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Describes 37-year-old Ferit Sahenk's challenges in taking over his father's traditionally managed $14 billion Turkish conglomerate in a period of economic instability. Leading the large holding company into the 21st century will require the establishment of a more institutionalized structure as opposed to the highly personal style of Ferit's father as he grew the company over the past 50 years. Addresses issues of how to establish credibility as the company's new leader, how to motivate his board members to participate more in the company decisions, how to manage in a period of increasing international competition and Turkey's political and financial instability, and the complexities of succession in family-owned businesses.

An unconventional manager within IBM leads the creation of a business unit with multibillion-dollar potential, winning over customers and nudging the organization to make the changes needed to achieve dramatic growth. This case provides an example of how organizational design and leadership behavior shape performance. Also an example of ambidextrous organization design.

Supplements the (A) case.

Why did Boeing's engineers and technicians strike for 40 days in early 2000? And what can other companies with large cadres of knowledge workers learn from the experience? The author contends that the morale of Boeing engineers was in a slump because management suddenly began emphasizing financial results rather than engineering excellence, and engineers felt their contributions were given short shrift. The indication is that top management failed to detect the decline in morale and made no preparation for weathering a strike; thus, it was caught by surprise when its knowledge workers walked out. The author examines the history and corporate culture of Boeing, changes in internal communications, and the motivational mindset of professional knowledge workers for clues as to the origins and development of conditions that led to the strike. It is suggested that, had Boeing been more sensitive to employee concerns, its new cost-cutting emphasis would have been far more readily accepted--perhaps even blessed--by all employees as the price for maintaining worldwide industry leadership.

Electronic Communications Ltd. (ECL) had decided to make China its second home and to seek common prosperity with Chinese people. The company knew that there were major gains to be made, but there were also risks and challenges. One of these was the management of cultural differences. An essential question facing the management was whether it should adapt ECL's management practice to the Chinese culture or instead implement ECL's global management policies in China.

Jill Hoover was looking skyward, marveling at the heart-stopping beauty of Paradise Park-Seattle's newest attraction, its tallest and scariest roller coaster to date: the Anaconda. "Quite impressive," Jill thought. But a scuffle in the ride queue quickly brought the CEO of Paradise Parks back to earth. The company's 19 seasonal and year-round amusement parks had always been popular--ever since Jill's father founded the original Paradise Park just after the Second World War--but they hadn't been very profitable of late. Operating costs had been spiraling, and every dollar of extra revenue had been hard won. At the company's annual management off-site meeting, held that morning at the Seattle park, CFO Nathan Cortland proposed that Paradise offer its customers the option of a "preferred guest" card. Cardholders would pay more, but they would get first crack at the rides--entering through separate lines--and would get seated immediately at any of the parks' restaurants. According to Nathan, the plan would bolster Paradise's sagging finances because it would target the "mass affluents"--a rising demographic of moneyed but time-pressed people who might visit the park more often and spend more if it weren't for long lines at the rides. Jill respects Nathan's idea--but hasn't her plan to upgrade some of the parks' souvenir shops to gift boutiques already shown some promise? And doesn't Nathan's plan smack of elitism, as Jill's longtime friend and park manager Adam Goodwin suggests? The CEO has resolved to get back to Nathan with a decision about "Operation Upmarket" by the time she leaves Seattle and returns to headquarters. Should Paradise Parks offer guests different levels of service? In R0110A and R0110Z, John Harrington, Edward Goldman, Alexander Labak, and Robert Crandall offer their advice in this fictional case study.

In the last 20 years, business has become the dominant institution in American society, in many respects usurping the role once played by religion. As such, business has infiltrated every aspect of our lives--including the hearts and minds of our children. For many, it is an unsettling force. The wild competitiveness of business today compels managers to be constantly available for customers and colleagues, inevitably reducing the time and energy they can devote to their kids. Although stories of the impact of business life on children rarely appear in the business press, debate rages in the broader community, and many parents fear that their children may be paying the price for their success. Is that price too high? In an in-depth interview with HBR senior editor Diane Coutu, writer and child psychoanalyst Robert Coles speaks to that question. Perhaps surprisingly, given the fashion for criticizing the way children are raised today, Coles is optimistic about the next generation. He rejects the stereotype of the hopelessly spoiled rich kid, instead emphasizing children's extraordinary adaptability and ingenuity. "Wealth can weaken some children in certain ways," he says, "unless parents know how to ask of them as well as give to them." In this interview, Cole also examines the role of working women in parenting, explores the difference for children between healthy and narcissistic entitlement, and suggests how we might listen to our children better. "Our children are wonderfully aware and awake," Coles says. "If only we'd stop and listen to the spiritual reflections and questions of our sons and daughters, we might learn something very important about them and about ourselves."

Every manager is familiar with the employee who just won't change. Sometimes it's easy to see why--the employee fears a shift in power or the need to learn new skills. Other times, such resistance is far more puzzling. An employee has the skills and smarts to make a change with ease and is genuinely enthusiastic--yet, inexplicably, does nothing. What's going on? In this article, two organizational psychologists present a surprising conclusion. Resistance to change does not necessarily reflect opposition, nor is it merely a result of inertia. Instead, even as they hold a sincere commitment to change, many people unwittingly apply productive energy toward a hidden competing commitment. The resulting internal conflict stalls the effort in what looks like resistance but is in fact a kind of personal immunity to change. An employee who's dragging his feet on a project, for example, may have an unrecognized competing commitment to avoid the even tougher assignment--one he fears he can't handle--that might follow if he delivers too successfully on the task at hand. Without an understanding of competing commitments, attempts to change employee behavior are virtually futile. The authors outline a process for helping employees uncover their competing commitments, identify and challenge the underlying assumptions driving these commitments, and begin to change their behavior so that, ultimately, they can accomplish their goals.

Marriott International for many years had a deeply ingrained culture of face time--if you weren't working long hours, you weren't earning your pay. That philosophy didn't seem totally off base in an industry that provides 24/7 service, 365 days a year. But it had a price: By the mid-1990s, Marriott was finding it tough to recruit talented people, and some of its best managers were leaving, often because they wanted to spend more time with their families. "Our emphasis on face time had to go," recalls Bill Munck, a Marriott vice president for the New England region. In this article, Munck describes how Marriott transformed its "see and be seen" culture by implementing an initiative dubbed Management Flexibility at several of its hotels. This six-month pilot program was designed to help managers strike a better balance between their work lives and their home lives--all while maintaining Marriott's high-quality customer service and its bottom-line financial results. Munck explains how he and his leadership team took the first, relatively easy, step of eliminating redundant meetings and inefficient procedures that kept managers at the office late. The tougher task, he says, was overhauling the fundamental way managers thought about work. Under the pilot, Marriott's message to employees was: Put in long hours when it's needed, but take off early if the work is done--and don't be shy about doing so. As a result of the program, managers are working five fewer hours per week with no drop-off in customer service levels; they report less stress and burnout; and they perceive a definite change in the culture, with less attention paid to hours worked and a greater emphasis placed on tasks accomplished.

Jill Hoover was looking skyward, marveling at the heart-stopping beauty of Paradise Park-Seattle's newest attraction, its tallest and scariest roller coaster to date: the Anaconda. "Quite impressive," Jill thought. But a scuffle in the ride queue quickly brought the CEO of Paradise Parks back to earth. The company's 19 seasonal and year-round amusement parks had always been popular--ever since Jill's father founded the original Paradise Park just after the Second World War--but they hadn't been very profitable of late. Operating costs had been spiraling, and every dollar of extra revenue had been hard won. At the company's annual management off-site meeting, held that morning at the Seattle park, CFO Nathan Cortland proposed that Paradise offer its customers the option of a "preferred guest" card. Cardholders would pay more, but they would get first crack at the rides--entering through separate lines--and would get seated immediately at any of the parks' restaurants. According to Nathan, the plan would bolster Paradise's sagging finances because it would target the "mass affluents"--a rising demographic of moneyed but time-pressed people who might visit the park more often and spend more if it weren't for long lines at the rides. Jill respects Nathan's idea--but hasn't her plan to upgrade some of the parks' souvenir shops to gift boutiques already shown some promise? And doesn't Nathan's plan smack of elitism, as Jill's longtime friend and park manager Adam Goodwin suggests? The CEO has resolved to get back to Nathan with a decision about "Operation Upmarket" by the time she leaves Seattle and returns to headquarters. Should Paradise Parks offer guests different levels of service? In R0110A and R0110Z, John Harrington, Edward Goldman, Alexander Labak, Robert Crandall, offer their advice on this fictional case study.

Jill Hoover was looking skyward, marveling at the heart-stopping beauty of Paradise Park-Seattle's newest attraction, its tallest and scariest roller coaster to date: the Anaconda. "Quite impressive," Jill thought. But a scuffle in the ride queue quickly brought the CEO of Paradise Parks back to earth. The company's 19 seasonal and year-round amusement parks had always been popular--ever since Jill's father founded the original Paradise Park just after the Second World War--but they hadn't been very profitable of late. Operating costs had been spiraling, and every dollar of extra revenue had been hard won. At the company's annual management off-site meeting, held that morning at the Seattle park, CFO Nathan Cortland proposed that Paradise offer its customers the option of a "preferred guest" card. Cardholders would pay more, but they would get first crack at the rides--entering through separate lines--and would get seated immediately at any of the parks' restaurants. According to Nathan, the plan would bolster Paradise's sagging finances because it would target the "mass affluents"--a rising demographic of moneyed but time-pressed people who might visit the park more often and spend more if it weren't for long lines at the rides. Jill respects Nathan's idea--but hasn't her plan to upgrade some of the parks' souvenir shops to gift boutiques already shown some promise? And doesn't Nathan's plan smack of elitism, as Jill's longtime friend and park manager Adam Goodwin suggests? The CEO has resolved to get back to Nathan with a decision about "Operation Upmarket" by the time she leaves Seattle and returns to headquarters. Should Paradise Parks offer guests different levels of service? In R0110A and R0110Z, John Harrington, Edward Goldman, Alexander Labak, and Robert Crandall offer their advice on this fictional case study.

This note offers a four-step framework for writing business letters, reports, and proposals. It advises the writer to consider purpose, audience, channel, and message structure when drafting managerial communications, and offers effective strategies for dealing with common communication challenges.

As a biotech start-up company involved in studying human genomes, Perlegen needed to develop an organization that fostered innovation and teamwork among a group of highly trained professionals from both the science and technology fields. Perlegen's CEO, Brad Margus, had joined Perlegen from the shrimp processing business after learning that two of his three sons had been diagnosed with a rare genetic disease. A Harvard MBA and self-trained geneticist, Margus looked forward to the opportunity to dedicate himself to Perlegen's scientific mission. During his first nine months on the job, Margus had hired a number of junior-level and mid-level employees; now it was time to fill out the senior management team. Margus's first senior management hire was Greg Brandeau, the former vice president of computer operations at Pixar Animation Studios, who signed on to be Perlegen's CEO. Brandeau faced a number of challenges as he integrated into the Perlegen organization, including the fact that he lacked a science background, his two direct reports had already been hired, and he would be the third leg of a tight-knit, two-person senior management team already in place.

After acquiring the German online auction company Alando.de, eBay CEO Meg Whitman and her team must integrate Alando's Web site with the company's existing platform. The acquisition is the first step of eBay's journey to become a global trading platform. In addition to the challenge of a technical integration of massive scale, the case explores the inner workings of eBay's senior team. Includes color exhibits.

A week after becoming country manager of eBay's recently acquired German auction site, Philipp Justus must steer the company through a massive technical integration with eBay's Web site. Throughout the seven-month project, Justus and his team must master the challenge of working with counterparts thousands of miles away and determine how much they can change their online trading site without completely alienating their user community.

An abstract is not available for this product.

When tasks are highly complex, demand a diversity of skills, or require a commitment from the involved parties, teams are usually the most effective way to approach them. But a group of people working together does not automatically equally a team, and groups are often inefficient and ineffective. Provides detailed information on team development, team management, and team process. Also suggests specific interventions that any team member can make to improve decision making and participation, as well as ways to influence dynamics and resolve conflicts.

Internal competition evokes mixed feelings among senior executives. It is typically seen as wasteful, bad for morale, and indicative of a lack of strategic direction; but at the same time it can also be very beneficial--a way to create flexibility in the face of technological uncertainty as well as challenge the status quo. This article draws on a five-year study in ten companies to provide advice to executives on how to realize the benefits of internal competition. It describes two distinct forms of internal competition (competition among technologies and competition among lines of business) and the appropriate strategies for managing each one. It also identifies the criteria for deciding whether to allow competing units to coexist or whether their activities should be consolidated.

The Himalayas are one of nature's most demanding classrooms, but they can teach us important principles about taking charge of our followers--and our own egos. In this article, Wharton professor Michael Useem recounts the experiences of MBA graduates and midcareer executives who took part in a leadership program on the lower slopes of Mount Everest. Conceived to heighten participants' appreciation of what leadership is all about, the program transforms abstract concepts into practice: Not only do people learn from the historical expeditions of others, they also gain insights from their own unfolding experiences. Through hiking some 80 miles over rough terrain, the participants learned about their own limitations--one CEO grappled with the decision to turn back when others feared the altitude had become too much for him--and about the value of communication: what to do when several team members are unaccounted for as night falls. The team also learned from those they met along the path to Everest's base camp. They benefited from rare encounters, such as a private audience with the reincarnate lama, the spiritual leader for the region's largely Buddhist population, and a discussion with a passing hiker who had been part of the harrowing Everest expedition described in the best-seller Into Thin Air. During the journey, four essential principles emerged: Leaders should be led by the group's needs; inaction can sometimes be the most difficult--but wisest--action; if your words don't stick, you haven't spoken; and leading upward can feel wrong even when it's right. Through compelling stories of the trekkers' triumphs and miscalculations, the author sheds new light on several central management principles.

If leadership, at its most basic, consists of getting things done through others, then persuasion is one of the leader's essential tools. Many executives have assumed that this tool is beyond their grasp, available only to the charismatic and the eloquent. Over the past several decades, though, experimental psychologists have learned which methods reliably lead people to concede, comply, or change. Their research shows that persuasion is governed by several principles that can be taught and applied. The first principle is that people are more likely to follow someone who is similar to them than someone who is not. Wise managers, then, enlist peers to help make their cases. Second, people are more willing to cooperate with those who are not only like them but who like them, as well. So it's worth the time to uncover real similarities and offer genuine praise. Third, experiments confirm the intuitive truth that people tend to treat you the way you treat them. It's sound policy to do a favor before seeking one. Fourth, individuals are more likely to keep promises they make voluntarily and explicitly. The message for managers here is to get commitments in writing. Fifth, studies show that people really do defer to experts. So before they attempt to exert influence, executives should take pains to establish their own expertise and not assume that it's self-evident. Finally, people want more of a commodity when it's scarce; it follows, then, that exclusive information is more persuasive than widely available data. By mastering these principles--and, the author stresses, using them judiciously and ethically--executives can learn the elusive art of capturing an audience, swaying the undecided, and converting the opposition.