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Governments, activists, and the media have become adept at holding companies to account for the social consequences of their actions. In response, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as an inescapable priority for business leaders in every country. Frequently, though, CSR efforts are counterproductive, for two reasons. First, they pit business against society, when in reality the two are interdependent. Second, they pressure companies to think of corporate social responsibility in generic ways instead of in the way most appropriate to their individual strategies. The fact is, the prevailing approaches to CSR are so disconnected from strategy as to obscure many great opportunities for companies to benefit society. What a terrible waste. If corporations were to analyze their opportunities for social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core business choices, they would discover, as Whole Foods Market, Toyota, and Volvo have done, that CSR can be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed--it can be a potent source of innovation and competitive advantage. In this article, Michael Porter and Mark Kramer propose a fundamentally new way to look at the relationship between business and society that does not treat corporate growth and social welfare as a zero-sum game. They introduce a framework that individual companies can use to identify the social consequences of their actions; to discover opportunities to benefit society and themselves by strengthening the competitive context in which they operate; to determine which CSR initiatives they should address; and to find the most effective ways of doing so. Perceiving social responsibility as an opportunity rather than as damage control or a PR campaign requires dramatically different thinking--a mind-set, the authors warn, that will become increasingly important to competitive success.

Countries, organizations, and individuals around the globe spend aggressively to solve social problems, but these efforts often fail to deliver. Misdirected investment is the primary reason for that failure. Most of the money earmarked for social initiatives goes to organizations that are structured to support specific groups of recipients, often with sophisticated solutions. Such organizations rarely reach the broader populations that could be served by simpler alternatives. There is, however, an effective way to get to those underserved populations. The authors call it "catalytic innovation." Based on Clayton Christensen's disruptive-innovation model, catalytic innovations challenge organizational incumbents by offering simpler, good-enough solutions aimed at underserved groups. Unlike disruptive innovations, though, catalytic innovations are focused on creating social change. Catalytic innovators are defined by five distinct qualities. First, they create social change through scaling and replication. Second, they meet a need that is either overserved (that is, the existing solution is more complex than necessary for many people) or not served at all. Third, the products and services they offer are simpler and cheaper than alternatives, but recipients view them as good enough. Fourth, they bring in resources in ways that initially seem unattractive to incumbents. And fifth, they are often ignored, put down, or even discouraged by existing organizations, which don't see the catalytic innovators' solutions as viable. As the authors show through examples in health care, education, and economic development, both nonprofit and for-profit groups are finding ways to create catalytic innovation that drives social change.

Companies find it challenging and yet strangely reassuring to take on opponents whose strategies, strengths, and weaknesses resemble their own. Their obsession with familiar rivals, however, has blinded them to threats from disruptive, low-cost competitors. Successful price warriors, such as the German retailer Aldi, are changing the nature of competition by employing several tactics: focusing on just one or a few consumer segments, delivering the basic product or providing one benefit better than rivals do, and backing low prices with super-efficient operations. Ignoring cut-price rivals is a mistake because they eventually force companies to vacate entire market segments. Price wars are not the answer, either: Slashing prices usually lowers profits for incumbents without driving the low-cost entrants out of business. Companies take various approaches to competing against cut-price players. Some differentiate their products--a strategy that works only in certain circumstances. Others launch low-cost businesses of their own, as many airlines did in the 1990s--a so-called dual strategy that succeeds only if companies can generate synergies between the existing businesses and the new ventures, as the financial service providers HSBC and ING did. Without synergies, corporations are better off trying to transform themselves into low-cost players, a difficult feat that Ryanair accomplished in the 1990s, or into solution providers. There will always be room for both low-cost and value-added players. How much room each will have depends not only on the industry and customers' preferences, but also on the strategies traditional businesses deploy.

In 1985 the architect Michael Graves designed his first consumer product--a now famous teakettle--for Alessi, the northern Italian home-furnishings manufacturer. Although Graves later designed a knockoff for Target that goes for one-fifth the price, Alessi has sold more than 1.5 million of the original version, which grew out of a process that Roberto Verganti calls "design-driven innovation." Alessi, the lighting manufacturers Flos and Artemide, the furniture maker Kartell, and a handful of other firms based in the Lombardy region ignore the design industry's two norms: "tech push," whereby an improvement in performance and functionality dictates a modification in design, and "market pull," whereby the design accommodates consumers' demand for new features. Instead, they favor an R&D operation in which a community of architects, suppliers, critics, publishers, artists, designers, and others immerse themselves in a discourse about the role, identity, and meaning of a product well before they address its form. The products that result often represent a dramatic break from their predecessors--giving them longer commercial lives and creating high consumer expectations for the brand's future offerings. A familiar example of how a change in a product's meaning can lead to a change in its design and identity is the iMac, whose friendly colors and ovoid form declared it to be, in contrast to the typical desktop computer, an appliance for the home. The author's eight years of research into seven European design communities revealed the Lombardy cluster's special strengths: the number and quality of the links between components of the design system, such as schools, studios, and manufacturers. In addition, Lombardy is strong on imagination and motivation--qualities within reach of any group of businesses. Verganti uses the Finger Lakes region of New York State to demonstrate that the potential for a design discourse exists almost everywhere.

Dov Frohman was the head of Intel Israel at the start of the First Gulf War, and it fell to him to determine how the company would respond. In this first-person account, he describes what it's like to hold not just the future of a company but the future of an entire industry and the lives of many employees in his hands. Israeli businesses were used to preparing for war, or so Frohman thought when he assigned a task force to draw up plans in the fall of 1990 to replace enough called-up reservists to operate the Jerusalem fabrication plant, the Haifa design center, and the Tel Aviv sales and marketing office on skeleton crews. But that was before Saddam Hussein stationed ballistic missiles just seven minutes away from Tel Aviv. Concerned about chemical attacks, the Israeli civil defense agency called for all nonessential Israeli businesses to shut down when the allied attacks against Iraq began on January 17, 1991. The first missiles hit Jerusalem in the small hours of the next day. Instead of being behind the war zone, Intel Israel was going to be right in it. Frohman called in his task force and drove the 20 minutes to work that morning. It would have been easy to follow the civil defense directive and close down. Everyone was doing it; Intel's senior executives in California would have understood. But Frohman chose to ignore the directive and asked his employees to continue coming to work to keep operations running. This is the story of how and why the Intel senior executive made that decision, how he carried it out, and what the consequences were. It is a lesson about decision making when the stakes couldn't be higher.

More and more, expanding companies are hiring high-functioning groups of people who have been working together effectively within one company and can rapidly come up to speed in a new environment. These lifted-out teams don't need to get acquainted with one another or to establish shared values, mutual accountability, or group norms; their long-standing relationships and trust help them make an impact very quickly. Of course, the process is not without risks: A failed lift out can lead to loss of money, opportunity, credibility, and even native talent. Boris Groysberg and Robin Abrahams studied more than 40 high-profile moves and interviewed team leaders in multiple industries and countries to examine the risks and opportunities that lift outs present. They concluded that, regardless of industry, nationality, or size of the team, a successful lift out unfolds over four consecutive, interdependent stages that must be meticulously managed. In the courtship stage, the hiring company and the leader of the targeted team determine whether the proposed move is, in fact, a good idea, and then define their business goals and discuss strategies. At the same time, the team leader discusses the potential move with the other members of his or her group to assess their level of interest and prepare them for the change. The second stage involves the integration of the team leader with the new company's top leadership. This part of the process ensures the team's access to senior executives--the most important factor in a lift out's success. Operational integration is the focus of the third stage. Ideally, teams will start out working with the same or similar clients, vendors, and industry standards. The fourth stage entails full cultural integration. To succeed, the lifted-out team members must be willing to re-earn credibility by proving their value and winning their new colleagues' trust.

Impenetrable strategy statements can't unite employees behind an organization's goals, but concrete language and stories can.

A study of executive life in one of history's great multinational enterprises--the British Empire--reveals that the leading workaday reality in foreign offices was boredom.

To reap the value of women's contributions, a board needs at least three female directors.

As a comparison of Costco and Sam's Club shows, stingy pay and benefits translate into higher costs in the long run.

Retailers are starting to place real products in virtual worlds. It's just a matter of time before virtual products make the leap into the real world.

Larry Winget, "The Pit Bull of Personal Development," uses irritation rather than motivation to get managers on the road to improvement.

Measuring the value of your knowledge-management program probably depends less on hard numbers than on soft indicators like anecdotes and employee surveys.

Cincinnati Works, a nonprofit employment agency in Ohio, provides an innovative business model for placing--and sustaining--unskilled entry-level workers.

Today's overachieving professionals labor longer, take on more responsibility, and earn more than the workaholics of yore. They hold what Hewlett and Luce call "extreme jobs," which entail workweeks of 60 or more hours and have at least five of ten characteristics--such as tight deadlines and lots of travel--culled from the authors' research on this work model. A project of the Hidden Brain Drain Task Force, a private-sector initiative, this research consists of two large surveys (one of high earners across various professions in the United States and the other of high-earning managers in large multinational corporations) that map the shape and scope of such jobs, as well as focus groups and in-depth interviews that get at extreme workers' attitudes and motivations. In this article, Hewlett and Luce consider their data in relation to increasing competitive pressures, vastly improved communication technology, cultural shifts, and other sweeping changes that have made high-stakes employment more prominent. What emerges is a complex picture of the all-consuming career--rewarding in many ways, but not without danger to individuals and to society. By and large, extreme professionals don't feel exploited; they feel exalted. A strong majority of them in the United States--66%--say they love their jobs, and in the global companies survey, this figure rises to 76%. The authors' research suggests, however, that women are at a disadvantage. Although they don't shirk the pressure or responsibility of extreme work, they are not matching the hours logged by their male colleagues. This constitutes a barrier for ambitious women, but it also means that employers face a real opportunity: They can find better ways to tap the talents of women who will commit to hard work and responsibility but cannot put in overlong days.

During the past decade, retaliation as a basis for employment discrimination claims has risen dramatically from 4th to 2nd place (behind race), an increase of 46%. By definition, retaliation is the act of an employer, through a manager, inflicting an adverse action (such as discharge, discipline, or demotion) against an employee who has complained of discrimination. Retaliation claims open the possibility of punitive damages, examples of which are given. Drawing on 1,361 cases from a 21-year database, we report the characteristics of retaliation claims and offer recommendations to prevent and manage such claims.

According to the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), approximately $350 billion in counterfeit goods is traded annually in the world economy. Additionally, the European Commission of Taxation and Customs Union reported that 100 million fake items were seized in 2004, a 900% increase over a four-year period. Recent trade initiatives, such as the U.S. Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) and the EU Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive, target both organized pirates and consumers in an effort to bolster the protection of intellectual property rights. Understanding these innovative trade initiatives will assist managers to better deal with anti-counterfeiting tactics.

Strategic alliances have become an important means for developing and improving a firm's level of competitiveness. Although attractive, alliances are risky and difficult to manage. One crucial mechanism in managing and reducing alliance risk is reliance on personal relationships between managers in partnering firms. Personal ties are beneficial in that they can form the basis for developing trust between partners and aid joint decision-making and information sharing, thereby reducing some of the risks inherent in alliances. Despite their usefulness, however, personal relationships may have drawbacks. For example, strong interpersonal ties in alliances can sometimes prevent dissolution of faltering arrangements, as feelings may prevent the making of difficult, yet prudent, termination decisions. In order to combat this possibility, firms can reduce the downside of personal relationships by carefully managing the role of performance managers across the life of the relationship.

Aligning employees with a firm's larger strategic goals is critical if organizations hope to manage their human capital effectively and ultimately attain strategic success. An important component of attaining and sustaining this alignment is for employees to have a "line of sight" (LOS) with their organization's strategic objectives. Illustrates how the translation of calculated firm goals into tangible results requires that employees not only understand the organization's strategy, but also accurately appreciate what actions are aligned with realizing that strategy. Using recent empirical evidence, theoretical insights, and tangible examples of exemplary firm practices, provides thought leaders with a comprehensive view of LOS by showing how it can be created, how it can be enhanced or stifled, and how it can be effectively managed. Further, integrates LOS with current thinking on employee alignment to help managers more effectively benefit from understanding human capital potential.

Conventional wisdom, together with the weight of published management advice, recommends that management teams engage task conflict directly but avoid relationship conflict. Implicit in this advice is the premise that it is indeed possible to separate the task and the relationship aspects of a business conflict. Argues that this separation is not always possible for management teams. When teams discuss "hot topics," substantive disagreements (task conflicts) tend to trigger negative attributions about others' motives or abilities (a key element of relationship conflicts). When this happens, most managers suppress their true thoughts, thus avoiding genuine discussion. Yet, when interpersonal attributions are suppressed, they tend to leak into the business conversation anyway, such as in the form of implied accusations or aggravated tones of voice. These dynamics are virtually inevitable, even when managers try hard to avoid them. Making a distinction between "hot" and "cool" topics can help clarify when avoiding discussion of relationship conflict in management teams is feasible and when it's not. In addition, management teams facing hot topics need to learn to handle relationship conflicts productively, despite the heightened emotions and interpersonal tensions associated with them.