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As the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the world, Huawei has been building telecommunications networks and services since its inception in 1987. Leveraging its close relationship with other telecommunications service providers, Huawei entered the consumer mobile devices market, supplying mobile phones and other white-label products for telecom service providers in the mid-2000s. In 2010, Huawei also began designing, manufacturing, and selling the first smartphones under its own brand, targeting middle-to-high-end consumer segments. By 2015, Huawei ranked first in China and third in the world in the smartphone market. By the first quarter of 2020, Huawei also became the largest smartphone vendor of the world, overtaking the title from Samsung for the first time. This case study explores the strategies that have resulted in Huawei's fast to rise to the top in the consumer business even as many of its competitors scaled back their footprint. In parallel, however, this remarkable success has been tinged with the challenges and headwinds faced by its telecom equipment business. In recent years, the company has been subject to increasing sanctions led by the US government related to some of its 5G telecom equipment business practices. In May 2020, the Trump Administration announced a new direct product rule (DPR) that effectively blocks Huawei's access to advanced semiconductors for all its products. Sanctions of this magnitude have put the company into crisis mode and has caused a rethinking of its supply and value chain strategies. This case highlights some lessons for Chinese companies as they attempt to globalize their brands and operations in a world that still perceives them as a threat. The case also highlights the need to evaluate supply and value chain risks from the strategic standpoint and not just an operational view.

This case is about INSEAD's Startup Booster for Entrepreneurs (SBE) and the MBA students who choose the elective. The unique course is designed to immerse students in an entrepreneurial environment. As an entrepreneur rather than a typical academic, Raomal Perera developed the elective to run over three periods, giving students enough time to start a venture or hatch an idea. SBE is an experiential entrepreneurial journey where students learn by doing. It provides real-world, hands-on experience for founders and would-be entrepreneurs rather than theory. Raomal encourages students who have a preconceived project to take the course and put what they learn into practice. Focal points include how to conduct customer discovery interviews, develop prototypes, and pitch an idea to investors. While the students who apply are all seriously 'venture-minded', they all have individual motives and experience, and their own distinct idea, goals and expectations. Outcomes vary: each student is a case study with his/her own success story.

Based in India, Butterfly Edufields Pvt. Ltd. (BFF) designed, developed, assembled, and distributed educational activities and games for Grade 1-10 students to help them understand various science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) concepts. After more than a decade of existence, BFF had grown significantly in terms of production capacity, human resources, product portfolio, and geographical reach. Between 2010 and 2019, its revenues had grown 15 times. In November 2019, the company's chief executive officer faced three challenges: (1) the firm's inability to meet orders for newly introduced products; (2) its limited ability to tap and serve the huge market of 1.5 million schools across India; and (3) its failure to capture the enormous potential of selling educational toys online-a $300 million market. The chief executive officer believed that the traditional cost structure of centralized design, production, and distribution might not support the non-linear growth he envisaged for the company, so he had collected the value-added details for one of BFF's products with the intention of evaluating alternate value chain configurations for the company.

In February 2020, an entrepreneur and his team in China created a mobile application called Tong Cheng Lian Kang (TCLK), which crowdsourced information on publicly known cases of COVID-19, enabling users to find out if they might have been exposed to an infected individual. The application leveraged blockchain technology to record and validate user submissions of COVID-19 cases to ensure that submission and validation data were immutable, transparent, and decentralized. Users could volunteer to submit publicly recorded cases of COVID-19 or to validate the submissions of others in exchange for digital tokens on the blockchain platform, which they could use to redeem small gifts. As the number of new COVID-19 cases decreased, the entrepreneur wondered how to expand the blockchain concept to build a more sustainable business model. He was considering three options: expanding internationally, which would require building trust with users who lacked familiarity with Chinese applications; diversifying within the healthcare industry by expanding to a business-to-business model, possibly by linking prospective patients to hospitals and health care; and applying the blockchain concept to address issues in industries outside of healthcare. How could he best ensure the sustainability of TCLK?

The Unified Dental Care case follows search fund leaders Jason Jackson and Olaide Lawal as they evaluate whether or not to acquire Unified Dental Care, a mid-sized dental practice in Detroit. The case addresses managing audits, accounting issues, and other issues of trust with a seller, as well as handling communications with a search fund board of investors.

This case analyzes the situation faced by the judges who were choosing that year's World Coach of the Year in November 2010. The FIFA Award ceremony was to be held for the first time in January of the following year in Zurich (Switzerland). The voting period opened in the final week of October and lasted a month. As this was the first time the award ceremony would be held, the judges needed to make a decision that convinced the public and did not jeopardize FIFA's credibility. Hence, they needed to take into consideration aspects relating to the results obtained by the coaches, their personalities, their relationships with the players, and the type of players who had an influence on the three finalists' leadership characteristics. The key question was: who was the most complete leader and deserved the 'World Coach of the Year' award?

On March 18, 2019, Yuvraj Mehta, head Corporate Brand Management & Communications (CBMC) at Larsen & Toubro (L&T), heard about negative media narratives against L&T, following a high-profile merger and acquisition (M&A) between the company and Mindtree. Some of the allegations against L&T were "hostile takeover" and "destruction of Mindtree's culture." Mehta was faced with the issues of influencing all stakeholders; turning the tide and changing the narrative from hostile takeover to continuity, growth and profitability; and integrating Mindtree and its employees and culture into L&T. Compared to L&T's previous acquisitions, which were small, and other strategic initiatives, which were mostly organic, Mindtree acquisition was the largest (in value terms) in its history. It was also the most complex as Mindtree promoters aggressively resisted the acquisition, and L&T had to acquire a large number of shares through an open offer. Media speculations began in January 2019 when L&T, the engineering and construction giant, planned to acquire a majority stake in the young IT firm, Mindtree. Soon the reporting changed to aggressive media ranting. Time was at a premium. Mehta knew he would need to begin strategising almost immediately. How should he proceed? What should be his first move?

The case describes the last quarter century in the Foundation's life cycle. During these years, the Foundation developed a governance structure and conditions of governance that allowed it to become the parent company of a group of enterprises in addition to being faithful to its mission, dealing with the moral hazard present in the different agency relationships, and remaining active in the environment in which it competed.In March 2017, 15 months following the withdrawal of the founding religious order, the relevant issue for the Foundation's director -following the validation of the organization's strategic orientation- was whether or not it was time to reconfigure its governance structure.

In 2019, BT Slingsby founds Catalys Pacific, the first biotech "venture creation" fund in Tokyo. After convincing some of the biggest Japanese pharmaceutical firms to invest, BT hopes the fund can make a big splash and transform biotechnology innovation in Japan. After examining hundreds of potential investment opportunities, his team must decide which deals to pursue first. How can Catalys Pacific establish a positive investment track record while galvanizing an entire innovation ecosystem? To achieve its vision, the Catalys Pacific team must use its experience in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry to identify promising deals, while navigating corporate politics and potential cultural roadblocks.

Hitachi must decide whether to make a British executive, who has successfully built its European rail business from scratch, head of its global rail division even though the bulk of revenues for the unit still come from Japan. The case describes the history of Hitachi Rail as the provider of trains for the Japanese Shinkansen and its struggles to build a European business with expatriates before the success of an outside hire, Alistair Dormer, in winning major contracts in the UK. By 2014, Hitachi is wondering whether to make Dormer CEO of the global rail business in order to further globalise the unit. Will an outsider and a foreigner be the correct choice for a Japanese company? How can the values of the Japanese company be preserved as it globalises? What changes are necessary to further globalise the business?

Pallak Seth, Group CEO of PDS Multinational Fashions, is contemplating options to bring better collaboration across his global apparel supply chain platform. PDS, a group of 50-plus subsidiary companies, each led by its own CEO and with different apparel industry specialties, has grown rapidly over the past decade, yet the industry is increasingly competitive and challenges remain constant. Looking for ways to reach the Group's 2023 goals of $2 billion in revenue, Seth and his executive board are considering two ways to increase collaboration and reward performance: a joint P&L approach, to drive partnerships across the subsidiaries, and an employee stock option plan, to unlock value across the Group.

Kenyan off-grid-solar pioneer d.light can power entire homes in rural Africa but must now decide how to fund the growth of its asset-heavy business model. Ned Tozun and Sam Goldman founded d.light in 2006 to transform lives through solar solutions enabling access to electricity, the seventh of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. Originally providing simple portable solar lanterns to people without access to reliable electricity, the enterprise developed solar home systems that included lights, mobile chargers, and an energy-efficient device such as a radio, fan or TV. By 2019, with the success of home systems, d.light had become one of the leading players in the off-grid solar sector, with the world's largest distribution network for off-grid solar products and a projected revenue of over $90 million. Key to d.light's solar home systems was pay-as-you-go (PayGo) plans, a lease-to-own model consisting of a down payment followed by small (<$1.50) daily payments, normally for a period of 12 to 18 months. In 2019, sales from PayGo products were expected to contribute close to 70% of the company's annual revenue. However, PayGo was an asset-heavy model and in the past 18 months, d.light had raised over $90 million, nearly 75% of which was in debt facilities. As the company continued to grow rapidly, its co-founders were deliberating whether they ought to go out and raise capital again. If so, should it be equity or debt? How much and from whom? If not now, when? Alternatively, should they modify the business model to reduce the company's need for so much external funding?

In 2000, Eaton Corporation was a broadly diversified industrial conglomerate. But its strategy was evolving and its focus was narrowing around "power management" and more recently on "intelligent power," the use of digitally enabled products and services designed to enhance efficiency and reliability. To implement this transition, Eaton had acquired more than 70 companies and divested another 50. Such active portfolio management required Eaton to regularly assess the prospects of each business unit-the profit and growth potential-and to explore opportunities to enhance its capabilities through acquisitions. In January 2020, Eaton got an offer from Danfoss, a Danish conglomerate, to buy its hydraulics business for $3.3 billion. Recently appointed CEO Craig Arnold must decide whether this deal makes sense strategically and financially. In particular, he must decide if $3.3 billion is a fair price for the firm's hydraulics business.

In mid-2019, the chief regions and markets officer of the Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE (AGCS) insurance company was wondering how to grow the company's innovation culture, and how to manage resistance from other areas of the business. AGCS was part of Allianz SE, a European multinational financial services company whose core businesses were insurance and asset management. Recent changes in the global landscape had been driven by technological advancements, and market leaders would need to consider using new methods and innovation. AGCS had set up a new corporate incubator to accelerate digital innovation. However, the digital innovation incubator's journey was not without challenges and learning curve issues, especially during its initial stages. Within 18 months, the new corporate incubator was fully entrenched within AGCS. The next steps involved finding the right key stakeholders and strategic thrust to help it thrive.

In February 2016, the managing director of Astro-Vision Futuretech Private Limited (Astro-Vision), one of the leading astrology product and service providers in India, was deliberating his company's strategic options. He had to decide on the strategic direction of his company, particularly the business verticals, products and services, and marketing and distribution channels he should focus on, given the business environment and the company's competencies, vision, mission, value propositions, and potential for future growth.

In January 2017, Canada-based Saputo Inc. was preparing an offer to acquire the remaining shares of an Australian dairy firm, Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory Co. Hold. Ltd. (WCB). Saputo Inc. had previously acquired a majority of the equity, but minority shareholders prevented Saputo Inc. from delisting WCB from the Australian Securities Exchange. Although WCB was a publicly traded company, the current share price might not reflect its intrinsic value because its shares were very thinly traded, with most shares being owned by Saputo Inc. and a few minority shareholders. Saputo Inc. had to determine an appropriate offer price for the acquisition.

This case analyzes the University of Michigan (U-M) Endowment Fund's capability and potential responsibility to divest from fossil fuels. Similar educational institutions, such as the University of California system, had cut fossil fuels from their portfolios, posing the question of whether U-M President Mark Schlissel would be able to do the same amid the university's stakeholder pressures. The university endowment managed $12.4 billion through 235 investment managers operating independently. A central question in the case is whether agents of a public university can shift to make more socially responsible investments while still delivering the desired revenue. President Schlissel had committed to carbon neutrality, but the university was still far from achieving the goal.

This case describes the bribery accusations and subsequent investigation of the Chinese subsidiary of a U.S. publicly listed Fortune 500 company, disguised as "Voles System". The primary purpose of the case is to illustrate the internal corporate governance challenges of developed-market multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in emerging markets. This case stands out in the management education field, as it fills a gap where there are very few teaching cases discussing the dark side of international business in emerging markets. After a brief introduction of the company's background, the case describes two anonymous internal "whistleblower" allegations that the Mainland China business unit (BU) had been bribing Chinese officials to win contracts. In response to these reports, the Legal Department conducted two investigations in late 2015 and 2016, respectively, but neither found concrete evidence of bribery, and the allegations could not be substantiated. A third report was subsequently made to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in April 2017. The DOJ placed Voles under formal investigation. While the investigation found that there was no concrete evidence of bribery of Chinese officials, several managers and staff of Voles's Mainland China BU had established a slush fund and related business entities to entertain senior managers of its key customers in China. The DOJ's investigation came at a great financial cost and hurt the company's reputation in the oil and gas industry. This case ends with multiple questions facing Voles and many MNCs operating in emerging markets: How did Voles fail to prevent such management malfeasance even after implementing industry best practices for corporate governance? What are some short-term measures through which Voles can address the situation in the Mainland China BU as revealed by the DOJ's investigation? What long-term measures should Voles implement to prevent such corporate governance failures from happening again?

The case describes Dangote Cement's history, growth and business model. Dangote Cement is the main subsidiary of Dangote Group, a leading African multinational and the country's largest conglomerate. Starting as a trading firm, the group has branched out into several sectors (e.g., cement, sugar, flour, salt, FMG, agriculture, oil & gas, transport, etc) and Aliko Dangote, the Group's founder, has become Africa's wealthiest person and leading industrialist. Dangote Cement's strategy involves a unique set of choices along the value chain in order to deliver a distinctive value proposition across several African markets. The company has become a top 10 global Cement company and the leading cement manufacturer in Africa through a highly integrated business model that responds to the particular challenges and opportunities present in the developing African continent. Currently, the Group is investing heavily across different sectors (e.g., agriculture, fertilizer/chemicals, oil & gas, etc) and taking advantage of the multiple opportunities in the market. It is also consolidating its leading position in the African Cement industry, by entering new markets every year with a disruptive force. However, as Dangote Group grows far and wide, as the African market develops and as competition for local and foreign players heats up, should the Group change the strategy that has worked so well?