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As a Lebanese non-governmental organization, Arcenciel (AeC) had successfully created several sustainable development programs and projects that addressed the needs of marginalized populations in Lebanon's society. At the same time, AeC based its activities on an economic strategy that guaranteed financial independence from donations and public funding. This social entrepreneur had been able to develop and adjust its strategy in a very challenging environment over the course of several decades, successfully bridging the gap between non-profit objectives and the necessity to be financially profitable. In December 2015, the organization was about to win a prestigious national peace award in recognition of its research and activities. Government institutions, municipalities, and individuals alike had recently sought AeC's assistance in dealing with a waste-management crisis. Although this project represented a useful opportunity for AeC to communicate its vision, the co-founder wondered whether the organization was prepared to assume a larger role in Lebanon or, even further, to introduce its concept abroad. He needed to think carefully about AeC's evolution as well as its past success factors and the possibilities for expansion.

Silver Spark Apparel Ltd. (SSAL), established in 2004 near Bangalore, India, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Raymond Ltd. The plant had significant expertise in the manufacturing of jackets. SSAL faced a significant challenge when it came to the attraction and retention of workers, with the predominantly female workers often citing family issues as a reason for quitting. In order to combat attrition, SSAL's head of human resources had initiated various employee engagement initiatives that had helped the company reach fourth place in manufacturing and production among "India's Best Companies to Work For, 2014." Nevertheless, the high rate of attrition had not been stemmed, and the data for the first quarter of 2015 was alarming.

In late 2011, Jerry Bertram, vice president and general manager of the fire retardant additives business of Huber Engineered Materials (HEM), a division of family-owned J. M. Huber Corporation, was preparing to present the potential acquisition of the precipitated alumina trihydrate (PATH) business to the environment, health, and safety committee of Huber's corporate board. He had convinced HEM's leadership of PATH's strategic value to their business and the urgency of the acquisition based on PATH's parent company's movement into Chapter 11 bankruptcy and its plans to close the PATH plant. Winning board approval posed a major challenge. It was unclear whether the plant would remain operational, because HEM would have to enter a shared-services arrangement with PATH's parent company, which continued to use the site. In addition, acquiring PATH would mean integrating its specialized, unionized labor force into Huber, which had very few union workers. Finally, early due diligence had revealed tens of millions of dollars of potential environmental risk on the site. The last issue was particularly critical, given Huber's generations-long history of respect for the environment, and its executives' and directors' reluctance to take on any business with excessive environmental risk. This case illustrates in depth the family business values that can promote consideration of an ostensibly unconventional and risky strategic move, and enable executives to push for approval of the same, as backed by comprehensive risk assessment and mitigation plans.

This case, set in the 1920s and 1930s, discusses Harvard Business School (HBS) Professors Elton Mayo and Fritz Roethlisberger and their contributions to management research at the School and the rise of the Human Relations Movement in management research. The case focuses on an overview of their research program at the Western Electric Hawthorne Works manufacturing plant between 1927 and 1932, known as the Hawthorne studies, and the resulting insights, publications, course development, and influence on colleagues and research methodology. Brief biographical details of Mayo and Roethlisberger are given, along with a synopsis of early research at HBS and the general history of management studies during the mid-20th century.

In 2017, executives at OpenNotes, a national movement to improve the relationship between doctors and patients by sharing doctors' visit notes about patients with patients, were considering options in efforts to achieve scale. The movement hoped to reach 50 million patients by 2020. One opportunity was building an OpenNotes app for smartphones, in which patients could access their visit notes on their phones through an app compatible with Apple CareKit. But OpenNotes had other options, including partnerships with consumer groups and insurers. In addition, they would always have a role in encouraging doctors and institutions to share notes more readily. What was the best way to scale OpenNotes? Was it the app route, or some other way to pursue the group's ambitions?

Founded in 2008, Floodgate pioneered the "micro-VC" category, a new type of investment firm that raised smaller funds and made earlier, smaller investments in technology startups than traditional venture-capital firms. By 2015, Floodgate had raised three funds totaling $225 million and achieved outsize success with investments in high profile startups like Twitter, Twitch, Cruise Automation, and Lyft. Floodgate measured success in terms of its coverage of the top 10-15 exits in any given year. These "Thunder Lizards," which had the potential to change the business landscape and grow to Godzilla-like scale, accounted for 97% of returns. With increasing competition from micro-VCs and alternatives like crowdfunding, opportunity funds, and incubators, partners Ann Miura-Ko and Mike Maples wondered how Floodgate could continue to compete successfully in a rapidly changing venture-capital landscape. Should Floodgate stay with the micro-VC model it helped invent, or raise more capital, leveraging its successful track record to make investments at the scale of more traditional VC firms? In selecting a path, they needed to consider Floodgate's dual responsibility to entrepreneurs and LPs.

In the summer of 2016, the general manager of IXSIR Winery of Lebanon (IXSIR)-a young winery in Lebanon that offered customers a new level of quality by producing wine from a mixture of grapes harvested from different terroirs-received news of a bomb striking Beirut. IXSIR had been facing challenges competing in the unstable and risky local market, and the general manager realized that the bombing signalled rougher economic times ahead and likely a decrease in wine consumption. He was concerned about how the political unrest in the country could negatively impact wine sales and started thinking about different ways to tackle the threat of an ongoing economic downturn. He also wondered how to mitigate a potential decrease in revenue. Should IXSIR pursue revenue-generating activities such as oenotourism or diversify into different products?

In 2012, after the U.S. government passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, the founder of Hudson Integrated, a website development company, decided to launch StartupValley, an equity crowdfunding company focused on the Title III provisions of the JOBS Act. These provisions allowed companies to solicit equity investments directly from small investors by using an intermediary registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, consisting of either a broker-dealer or an approved funding portal. However, three years passed before all Title III regulations were finalized, and more than six months later, they came into effect. During that time, the market became crowded with both start-ups and established companies. In 2016, when the Title III provisions finally went into effect, the entrepreneur faced two key challenges. How should he position StartupValley for success in this new industry? And how should he balance his own time and resources between his existing web development business and the new venture?

Midea Group Co., Ltd. was a white goods empire built by its Chinese founder over several decades; consequently, the Midea brand led the home appliance industry in China. In August 2012, the 70-year-old founder and chairman retired as board chairman. The founder's chosen successor was a 45-year-old professional manager and the former chairman and chief executive officer of one of Midea Group's firms. This manager faced a grim situation as he took over the position: business performance was plummeting, Midea Group was urgently in need of a strategic transformation, senior management would likely resist taking orders from him, and, at a basic level, the organization was overstaffed and ineffective. In addition, many senior managers felt that the founder's son would have been a better choice as successor to his father, following Chinese cultural traditions. The manager knew that changes would be necessary to help Midea Group thrive, but such changes were complicated by complex organizational structures and the countless subcultures caused by Midea Group's former growth-oriented focus. How could the company successfully navigate this succession process?

Founded by an entrepreneur in 2007, Hillberg & Berk was a successful Canadian company in the affordable designer jewellery industry. After being funded through the Dragons' Den television show in 2009, the entrepreneur and her team grew the company to achieving more than $10 million in annual sales. The company had focused its growth in its home province of Saskatchewan and into the neighbouring province of Alberta, but in late 2016, it faced a turning point. The entrepreneur wanted to capitalize on the success of the company's signature Sparkle Collection and grow its other product lines by building customer loyalty. As Hillberg & Berk was no longer a small company and not yet a large company, the entrepreneur knew that how she managed her company's strategy would have significant implications for its ability to maintain sustainable growth.

Ramco Systems Limited (Ramco) was a leading information technology (IT) product company and a pioneer in India, where the majority of IT companies were focused on services. It created three world-class products that drove its growth: a cloud-based enterprise resource planning system, a human capital management system, and aviation software. In 2016, the company was enjoying impressive growth, making profits, and acquiring new clients from around the world. At this point, the chief executive officer had to decide how to balance more rapid innovation with product stabilization. He needed to build structures, processes, and a corporate culture that would enable Ramco to continue to grow. At the same time, he needed to consider the ways new technologies were changing clients' requirements for newer product features-such as the use of mobility or cloud computing. Should the company adopt a mobile-only or mobile-also strategy? Should it incorporate features from social-media platforms as product features? Should it provide its products via software installed at clients' premises, or should products be available on the cloud, via software-as-a-service (SaaS) subscriptions?

In 2013, Brett Peiser, CEO of the charter school management organization (CMO) Uncommon Schools, is reassessing the non-profit's strategy. For nearly 10 years, Uncommon had fulfilled its mission to bring high-quality education to students in low-income, urban areas using a "network of networks" structure, where regional networks of charter schools operated independently, guided by Uncommon's shared beliefs and practices. The autonomy built into the structure had allowed teachers and school leaders to develop innovative and effective practices that could then be rolled out throughout the network. But in the 2012-2013 school year, this strategy comes into question when students take the first standardized test aligned with the more rigorous Common Core State Standards. While the test results show that, on average, Uncommon's students still perform well compared to their district peers, they also reveal a disparity in achievement across the schools and regions. The case gives students the opportunity to assess the benefits and challenges of Uncommon's strategy so far, determine the best way to address the inconsistency in academic achievement, and consider the best way to consistently scale excellence.

This case examines the career of the Russian business oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Berezovsky was one of a small group of business tycoons that became fabulously rich after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the new Russian government, advised by prominent Harvard economists, privatized state assets. The case provides an opportunity to explore how this happened, and what its impact was both at the time and for the subsequent development of capitalism in Russia. Berevosky's business empire suffered a major reversal after the appointment of Russian President of Vladimir Putin in 2000. Berevosky's opposition to Putin's plans to restore the authority of the Russian state led to his exile in Britain, where he reinvented himself as an opponent of authoritarianism.

Cantel Medical Corporation provided infection prevention and control products and services for patients, caregivers, and other healthcare providers. In 2016, Cantel generated sales of $665 million and net profits of $60 million, double the levels of five years earlier. Chief Executive Officer Jørgen B. Hansen, appointed on August 1, 2016, was aiming to double the size of the business again. Cantel operated in three major vertical market segments: endoscopy, water purification and filtration, and healthcare disposables, which together accounted for more than 95% of Cantel's sales. Over 90% of revenues were generated in North America. Hansen was looking to add new verticals to the portfolio, but he also saw opportunities to drive growth in Cantel's core businesses, both at home and internationally. Over two decades, the company had delivered consistent organic growth and integrated over 30 acquisitions, providing total annual returns of 22% to its shareholders, with relatively limited leverage. Hansen was determined to maintain that track record, but the key question was how to achieve this goal. Was there enough growth in Cantel's three key verticals in North America, or would more be needed? If so, which other verticals should Cantel consider? Should the company stick to infection control or add other products to its offering to leverage its customer relationships? How much would a drive into international markets help? And what organization was best suited to Cantel's strategy? It had been run as a holding company in the past. Did that structure still make sense as the company ventured overseas?

PharmAccess is an Amsterdam based NGO working to support the development of the private health care market in Africa. This work is critical as over 50% of care is delivered through the private sector, but well-intentioned efforts to address global health through the public sector have the unintended consequence of crowding-out capital formation in the private sector. PharmaAccess is working to crowd-in funding instead through the development of a three-pronged effort in Kenya. They are working to address supply through efforts to improve the quality of health care facilities through education and through a micro-lending program. At the same time, they are working to address demand through the development of the M-TIBA mobile health wallet. The critical question for this case is whether these efforts, in essence the development of a novel platform simultaneously addressing supply and demand, will be enough to change the dynamics of the private health care market. The case provides a background on private health care in Africa and in Kenya.

In May 2015, the new director at Schneider Electric's plant in Rudrapur, India, faced a challenging situation. The company had an ongoing struggle with quality issues and consistently missed its production targets. From a human relations perspective, employee engagement and morale were low and the shop-floor workers had very little respect for the plant's management team. The new director quickly launched a program of human resource initiatives aimed to turn the plant around, but in the midst of his efforts, a sister plant submitted a high-volume order that seemed well beyond Rudrapur's production capabilities. Against the advice of his superiors, and in the face of some resistance from his staff at the plant, the plant director accepted the order and used an adaptive leadership approach to implement several plant-level changes in the production processes at Rudrapur. While the team had made a lot of progress in improving the overall function of the Rudrapur plant, there was still a long way to go and a huge production hurdle to be crossed. Were the director's interventions likely to succeed? Should he adopt a different approach to meet the challenges?

Impex, a division of the South Indian firm KCM Appliances, dealt with kitchen, household, and home entertainment appliances. KCM's managing director needed to decide on a year-end sales promotion for Impex. One option was direct-response advertising in the Times of India newspaper, which could potentially help Impex expand its reach in India. This option was in contrast to the previous year's promotion, which involved collaboration with distributors and retailers in the Kerala region of South India. Deciding between the two options required a quantitative analysis to estimate the incremental volume and sales revenue gained from the previous year's promotion. Those gains could then be compared with the break-even volumes required to cover the costs of the promotion with the Times of India. Impex also needed to consider a qualitative analysis by examining the tensions created by the two options, including channel relations versus brand awareness, an existing market focus versus a future market focus, and product management versus sales management. Should Impex repeat the previous year's tried-and-tested promotion, or pursue the Times of India offer, whereby it could sidestep its local channel partners and directly sell to consumers?

In 2015, the Indian retail industry contributed around 10 per cent to India's gross domestic product, and online retail had a growth rate of 85 per cent. In the same year, food and grocery made up 60 per cent of the Indian retail market, and the online grocery segment was estimated at US$600,000. To capture its share of this market, Amazon India launched its own online grocery arm, KiranaNow, with a marketplace model. As it set out to carve out a space for itself in the online grocery market, KiranaNow faced challenges related to merchandising, managing human resources, customer perceptions, and technology hurdles, including the question of whether its chosen business model was sustainable. The company needed to overcome these challenges to find success in the Indian online grocery market.

Sumitomo-Mitsui Bank (the Bank) was found not to have breached its duty of explanation when an interest-rate swap agreement had been executed between the Bank and a customer (the Company), under which fixed and floating interest rates would be swapped and the resulting difference settled. The Company had borrowed substantially at floating-rate interest and wanted to hedge against the risk associated with rising interest rates. During the period from June 8, 2005 to June 7, 2006, the Company paid ¥8.8 million in total to the Bank as the difference between the fixed interest rate and the floating interest rate, and penalty interest payments due to delay. The Company then sued the Bank and asserted that it had breached its duty of explanation, abused its superior bargaining position, and inappropriately and unfairly solicited this agreement with the Bank. The Company had a basic question as to whether this swap was for hedging or speculation, and claimed that the Bank had not fully explained the product and the risk involved. A full economic analysis of this derivative for this case study was included so that it can be employed to assess the court decision.

Canadian Arrow Mines Limited (CRO) had a promising nickel property, the Kenbridge deposit, located 70 kilometres southeast of Kenora, Ontario. The spot had been the site of significant exploration in the past. Further exploration by CRO had indicated that it could be profitable. CRO had spent close to CA$10 million on redevelopment, and needed a further $3 million for the final feasibility study before going into full operation. In 2007, nickel hit a high of $27 per pound, but by 2009, prices had dipped to under $8 per pound, which severely curtailed the firm's ability to raise the final $3 million. CRO turned its attention to other projects to raise money in the hope of a recovery, but the trend had been negative until mid-2016. To save the property, CRO had laid off all of its employees and reduced expenses to the minimum required. With a small recovery evident, CRO management wondered if CRO should hang on further and wait for nickel prices to rise enough to support the final feasibility study. The team wanted to know what nickel price was required to run a profitable operation. Were there any indicators about which direction this price would take in the future?