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This case examines the strategic choices and evolving business model of Imprimis Pharmaceuticals from the perspective of CEO Mark Baum. The A case provides a brief history of the company and of the compounding business, outlining the challenges faced by Imprimis in 2013. At the time, Imprimis was in the process of seeking FDA approval for a branded drug called Impracor. This process, already difficult, was further complicated by recent manufacturing issues. Meanwhile, the opportunity arose for Imprimis to purchase a technology related to compounded ocular injections. Because of the different competencies and business models required for the traditional pharmaceutical business vs. pharmaceutical compounding, Imprimis did not have the resources to pursue both of these options at once. Instead, Baum had to decide whether or not to abandon the company's previous focus on Impracor and to delve headlong into the compounding business. The two paths would require vastly different approaches to marketing, R&D, and manufacturing, so that either decision would shape the future of the company for years to come.

In 2015, Ukraine needs IMF funding to bridge a projected $40 billion funding shortfall and is proposing a 40% "haircut" to Ukraine's $18 billion of Eurobonds. Can Ukraine negotiate a deal with its many creditors that will give it the funding the country needs on terms they can accept?

Raj Makam had spent months trying to restructure a 2006 investment he had made in National Truck Stops, Inc. (NTS) as a senior member of Oaktree Capital Management's (Oaktree) Mezzanine finance business within their Corporate Debt platform. It was the first time they had truly considered forcing a company into involuntary bankruptcy, which he clearly would prefer to avoid lest they risk losing their entire investment. As the company's financial position worsened, Oaktree's counterparties became increasingly difficult. It often seemed as if they were prioritizing their ongoing business relationships over the economics of their respective investments. Oaktree knew the cards were stacked in its favor legally, but did that really make a difference when the cost of perfecting its interests would be so expensive and difficult? Would this be a Pyrrhic victory?

James Reid, the newly appointed GM of Troubled Spain, has been given a mandate by the CEO of Troubled Inc. to turn the subsidiary around within six months. Troubled Spain has experienced several years of poor performance that cannot be explained by either sluggish demand or lagging technology. The case provides information about interviews that James had with several employees, describing the role of the employee and giving insights into the issues that they see the company facing. These interviews are complemented by three charts prepared by consultants that James hired to conduct an internal audit of collaboration, communication and informal leadership in the organization. James needs to transform the organization within six months; however, this implies changing relationships that have been developed over decades and clarifying roles and boundaries that have been blurred over many years. The case challenges students to take James' position and identify the issues of Troubled Spain to develop an action plan in order to address the challenges facing the company. James needs to address: 1) issues concerning Troubled Spain's formal structure, 2) issues regarding its informal structure, including leadership issues, and 3) issues stemming from the combination of both formal and informal features. Case B provides information about what happened next and may be distributed at the end of the session.

Founded in 2013 as a laundry service featuring online ordering for home pickup and delivery, China's edaixi (eWash) illustrated the online-to-offline (O2O) business model. As yet unclear in 2016 was the optimal way to organize third-party laundry service providers, locally sourced teams of freelancers, and in-house operations.

Radically innovative thinker Sy Friedland was a decade or more ahead of the trends when he took the reins of Boston's venerable Jewish Children & Family Services in the late 1990s. A career clinical social worker, Friedland was also a visionary who knew that the future of building sustainable social services and nonprofits lay in the willingness of nonprofit workers to embrace "for-profit" concepts, attitudes and best practices. Friedland's total transformation of JF&CS enabled the agency to thrive and become self-supporting. When Friedland decided to step down after 17 years, he knew the agency could suffer in the transition and took elaborate steps to avoid crippling his agency's fundraising capacity and minimize disruption, even calling in a highest-level corporate HR consultancy firm to reduce risk and assist in on-boarding his hand-picked successor. However, because he was focused exclusively on minimizing disruption, Friedland made some crucial errors. His handling of his transition ended up causing an uproar in the board that resulted in changes in governance and policies going forward-proving that even visionaries can make mistakes.

One of the biggest logistics services providers in Colombia, Servientrega started out as a one-man courier operation on the streets of Bogota in 1982. Jesus Guerrero, an enterprising messenger boy, set up his own delivery service at the age of 18. After attracting more clients than he could handle, he persuaded his sister Luz Mary to join the company and invest her savings in exchange for half of the shares. Before long, Servientrega was growing so fast that they employed other siblings. Jesus gave one brother a 5% share in the business, expecting his sister to do the same. However, she held on to her 50% and used her majority shareholder position to take over, forcing her brother out of the CEO job. Jesus began acquiring new logistics operations that he consolidated into the Guerrero Group, which today has 39 subsidiaries (including Servientrega) and employs 28,500 people. The lawsuits that plagued the former partners and put their venture at risk ultimately prompted Jesus to launch a competitor to Servientrega, RedServi.

Sembcorp Industries, a Singapore conglomerate with assets of over S$22 billion, was undergoing a change in leadership. Tang Kin Fei retired as group president and CEO in April 2017 after 30 years with the company. Overseas operations accounted for 63% of their Utilities business' net profit, which formed the bulk of group earnings in 2016. Sembcorp's global power portfolio had doubled in the last five years. Rapidly developing economies, hungry for energy to fuel growth and urbanisation, were their key targets. There were growing concerns on the execution risks of developing a project pipeline in these markets and the environmental, social and governance (ESG) challenges involved. Sustaining their growth path might not simply be a matter of building on past success and replicating their business model overseas. How would they manage the inherent risks and complexities of the emerging markets, namely India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China, albeit ripe with opportunities?

Delta Plastics of the South developed a new software product, Pipe Planner, which was complementary to its core product, Polytube, used by farmers to irrigate crops in the delta region of Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana. Pipe Planner helped farmers by calculating, for any particular field, the size of pipe needed, how to punch holes in the pipe and how long to irrigate. Using the software could lower the farmer's cost of irrigating by up to 25 percent particularly through savings of fuel and time. It also conserved water, an important issue for delta farmers. The software was a significant improvement to PHAUCET, a similar but free government program already in limited use in the delta. Company leadership was sure that the product would have a strong market, but sales were discouraging with fewer than 200,000 acres (less than three percent of the market) under Pipe Planner management after three years of development efforts. Company leaders must decide if Delta Plastics should continue to invest money and resources in Pipe Planner, and if so, how to market and encourage use of the Pipe Planner program software by farmers. In this case the students can study the initial failure of diffusion of a market innovation and analyze the factors that led to that failure in a particular social context-farmers in the delta region. The case is suitable for use in a class on communication, or product innovation and marketing, for upper level undergraduates or graduate students. Students use the diffusion of innovation analysis to propose and evaluate options for Delta Plastics regarding next steps in the marketing and promotion of Pipe Planner within its core market.

In late October 2012 the board of directors of Spanish industrial conglomerate Inveravante (IV) were set to have a meeting to examine the situation regarding an investment IV had made in Venezuelan oil company Vetra, and to consider possible ways to divest said company. As managing director of Avantegenera, one of the business units of IV, Luis García was appointed to present realistic options for divesting Vetra to the board of directors of IV, offering a valuation of Vetra and recommendations for the future. He knew that the members of the board believed that it was time for a change and to finally make some profit from the investment in Vetra. Since the proposal to invest in Vetra had been made to the board by Mr. García some years earlier, he was very keen to bring the venture to a successful completion.

The CIO of Fintech, Inc. -a billing-and-payment processing service for the alcoholic beverages industry must choose a cloud services provider for a new application for Fintech's clients. The CIO sees this initiative as a useful first step to take before moving other resources and services into the cloud. His staff briefs him on three providers: Amazon, Google, and Microsoft. Each provider offers services which fit Fintech's requirements, yet with important differences. The Fintech case addresses the perspective of a company purchasing cloud computing services, as opposed to a vendor selling cloud computing services. It offers the added benefit of describing an important specialist intermediary in the highly regulated and complex US alcoholic beverages industry. The case has been tested in MIS and IT Management classes in undergraduate, MBA, MS-IT and DBA programs. It introduces cloud concepts (SaaS, IaaS, PaaS), and provides an opportunity for students to consider technical, economic, operational and strategic factors when making mission-critical IT decisions such as moving an important application to the cloud. Students can also consider how to mitigate risks associated with particular providers. The instructor can use it to introduce students to pilot testing and issues in vendor selection and ongoing management. After considering strengths and weaknesses of each provider and the provider selection process, the instructor can ask students to recommend a provider and/or other steps Kwo should take before making a final decision.

In the fall of 2016, with the January 2017 deadline to file bills fast approaching, State Senator Jason Lewis was contemplating the details of a sugary drink legislative proposal in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Senator Lewis had a particular interest in legislative efforts to contain healthcare costs and prevent chronic disease through prevention and wellness approaches. He was particularly concerned about the rising levels of sugary drink consumption and associated conditions of obesity, diabetes, and dental caries, considering such drinks "a uniquely toxic food." As an experienced legislator he knew he was facing a tough battle and wanted to take an approach that would give the bill the best chance of succeeding. Senator Lewis explained, "Massachusetts should be leading the legislative effort to reduce sugary drink consumption in the Northeast. Significant opposition from the beverage industry is expected, but we have a real chance of making progress at the local and state levels."

By 2017, pervasive mobile connectivity and the rise of the on-demand economy resulted in an explosion of businesses attempting to fulfill immediate consumer demand in the food delivery market. A broad, secular shift was occurring: Online or mobile orders were rapidly replacing the traditional method of picking up the phone to call in takeout and delivery orders. Still, concerns began to arise as market participants struggled to raise funding amid an uncertain investing climate in 2016. Meanwhile, despite rapid consolidation amongst industry players, the market remained highly competitive with up to a half-dozen players vying for customer attention in some locations. In addition, the arrival of logistics platforms, Uber and Amazon, into the food delivery space posed a serious competitive threat, while companies in segments not in direct competition, such as local delivery platform Postmates, continued to chip away at market share. As a result, questions arose regarding the long-term profitability of food delivery businesses. Specifically, observers wondered whether the businesses could make money, who was best positioned in the marketplace, and what aspects of each business model would prove to be an essential competitive edge. This case examines the challenges facing the on-demand food delivery market. It provides a brief history of food delivery, an industry overview, a summary of predominant food delivery models and predominant U.S. food delivery companies, an in-depth look at industry trends, and a brief view toward the future of online food delivery.

In early 2017, camera manufacturer GoPro stunned investors by reporting its first recorded annual profit loss and a revenue forecast that sharply missed analyst estimates. What had once been widely heralded as one of the biggest initial public offerings of 2014, tripling in price in just over three months following the June IPO, the stock had tumbled 90.7 percent by the end of 2016. A series of camera pricing mistakes, altered product release schedules, and lower marketing spend, set against a backdrop of relative market saturation, negatively impacted demand for GoPro cameras. In fiscal year 2016 alone, units shipped and revenues both declined by nearly 30 percent, a remarkable reversal from the early days, when revenues more than doubled each year following the company's 2004 launch. While sales of GoPro cameras declined, its brand remained one of the most revered in the world. As a result, Tony Bates, director and former president of GoPro, mulled over ideas for leveraging the brand beyond the camera. For Bates, this meant potentially launching a new product using the existing GoPro brand in a different category. While it seemed easy enough, GoPro had to consider where to extend the business in a way that made sense for the company's core demographic. GoPro also had to determine whether to license the brand to others or partner with another company. Given the consumer-centric roots of the company and the evolution of the brand, there was a lot to consider. This case examines the challenges facing GoPro in the face of falling sales, and how best to leverage its increasingly popular brand. It provides a brief background of the company, the evolution of the brand, a description of early attempts to grow the brand, models for licensing the brand, how best to implement a licensing model, the need to protect the brand, as well as two case studies using Red Bull and Virgin Group as examples of successful brand extensions.

In 2006, Sophia Tannis, a 36-year-old professional with the U.S.-based multinational company CPA Solutions (CPA), who had worked internationally for many years, was asked by an influential leader at corporate headquarters in the United States to inject herself into a business-critical situation in Moscow. An established local competitor had been using various methods to damage CPA's reputation in Moscow, and Tannis had to decide between employing the usual approaches expected by her leaders-involving the courts, media, and outreach to customers-or taking a more informal, relationship-based approach, as her Moscow-based counterpart encouraged. Tannis had to make a choice that could impact the company's credibility, and she had to choose between strategies that were successful in North America and Europe and those proposed by her local advisors.

The Hershey Company has just received a purchase offer from Mondelez, another confectionery company, and students are thrust into the role of Layla Dylan, one of Hershey's board members. The Hershey Company has an unusual ownership structure, in which the Hershey Trust Company controls 9% of the shares and 80% of the voting rights. The Hershey Trust Company is charged with providing for the Milton Hershey School, a responsibility which can be interpreted as ensuring for the richness of the entire community of Hershey, PA. While the purchase offer for the Hershey Company makes business sense, it may interfere with the charter of the Hershey Trust Company. As a board member of both the Hershey Company and the Hershey Trust Company, Dylan must balance the two organizations' goals as she makes her decision.

In 2009 Mark Weick, Director of Sustainability at The Dow Chemical Company, faced a difficult decision. Dow had spent three years working steadily toward meeting its 2015 sustainability goals, but the recent acquisition of Rohm & Haas threatened to change all that. The ongoing 2009 global recession had diminished the capital resources Dow could use to improve sustainability. The acquisition increased the size of Dow and meant that the already diminished capital would need to be stretched further and that Dow would need to improve sustainability more than anticipated. Could Dow achieve its 2015 sustainability goal of improving energy intensity by 25% over 2006? Weick had an important decision to make. Should he adjust the 2015 energy intensity target, potentially weakening Dow's reputation as a leader in sustainable chemistry? Or should Dow aim to meet the 2015 goals, knowing that failure to do so could damage its reputation?

In February 2008, as world markets slid deeper into economic decline, J. Michael Pearson joined Valeant Pharmaceuticals, a specialty pharmaceuticals company, then based in a quiet suburb of southern California. By August 2015, the stock price peaked, valuing the company at nearly $90 billion, up from $2 billion in 2008. In that time, Valeant had made over 100 acquisitions with total revenues growing from roughly $750 million in 2008 to over $10 billion in 2015. The explosive growth of Valeant in just seven-and-a-half years was not without purpose.

Online stores sell thousands of products and services. Despite all care, mistakes can get made. These mistakes can have severe implications for the seller. A contract once formed is normally binding on the parties. The seller gets bound to sell at the mistaken price. Can an online seller get out of the contract on the ground that the price was a mistake? The only court judgement on the theme is Chwee Kin Keong v. Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd, a judgement of the Singapore High Court. With reference to the judgement, the case explores pricing mistakes by online stores.

Vishant Patel, the founder of Patidar Exports Private Limited (PEPL), an export firm for cotton and other products in Ahmedabad in January 2017, was thinking whether to export cotton to Indonesia or not. He exported cotton to countries like China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam, but not sure about Indonesia because of the strict regulation of the buyers in the country. Indonesia was the sixth largest importer of cotton in the world. Exporting to Indonesia could create a new market for Patel while meeting the standard requirements would increase the cost of his cotton. He was not confident whether Indonesian buyer would like to purchase Indian cotton at a higher cost when they had options like American and Australian sellers available.