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In 2018, the founder of Swift Mobility in Nakuru, Kenya, Africa was considering her options for the future of her company, which was a Safaricom Plc dealership. The founder was reflecting on how much her business had progressed in the past ten years and wondering if this was the right time to expand or invest in the company’s future. She had just spoken with the property owner of a potential new store in Mombasa, Kenya, but was also considering other options. In addition to potentially expanding to a new location, the founder could choose to invest further to grow her current operation, or sell the business and exit the highly competitive telecommunications industry in favour of a more moderate lifestyle. Which option would be her best path forward?

Two managers in the Power Tools division of German multinational corporation Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch) have been tasked with devising potential solutions for addressing tensions between the regional headquarters (RHQ) for the Eastern Europe and Middle East region of Bosch Power Tools' Blue Emerging Markets business unit. The RHQ faces challenges in managing its geographically dispersed subsidiaries, with the subsidiaries complaining about slow decision-making, a lack of efficiency, and a limited understanding of customer needs. Bosch Power Tools must rethink its approach to the Blue Emerging Markets unit and the organizational set-up of the RHQ. Thus, the two managers are meeting with senior managers from across the Eastern Europe-Middle East region and the board of management (Case A) in order to determine the best way to address the issues (Case B).

In January 2019, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the French air transport group Air France–KLM SA (Air France–KLM) was tasked with developing the firm’s vision for the upcoming meeting of the board of directors. Faced with several challenges, such as low profitability, falling prices, and increasing competition, Air France–KLM had gone from leading the European market in 2004 to fourth position in 2019. At the same time, the European air transport industry had been affected by the rise of local low-cost airlines and the entry of high-end airlines from emerging economies. In response, Air France–KLM had created several businesses to challenge the new competition, but it had yet to improve performance. In this changing competitive context, what strategy should the CEO propose?

Dalian Xinyi Electronics Co., Ltd. (Dalian Xinyi), founded in 2014 and based in the province of Liaoning, China, had created a catch doll brand, Paw Toy, and operated more than 10 physical catch doll stores across the country. To deal with fierce competition from offline competitors, Dalian Xinyi had developed an online claw game application (app) in 2018 and had become a domestic Chinese catch doll brand, operating both an online app and offline stores. Although the performance of the online catch doll app was improving, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Zefei Su, the founder and president of Dalian Xinyi, knew that the online app still faced design flaws such as a lack of ranking and sharing functions, problems with simple brand promotion strategies, and fierce competition from other online catch doll apps. Su was facing an important decision concerning Dalian Xinyi’s future: Should the company return its focus to the operation of offline catch doll stores, even while online catch doll gaming seemed to be a future trend?

In January 2019, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the French air transport group Air France-KLM SA (Air France-KLM) was tasked with developing the firm's vision for the upcoming meeting of the board of directors. Faced with several challenges, such as low profitability, falling prices, and increasing competition, Air France-KLM had gone from leading the European market in 2004 to fourth position in 2019. At the same time, the European air transport industry had been affected by the rise of local low-cost airlines and the entry of high-end airlines from emerging economies. In response, Air France-KLM had created several businesses to challenge the new competition, but it had yet to improve performance. In this changing competitive context, what strategy should the CEO propose?

The chief executive officer of Zoomcar, an Indian car-rental company, had recognized that the costs of vehicle ownership were high for many individuals who needed vehicles only sporadically. The venture capital-funded, entrepreneur-driven business had launched in 2013, gone through three changes in its business model between 2016 and 2019, and identified a gap in the market with adequate demand to be fulfilled. Having adjusted its business model twice to circumvent the issue of supply, in 2020 it believed that it had identified the perfect product-market fit that would solve consumers’ concerns over owning versus hiring vehicles. The business's shared-mobility model would allow customers to reduce the total cost of vehicle ownership by offering their vehicles for short-term hires to other users on the Zoomcar platform. Now, it needed to resolve three issues: First, how could it get more cars on the platform? Second, even if it had the cars, how could it get people to adapt to a shared-mobility ecosystem? Third, how could it manage all of this while maintaining viable unit economics and ensuring long-term profitability?

Droom Technology Private Limited (Droom), a used-automobile marketplace platform based in India, had identified a big-ticket item with an average selling price of ₹200,000–₹600,000 and harnessed its innovative technology to build an online ecosystem. In doing so, it had stayed clear of inventory management by following a marketplace model like that used by Flipkart Internet Private Ltd. and Amazon.com, Inc. in India, bringing all participants—including used-vehicle dealers, individual buyers and sellers, and financiers—into the online marketplace. Subsequently, Droom created functional, monetary, time, and psychic values for its customers through its various automobile inspection, valuation, records search, insurance, and other services. Droom went from having a single revenue source to having six independent revenue sources through its subsidiaries, which each offered a unique combination of values and collectively created a tough barrier for competitors to penetrate. By April 2020, the start-up had enjoyed some success, but looking to increase its growth, it faced some questions: Was it offering too much for too little? Was its pricing justified by the value offered? Were its performance metrics commensurate with the value provided? Finally, what strategy would successfully shift Droom from a hybrid to a completely online model ready for listing on the Nasdaq exchange?

In 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic and a rise in "reshoring" sentiment in the U.S., Hester Pharmaceuticals had to decide whether to build a new plant for its new oncology drug Akrozumab in Germany or in the U.S., or whether it should hire a contract manufacturing organization (CMO) to produce the drug.

Telepass, until very recently the sole processor of electronic toll payments on Italy's highways, has ambitions beyond tolling. Since the mid-2010s, the company has been expanding into adjacent services. In 2017, Telepass launched TelepassPay-a mobile payment application (app) that allows subscribers to pay for dozens of mobility-related services and products from their smartphones. In 2019, Telepass launched a car insurance brokerage service. Using Telepass data, the brokerage service offers tailored insurance products to existing customers on behalf of insurance companies for a commission on converted leads. Now, in September 2020, Telepass's senior leaders are considering a new, insurance-related growth opportunity: moving beyond the brokerage model to become the primary insurance seller. It is unclear, however, whether Telepass's data provides sufficient insights into individual drivers' risk profiles to build competitive, customized insurance products. Alternatively, Telepass could continue to improve the brokerage model and focus its resources on adding new mobility services to TelepassPay. This case is paired with a supplementary dataset (courseware no. 622-701), which provides a data analysis opportunity for students.

Spreadsheet supplement to 622-011 and 622-050.

Telepass, until very recently the sole processor of electronic toll payments on Italy's highways, has ambitions beyond tolling. Since the mid-2010s, the company has been expanding into adjacent services. In 2017, Telepass launched TelepassPay-a mobile payment application (app) that allows subscribers to pay for dozens of mobility-related services and products from their smartphones. In 2019, Telepass launched a car insurance brokerage service. Using Telepass data, the brokerage service offers tailored insurance products to existing customers on behalf of insurance companies for a commission on converted leads. Now, in September 2020, Telepass's senior leaders are considering a new, insurance-related growth opportunity: moving beyond the brokerage model to become the primary insurance seller. It is unclear, however, whether Telepass's data provides sufficient insights into individual drivers' risk profiles to build competitive, customized insurance products. Alternatively, Telepass could continue to improve the brokerage model and focus its resources on adding new mobility services to TelepassPay. This case is paired with a supplementary dataset (courseware no. 622-701), which provides a data analysis opportunity for students.

Many organizations are eager to develop a digital platform. Yet, it is not clear how to realize this ambition, especially for large companies with complex existing structures. This study demonstrates how the growing trend of "Inner Source" (adopting internal open- source/crowdsourcing practices within large organizations) can help companies become more platform-based. This article studies three large organizations - Zalando, Philips Healthcare, and PayPal - and identifies a four-stage model that explains how Inner Source helped them develop their internal and external platforms. It details six recommendations for large organizations wishing to follow a strategy of Inner Source-driven platformization.

The potential benefits of augmented reality (AR) to consumers include high levels of interactivity, exposure to an extensive virtual inventory tailored to their needs, high-quality customer support, and better integration between web and store-based shopping experiences. The anticipated benefits of a successful AR strategy to a brand or retailer include higher inventory turnover, increased average sales, reduced sales costs, lower customer returns, higher levels of related-item selling, and better customer support outcomes. Despite these revenue- and loyalty-enhancing benefits, few companies use AR, develop a highly integrated AR plan, or incorporate AR into their marketing programs. This article focuses on the successful planning and implementation of AR through a six-step process: (1) Determine how AR can help achieve marketing objectives; (2) choose appropriate products, channels, and target markets for AR; (3) select among AR application types; (4) design AR apps; (5) evaluate alternative AR organizational formats; and (6) measure the success of AR programs.

Rappi Inc. (Rappi) was an on-demand delivery mobile application (app) that allowed users in Latin America to shop online for groceries, meals, and other products and have these delivered to them. It also provided various other services, such as cash withdrawals and dog walking. Rappi was founded in 2015, and in less than five years, it had evolved from operating in improvised headquarters in a parking lot in Bogotá to becoming a member of an exclusive club of technological start-ups valued at more than US$3.5 billion.<br><br>In 2021, although the situation was highly favourable for Rappi, it still faced major challenges to consolidate as a technology firm that would make life easier for its users. The question for Rappi now was how to continue its growth path in order to become the leading super app for Latin America.<br><br><br>Enrique Ramírez R. and Andrés Gonzalez R. are affiliated with Universidad ICESI.<br>

Rappi Inc. (Rappi) was an on-demand delivery mobile application (app) that allowed users in Latin America to shop online for groceries, meals, and other products and have these delivered to them. It also provided various other services, such as cash withdrawals and dog walking. Rappi was founded in 2015, and in less than five years, it had evolved from operating in improvised headquarters in a parking lot in Bogotá to becoming a member of an exclusive club of technological start-ups valued at more than US$3.5 billion. In 2021, although the situation was highly favourable for Rappi, it still faced major challenges to consolidate as a technology firm that would make life easier for its users. The question for Rappi now was how to continue its growth path in order to become the leading super app for Latin America.

This case provides students an opportunity to learn how to assess the competitiveness and profitability of the global computer industry through the SWOT analysis framework. By analyzing the effectiveness of Lenovo's business growth strategy, enabled by a dual supply chain approach for achieving both responsive and efficient objectives, students will also understand how Chinese companies can successfully transform themselves from operating merely as an OEM to OBM with a recognized global brand.

David Heller began delivering food in Toronto using the UberEATS platform in December 2016. Several months after signing a service agreement with Uber Technologies Inc. (Uber), Heller drove for Uber approximately 40–50 hours every week, generating earnings that ranged from CA$400 to $600 per week, or approximately CA$20,800–$31,200 per year. Uber drivers could not enjoy the rights and protections granted to employees under Ontario’s Employment Standards Act. If a dispute were to arise, Heller would have to pay approximately CA$19,000 to have his dispute with Uber resolved in the Netherlands. According to Uber, the dispute resolution process was to take place in the Netherlands even though Heller was living and working in Toronto. Was this fair? It could be argued that Heller had no bargaining power due to the financial and geographic constraints Uber had imposed. If Heller could convince Ontario’s court that Uber’s dispute regulation was unconscionable, this would change the nature of relationships between workers and companies in the Canadian gig economy.

David Heller began delivering food in Toronto using the UberEATS platform in December 2016. Several months after signing a service agreement with Uber Technologies Inc. (Uber), Heller drove for Uber approximately 40-50 hours every week, generating earnings that ranged from CA$400 to $600 per week, or approximately CA$20,800-$31,200 per year. Uber drivers could not enjoy the rights and protections granted to employees under Ontario's Employment Standards Act. If a dispute were to arise, Heller would have to pay approximately CA$19,000 to have his dispute with Uber resolved in the Netherlands. According to Uber, the dispute resolution process was to take place in the Netherlands even though Heller was living and working in Toronto. Was this fair? It could be argued that Heller had no bargaining power due to the financial and geographic constraints Uber had imposed. If Heller could convince Ontario's court that Uber's dispute regulation was unconscionable, this would change the nature of relationships between workers and companies in the Canadian gig economy.

In March 2020, the chief innovation and strategy officer (CISO) of Amsterdam-based Koninklijke Philips NV (Philips), a global leader in health technology, was surveying the distance that Philips had traversed in its transition from products to platforms. The CISO faced three managerial dilemmas: How could he transform the long-standing functional orientation at Philips into a multidisciplinary alignment? How could he ensure that Philips's customer-facing teams moved from a transactional mode to a relational mode? And how could he motivate employees to deal with a burning platform when they did not see one?