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Provides an overview of antitrust law as it relates to competitive strategy. Discusses the problem of managing antitrust risk and provides a guide to business actions that pose antitrust risk.

In the spring of 2000, planners at Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), the regional public transit agency serving the Dallas metropolitan area, had to decide whether to cancel or modify a poorly performing bus route serving the suburban cities of Garland and Rowlett. The route was typical of many that DART operated in the suburbs, so the decision raised basic questions about DART's strategy as a public agency, and particularly whether it could design suburban services that were useful and cost-effective enough to maintain the political and financial support it received from Dallas' suburbs. The fact that the route is performing so poorly-losing $27 per passenger, for example-encourages students to think about more radical service and political strategies for the agency. HKS Case Number 1696.0

The companies that are most successful at creating long-term shareholder value tend to be those that systematically make acquisitions through good times and bad.

Updates the continuing developments in the disposable diaper industry from 1994 to 2003. Investigates new product innovation, global expansion, and emerging competitors in the highly competitive diaper industry, including the rise of training pants and ventures into Europe. Tracks the improvements of Kimberly-Clark's Huggies, Procter & Gamble's Pampers and Luvs, as well as the market share battles that result.

In 1992, Toys "R" Us, the pioneer of the "category killer" retail format, faced significant competitive threats from mass discounters and warehouse clubs and was losing market share. This case explores the dynamic sustainability of Toys "R" Us's retailing model, its competitive options, and the benefits and costs of leveraging market power.

Supplements the (A) case.

Le Centre Suisse d'Electronique et de Microtechnique S.A. (CSEM)--the Swiss Center for Electronics and Microtechnology--was a major nonprofit research institution located in Neuchatel, Switzerland, with roots in the Swiss watch industry. CSEM maintained close links to several Swiss universities, and over time, the center's activities expanded to include basic and applied research, contract production, and technology consulting. By the late 1990s, CSEM began spinning off promising commercial ventures and incorporating them as for-profit companies. In 2001, CEO Thomas Hinderling wondered whether any adjustments in CSEM's strategy were necessary or desirable going forward.

Provides a broad overview of the numerous internal and external forces that were driving change in the global pharmaceutical industry in 2003. These forces--including downward price pressures, political and social pressures, increased development costs, new technologies, new and different competitors, consolidation, and threats to its basic business models--were changing the way drugs were discovered, developed, manufactured, tested, regulated, marketed, sold, and purchased. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

This case is one of two cases that describe the situation and poor performance at McDonald's Corp. in early 2003. This exercise instructs students to employ an unstructured brainstorming process to develop strategic options for McDonald's.

Describes the evolution of AFP Provida, one of the early entrants into the Chilean pension fund system established in 1981. By 1999, AFP Provida was not only the largest pension fund administrator in Chile, but also the largest in Latin America in terms of number of affiliates and the second largest in terms of assets under management, after the Brazilian company Previ. Provida was also the most international firm in the industry. At the turn of the 20th century, Provida's senior management was considering how to extend the company's position in a rapidly expanding international marketplace. Describes the firm's internationalization process in terms of timing, geographic choices, and modes of entry. Also discusses Chilean special conditions for the pension fund industry, including local factors, context for strategy and rivalry, demand conditions, and related and supporting industries. Allows for the discussion of the origins of clusters in developing economies as well as the sources of international competitive advantage. Also provides an interesting evaluation of Provida's strategic choices and the sustainability of its international leadership.

Examines how managers use, and sometimes misuse, analogical reasoning as they formulate their strategies. Suggests a process that managers can employ to use analogies productivity.

Acoplasticos was established in 1961 as a lobbying group for Colombia's major plastics manufacturing companies. In the early 1980s, the organization shifted its focus toward improving the productivity of the Colombian plastics and rubber cluster, which also included certain petrochemical, manmade fiber, paint, and ink industries. Over time, the organization's activities expanded to include cluster technology upgrading, training, trade fair production, joint procurement, and information collection and dissemination. Despite significant improvement in the performance of the Colombian plastics and rubber cluster during the 1990s, however, Executive Director Carlos Garay was concerned about the challenging economic and political environment in 2002.

Ember is a venture capital-funded start-up that hopes to establish a standard for ubiquitous wireless networks. Its unique approach and proprietary technology promises to create enormous value in a wide variety of markets, particularly in local sensing and control. However, competition has emerged much faster than expected. What should Ember do next?

Spreadsheet for use with case (9-702-443). Download Only. (Exhibits 1 and 3).

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Even at the prototype stage, experts were saying the technology was obsolete. Yet, in the face of tepid consumer response, the company stubbornly kept increasing production capacity and developing new models. By the time it was finally killed, the initiative had cost the company an astounding $580 million and had tied up resources for 14 years. The product was RCA's SelectaVision videodisc recorder, and its story is hardly unique. Companies make similar mistakes--if on a somewhat smaller scale--all the time. But why? No one comes to work saying, "I'm going to pursue a project that will waste my company millions of dollars." Quite the opposite. They come to work full of excitement about a project they believe in. And that, surprisingly, can be the root of the trouble--a fervent belief in the inevitability of a project's ultimate success. Starting, naturally enough, with a project's champion, this faith can spread throughout the organization, leading everyone to believe collectively in the product's viability and to view any signs of impending doom merely as temporary setbacks. This phenomenon is documented here in two chillingly detailed case studies, one involving Essilor, the world's largest maker of corrective lenses for eyeglasses, and the other involving Lafarge, the largest producer of building materials. By counterexample, they point the way toward avoiding such morasses: assembling project teams not entirely composed of like-minded people and putting in place--and sticking to--well-defined review processes.