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Describes a small consulting business, Business Networks, led by Les Cunningham. The firm's primary product was the establishment of groups or "networks" of similar businesses and the facilitation of each network's biannual meetings. Owners of individual firms, called networkers, met to tackle each other's business problems and share solutions. The networks were formed of like-sized remodeling contractors that specialized in similar lines of business. Provides a description of one biannual meeting and perspective from network members on the pros and cons of the process of performance improvement.

When struggling companies look for a new chief executive today, the one quality they prize above all others is charisma. But once they've recruited a larger-than-life leader, they often find that their troubles only get worse. Indeed, as the author's new research painfully reveals, the widespread belief in the powers of charismatic CEOs can be problematic. Why? First, Khurana says, there's no conclusive evidence that charismatic leadership affects an organization's performance. Second, the insistence on finding a charismatic leader, combined with the undefinable nature of charisma, results in selection processes that are overly conservative and even irrational. Boards end up considering only candidates who have already achieved the rank of CEO or president at a high-performing, high-profile company, even if they are not right for the job. Third, charismatic leaders deliberately destabilize organizations. This can result in a more vibrant company, as it did at General Electric during Jack Welch's tenure, but it can also leave a troubled legacy for the organization to overcome, as GE, Ford, and Enron have all found. Faith in a company, a product, or an idea can unleash tremendous innovation and productivity.

In the wake of meltdowns at WorldCom, Tyco, and Enron, enormous attention has been focused on the companies' boards. It seems inconceivable that business disasters of such magnitude could happen without gross or even criminal negligence on the part of board members. And, yet, a close examination of those boards reveals no broad pattern of incompetence or corruption. In fact, they followed most of the accepted standards for board operations: Members showed up for meetings; they had money invested in the company; audit committees, compensation committees, and codes of ethics were in place; and the boards weren't too small or too big, nor were they dominated by insiders. Corporate governance expert Jeffrey Sonnenfeld suggests that it's time for some new thinking about how corporate boards operate and are evaluated. He proposes thinking not only about how to structure the board's work but also about how to manage it as a social system. Good boards are, very simply, high-functioning work groups. They're distinguished by a climate of respect, trust, and candor among board members and between the board and management. Information is shared openly and on time; emergent political factions are quickly eliminated. Members feel free to challenge one another's assumptions and conclusions, and management encourages lively discussion of strategic issues. Directors feel a responsibility to contribute meaningfully to the board's performance. In addition, good boards assess their own performance, both collectively and individually.

In an ideal world, a subordinate would accept critical feedback from a manager with an open mind. He or she would ask a few clarifying questions, promise to work on certain performance areas, and show signs of improvement over time. But things don't always turn out that way. Fearing that the employee will become angry and defensive, the boss all too often inadvertently sabotages the meeting by preparing for it in a way that stifles honest discussion. This unintentional--indeed, unconscious--stress-induced habit makes it difficult to deliver corrective feedback effectively. Insead professor Jean-Francois Manzoni says that by changing the mind-set with which they develop and deliver negative feedback, managers can increase their odds of having productive conversations without damaging relationships. Manzoni describes two behavioral phenomena that color the feedback process--the fundamental attribution error and the false consensus effect. Managers tend to frame difficult situations and decisions in a way that is narrow (alternatives aren't considered) and binary (there are only two possible outcomes--win or lose). And during the feedback discussion, managers' framing of the issues often remains frozen. Manzoni says that bosses need to consider an employee's circumstances rather than just attribute weak performance to a person's disposition.

It's common sense that managers should deliver on promises and demonstrate the values they preach, but what's the real cost when bosses fail to "walk the talk?" A hotel-industry study shows a stunning association between profitability and how workers perceive their managers' behavioral integrity.

Women tend to be less enthusiastic than men about hierarchies, says Kim Campbell, Canada's first female prime minister and minister of national defense, and that can be good for business. When women join leadership teams, hierarchies become less rigid and can lose their power to protect bad leaders.

After years of strong performance with market-dominating brands, Gillette's performance slips and a new CEO is selected from outside the company to lead a turnaround. This case describes the business and financial situation he inherited and asks what he should do during his first day and week on the job.

Describes the actions and behavior of a new CEO in his first days and weeks as he sets expectations for his top management team and introduces processes and disciplines to begin the turnaround of a global consumer products company.

Examines the strategic change agenda set by a new CEO as the initial priorities in the turnaround of this leading global consumer products company.

How a strategic change agenda is implemented depends on leaders below the top in every function and geographic region translating the agenda into actions. But those actions do not always unfold as planned. This case examines the first 16 months of a turnaround from the perspective of implementers in the field. It describes business issues, organizational design dilemmas, and the cultural and behavioral challenges of implementing change in a global company.

In early 2001, Trilogy Software faced a slowdown in its business, a large number of unsuccessful customer deployments, and an overall weakening in the enterprise software market. In response, the company revamped its business model and restructured the organization. Joe Liemandt, chairman and CEO of Trilogy, along with members of the company's senior management team must decide whether Trilogy University, the company's internal training program for new college recruits and other recently hired employees, supported or detracted from the company's new objectives. Specifically, they must decide whether and, if so, how Trilogy University, the traditional source of new ideas, new products, and new approaches at Trilogy, should be adapted to reflect the strategic changes that were taking place throughout the organization.

Sets the stage for self-assessment as an integral component in the process of career development.

Managing conflict and differences has always been an essential, but challenging, skill for effective managers to master. This case was designed to build expertise in conflict management and assertiveness. Grounded in the pedagogy of experiential learning, the case consists of three role-play scenarios that exemplify three challenging business situations. In each scenario, two individuals are faced with a possible difference in perspective or goals. The role-play requires students to assume the role of one of the individuals, and each scenario requires another student to initiate the discussion.

If you're like most managers, you've worked with people who swear they do their most creative work under tight deadlines. You may use pressure as a management technique, believing it will spur people on to great leaps of insight. You may even manage yourself this way. If so, are you right? Not necessarily, these researchers say. When creativity is under the gun, it usually ends up getting killed, the authors say. They recently took a close look at how people experience time pressure, collecting and analyzing more than 9,000 daily diary entries from individuals who were working on projects that required high levels of creativity and measuring their ability to innovate under varying levels of time pressure. The authors describe common characteristics of time pressure and outline four working environments under which creativity may or may not flourish. High-pressure days that still yield creativity are full of focus and meaningful urgency--people feel they are on a mission. High-pressure days that yield no creativity lack such focus--people feel they are on a treadmill, forced to switch gears often. On low-pressure days that yield creativity, people feel as though they are on an expedition--exploring ideas rather than just identifying problems. And on low-pressure days that yield no creative thinking, people work on autopilot--doing their jobs without engaging too deeply. Managers should avoid extreme time pressure when possible.

"The fastest way to succeed," IBM's Thomas Watson, Sr., once said, "is to double your failure rate." In recent years, more and more executives have embraced Watson's point of view, coming to understand what innovators have always known: Failure is a prerequisite to invention. Although companies may grasp the value of making mistakes at the level of corporate practices, they have a harder time accepting the idea at the personal level. In this article, psychologist and former Harvard Business School professor Richard Farson and co-author Ralph Keyes discuss how companies can reduce the fear of miscues. What's crucial is the presence of failure-tolerant leaders--executives who, through their words and actions, help employees overcome their anxieties about making mistakes and, in the process, create a culture of intelligent risk-taking that leads to sustained innovation. Drawing from their research in business, politics, sports, and science, the authors identify common practices among failure-tolerant leaders. These leaders break down the social and bureaucratic barriers that separate them from their followers. They engage at a personal level with the people they lead. They take a nonjudgmental, analytical posture as they interact with staff. They openly admit their own mistakes. And they try to root out the destructive competitiveness built into most organizations. Above all else, failure-tolerant leaders push people to see beyond traditional definitions of success and failure. They know that as long as a person views failure as the opposite of success, rather than its complement, he or she will never be able to take the risks necessary for innovation.

As companies try to keep pace with rapid changes in technology and cope with unstable business environments, their research departments have to do more than simply invent new products. They must design the new technological and organizational architectures that make a continuously innovating company possible. In this 1991 article, John Seely Brown, then director of Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), describes the business logic behind this distinctive vision of research's role and the ways Xerox PARC tried to realize that vision. Its researchers developed prototypes of new work practices as well as new technologies and products. They designed new uses for technology to encourage the local innovation that, they found, occurs naturally at all levels of any big company. And they experimented with new techniques for what the author terms "coproducing" technological and organizational innovations with Xerox's customers. Xerox's business is technology, but Seely Brown argues that any company, no matter what its business, must eventually grapple with the issues he raises. The successful company of the future must understand how people really work and must adapt its technology to the work rather than the other way around. It must know how to create an environment that allows for continuous innovation by all employees. McKinsey Award Winner.

Insurance giant Marsh & McLennan acquires management consulting firms Temple, Barker & Sloane (TBS) in 1987 and Strategic Planning Associates (SPA) in 1990 and sets out to merge the two. The merger proceeds slowly and painfully. Following the February 1990 merger, George Overholser and Ware Adams face difficult decisions. Overholser, a principal at Mercer, must decide how to meet the challenge of leading an effort to integrate the two firms. Adams, a Mercer associate, must decide whether to leave the firm to join Dean & Co., a spin-off recently founded by former partners Dean Wilde and Dean Silverman. Overholser, who had also been invited to join the Deans, had already declined the offer when the case opens. Overholser, Adams, Wilde, and Silverman are all formerly of SPA, a firm whose culture and business model differed markedly from that of TBS. Walker Lewis, founder of SPA, arrived at the terms "industry knowledge consulting" and "expertise consulting" to describe TBS's approach and "analytical consulting" and "model-driven consulting" to describe SPA's.

Supplements the (A) case.

Todd McKenna, a third-year associate at an investment banking firm, confronts his boss. His boss had told him he would be the top paid associate at the firm, and McKenna finds out that this isn't true. He approaches his boss to find out why he was lied to.

Sophie Wong, president and CEO of North East Medical Services, a health care organization dedicated to serving the underprivileged Asian American community in San Francisco, must decide how to reposition the organization to serve patients from multiple income levels without compromising the mission of the clinic. Wong must reconcile issues surrounding divergent stakeholder preferences and beliefs about the quality of service offered at the clinic.