to circumvent the regular resource allocation process when necessary.

Regulators, industry groups, consultants, and individual companies have developed elaborate guidelines over the years for assessing and managing risks in a wide range of areas, from commodity prices to natural disasters. Yet they have all but ignored reputational risk, mostly because they aren't sure how to define or measure it. That's a big problem, say the authors. Because so much market value comes from hard-to-assess intangible assets like brand equity and intellectual capital, organizations are especially vulnerable to anything that damages their reputations. Moreover, companies with strong positive reputations attract better talent and are perceived as providing more value in their products and services, which often allows them to charge a premium. Their customers are more loyal and buy broader ranges of products and services. Since the market believes that such companies will deliver sustained earnings and future growth, they have higher price-earnings multiples and market values and lower costs of capital. Most companies, however, do an inadequate job of managing their reputations in general and the risks to their reputations in particular. They tend to focus their energies on handling the threats to their reputations that have already surfaced. That is not risk management; it is crisis management--a reactive approach aimed at limiting the damage. The authors provide a framework for actively managing reputational risk. They introduce three factors (the reputation-reality gap, changing beliefs and expectations, and weak internal coordination) that affect the level of such risks and then explore several ways to sufficiently quantify and control those factors. The process outlined in this article will help managers do a better job of assessing existing and potential threats to their companies' reputations and deciding whether to accept a particular risk or take actions to avoid or mitigate it

Discusses the rise of Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (CC) as the most important radio broadcasting company in the United States. While CC can look back on a glorious past, it faces a multitude of business issues: radio listenership is in decline, media deregulation has come to a halt, and the company's public image is less than favorable.

AMD's launch of the Opteron microprocessor in 2003 has allowed the company to make inroads into the lucrative server segment. A long-time follower to Intel, AMD management felt it was in a position to lead the microprocessor industry in new directions. However, in 2006 it was not clear whether Opteron's success in the server segment would translate into success in other microprocessor segments, notably corporate desktop and laptop, and whether the initial success in servers could be sustained in the future. Intel's imminent new product and pricing plans, as well as its existing brand power, could greatly hamper AMD's growth and thwart its new initiatives--which included opening up its architecture for end users to customize and recast its brand identity. Also examines how a company tries to gain competitive advantage through an approach to innovation that emphasizes customer centricity.

The fall of 2004 brought exciting news to Love Field, the Texas headquarters of Southwest Airlines. Delta Airlines, one of Southwest's main competitors, had announced that it would dramatically decrease service from the nearby Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW) airport, cutting the number of daily flights from 250 to a mere 21. Gary Kelly, Southwest's newly minted CEO, thought about what appeared to be a golden opportunity. How could Southwest best capitalize on Delta's withdrawal? As Kelly saw it, Southwest had several options to pursue the new business opportunities. A first was to service the canceled Delta routes from Love Field. A second possibility was to encourage members of Congress to repeal the Wright Amendment, which limited Southwest's flight offerings from Love Field. An alternative to fighting for the repeal of the Wright Amendment was for Southwest to lease the 18 gates that Delta had left at DFW. Kelly carefully considered his options. Was now the time to call his lobbyist?

Netflix, the online movie rental subscription service, did not contend with significant direct competition in online DVD rentals for six years until Blockbuster, the movie rental chain giant, entered the market in 2004 and began a price war. After that point, CEO Reed Hastings's company scrambled to maintain share and remain profitable. Investors balked at the impact direct competition had on margins and the unlikely sustainability of price cutting against a behemoth competitor. When Amazon began signaling an intention to enter the market in 2005, Hastings had at least two major decisions to make: whether to drop prices to match Blockbuster, and whether to stay the course with regard to his historic strategy of "business-as-usual" when a competitor emerged on the scene.

Introduces students to the study of corporate strategy, while providing an overview framework for understanding international strategy. Focuses on questions of scope and ownership. Examines both horizontal and vertical integration. Underscores the point that economies of scope, or the existence of relationship-specific investments, are insufficient to explain effective corporate strategy unless there are important obstacles to contractual solutions.

Describes the challenges of using the Balanced Scorecard to implement a triple-bottom-line strategy for delivering excellent economic, environmental, and social performance. The owners and senior executive team of Amanco, a producer of plastic pipe and complete water treatment systems, want strong financial returns but are also deeply committed to improving the environment and making a difference in people's lives. Robert Salas, CEO, wants a management system that communicates and motivates Amanco's three high-level goals. Initially, he creates a simple scorecard of measures, but he soon migrates to developing a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard that places economic, environmental, and social objectives as the highest-level objectives. He faces the challenges of cascading the corporate Balanced Scorecard to operating units throughout Latin America and how to develop better measures of social and environmental impact. Salas must also address whether he can sustain Amanco's balanced strategy while entering the Brazilian market, where he faces an entrenched and much larger competitor.