個案總覽

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Unless an enterprise generates new knowledge and pumps it efficiently throughout its network, it will soon be playing tomorrow's game with yesterday's tools. Many rely on an information technology infrastructure; but no matter how sophisticated, it is not the key to effective knowledge management. Success, say the authors, depends more on the social system in which people operate--the social ecology of a company. Social ecology drives people's expectations, defines who will fit in, shapes individuals' freedom to pursue actions without prior approval, and affects how they interact with both insiders and outsiders. Focusing on Nucor Corp.'s success in the 1980s and 1990s, the authors suggest that it was the company's social ecology that contributed to it becoming one of the most efficient steel producers in the world. Through effective management of knowledge, Nucor developed and constantly upgraded its main strategic and proprietary competencies: plant construction and start-up know-how, manufacturing process expertise, and the ability to adopt breakthrough technologies earlier than competitors. Nucor's social ecology also allowed, among other things, excellence in the tasks associated with sharing and mobilizing knowledge: identifying opportunities to share knowledge, encouraging individuals to share knowledge, building effective and efficient transmission channels, and convincing individuals to accept and use the knowledge received. The authors explain how others can maximize knowledge sharing by setting stretch goals, providing high-powered incentives, cultivating empowerment, equipping every unit with a well-defined "sandbox" for experimentation, and cultivating an internal market for ideas. It's a difficult challenge. But its very difficulty means that companies tackling it successfully will have a competitive advantage that rivals cannot beat merely by buying the same software.

The American health care system is undergoing a market and organizational transformation analogous to the deregulation of the transportation, communication, utility, and finance industries, with price competition replacing rate controls, new entrants displacing organizational incumbents, innovation disrupting stability, and individual choice supplanting governmental oversight. These turbulent changes are generating uncertainty, hostility, and a backlash towards re-regulation. This article compares the evolution of the health care sector with the experiences of other deregulated industries, highlighting four effects that cut across all sectors. Deregulation and the role of price competition has led everywhere to: lower costs, due to better capacity utilization and improved productivity; increased differentiation of prices and products, moving away from the one-size-fits-all patterns characteristic of regulated industries; dynamic changes in both market and organizational structures, culminating in consolidation into multi-product, geographically diversified firms; and political backlash, fueled by uncertainty, organized producer groups, and selected groups of consumers who do not benefit from the overall cost and product improvements.

The role of American corporations as purchasers of health insurance for their employees has changed dramatically over the past several decades from a passive stance to an aggressive purchasing and policy-making role. The transformation has caused purchasers to question the appropriateness of their health benefit interventions for legal, ethical, and financial reasons. Recent research about the role of "medical necessity" in California managed care decision making reveals a number of problems purchasers face and describes solutions recommended by some purchasers to those problems.

Managing an organizational transformation is a risky and difficult endeavor. This article examines the lessons learned from the transformation of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), one of the largest agencies in the federal government. The transformation, which has proven to be highly successful, has focused on changing the agency from a health care delivery system emphasizing inpatient-oriented tertiary care to a health care delivery system that can meet the growing needs of veterans for outpatient-oriented primary care. The VHA's experience reveals the importance of selecting leaders whose qualifications match the needs of the transformation, developing a coherent transformation plan, maintaining a focus on key transformation goals, and managing external changes to complement internal ones. In addition, the VHA's experience reminds us that a transformation often raises significant issues concerning employee training and education, communication with frontline employees, and the balance between centralized control and operating unit flexibility.

A recent report from the Institute of Medicine has focused attention anew on the incidence of medical errors in the health care industry. While there is a relatively large body of research on how organizations can operate in a highly reliable manner, and thus avoid such errors, little of that work has been done in the health care field. This article discusses the ways in which the health care industry has failed to meet systematically the standards for achieving high reliability, based in part on two existing theories about the management of high-hazard environments--High Reliability Organization Theory (HROT) and Normal Accidents Theory (NAT).

How can manufacturers of styled products analyze and predict consumers' style preferences more effectively? Based on insights from a decade of desk and field research, the authors outline a model for facilitating style decisions that balance extreme innovation with the least market risk. The core concept in the model is adoption propensity (AP): the quantifiable willingness of an individual consumer to adopt new and different styles. By relating style appeal to consumers' AP over time, one can construct a model of the style acceptance cycle that fits the research data and provides predictive power in the development phase of a style. The model suggests the importance of separating a style's total sample appeal into that of consumers with high and low APs. Otherwise, there is no way to tell the difference between a promising cycle marked by steadily increasing style acceptance and the opposite one of a premature "has-been." There is no such thing as a universal category of early adopters, and they can be identified for a specific product category only by interview or similar methods. Early adopters alone tell us nothing about a style's potential; more important is the absolute difference in acceptance between high and low APs--if both early and late adopters like a style, then it's fine for today, but has no future. Wherever styled products are targeted to the mass market, this type of pre-market testing should become a normal function of product development.

It's no secret that health care delivery is convoluted, expensive, and often deeply dissatisfying to consumers. But what is less obvious is that a way out of this crisis exists. Just as the PC replaced the mainframe and the telephone replaced the telegraph operator, disruptive innovations are changing the landscape of health care. Nurse practitioners, general practitioners, and even patients can do things in less-expensive, decentralized settings that could once be performed only by expensive specialists in centralized, inconvenient locations. But established institutions are fighting these innovations tooth and nail. Not only is this at the root of consumer dissatisfaction with the present system, it sows the seeds of its own destruction. The history of disruptive innovations tells us that incumbent institutions will be replaced with ones whose business models are appropriate to the new technologies and markets. Instead of working to preserve the existing systems, regulators, physicians, and pharmaceutical companies need to ask how they can enable more disruptive innovations to emerge. If the natural process of disruption is allowed to proceed, the result will be higher quality, lower cost, more convenient health care for everyone.

When looking for ways to cut costs, most managers reach for the head-count hatchet, and the markets usually roar with approval. But a company can almost always create far more sustainable value by rigorously evaluating the small-ticket capital items that often get rubber-stamped. Drawing on his experience as a consultant and providing numerous anecdotes, the author contends that those "little" requests often prove to be gold plated or unnecessary. A disciplined evaluation involves asking only eight questions and conducting postmortems--regular audits of units' capital spending. But the payoff is enormous. Because cutting the capital budget increases cash flow, the author argues that a permanent cut of just 15% in the planned level of capital spending could boost some companies' market capitalization by as much as 30%.

Though only five years old, employee-owned St. Luke's Communications has become one of the most talked about advertising agencies in the United Kingdom, increasing its profits eightfold. Chairman and cofounder Andy Law attributes the firm's success to its determination to continuously reinvent itself in a world populated by dot-coms and mega-ad agencies. St Luke's intends to revolutionize the way business is done and provide a credible alternative to the capitalism of both the old economy and the new. To that end, it pushes its people to take enormous risks. As Law says in this candid interview, "We're fundamentally convinced that there is a connection between co-ownership, creativity, collaboration, and competitive advantage." Safety and fear play key roles. No one has ever been fired for poor performance, so employees can feel secure about their jobs, but the firm requires people "to peel away all the levels of their personalities....That's truly frightening." Self-knowledge, Law says, "is the DNA of a creative company in the creative age."

Employees have an enormous amount of business information at their fingertips--more specifically, at their desktops. The floodgates are open; profitable possibilities abound. But having to handle all that information has pushed downsized staffs to the brink of an acute attention deficit disorder. To achieve corporate goals, business leaders need their employees' full attention--and that attention is in short supply. In this article, the authors analyze the components of attention management through three lenses--economic, psychobiological, and technological--and offer guidelines for keeping employees focused on crucial corporate tasks. Their lessons are drawn from the best practices employed by today's stickiest Web sites and by traditional attention industries such as advertising, film, and television. The authors say executives must manage attention knowing that it's a zero-sum game (there's only so much to go around). Managers should also consider capitalizing on the basic survival and competitive instincts we all have that help determine how much attention we pay to certain things. For instance, the threat of corporate demise--and the consequent loss of jobs and livelihoods--undoubtedly focuses workers' attention on the need to change. Likewise, internal competition among business units may give employees added incentive to pay attention to a profit or sales goal.

We all know that leaders need vision and energy, but after an exhaustive review of the most influential theories on leadership--as well as workshops with thousands of leaders and aspiring leaders--the authors learned that great leaders also share four unexpected qualities: 1) They selectively reveal their weaknesses; 2) They rely heavily on intuition to gauge the appropriate timing and course of their actions; 3) They manage employees with "tough empathy"; and 4) They capitalize on their differences. All four qualities are necessary for inspirational leadership, but they cannot be used mechanically; they must be mixed and matched to meet the demands of particular situations. Most important, however, is that the qualities encourage authenticity among leaders. To be a true leader, the authors advise, "Be yourself--more--with skill."

Business incubators such as Hotbank, CMGI, and Idealab! are a booming industry. Offering office space, funding, and basic services to start-ups, these organizations have become the hottest way to nurture and grow fledgling businesses. But are incubators a fleeting phenomenon born of an overheated stock market, or are they an important and lasting way of creating value and wealth in the new economy? The authors argue that one type of incubator, called a networked incubator, represents a fundamentally new and enduring organizational model uniquely suited to growing businesses in the Internet economy. Its key distinguishing feature is its ability to give start-ups preferential access to a network of potential partners. Such incubators institutionalize their networking. That doesn't mean incubatees get preferential treatment; it means only that they have built-in access to partnerships that might not have existed without the incubator. Even with this advantage, however, networked incubators can easily follow the road to ruin. To avoid failure, they must create a portfolio of companies and advisers that their incubatees can leverage.

Digital technology is reshaping the media and telecommunications industries. Now we can convert all kinds of information into digital bits and deliver them through the same pipe. This is an earthquake rocking traditional publishers like Encyclopaedia Britannica, media moguls like Time Warner, and telecom giants like Bell Atlantic. Barriers to entry are falling everywhere. Hillis predicts a battle in the next decade, as the incumbents try to hold on to their traditional advantages. Since Congress is easier to fool than the marketplace, Hillis maintains, much of that battle will be fought over regulations. Reed Hundt's engaging You Say You Want a Revolution provides useful background to this battle. As chairman of the FCC from 1993 to 1997, Hundt was at the forefront of efforts to break down the barriers between the different delivery media. Less satisfying to Hillis is George Gilder's large think piece, Telecosm, in which Gilder looks at the emerging technology and business of information delivery. Lyrical, but not always accurate, the book should be read more for its gestalt than for its details. Gilder and Hundt may disagree on how much to deregulate, but they agree that deregulation is desirable in the long run. Once the marketplace is open, Hillis predicts, the industries will split along functional lines: technology companies will deliver the bits and creative specialists will provide content and services.

If you were a military general on the march, you'd want your troops to have plenty of maps--detailed information about the mission they were on, the roads they would travel, the campaigns they would undertake, and the weapons at their disposal. The same holds true in business: a workforce needs clear and detailed information to execute a business strategy successfully. Authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton, cocreators of the balanced scorecard, have adapted that seminal tool to create strategy maps. Strategy maps let an organization describe and illustrate--in clear and general language--its objectives, initiatives, targets markets, performance measures, and the links between all the pieces of its strategy. Using Mobil North American Marketing and Refining Company as an example, Kaplan and Norton walk through the creation of a strategy map and its four distinct regions--financial, customer, internal process, and learning and growth--which correspond to the four perspectives of the balanced scorecard. The authors show how the Mobil division used the map to transform itself from a centrally controlled manufacturer of commodity products to a decentralized, customer-driven organization.

Identifying which business ideas have real commercial potential is fraught with uncertainty, and even the most admired companies have stumbled. In this article, W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne introduce three tools that managers can use to help strip away some of that uncertainty. The first tool, "the buyer utility map," indicates how likely it is that customers will be attracted to a new business idea. The second, "the price corridor of the mass," identifies what price will unlock the greatest number of customers. And the third tool, "the business model guide," offers a framework for figuring out whether and how a company can profitably deliver the new idea at the targeted price. Applying the tools, though, is not the end of the story. Many innovations have to overcome adoption hurdles--strong resistance from stakeholders inside and outside the company. The authors conclude by discussing how managers can head off negative reactions from stakeholders.

Once you say what business you're in, you put your employees into a mental straitjacket and hand them a ready-made excuse for ignoring new opportunities. So rather than dictate his company's identity, Ricardo Semler--the majority owner of Semco in Sao Paulo, Brazil--lets his employees shape it through their individual efforts and interests. "I don't know what Semco is," he writes in this first-person account of his company's expansion from manufacturing to Internet services. "Nor do I want to know." The author shares some of the lessons he has learned: Forget about the top line. Never stop being a start-up. Don't be a nanny (treat your employees like adults). Let talent find its place. Make decisions quickly and openly when it comes to reviewing proposals for new businesses. And partner promiscuously: "Our partners," Semler says, "are as much a part of our company as our employees."

We've all worked with highly competent people who are held back by a seemingly fatal personality flaw. At best, people with these "bad habits" create their own glass ceilings, which limit their success and their contributions to the company. At worst, they destroy their own careers. The authors suggest concrete tactics they have used to help people recognize and correct the following six behavior patterns: The hero, who always pushes himself--and subordinates--too hard to do too much for too long. The meritocrat, who believes that the best ideas can and will be determined objectively and ignores the politics inherent in most situations. The bulldozer, who runs roughshod over others in a quest for power. The pessimist, who always worries about what could go wrong. The rebel, who automatically fights against authority and convention. And the home run hitter, who tries to do too much too soon--he swings for the fences before he's learned to hit singles. Helping people break through their self-created glass ceilings is the ultimate win-win scenario: both the individual and the organization are rewarded. Using the tactics introduced in this article, managers can help their brilliantly flawed performers become spectacular achievers.

Entrepreneurs risk having strategically sensitive information leaked to competitors when their VCs discuss new ventures with outside partners. To avoid that problem, many are turning to other sources of financing.

Antibusiness protestors are increasing their presence on the Web. Companies need to be smarter in using their own Web sites to deflect attacks.

Hewlett-Packard is giving away its e-speak software. The product's general manager explains the rationale for the risky move.