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A study of more than 600 retail outlets finds that stock-outs are far more costly than most companies imagine.

A corporate brand, which is based on the characteristics of the firm as well as its products, can play a critical role in a company's brand portfolio. It can help differentiate the firm, support internal brand building, facilitate brand management, build credibility, and provide a vehicle for communicating with and maintaining support among broad external constituencies. However, defining and successfully managing the corporate brand requires the firm to address a number of challenges, including maintaining its relevance to the company's strategy, demonstrating its benefits to consumers, and avoiding negative associations or controversies.

Although all companies would like a better corporate reputation, many are not sure what it takes to create a good reputation and others are not sure that they should use their good reputation to compete in their various markets. Mimicking the behavior of respected companies does not provide a reliable resolution to these dilemmas. Presents a framework to help managers create a better corporate reputation for their organizations and assist them in deciding whether to use this as a primary basis for competition. Also exposes some of the main costs for an organization that decides to compete on its corporate reputation.

Advance selling can be profitable when consumers are uncertain about their future consumption state. At the time of consumption, that uncertainty is resolved, but buyer states still remain unobservable to sellers. Consequently, buyer and seller information is symmetric in advance but asymmetric at consumption (i.e., sellers have an informational disadvantage in the consumption period relative to the advance period). Therefore, sellers can profit from transacting in the advance period when they are at less of a disadvantage. New technologies (e.g., biometrics, electronic tickets, smart cards, online prepayments, and new e-commerce technologies) also enhance the profitability of advance selling by lowering advance-selling costs and restraining arbitrage.

The need to play catch-up in biotechnology has led Germany and Japan to adopt novel technology policies. Whereas policies to assist domestic industries have traditionally been geared toward incumbent firms, current trends revolve around "science entrepreneurship"--reforms in the national R&D system and targeted incentives for biotechnology scientists to file patents and start up their own firms. Japan, in particular, has recognized that catching up with the United States in basic science and in the commercialization of scientific research represents a kind of final frontier.

Although there has been an explosion in the number of technology sourcing relationships between firms--including alliances, acquisitions, and all intermediate levels of equity ownership--managers lack a comprehensive framework to guide them in equity ownership decisions meant to access technology. Higher levels of equity ownership can provide benefits such as exclusive access to and control over critical resources, alignment of interests between partners, and better coordination and control of partner interaction. On the other hand, equity ownership also entails costs associated with implementing changes to organizational structures, in addition to lower employee motivation as well as commitment costs due to market or technological uncertainty.

China is one of the most important foreign investment markets in both volume and growth. However, property rights protection in China is extremely weak and expropriations by both public and private actions are rampant. How can the booming of foreign investment and the looting of property co-exist? Why is protecting property rights so difficult in China? Shows that the different paces of institutional change between formal and informal constraints are the major cause behind the lack of property right protection in China. Discusses policy considerations for China to improve property right protection and raises two fundamental issues for multinational firms doing business in China.

Presents 10 standard guidelines for calculating social return on investment (SROI)--quantitative summaries of companies' social and environmental impacts, actual or projected. SROI is a technique for summarizing the value of companies' environmental and social benefits in terms of a dollar value equivalent. Using data and examples from 88 actual business plans, this article discusses common errors in such assessments and makes recommendations for standardizing them. The aim is to make SROI metrics more comprehensive, credible, and useful for entrepreneurs, managers, and analysts. Such a common framework would also enable investors to compare the social impact of different firms within the same industry.

In China, guanxi, or personal connections, can divide the loyalties of the sales and procurement people on which your company depends. If you're alert to its potential to cause mischief, you can head off relationships that could work against you.

Companies voluntarily reducing their greenhouse gases are helping to shape the governmental regulations that are coming soon. If you don't act now, you'll find your competitors will write the rules for you.

Social and professional networks are crucial to innovation. New research reveals that it takes just a few key players to catalyze the agglomeration of many small networks into larger ones and boost innovation across a whole region.

Nonprofits are putting hard numbers on the value of their brands, many of which consumers trust highly. Such organizations are hoping brand valuation will give them greater influence as they negotiate cobranding alliances with corporate partners.

Real-time information about things like network outages, product development, and customer satisfaction is available, but few executives capitalize on it. That's because they're not asking the right questions.

For men, ambition is considered a necessary and desirable part of life. Most women, however, associate ambition with egotism, self-aggrandizement, or manipulation. Getting to the bottom of why this is so required study of what ambition consists of--for both sexes. In childhood, the research uncovered, girls are clear about their ambitions. Their goals are grand and they make no apologies for them. In nearly all childhood ambitions, two distinct factors are in place: the mastery of a special skill and recognition for it. And what's true in childhood is no less true in later life: We all want our efforts and accomplishments acknowledged. Yet, there are dramatic differences in how women and men create, reconfigure, and realize (or abandon) their goals. Most women are demure when praised for their achievements. Research shows that such behavior varies according to social context: Women more openly seek and compete for affirmation when they are with other women, but behave differently when competing with men. The underlying problem has to do with cultural ideals of femininity. Women face the reality that to appear feminine, they must provide or relinquish scarce resources to others--and recognition is a scarce resource. Although women have more opportunities than ever before, they still come under social scrutiny that makes hard choices--such as when and whether to start a family or advance in the workplace--even harder. There are no easy solutions, but there are ways women can hold fast to their dreams. They must band together, learn to blow their own horns, and structure their lives in a way that promotes recognition.

The winners in business play hardball, and they don't apologize for it. They single-mindedly pursue competitive advantage and the benefits it offers: a leading market share, great margins, and rapid growth. They pick their shots, seek out competitive encounters, set the pace of innovation, and test the edges of the possible. Softball players, by contrast, may look good, but they aren't intensely serious about winning. They don't accept that you must sometimes hurt your rivals, and risk being hurt, to get what you want. Softball players don't play to win; they play to play. That approach may reflect the recent focus of management science, which itself has gone soft. Indeed, the discourse around soft issues such as leadership, corporate culture, knowledge management, talent management, and employee empowerment has encouraged the making of softball players. Although there are countless ways to play hardball, a handful of classic strategies are effective in generating competitive advantage. Best employed in bursts of ruthless intensity, these strategies are: Devastate rivals' profit sanctuaries, plagiarize with pride, deceive the competition, unleash massive and overwhelming force, and raise competitors' costs. But hardball isn't only about the moves you make. It's also about the attitude you bring to them. The playbook won't do you any good if you feel squeamish about using it.

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges, and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives with the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is not easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand.

Breakthrough innovations--not just steady improvements--in operations can destroy competitors and shake up entire industries. Just look at Dell, Toyota, and Wal-Mart. But fewer than 10% of large companies have made serious attempts to achieve operational innovation. Why? One reason, contends the author, is that business culture undervalues operations--they're not as sexy as deals or acquisitions. In addition, many executives who rose through the ranks of finance or sales aren't familiar with operations--and they aren't interested in learning more. Finally, because no one holds the title vice-president of operational innovation, it doesn't have a natural home in the organization, so it's easily overlooked. Fortunately, all of these barriers can be overcome. This article offers practical advice on how to develop operational innovations, such as looking for role models outside your industry to emulate and identifying--and then defying--constraining assumptions about how work should be done. The author also discusses the best way to implement operational innovations. For instance, because they are disruptive by nature, projects should be concentrated in those activities with the greatest impact on enterprise strategic goals. Operational innovation may feel unglamorous or unfamiliar to many executives, but it is the only lasting basis for superior performance.

Deal making is glamorous; due diligence is not. That simple statement goes a long way toward explaining why so many companies have made so many acquisitions that have produced so little value. The momentum of a transaction is hard to resist once senior management has the target in its sights. Companies contract "deal fever," and due diligence all too often becomes an exercise in verifying the target's financial statements rather than conducting a fair analysis of the deal's strategic logic and the acquirer's ability to realize value from it. In a recent Bain & Co. survey of 250 international executives with M&A responsibilities, only 30% of them were satisfied with the rigor of their due diligence. And fully a third admitted they hadn't walked away from deals they had nagging doubts about. In this article, the authors, all Bain consultants, emphasize the importance of comprehensive due diligence practices and suggest ways companies can improve their capabilities in this area. They provide rich, real-world examples of companies that have had varying levels of success with their due diligence processes, including Safeway, Odeon, American Seafoods, and Kellogg's. Effective due diligence requires answering four basic questions: What are we really buying? What is the target's stand-alone value? Where are the synergies--and the skeletons? And what's our walk-away price? Each of these questions will prompt an even deeper level of querying that puts the broader, strategic rationale for acquisitions under a microscope.

During the dot-com boom, many people saw the potential for new communication technologies to enable radically new business models, but they were far too optimistic about the speed with which the revolution would occur. Now, as the bitter disillusionment of the dot-com bust begins to fade, we have a chance to think again--this time more rationally--about how best to take advantage of the remarkable changes these new technologies are gradually making possible. One such change is the ability to create markets inside companies, allowing decision making to be decentralized and introducing some of the efficiency, flexibility, and motivating influence of free markets. In this article, the author examines this nascent form of business organization, exploring the benefits as well as the potential risks. BP, for example, met its goal of reducing the company's greenhouse gas emissions nine years ahead of schedule, not by setting and enforcing targets for each division but by allowing business unit heads to buy and sell emissions permits among themselves using an electronic trading system. And Hewlett-Packard recently experimented with a system that allowed employees to buy and sell predictions about likely printer sales, using a kind of futures contract. The markets ended up predicting the actual printer sales with much more accuracy than official HP forecasts. At a fundamental level, these changes are enabled by the fact that electronic technologies allow information to be widely shared at little cost. This simple fact has a profound implication for organizing businesses. When more people have more information, they can use it to make their own well-informed decisions, appropriate to local circumstances, instead of following orders from above. As a result, even very large companies can benefit from the collective wisdom of their employees.

In the late 1990s, Fleet Bank was facing high and rising employee turnover, particularly in its retail operations. Overall turnover had reached 25% annually, and among some groups, such as tellers and customer service reps, turnover was as high as 40%. Using a new methodology developed by Mercer Human Resource Consulting, Fleet set out to determine why so many employees were leaving and what could be done to retain them. Fleet's analysis showed that people were leaving not so much for better pay but for broader experience, which they thought would enhance their marketability. Additionally, the analysis revealed a link between the turnover problem and the company's busy history of mergers and acquisitions. Fleet's mergers and acquisitions frequently meant that it had to consolidate operations. That consolidation resulted in layoffs, which provoked higher levels of voluntary turnover, perhaps because remaining employees began worrying about their job security. Although the obvious solution to the turnover problem might have been to compensate the remaining employees--say, with higher pay--the more effective and less costly solution, Fleet discovered, was to focus on employees' career opportunities within the company. Those who moved up the hierarchy, or who even made lateral moves, stayed longer. Its solutions required only modest investments that, in the end, saved the company millions of dollars.