個案總覽

The firm has to choose between an established brand, Tanishq, and a new skunkworks brand, GoldPlus, to go after the Indian plain gold jewelry market: Tanishq, initially targeted at a western customer, has undergone strategic retooling and has currently been repositioned to serve the "traditional yet modern" Indian woman. The brand still carries some baggage from its past. GoldPlus, on the other hand, is a new brand that is positioned to serve the plain gold wedding jewelry market. A variety of strategic, economic, organizational and brand investment reasons make the decision an important one.

Lulu.com is an e-commerce company that distributes content for book authors, video producers, calendar designers and other intellectual property creators that can be captured in digital formats. At this time, Lulu.com has developed a successful niche market in print-on-demand books within the United States. However, the vision of its founder is much larger. The president is faced with the strategic dilemma of whether to expand Lulu.com's product offerings or to focus on internal operations for the next six to 12 months.

Since the company launched its software product in August 2003, the word "Skype" has become synonymous with free calls over the Internet. Skype developed software that allowed people around the world to talk to each other for free. Prior to the company's $2.6 billion acquisition by eBay, announced in September 2005 and finalized in October 2005, the Skype network had grown to over 55 million registered users. Within two years of the Skype beta product launch, the software had been downloaded over 205 million times and the user growth rate had climbed to an impressive 130,000 new users per day. Skype's registered user growth rate exceeded that of KaZaa, Hotmail, and ICQ over the initial 24-month period after each company launched its product. From Skype's inception until the company's acquisition by eBay, the company had secured over $20 million in venture capital funding, while operating with just over 200 employees. eBay announced its intention to acquire Skype in a cash and stock transaction totaling $2.6 billion on September 12, 2005. The acquisition was completed on October 14, 2005. Within six months of the announcement, Skype went on to sign co-marketing deals and partnerships with Motorola, Intel, Kodak, Netgear, Panasonic, Philips, and Warner Music Group. Skype continued to break new records and achieve significant growth: the total number of registered users climbed to over 100 million in April 2006 and the number of simultaneous Skype users online was propelled to 6 million. By mid-2006, it was believed that Skype carried an estimated 7% of all global international voice traffic. Looking forward, the Skype team had a number of challenges with which to contend. How would the eBay acquisition impact Skype's distinctive culture? How would Skype compete with emerging services such as GoogleTalk and incumbents such as AT&T? What strategy should Skype pursue to sustain its growth?

Ocean Park was the only amusement park in Hong Kong until 2005, when Hong Kong Disney exploded onto the scene. Outlines Ocean Park's history and its response to Disney's encroachment into its market. Ocean Park acted swiftly and decisively to capitalize on the excitement generated by Disney, thus turning what could have been a threat into an opportunity. In terms of business-level strategy, the park moved to accentuate the differences with Disney rather than compete head-on. As the CEO stated, "We have no intention of trying to out-Disney Disney." The park focused on its aquarium, animals, and thrill-rides as opposed to the "fantasy" and animated characters that make up Disney's core competence. By following this strategy, the park was able to capture a large portion of Disney visitors that came from Mainland China. Also discusses a recent restructuring, human resources management issues, and other challenges that the park faced in 2006.

Presents a simple model to demonstrate that bundling can act as a barrier to entry.

As part of the privatization in Eastern Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Dow Chemical made a major investment in the Halle-Leipzig region, one of the largest chemical industry sites in Europe. The executive in charge of Dow's operations in the region, Bart Groot, increasingly felt that the long-term success of Dow's investment depended on a more dynamic development of the entire regional economy. On his own initiative, in 1997, Groot launched a private sector-driven effort to enhance the economic development in central Germany, the region located around Halle-Leipzig. Bundling together 50 other firms and four cities, he founded a regional marketing effort to brand or market the area, but then shifted focus to building clusters. Examines the motivations of companies and company executives to get involved in regional competitiveness efforts and provides a platform to discuss the factors that drive the success of cluster-building efforts through cooperation across firms in a disadvantaged area.

This case looks at the adoption by the city of Coventry, UK, of a 1998 law meant to enhance collaboration among public agencies to reduce crime rates. Coventry created a Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership and hired staff to coordinate activities among the police, local government, public housing, nonprofits, and the business community (plus later, fire and the national health service). The law gave communities little guidance on what anti-crime activities to pursue, or how to coordinate them, yet it proposed to hold partnerships responsible for crime rates. This case traces Coventry's efforts to find mechanisms for implementation, as well as the spillover effects of the law onto other areas of potential cooperation among government bodies. Students will gain an understanding of the challenges at the local level of implementing well-intentioned, but poorly specified, national legal mandates. They will see how an individual leader can make a difference in setting common goals and holding agencies accountability. They will also learn about some innovative collaborative approaches to crime prevention. This case can be used in courses about public management, about leadership, or about policing. HKS Case Number 1831.0

The September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States precipitated US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, increasing demand for certain military assets. Domestically, the attacks crippled an already struggling airline industry, hurting domestic aircraft orders at Boeing Company, the only US producer of large-frame commercial aircraft. Boeing's supporters on Capitol Hill proposed procuring converted Boeing 767 airframes to replace the Air Force's aging fleet of aerial refueling tanker aircraft. Yet, the Air Force could not fit a purchase of the tanker aircraft into its budget without sacrificing other key programs. Leasing the aircraft through a special purpose entity was suggested as a solution. Critics questioned the cost, need, and structure of the tanker deal and pushed Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to reject the agreement. HKS Case Number 1845.0

In May 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved an agreement allowing the Air Force to lease 100 converted Boeing 767 aircraft as aerial refueling tankers. The deal's critics, most prominently Senator John McCain, argued that no the aircraft were not needed, that the lease was a thinly disguised purchase designed to circumvent the budget process, and that the agreement was a government handout to the Boeing Company. As the deal neared Congressional approval, evidence surfaced of illegal conduct involving an Air Force acquisition executive and Boeing, casting uncertainty over the agreement's prospects. This case discusses the financial and accounting issues of leasing rather than purchasing the aircraft, the translation of commercial business practices to government, and the process and purpose of government budgeting. This case is best used in concert with "The Boeing Tanker Lease Deal (A)." HKS Case Number 1846.0

In April 2006, SAP AG CEO Henning Kagermann faces several critical decisions. Over the past two years, Kagermann has put in place a bold growth strategy for the company--one that aims to transform the business software applications giant into a pioneer in the emerging Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) technology field, a leader in the small- to mid-size enterprise market segment, and a relevant solution provider for a broader population of business software users. Concurrent with the formulation of this strategy, Kagermann has instituted many internal changes and initiatives designed to make SAP into a more agile, efficient, and globally aligned organization. In several cases, these changes to organizational design, leadership, management processes, culture, and values directly challenge what many consider to be the foundational principles of this highly traditional, 30+year-old German company. Kagermann's plan and changes are not met with universal enthusiasm by employees or customers. Approximately one year after his public announcement of SAP's new growth strategy, Kagermann must now assess the situation and decide how to proceed. He has made repeated statements to the market that by 2010 SAP would be a company transformed, and even publicized specific quantitative goals that would substantiate such a transformation. However, in the meantime, a new development has occurred. Resurgent demand for SAP's legacy software applications is driving record revenues and profits and pushing SAP's stock price to new heights. As a result, Kagermann must answer several key questions. How can he determine whether the current pace of execution regarding the new growth strategy is right? How should he sequence the rollout of internal changes still required to support the corporate transformation? And given the industry environment and the resurgent growth of SAP's legacy business, how should he balance resource allocation between short- and long-term opportunities?

In 2006, a nascent market for music-enabled mobile phones was emerging to challenge Apple Computer's dominant position in the digital music industry. Through its iPod line of portable digital music devices and its iTunes Music Store, Apple controlled more than half of the market for both music player hardware and online music sales. But the evolving ability to merge those devices with mobile phones, and to deliver music to mobile handsets (via streaming, side-loading content from a PC or downloading it wirelessly over the air), created a potentially market-changing opportunity for players in several industries. Examines the key players, including Apple; the major wireless service carriers, such as Cingular, Sprint-Nextel, and Verizon Wireless; technology and service vendors, such as RealNetworks and Microsoft; and mobile virtual network operators, such as Virgin Mobile. Covers the origins of the mobile music business, projections on its potential size, its technological building blocks (such as file formats, digital rights management systems, wireless network infrastructure, and handset capacity), and the key dynamics--music delivery method, pricing, mobile-PC integration--that characterize mobile music business models.

In the summer of 2005, LinkedIn, a two-year-old start-up, was choosing between two options to monetize its 5 million business people network. Members could contact each other through trusted intermediaries on the network to offer or seek jobs, consulting engagements, expertise, and financing. The company had outpaced its competitors by building the most populous online business network, but it had little revenue to show its investors. The first revenue option entailed keeping the existing features unchanged and rolling out a bundle of eight new services for a monthly fee of $15. These services would be targeted at network members who had forged many connections, logged in frequently, and viewed the profiles of many other members. The second proposal involved changing a basic design feature of LinkedIn by allowing members to contact each other without intermediaries for a fee. Fewer members would avail themselves of this feature, but those who did would be willing to pay as much as $5-$15 per message. This option ran a substantial risk of alienating members and would prompt some to abandon LinkedIn.

An abstract is not available for this product.

In December 2003 the management team at Saurer Twisting Systems (STS) was facing increasing competition in the critically important Chinese market. Local competitors in China were undercutting the price of Saurer's CompactTwister, which was manufactured in China, by over 50%. The company was considering the introduction of a lower cost machine targeted at Chinese and Asian customers, who would not buy its high cost machine. Margins were likely to be significantly lower on the new machine, and the new machine might cannibalize their high-end product. If the STS team did decide to introduce the new machine, it would have to make some difficult decisions about positioning, pricing, naming the product, and sales strategy. It was also not clear how their Chinese competitors would respond to the proposed new product.

An abstract is not available for this product.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Many manufacturers already have established product development activities in different countries around the world. As a rule, the current approach includes colocation of cross-functional teams to foster close collaboration among engineering, marketing, manufacturing, and supply-chain functions. The results to date--better product designs, faster time to market, and lower-cost production--have been satisfactory. However, growth and innovation can now be much more effective if manufacturers tie their decentralized development organizations into a cohesive, unified global product development (GPD) operation. In this article, the authors introduce new empirical frameworks to guide managers toward such practices. Citing exemplars such as Hewlett-Packard, Eastman Kodak, Hyundai Motors, Haier, Alcatel, and Cummins, the authors explain why GPD has come of age and demonstrate a three-stage approach that puts product development in the context of a company's relationships with outside partners. The article draws from extensive interviews with engineering managers at more than 100 companies in 15 countries in North America, Europe, and Asia. Additional data are from a recently completed study on GPD that PTC has conducted with BusinessWeek Research Services, interviewing and surveying more than 1,100 engineering managers worldwide.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Dozens of markets of all types are in the early stages of a revolution as the Internet and related technologies vastly expand the variety of products that can be produced, promoted, and purchased. Although this revolution is based on a simple set of economic and technological drivers, the authors argue that its implications are far-reaching for managers, consumers, and the economy as a whole. Looks at what has been dubbed the "Long Tail" phenomenon, examining how customers derive value from an important characteristic of Internet markets: the ability of online merchants to help consumers locate, evaluate, and purchase a far wider range of products than they can typically buy via the traditional brick-and-mortar channels. The article examines the Long Tail from both the supply side and the demand side and identifies several key drivers. On the supply side, the authors point out how e-tailers' expanded, centralized warehousing allows for more offerings, thus making it possible for them to cater to more varied tastes. On the demand side, tools such as search engines, recommender software, and sampling tools are allowing customers to find products outside of their geographic area. The authors also look toward the future to discuss second order amplified effects of Long Tail, including the growth of markets serving smaller niches.

Faced with exponential growth and a competitive telecom environment, Bharti looks for ways to better manage its capital expenditures for telecommunications and information technology. One option is to hand over management of its telecom and IT networks to its vendors. Explores the pros and cons of such an outsourcing arrangement for a company in an industry where technological superiority is considered an essential element in competitive strategy.

Examines Boeing's new strategy of offering services to regain market dominance and help its struggling airline customers improve efficiency and profitability.

Founded in April 2004 by a former sports agent and a famed blackjack player from MIT, PROTRADE offered an Internet-based stock market for athletes. The start-up company utilized sophisticated algorithms--which were substantively derived from a book and its protagonist--to compute the value of athletes' performance. PROTRADE was targeting primarily two markets: the online sports content market and the fantasy sports market. Tracks the company's progress from idea to launch and focuses on its strategic alternatives for generating revenues.