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Hewlett-Packard's proposed $24 billion acquisition of rival Compaq marked the largest merger in the history of the computer industry. The merger was Hewlett-Packard's response to sweeping changes impacting the technology industry. The severity of the stock market's reaction to the deal's announcement, coupled with a "slim but sufficient" 51.4% shareholder approval margin, left many wondering whether the deal was beneficial for shareholders.

In 2006, all major U.S. dialysis providers were facing a daunting set of challenges. Having survived a period of intense consolidation and ever-diminishing operating margins, they were now struggling to understand what lay ahead. With more than 80% of their patients covered by Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program and with Medicare reimbursement barely covering costs, these providers increasingly relied on additional reimbursement for certain injectable drugs, as well as on the small percentage of patients with private insurance, for financial viability. However, both of these sources of profitability were coming under pressure. Ongoing demonstration projects by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) were opening the way for dramatic changes in the reimbursement landscape, and private payers were becoming more restrictive regarding what they would pay for and how much they would pay. These actions by CMS and private payers were sure to have far-reaching implications for patients, providers, and the ESRD program as a whole. Change was imminent and the uncertainty facing providers was creating significant challenges.

Set in Brazil during the period of telecommunication's privatization, CEO Manoel Amorim must define a sustainable strategy and build capabilities in his organization.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. By one informed estimate from the late 1990s, three-quarters of the Fortune 100's total market capitalization was represented by intangible assets, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks. In this environment, cautions the author, intellectual property management cannot be left to technology managers or corporate legal staff alone--it must be a matter of concern for functional and business-unit leaders as well as a corporation's most senior officers. To realize the full value of their companies' intellectual property, top executives must seek answers to the following questions: How can the company use intellectual property rights to gain and sustain competitive advantage? How do intellectual property rights affect the industry's structure? What options do intellectual property rights offer vis-a-vis competitors? How can intellectual property rights grant incumbency advantage and establish barriers to entry? How can intellectual property rights help the company gain vertical power along the value chain? What organizational design accommodates an intellectual property strategy most effectively? The author explores each question, drawing on such company examples as Nokia, Motorola, Novo Nordisk, and Leo Pharma, in the process helping lead intellectual property rights out of their shadowy existence in patent and legal departments.

The winners in business play hardball, and they don't apologize for it. They single-mindedly pursue competitive advantage and the benefits it offers: a leading market share, great margins, and rapid growth. They pick their shots, seek out competitive encounters, set the pace of innovation, and test the edges of the possible. Softball players, by contrast, may look good, but they aren't intensely serious about winning. They don't accept that you must sometimes hurt your rivals, and risk being hurt, to get what you want. Softball players don't play to win; they play to play. That approach may reflect the recent focus of management science, which itself has gone soft. Indeed, the discourse around soft issues such as leadership, corporate culture, knowledge management, talent management, and employee empowerment has encouraged the making of softball players. Although there are countless ways to play hardball, a handful of classic strategies are effective in generating competitive advantage. Best employed in bursts of ruthless intensity, these strategies are: Devastate rivals' profit sanctuaries, plagiarize with pride, deceive the competition, unleash massive and overwhelming force, and raise competitors' costs. But hardball isn't only about the moves you make. It's also about the attitude you bring to them. The playbook won't do you any good if you feel squeamish about using it.

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges, and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives with the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is not easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand.

In mid-2003, CEO Chris McCormick felt L.L. Bean was in a good position to begin to grow again. For nearly 90 years, the company sold clothing and gear for outdoor enthusiasts through its catalogs and a single retail store in Freeport, Maine. In the three decades prior to 1996, sales growth averaged nearly 20% per year. In 1995, sales hit $1 billion, but stagnated for the next six years--growing at less than 2% annually. The company responded with a structural reorganization and investment in its Internet sales channel. In 2002 and early 2003, McCormick led an effort to reduce overhead and improve its internal systems, including the elimination of 1,000 jobs--which reduced year-round headcount by nearly 15%. After these initiatives, the company remained profitable and enjoyed a strong balance sheet, but sales growth remained near zero. Most significantly, between 2000 and 2002, L.L. Bean opened three retail stores in shopping malls outside Maine. McCormick viewed these three stores as the first of a chain of stores that would form a new selling channel and enable L.L. Bean to grow. Early results from the three new stores were below expectations; L.L. Bean spent significant time examining its retail store activities in an attempt to learn where it could improve. As the company began to apply those lessons in the stores, performance picked up, fueling McCormick's optimism that L.L. Bean could grow with retail stores.

The case describes the history of the executive search firm Egon Zehnder International (EZI) from its inception through 2000. Internal and environmental changes lead EZI leaders to question whether the firm might be at an inflection point in its history. The EZI executive committee contemplates whether and how to engage in a strategy review process.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Describes the transformation of a company's corporate-level strategy. Begins by laying out the strategy that brought the Newell Co. stunning success for nearly three decades. The highly integrated, internally consistent strategy was tailored for manufacturing and selling a particular genre of products to a particular kind of customer. In the mid-1990s, Newell encountered some shifts in its competitive environment and a subtle erosion in profits. In 1999, the $3.5 billion company paid a 49% premium to acquire the $2.5 billion Rubbermaid Co., in part for its product development process and strong consumer brands. After the acquisition, the profits of the combined enterprise deteriorated at an accelerated rate and the CEO was replaced. In less than a year, a fundamentally new strategy was announced, profits improved, and both Wall Street and major retailers were encouraged. Some setbacks followed, leading to reduced earnings and revised expectations. Exposes students to the pains and struggles of changing a deeply ingrained and long-lived strategy. Also forces them to confront the question of whether the new strategy is the right one and the markers one should seek to prove the case.

Describes the history and challenges of the economically distressed inner city areas of St. Louis, a major U.S. metropolitan area. Profiles regional and inner city economics and describes a new effort by community leaders to develop and implement a strategy to revitalize the inner city economy.

Examines RealNetwork's (Real's) strategy for the rapidly emerging online music market. In contrast to rivals who sell individual copies of songs, Real offers online music on a subscription basis. For a $10 monthly fee, subscribers to Real's Rhapsody service have unlimited rights to stream all songs from a 600,000-title library to any PC and can burn CD copies of these songs for 79 cents apiece. Real faces significant marketing challenges in persuading consumers to "rent" rather than own their music. The company must decide which channel partners--broadband access providers, consumer electronics retailers, PC manufacturers, or portals--are best equipped to help sell its services. Finally, Real must determine how to differentiate its services from those soon to be offered by a glut of new competitors poised to enter the online music market, including Wal-Mart, Viacom, Sony, Dell, and Microsoft.

Examines the challenges and opportunities for strategic integration at LVMH, global, luxury brands company based in Paris. The company is composed of established and newly developed brands of luxury goods such as apparel, leather goods, watches, wines and liquors, and fragrances, which it manufactures and sells in countries around the world. Includes in-depth interviews with key LVMH executives.

The president of Wheels Group and the founder and major shareholder of the company are evaluating alternatives for doubling the company's revenues over the next five years. They must decide between two competing growth strategies: an asset-based growth strategy and a nonasset-based growth one. Complicating the decision is the fact that approximately 75% of the company's revenues are currently derived from nonasset-based activity. Students can explore issues associated with developing, evaluating, and implementing business strategy within the third-party logistics industry.

As the leading content delivery network, Akamai helps Internet companies deliver Web site content to end users with fewer delays and lower costs. Describes the strategic management challenges facing Akamai in early 2004. The company is poised to offer its next generation of services for enterprise customers, which will allow them to run Internet-enabled applications ("Web services")--on demand, with minimal capital investment--from Akamai's network of 15,000 servers located in ISP facilities at the Internet's "edge"--close to end users. Many large enterprise software companies have developed proprietary platforms for creating and managing Web services. Akamai must decide which of these software companies would be attractive partners and whether it can and should remain uncommitted to a platform as it helps customers deploy Web services. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

In March 2002, Singapore Airlines (SIA), recognized internationally for quality, profitability, and management, was facing difficult operating conditions. Dr. Cheong Choong Kong, deputy chairman and CEO, considered how he and his management committee would respond to the forces of globalization, regulatory adjustment, and the impact of terrorist attacks in America on the airline and the industry. Their challenge: to position the airline for continued growth in a globalizing industry while maintaining the airline's loss-free record. The airline's continuing challenges would stretch SIA's people far beyond the demands of its previous history. Was the company's strategy right for the more turbulent times ahead, and was the organization durable and flexible enough to ensure its success?

It's tough to get consumers to adopt innovations--and it's getting tougher all the time. That's because more and more markets are taking on the characteristics of networks. The interconnections among today's companies are so plentiful that often a new product's adoption by one player depends on its systematic adoption by other players. The traditional levers executives use to launch products--such as targeting unique customer segments or developing compelling value propositions--don't work as well in this new environment. Instead, innovators must orchestrate a change of behaviors across the market so that a large number of players adopts their offerings and believes they are better off for having done so. In this article, Monitor Group's Bhaskar Chakravorti outlines a four-part framework for doing just that: Reason back from a target endgame, implementing only those strategies that maximize the chances of getting to goal; complement power players, positioning the innovation as an enhancement to products or services; offer coordinated switching incentives to three core groups: the players that add to the innovation's benefits, the players that act as channels to adopters, and the adopters themselves; and preserve flexibility in case the initial strategy fails.

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that a bigger factor of their success is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems vividly highlights certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role? Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator?

Over three decades, Oscar de la Renta (ODLR) had established itself as one of the premier luxury brands in America. Its mainstay business had always been producing and marketing high-priced, couture/ready-to-wear luxury goods. Now, in September 2003, it faced a series of critical strategic decisions. First, how should it grow the business while preserving its luxury brand? Should it diversify into the moderately priced segment of apparel and unserved customer segments like the Hispanic market, where it had a strong brand appeal but negligible presence? Second, as a family-owned company, how could it effectively compete against increasingly larger, publicly financed, luxury goods conglomerates? And, how might de la Renta, the company's founder and chief designer since inception and now 71 years old, effectively prepare the company for the future? Describes the company's business and highlights these key tensions: expanding the scope of a luxury brand, pursuing licensing or organic growth strategies, and competing against publicly owned conglomerates. Includes color exhibits.