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Describes how JCDecaux, the second largest global outdoor advertising company, became the world leader in street furniture advertising in a fast consolidating business environment. Also explains why, in the late 1990s, JCDecaux diversified its activities into billboards and transport outdoor advertising in reaction to competitor attacks. Places students in the position of Jean-Francois Decaux and his brother Jean-Charles Decaux, the sons of the founder and JC Decaux's co-CEOs who, in late 2004, explore ways to continue the success of the 73% family-owned business.

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In July 2001, eight months after the release of Intel's Pentium 4 processor, sales of the new product had not met expectations. This was due in large part to significant downturns in world markets following record microprocessor demand in 1999 and early 2000. At the same time, Pentium III processor sales had not declined as rapidly as expected; in fact, production of desktop Pentium III processors was accelerated in the second quarter of 2001 to meet demand. Intel was faced with critical decisions about how to turn the tide to make the continuing transition to the Pentium 4 processor a success.

In 1990, President Alberto Fujimori swept to power in Peru on a wave of public enthusiasm for his promised reforms. Indeed, over the next five years Fujimori accomplished something of an economic turnaround miracle. He also vanquished a homegrown terrorist movement and proved a willing partner in the war against drugs. The international community, including the US, admired and supported him. By Fujimori's side stood a shadowy figure, Vladimiro Montesinos. Never appointed to any official office, Montesinos nonetheless became the virtual head of the intelligence service, and he exercised unique influence over Fujimori. His reputation was as Mr. Fix-it: he could get anything done. Both Fujimori and the US (he had a relationship with the CIA) benefited from his services. With Montesinos' behind-the-scenes assistance, Fujimori's government became ever more authoritarian, extending executive influence over the judiciary, the military and the legislature. But in September 2000, the reason for Montesinos' remarkable effectiveness was dramatically exposed with the television airing of a videotape in which he bribed an opposition congressman. As the story unfolded, Montesinos was revealed as the mastermind of a sophisticated network of corruption which reached into most sectors of society: the legislature, judiciary, media, military and industry. Working with the primary evidence of the videotapes, this case paints a rarely glimpsed picture of corruption in action. It describes Montesinos' rise to power, and the mechanics and protocols of bribery and fraud. HKS Case Number 1722.0

In industries characterized by very large capital investment and fast-moving technological dynamics, cyclical behavior emerges as the setting in which firms have to strategize. The barriers to entry in such settings are extremely high, but they can be breached--as shown in the flat panel display industry, which has seen successive entries by Japanese, then Korean, then Taiwanese firms during the past decade. In its short history, this industry has already exhibited four cycles (the "crystal cycle") and a fifth downturn is now looming. However, the striking feature of the industry is that firms have successfully entered only during industry downturns, engaging in counter-cyclical investment; not a single firm has entered during an upturn. This provides the starting point for a strategic analysis of this fast-growing industry, conducted through a dynamic framework that complements the "competitive forces" framework introduced in a static setting by Michael Porter over two decades ago. It is critical to draw on both dynamic and static frameworks to comprehend fully the strategic options open to firms.

Analyzes the multiple innovation trajectories and changes in competitive strategy in Singapore as it evolves from an industrial economy to a knowledge-based one. In addition to the existing national innovation system in the well-heeled industrial manufacturing sectors such as electronics, chemicals, and precision engineering, a new mode of innovation has been evolving in the research-intensive biomedical industries cluster, which emphasizes a special role for the academic sector in the innovation milieu. Biotech investments at the moment appear to pose high risks due to the rather amorphous and unclear market signals coming out of the industry. However, as technologies become more speculative, governments need to spread their bets more widely to encourage more possibilities. The challenges and opportunities Singapore faces are relevant to other states seeking to adopt new policies for gaining competitiveness and national comparative advantage in an era of globalization.

In August 2002, the FDA had notified the executive steering committee for Abbott Laboratories' new rheumatoid arthritis drug to expect approval significantly ahead of schedule. If everything went smoothly, the compound D2E7 (brand name HUMIRA) would be approved for sale in the United States before the end of the year. This gave Abbott and its HUMIRA brand team no more than four months to complete preparations for the product's launch. Abbott acquired D2E7, a biologic disease-modifying antirheumatic drug, when the company purchased Knoll Pharmaceuticals in March 2001. With a significant head start and combined 2002 sales anticipated to exceed $2 billion, Enbrel (from Immunex, later acquired by Amgen) and Remicade (from the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Centocor) would provide HUMIRA with tough competition. Yet, with the rheumatoid arthritis market expected to grow to over $7.5 billion by 2008, there was still a significant opportunity for Abbott. The executive steering committee knew that the HUMIRA team would have to orchestrate every aspect of the product's global launch carefully to quickly and effectively establish HUMIRA in this challenging market.

As globalization changes the basis of competition, sourcing is moving from the periphery of corporate functions to the core. Always important in terms of costs, sourcing is becoming a strategic opportunity. But few companies are ready for this shift. Outsourcing has grown so sophisticated that even critical functions like engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can--and often should--be moved outside. And that, in turn, is changing the way companies think about their organizations, their value chains, and their competitive positions. Already, a handful of vanguard companies are transforming what used to be purely internal corporate functions into entirely new industries. Companies like UPS, Solectron, and Hewitt have created new business models by concentrating scale and skill within a single function. As these and other function-based companies grow, so does the potential value of outsourcing to all companies. Migrating from a vertically integrated company to a specialized provider of a single function is not a winning strategy for everyone. But all companies need to reassess rigorously each of their functions as possible outsourcing candidates. This article presents a simple three-step process to identify which functions your company needs to own and protect, which can be best performed by what kinds of partners, and which could be turned into new business opportunities. The result of such an analysis is a comprehensive capabilities-sourcing strategy. As a detailed examination of 7-Eleven's experience shows, the success of the strategy often hinges on the creativity with which partnerships are organized and managed. But only by first taking a broad, strategic view of capabilities sourcing can your company gain the greatest benefit from all of its sourcing choices.

In 1996, Gillette acquired Duracell for $7.3 billion in stock. The purchase was met with optimism not only by Gillette's senior management and its highly visible director, Warren Buffet, but also Wall Street analysts. Highlights the numerous challenges that Gillette has encountered since the acquisition. Despite the initial enthusiasm, Duracell has proven to be a drain on Gillette's earnings and has cost Michael Hawley, James Kilt's predecessor as CEO, his job after only 18 months in the position--in large part for his inability to turn around the financial hemorrhaging at the Duracell division. The key strategy questions revolve around what can be done to turn around the battery business to help it achieve the potential for Gillette that everyone had assumed it possessed.

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Jonathan King and Jim Stott, the founders of Stonewall Kitchen, started out in 1992 with a simple business selling jams and jellies at local farmers' markets. By 2004, they had grown the company into a $25 million organization with 250 employees. They expanded their range of services to include high-end specialty food manufacturing and wholesaling, as well as retailing through free-standing stores and catalogs. King, who serves as president and CEO, set an aggressive growth goal: to quadruple the business to $100 million within the next five years. Challenges students to consider product/market issues as well as organizational and cultural implications. Raises questions about the impact on the business and the founders of taking on new partners.

At the dawn of the 20th anniversary of its involvement in China's passenger car industry, Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW) found itself caught in changed external and internal environments, with factors critical to its past success gone or quickly diminishing. Although taking first-mover risks has rewarded Volkswagen with a dominant market position and high profitability, such dominance and profitability might not be sustained in the long run as the competitive landscape transforms. The test is whether SVW can quickly adapt to the new environment and establish a new set of competitive advantages that positions it favorably against its rivals.

A study involving over 200 senior managers demonstrates that overall firm performance is strongly influenced by how well a firm's business strategy is matched to its organizational structure and the behavioral norms of its employees. Identifies a taxonomy comprised of four different combinations of structure/behavior types: Management Dominant, Customer-Centric Innovators, Customer-Centric Cost Controllers, and Middle Ground. These alternative structure/behavior types are then matched with specific business strategies (i.e., Prospectors, Analyzers, Low-Cost Defenders, Differentiated Defenders) to identify which combination(s) of structures and behaviors best serve to facilitate the process of implementing a specific strategy.

Abstract to follow.

The president of Loblaw Companies Ltd. must decide what to do in response to the rumored introduction of Wal-Mart's SuperCenters (combining grocery and nonfood items) in Canada. The potential launch of SuperCenters in Canada was seen by observers as a threat to Loblaw, the market leader in Canadian grocery. Wal-Mart is a vigorous competitor, and the Every Day Low Prices strategy of Wal-Mart's SuperCenters could wean away traffic from Loblaw's various banners.

Since its inception in 1984, Lenovo Group Ltd. had grown from a company engaged primarily in the distribution of imported computers to being the largest IT corporation in the People 's Republic of China. Although Lenovo was able to hold onto its market leadership position, competitive pressure from Dell, IBM, Toshiba, and HP was increasing, with the company taking large hits, mainly at the hands of Dell. Engaging in a series of price wars to retain the low end of the consumer segment, Lenovo was also struggling to maintain its stronghold in corporate sales to Chinese government ministries and schools. With the PC market in China maturing rapidly, Lenovo's main challenge was to develop a business model that would not only combat Dell's direct selling model but would also take advantage of the group's traditional strengths. With a view to meeting the group's projected target of becoming a Fortune 500 company by 2010, Lenovo was looking toward tapping international markets as well as exploring product diversification strategies in the local market. Lenovo's predicament highlights the growing pains many Chinese companies faced in their efforts to become global players while defending their domestic market share from foreign rivals.

This case presents the first of two workshop descriptions and templates for the Sustainable Marketing Leadership (SML) executive program. It enables a top management team to focus on the first two steps in the four-step SML process: strategic visioning and integrated planning.

This case presents the second of two workshop descriptions and templates for the Sustainable Marketing Leadership (SML) executive program. It enables a top management team to approach the last two steps in the four-step SML process: managing performance and marketing controllership.

Introduces students to the study of corporate strategy. Focuses on questions of scope and ownership. Examines both horizontal and vertical integration. Underscores the point that economies of scope, or the existence of relationship-specific investments, are insufficient to explain effective corporate strategy unless there are important obstacles to contractual solutions.

Discusses how strategy-makers should take organizational inertia into account in strategy formulation. Looks at two classes of inertia: cognitive inertia and action inertia. A rewritten version of an earlier case.