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This case describes a number of situations in which important customers of a major electronics manufacturing firm (contract manufacturer) behaved in a manner that could be considered "ethically challenged." The case is told from the perspective of the EMS firm's ECO, who was personally involved in addressing these issues. Issues with three customers are described. All were a significant portion of the EMS firm's overall business. In one, a customer misled the EMS firm about its order receipts, leading to the EMS firm acquiring a substantial excess inventory that the customer was contractually required to pay for. The customer threatened to withdraw its future business if forced to make the payment. A second customer, facing a profit shortfall, demanded a payment for a "warranty problem." The EMS firm faced difficulties with a third customer related to a small R&D firm that it purchased at the customer's request, in order to serve the customer's engineering needs.

What happens when small iconic socially oriented businesses are acquired by large corporations? Such mergers create significant opportunities for creating both business value and substantially expanded social value, but they also pose unusually difficult challenges because the merging entities are often strikingly different in philosophy and operating styles as well as in scale. This article examines three examples-Ben and Jerry's acquisition by Unilever, Stonyfield Farm by Groupe Danone, and Tom's of Maine by Colgate-to ascertain what is distinctive about the merger process and to analyze the elements critical to success. The article offers suggestions on how other companies considering similar arrangements might best manage the process of courtship, developing agreements, and executing effectively within the newly merged entities.

This note provides background information on the global wind industry and is meant to accompany HBS cases 708-051, The Suzlon Edge; 708-022, Cape Wind: Offshore Wind Energy in the USA; and 707-016, Supergrid.

After hearing a talk by Muhammad Yunis, a Bangladeshi economist, about an innovative program to provide loans to beggars, Jessica Jackley Flannery became convinced that microfinance "was the coolest thing in the world." In 2004 she and her husband, Matt Flannery, went to Africa and began discussing how they could contribute to microfinance. In October 2005 they ran a pilot Internet trial with eight Ugandan entrepreneurs. The couple sent an email to people on their wedding guest list announcing the opportunity to lend-over the weekend all eight entrepreneurs were fully funded. The duo also sent out a press release that was posted on Daily Kos, and $10,000 was raised in one day. The first person-to-person micro-lending organization had been born. This case describes Kiva's operations and introduces the challenges that the organization faced as it pondered growth.

This case outlines the dilemma of V. Raja, president and CEO of GE Healthcare India, when the company's ultrasound machines were implicated in many cases of prenatal sex determination. Even in the 21st century, Indian society favored males and many in India saw females as a burden on their families. Studies had shown that fewer and fewer girls were being born, with potentially catastrophic results for future Indian society. The reason: Many women were relying on ultrasound machines to determine the gender of their fetus and, if it were a girl, having abortions. Raja knew that GE Healthcare and ultrasound machines were providing much better medical care for Indians, particularly those in rural communities, and that the company was following all the rules and regulations to prevent this type of abuse. But he also understood the social issues that were involved. Ultrasound machine sales had enormous potential to help maintain GE's market-leading position in India. But should the company step back from its aggressive sales strategy? How could Raja and the company alleviate the growing discontent among critics and the media against the practice of prenatal sex determination testing using GE's ultrasound machines? What additional efforts did GE need to make to prove its intentions of promoting prenatal care? What other efforts should the company make to stop the illicit prenatal gender determination and resulting abortions? How could he protect the as yet untarnished image of GE as a responsible corporation going forward?

Why is that question in the past tense? Because individuals can no longer feel confident that the details of their lives - from identifying numbers to cultural preferences - will be treated with discretion rather than exploited. Even as Facebook users happily share the names of their favorite books, movies, songs, and brands, they often regard marketers' use of that information as an invasion of privacy. In this wide-ranging essay, McCreary, a senior editor at HBR, examines numerous facets of the privacy issue, from Google searches, public shaming on the internet, and cell phone etiquette to passenger screening devices, public surveillance cameras, and corporate chief privacy officers. He notes that IBM has been a leader on privacy; its policy forswearing the use of employees' genetic information in hiring and benefits decisions predated the federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act by three years. Now IBM is involved in an open-source project known as Higgins to provide users with transportable, potentially anonymous online presences. Craigslist, whose CEO calls it "as close to 100% user driven as you can get," has taken an extremely conservative position on privacy - perhaps easier for a company with a declared lack of interest in maximizing revenue. But TJX and other corporate victims of security breaches have discovered that retaining consumers' transaction information can be both costly and risky. Companies that underestimate the importance of privacy to their customers or fail to protect it may eventually face harsh regulation, reputational damage, or both. The best thing they can do, says the author, is negotiate directly with those customers over where to draw the line.

The chief executive officer of an oil and gas company must decide whether he wants to invest heavily in reducing greenhouse gases. Specifically, Suncor Energy must evaluate whether it should invest $425 million in carbon capture and storage or wait until there is greater certainty in the political, social and business environment. The case will help students develop skills of analyzing business decisions under higher environmental uncertainty, especially when the outcome is a long-term goal. Further, the issues presented in the case open up discussions about climate change and the interaction between business actions and societal expectations. There is also an opportunity to speak about the interaction between business and public policy.

This article embarks on a road trip to NASCAR, the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, to take a close look at why cheating occurs within that organization. Two arguments drive the article, namely that NASCAR (1) may not be able to stop cheating particularly within the current context, and (2) might not want or be motivated to stop cheating. Obstacles complicating NASCAR's efforts to stop cheating include the long-standing culture of unethical behavior within stock car racing, and the inconsistent imposition of punishments by NASCAR which drivers and race teams perceive as favoritism and unfair treatment. Yellow flags that raise caution include pressure from unwavering fans, and the friction between innovation and maintaining parity among teams. Proposed solutions include changing the culture within the NASCAR community, as well as developing ethical role models, both of which require major action by NASCAR's top managers to signal the importance of ethical behavior. Other key stakeholders such as sponsors and fans must create incentives and rewards for ethical behavior, and consider reducing or ending support for drivers and teams that engage in unethical conduct. Our analysis and recommendations have broad applications because NASCAR is an archetype of a large organization attempting to reduce cheating and unethical behavior.

The A1 and A2 versions of the "Shareholder Activists at Friendly Ice Cream (A)" split the original A case into two parts. The A1 case ends as activists Sardar Biglari and Phil Cooley prepare to meet with CEO Don Smith at Friendly's headquarters in September 2006. The A2 case resumes the story just after the meeting and details Biglari's and Friendly's actions from that point on. The A1 and A2 cases are provided for instructors who wish more flexibility in the teaching plan. These cases do not omit or abridge any information contained in the original A case. Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO and that the directors had conflicts of interest because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

The A1 and A2 versions of the "Shareholder Activists at Friendly Ice Cream (A)" split the original A case into two parts. The A1 case ends as activists Sardar Biglari and Phil Cooley prepare to meet with CEO Don Smith at Friendly's headquarters in September 2006. The A2 case resumes the story just after the meeting and details Biglari's and Friendly's actions from that point on. The A1 and A2 cases are provided for instructors who wish more flexibility in the teaching plan. These cases do not omit or abridge any information contained in the original A case. Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO and that the directors had conflicts of interest because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

For three months this spring, HBR Green hosted a six-part series of online commentary and discussion exploring best practices and new thinking in green business strategy. Leaders of the business world-including Brian Walker, CEO of Herman Miller; Judith Samuelson, an executive director at the Aspen Institute; and Stuart Rose, chief executive of Marks & Spencer-asked provocative questions about how environmental issues are affecting key corporate disciplines: operations, corporate governance, marketing, ethics, leadership, and supply chain management. Featured contributors and readers from around the globe-executives of companies large and small, consultants, heads of utilities, academics-answered with robust and lively commentaries. Their contributions taught us that in marketing green products, companies must not lose sight of the basic reasons consumers buy them in the first place; that products that are green from the ground up have fundamentally different economics and markets from products that start dirty and are cleaned up by reengineered processes; that global pooling and exchange of technology are vital to cleaning up supply chains and reducing worldwide greenhouse gas emissions; that going green requires a sustained and unified effort from a diverse set of companies, customers, suppliers, workers, nonprofits, governments, and NGOs. And, as the highlights collected in this special section reveal, no company, industry, or executive will remain untouched.

This case explores the role that MTV, with its heavy diet of music and general youth-oriented media content, plays in spreading public-service messaging to contain the scourge of HIV/AIDS worldwide. There is a focus especially on its efforts in several emerging markets, particularly the parts of Africa that have a heavy disease incidence. MTV has developed a DNA of public service announcements that it claims are of central relevance to its high-risk customer base. How core is this to the strategy of a for-profit firm like MTV? What role can a multinational play in helping develop the health care 'soft' infrastructure in such emerging markets?

Reacting to the 1973-4 Arab oil embargo, Congress enacted a Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) system in 1975 that required an increase in automobile fuel economy from 14.2 miles per gallon in 1974 to 27.5 mpg in 1984. Since that time, Congress had made no changes to CAFÉ, with efforts in 1990 and 2002 both failing. By 2007, however, circumstances had changed significantly enough that Congress was poised to enact a 40 percent increase in required fuel efficiency. Although the automobile industry had initially opposed any major increase, the seemingly inevitable increase convinced to industry to instead focus on details of the pending legislation and how to influence those details. This case explores the response of the auto industry to the pending fuel efficiency increases, setting up an evaluation of the industry's strategy to help craft the legislation.

Is "Fair Trade" really fair? This case examines the concept, history, and logistics of the Fair Trade movement, specifically for coffee. Fair Trade began as an attempt to ensure farmers received fair compensation for their crops and credit when needed. Fair Trade also provided opportunities to help coffee growers learn best practices and sustainable farming methods (minimal damage to the environment, for example). But Fair Trade had its critics, who claimed that ultimately the farmers did not benefit and that retailers charged more for Fair Trade products and pocketed the difference. This case examines these issues through the eyes of one coffee-drinker who has specifically chosen her caffeine venue because of the Fair Trade designation.

This short (B) case provides an update of how Microsoft organized its unlimited potential initiative.

Why do managers become corrupt? Does corruption ever pay? When do friendly relations cross into bribery? How can CEOs manage and prevent outbreaks of corruption? These and other questions are raised by three short case studies of corruption in Germany: at the global engineering firm Siemens, the automaker VW, and the chemical giant BASF. While German law not only permitted overseas bribery but even made it tax deductible until 1999, it was not welcomed in some nations where Siemens did business such as the United States-or in Germany after 2000-but old practices continued. Cooperative management-labor relations, often seen as key to the post-World War II German industrial powerhouse, went sour at VW, as a top manager secured key concessions by paying for union leaders' lavish foreign travel and visits to prostitutes. After vitamin prices sagged in the late 1980s, BASF and the Swiss chemical firm Hoffmann-La Roche plotted a global cartel that lasted a decade and raised the prices of many vitamins 50 percent or more. In the end, even after record criminal fines and jail time for some executives, some observers argued, such practices were likely to recur.

In Africa, the usage of insecticide treated bed-nets (ITNs) has shown to be one of the best ways to prevent malaria. USAID, the principal U.S. agency for providing assistance to countries, has just announced that by mid-2008, it will provide an additional $5 billion for malaria prevention and treatment in Africa. Specifically, the agency would like to see Tanzania improve not only ITN coverage (currently at only 14%) but more importantly ITN usage by the country's 35 million citizens. As of 2004, only 10% of children under the age of 5 were sleeping under bed-nets. USAID's goal for 2010 is to increase this to 80%. In this simulation, students need to develop a compelling proposal for USAID for reducing the malaria burden in Tanzania. View Video.

September 2007. For both founding fathers of the Happy Shrimp Farm, it had been a hectic three years. What started as a simple market research on co-siting for the Rotterdam Port Authority (RPA) in April 2004 had rapidly developed into an international multi-million euro business proposition that literally took over their lives. Their research had identified interesting business opportunities. RPA agreed to support them on a case-by-case basis, starting with the Happy Shrimp Farm. Initial challenges included getting a residual energy contract to heat the shrimp production ponds and external funding for the venture. Construction started in September 2006. With its energy recycling and urban revival themes, Happy Shrimp generated extensive press coverage. Greiner and Curtessi were already looking ahead: Could the concept be replicated in Germany and Canada? Could it be applied to seaweed production as well? How sustainable was sustainability as a business concept? Happy Shrimp International needed to take shape fast. Could they manage all this growth? And handling the multiple stakeholders was still a headache... Learning objectives: Managing multiple stakeholders in a sustainable project development. Understanding the economic drivers of cradle-to-cradle, recycling projects. Discuss sustainability as a business model.

Burger King has found a low-key but surprisingly effective way to deal with consumer concerns about animal welfare: Establish an advisory panel of outside experts who can help analyze and filter ideas for initiatives.

In 2002, a successful community development corporation in Boston, Massachusetts was approached by two other organizations about potential mergers. Each organization had distinctive geographical and ethnic roots but there were clear financial and management advantages to be had from combining assets. In one case, merger discussions proceeded with the benefit of lawyers and common board connections. In the other case, despite good progress at the beginning, the merger talks became increasingly contentious with opposition from community groups who rallied political leadership to step in. This case offers the opportunity to analyze the action and decision-making of the three organizations using alliance, negotiations, organizing and strategic frameworks. It also allows the class to engage in discussion about the nature of "community" in community-based organizations. HKS Case Number 1921.0